Advanced search options

Advanced Search Options 🞨

Browse by author name (“Author name starts with…”).

Find ETDs with:

in
/  
in
/  
in
/  
in

Written in Published in Earliest date Latest date

Sorted by

Results per page:

Sorted by: relevance · author · university · dateNew search

Dates: Last 2 Years Language: English

You searched for subject:(two sided matching). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

Search Limiters

Last 2 Years | English Only

No search limiters apply to these results.

▼ Search Limiters


University of New South Wales

1. Sun, Zhaohong. Mechanism Design for Matching with Constraints.

Degree: Computer Science & Engineering, 2020, University of New South Wales

In recent years, several new challenges have been observed in the application of matching theory. One important realization is that real-life matching markets are often subject to various constraints. These practical problems impose different forms of constraints on the markets which makes them different from the classical matching model. Consequently, we cannot employ classical mechanisms in these new challenges and a stable outcome, the standard solution in matching theory, is no longer guaranteed to exist. For example, one of the most pressing issues nowadays is how to allocate refugees to hosts in a safe and timely manner. A refugee family could be placed at a host country only if the multi-dimensional requirement of the family is satisfied, which may involve different types of services such as house beds, children’s day care and special medical treatments. Such multi-dimensional constraints makes it different from the traditional two-sided matching model. Another example is the controlled school choice problem that takes account of affirmative action and diversity concerns. In this model, each student is associated with a set of types which capture traits such as being from a disadvantaged group or being extra-talented. Schools impose quotas on each distinct type that need to be taken into account while deciding the outcome.The main objective of this research is to design efficient algorithms for these new emerging problems that satisfy desirable properties while taking agents' preferences into account. For instance, a refugee family may prefer to thrive in a country where they have a community or they can support themselves, and the host country may prefer migrants who can speak the same language. However, the current placement of refugees resettlement is implemented in an ad hoc manner in which the preferences of both refugees and hosts are not taken into account. Given the number of agents that participate in the market is huge, we also consider the computational efficiency to be of central importance. We are interested in designing algorithms that yield reasonable outcomes efficiently. If an algorithm could not be implemented in polynomial time, then it is not regarded as a suitable solution. Advisors/Committee Members: Aziz, Haris, Computer Science & Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, UNSW, Serge, Gaspers, Computer Science & Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, UNSW, Toby, Walsh, Computer Science & Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, UNSW.

Subjects/Keywords: School Choice; Mechansim Design; Two-sided Matching; Regional Quotas; Refugee Resettlement

Record DetailsSimilar RecordsGoogle PlusoneFacebookTwitterCiteULikeMendeleyreddit

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Sun, Z. (2020). Mechanism Design for Matching with Constraints. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of New South Wales. Retrieved from http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/70132 ; https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:71986/SOURCE02?view=true

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Sun, Zhaohong. “Mechanism Design for Matching with Constraints.” 2020. Doctoral Dissertation, University of New South Wales. Accessed October 31, 2020. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/70132 ; https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:71986/SOURCE02?view=true.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Sun, Zhaohong. “Mechanism Design for Matching with Constraints.” 2020. Web. 31 Oct 2020.

Vancouver:

Sun Z. Mechanism Design for Matching with Constraints. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of New South Wales; 2020. [cited 2020 Oct 31]. Available from: http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/70132 ; https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:71986/SOURCE02?view=true.

Council of Science Editors:

Sun Z. Mechanism Design for Matching with Constraints. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of New South Wales; 2020. Available from: http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/70132 ; https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:71986/SOURCE02?view=true


Erasmus University Rotterdam

2. Xia, Shuo. Essays on Markets for CEOs and Financial Analysts: Essays on markets voor CEO’s en financiële analisten.

Degree: 2018, Erasmus University Rotterdam

markdownabstractThis thesis contains three essays study markets for two types of agents in the financial market, CEOs and financial analysts. The first essay focuses on a particular kind of CEO succession that involving a lame duck CEO. We evaluate the firm's performance around the succession period and provide possible explanations for the observed performance pattern. The second essay tries to understand the positive correlation between new CEOs' incentive pay and firms' performance change. More specifically, it distinguishes (i) the selection effect that better CEOs are matched with firms provide higher incentive pay and (ii) the incentive effect that CEOs receive higher incentive pay are better motivated. The third essay investigates the positive impact of brokerage houses’ reputation on financial analysts' forecasting accuracy. By using a matching model and a Markov Chain Monte Carlo method, it distinguishes the relative importance of (i) the influence effect that more reputable brokerage houses provide more resources to help their analysts make better forecasts and (ii) the selection effect that more reputable brokerage houses attract better analysts.

Subjects/Keywords: CEOs; analysts; two-sided matching; selection

Record DetailsSimilar RecordsGoogle PlusoneFacebookTwitterCiteULikeMendeleyreddit

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Xia, S. (2018). Essays on Markets for CEOs and Financial Analysts: Essays on markets voor CEO’s en financiële analisten. (Doctoral Dissertation). Erasmus University Rotterdam. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/113275

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Xia, Shuo. “Essays on Markets for CEOs and Financial Analysts: Essays on markets voor CEO’s en financiële analisten.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Accessed October 31, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/1765/113275.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Xia, Shuo. “Essays on Markets for CEOs and Financial Analysts: Essays on markets voor CEO’s en financiële analisten.” 2018. Web. 31 Oct 2020.

Vancouver:

Xia S. Essays on Markets for CEOs and Financial Analysts: Essays on markets voor CEO’s en financiële analisten. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Erasmus University Rotterdam; 2018. [cited 2020 Oct 31]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/113275.

Council of Science Editors:

Xia S. Essays on Markets for CEOs and Financial Analysts: Essays on markets voor CEO’s en financiële analisten. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Erasmus University Rotterdam; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/113275

.