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You searched for subject:(three dimensionalism ). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

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University of St. Andrews

1. Porro, Laura Cecilia. Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what .

Degree: 2013, University of St. Andrews

In this thesis I focus on dismissivism in metaphysics. Some philosophers argue that at least some metaphysical disputes are not substantial, and as a consequence should be dismissed. In this work I restrict my attention to metaphysics and focus on debates about existence and grounding. In particular I am interested in finding out whether there is a difference between the possible options available for dismissing debates about what there is and the possible options available for dismissing debates about what grounds what. I will delve into this in two different steps. First of all I explore the possibility to dismiss debates about what there is, and as a case study I analyse the debate between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism. Secondly I delve into whether it is possible to dismiss debates about what grounds what, thanks to the discussion of another case study, i.e. the debate between tropes ontologies and universals ontologies. It is worth exploring the nature of dismissivism, because it bears on the future of philosophy. If philosophy has to have a future, we have to make sure that at least some disagreements within it are substantial. My conclusions will be that metaphysical debates about what there is can be dismissed for a variety of reasons (semantic, epistemic, ...). I also argue there is no general formula to find out whether a specific debate should be dismissed. On the other hand I argue that debates about what grounds what should be dismissed. I offer two distinct arguments in favour of my claim. Firstly, I argue that disputants are having a verbal dispute when they talk about what grounds what, and thus their disagreement is non genuine. Secondly, I argue that the notion of grounding is underspecified, because it cannot be properly distinguished from causation. Advisors/Committee Members: Hawley, Katherine (Katherine Jane) (advisor), Brown, Jessica (Jessica Anne) (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Dismissivism; Metaphysics; Metametaphysics; Tropes; Universals; Grounding; Three-dimensionalism; Four-dimensionalism; Parsimony; Existence

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Porro, L. C. (2013). Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what . (Thesis). University of St. Andrews. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10023/4108

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Porro, Laura Cecilia. “Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what .” 2013. Thesis, University of St. Andrews. Accessed January 24, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/4108.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Porro, Laura Cecilia. “Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what .” 2013. Web. 24 Jan 2020.

Vancouver:

Porro LC. Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what . [Internet] [Thesis]. University of St. Andrews; 2013. [cited 2020 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/4108.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Porro LC. Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what . [Thesis]. University of St. Andrews; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/4108

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation


University of Lund

2. Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias. Objects in Time : Studies of Persistence in B-time.

Degree: 2009, University of Lund

This thesis is about the conceptualization of persistence of physical, middle-sized objects within the theoretical framework of the revisionary ‘B-theory’ of time. According to the B-theory, time does not flow, but is an extended and inherently directed fourth dimension along which the history of the universe is ‘laid out’ once and for all. It is a widespread view among philosophers that if we accept the B-theory, the commonsensical ‘endurance theory’ of persistence will have to be rejected. The endurance theory says that objects persist through time by being wholly present at distinct times as numerically the same entity. Instead of endurantism, it has been argued, we have to adopt either ‘perdurantism’ or the ‘stage theory’. Perdurantism is the theory that objects are four-dimensional ‘space-time worms’ persisting through time by having distinct temporal parts at distinct times. The stage theory says that objects are instantaneous temporal parts (stages) of space-time worms, persisting by having distinct temporal counterparts at distinct times. In the thesis, it is argued that no good arguments have been provided for the conclusion that we are obliged to drop the endurance theory by acceptance of the B-theory. This conclusion stands even if the endurance theory incorporates the claim that objects endure through intrinsic change. It is also shown that perdurantism and the stage theory come with unwelcome consequences. Paper I demonstrates that the main arguments for the view that objects cannot endure in B-time intrinsically unchanged fail. Papers II and III do the same with respect to the traditional arguments against endurance through intrinsic change in B-time. Paper III also contains a detailed account of the semantics of the tenseless copula, which occurs frequently in the debate. The contention of Paper IV is that four-dimensional space-time worms, as traditionally understood, are not suited to take dispositional predicates. In Paper V, it is shown that the stage theory needs to introduce an overabundance of persistence-concepts, many of which will have to be simultaneously applicable to a single object (qua falling under a single sortal), in order for the theory to be consistent. The final article, Paper VI, investigates the sense in which persistence can, as is sometimes suggested, be a ‘conventional matter’. It also asks whether alleged cases of ‘conventional persistence’ create trouble for the endurance theory. It is argued that conventions can only enter at a trivial semantic level, and that the endurance theory is no more threatened by such conventions than are its rivals.

Subjects/Keywords: Philosophy; B-time; three-dimensionalism.; stage theory; tenselessness; persistence; perdurance; mereology; four-dimensionalism; dispositions; endurance; B-theory of time; change; temporary intrinsics

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Hansson Wahlberg, T. (2009). Objects in Time : Studies of Persistence in B-time. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Lund. Retrieved from https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1503766 ; https://portal.research.lu.se/ws/files/5812281/1586252.pdf

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias. “Objects in Time : Studies of Persistence in B-time.” 2009. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Lund. Accessed January 24, 2020. https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1503766 ; https://portal.research.lu.se/ws/files/5812281/1586252.pdf.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias. “Objects in Time : Studies of Persistence in B-time.” 2009. Web. 24 Jan 2020.

Vancouver:

Hansson Wahlberg T. Objects in Time : Studies of Persistence in B-time. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Lund; 2009. [cited 2020 Jan 24]. Available from: https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1503766 ; https://portal.research.lu.se/ws/files/5812281/1586252.pdf.

Council of Science Editors:

Hansson Wahlberg T. Objects in Time : Studies of Persistence in B-time. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Lund; 2009. Available from: https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1503766 ; https://portal.research.lu.se/ws/files/5812281/1586252.pdf

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