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Duke University

1. Zhou, Bo. Family Plans: Market Segmentation with Nonlinear Pricing .

Degree: 2014, Duke University

In the telecommunications market, firms often give consumers the option of purchasing an individual plan or a family plan. An individual plan gives a certain allowance of usage (e.g., minutes, data) for a single consumer, whereas a family plan allows multiple consumers to share a specific level of usage. The theoretical challenge is to understand how the firm stands to benefit from allowing family plans. In this paper, we use a game-theoretic framework to explore the role of family plans. An obvious way that family plans can be profitable is if it draws in very low-valuation consumers whom the firm would choose not to serve in the absence of a family plan. Interestingly, we find that even when a family plan does not draw any new consumers into the market, a firm can still benefit from offering it. This finding occurs primarily because of the strategic impact of the family plan on the firm's entire product line. By allowing high- and low-valuation consumers to share joint allowance in the family plan, the firm is able to raise the price to extract more surplus from the individual high-valuation consumers by reducing the cannibalization problem. Furthermore, a family obtains a higher allowance compared to the purchase of several individual plans and therefore contributes more profits to the firm. We also observe different types of quantity discounts in the firm's product line. Finally, we identify conditions under which the firm offers a pay-as-you-go plan. Advisors/Committee Members: Desai, Preyas (advisor), Purohit, Debu (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Marketing; Family Plan; Nonlinear Pricing; Segmentation; Three-part Tariff

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APA (6th Edition):

Zhou, B. (2014). Family Plans: Market Segmentation with Nonlinear Pricing . (Thesis). Duke University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10161/8719

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Zhou, Bo. “Family Plans: Market Segmentation with Nonlinear Pricing .” 2014. Thesis, Duke University. Accessed October 31, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10161/8719.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Zhou, Bo. “Family Plans: Market Segmentation with Nonlinear Pricing .” 2014. Web. 31 Oct 2020.

Vancouver:

Zhou B. Family Plans: Market Segmentation with Nonlinear Pricing . [Internet] [Thesis]. Duke University; 2014. [cited 2020 Oct 31]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/8719.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Zhou B. Family Plans: Market Segmentation with Nonlinear Pricing . [Thesis]. Duke University; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/8719

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation


University of Southern California

2. Chao, Yong. Essays on bundling and discounts.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2010, University of Southern California

This dissertation studies a variety of bundling and discount strategies adopted by dominant firms, analyze their corresponding competitive effects in the upstream-and-downstream context, as well as in two-sided markets; and discuss their implications for regulation and antitrust law enforcement.; The first essay investigates strategic effects of three-part tariffs in a sequential-move game and offers an equilibrium theory of three-part tariffs in a competitive context. I show that, compared with linear pricing equilibrium and two-part tariff equilibrium, a three-part tariff always strictly increases the dominant firm's (the leader's) profit when competing against a rival (the follower) with substitute products, in the absence of usual price discrimination motive. The competitive effect of a three-part tariff in contrast to linear pricing depends on the degree of substitutability between products: Competition is intensified when two products are more differentiated, yet softened when two products are more substitutable. This is in stark contrast with the competitive scenario posed by a two-part tariff: A two-part tariff always enhances competition and gives the highest total surplus of these three pricing schemes. My findings offer a new perspective on three-part tariffs, a perspective which could help antitrust enforcement agencies distinguish the exclusionary three-part tariff from the pro-competitive one.; The second essay extends the traditional literature on bundling and the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets by presenting a theoretical monopoly model of mixed bundling in the context of the portable video game console market – a prototypical two-sided market. Deviating from both traditional bundling literature and standard two-sided markets literature, we find that, under mixed bundling, both the standalone console price on the consumer side and the royalty rate on the game developer side are lower than their counterparts under independent pricing equilibrium. In our setting, mixed bundling acts as a price discrimination tool segmenting the market more efficiently as well as functions as a coordination device helping solve "the chicken or the egg" problem in two-sided markets. We further test the model predictions with new data from the portable video game console market, and find empirical support for all theoretical predictions. Advisors/Committee Members: Tan, Guofu (Committee Chair), Carrillo, Juan D. (Committee Member), Cheng, Harrison (Committee Member), Dukes, Anthony J. (Committee Member), Wilkie, Simon J. (Committee Member).

Subjects/Keywords: bundling; discounts; price discrimination; three-part tariff; oligopoly; two-sided markets; video game industry; antitrust

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Chao, Y. (2010). Essays on bundling and discounts. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/343518/rec/2442

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Chao, Yong. “Essays on bundling and discounts.” 2010. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. Accessed October 31, 2020. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/343518/rec/2442.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Chao, Yong. “Essays on bundling and discounts.” 2010. Web. 31 Oct 2020.

Vancouver:

Chao Y. Essays on bundling and discounts. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2010. [cited 2020 Oct 31]. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/343518/rec/2442.

Council of Science Editors:

Chao Y. Essays on bundling and discounts. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2010. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/343518/rec/2442

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