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You searched for subject:(single price auction). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

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Penn State University

1. Izmalkov, Serguei. Essays on Auctions and Efficiency.

Degree: 2008, Penn State University

Auctions are among the oldest economic institutions in place – they have been used since antiquity to sell a wide variety of goods, and their basic form has remained unchanged. In this dissertation, I explore the efficiency of common auctions when values are interdependent – the value to a particular bidder may depend on information available only to others – and asymmetric. In this setting, it is well known that sealed-bid auctions do not achieve efficient allocations in general since they do not allow the information held by different bidders to be shared. Open auctions, however, do allow such sharing of information and form the subject of this thesis. In the first essay, I present a model of the English auction. Typically, in an English auction, say of the kind used to sell art, the auctioneer sets a relatively low initial price. This price is then increased until only one bidder is willing to buy the object, and the exact manner in which this is done varies. In my model a bidder who drops out at some price can ``reenter' at a higher price. This feature is realistic, but previous analyses ruled out the possibility of reentry for analytical convenience. The main result is that the English auction with reentry has an efficient equilibrium under weak conditions, a feature not shared by the standard model without reentry. The required conditions are the pairwise single-crossing property – known to be necessary for efficiency – and a new signal intensity condition. These conditions are much weaker than the conditions under which the standard English auction is efficient. Thus the modification is not only a more realistic model of the real-world auction but has superior theoretical properties. The second essay, written jointly with my colleague, Oleksii Birulin, examines the question of when the standard English auction without reentry has an efficient equilibrium. Maskin (1992) shows that the pairwise single-crossing condition is necessary and sufficient when there are only two bidders. It is known, however, that this condition is not sufficient once there are three or more bidders. We identify a condition that is both necessary and sufficient for efficiency with a general number of bidders. This new condition, called generalized single crossing, is a multilateral version of pairwise single-crossing. In the third essay, I examine some extensions to situations in which multiple identical objects are to be sold. I present an efficient multi-unit auction that consists of a number of sequential English auctions with reentry and show that this allocates efficiently under quite general circumstances. In each of the individual auctions all bidders compete simultaneously in the open ascending price format. The distinctive feature of the mechanism is that winners are determined first, and then additional auctions are conducted to determine prices. Total number of auctions depends only on the number of goods to be allocated and not on the number of bidders. Advisors/Committee Members: Anthony Mark Kwasnica, Committee Member, Kalyan Chatterjee, Committee Member, James Schuyler Jordan, Committee Member, Tomas Sjostrom, Committee Member, Vijay Krishna, Committee Chair/Co-Chair.

Subjects/Keywords: English auction; generalized single-crossing; open ascending price auction; auction with reentry; multi-unit auctions; interdependent values; efficient auction

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Izmalkov, S. (2008). Essays on Auctions and Efficiency. (Thesis). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/5975

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Izmalkov, Serguei. “Essays on Auctions and Efficiency.” 2008. Thesis, Penn State University. Accessed October 31, 2020. https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/5975.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Izmalkov, Serguei. “Essays on Auctions and Efficiency.” 2008. Web. 31 Oct 2020.

Vancouver:

Izmalkov S. Essays on Auctions and Efficiency. [Internet] [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2008. [cited 2020 Oct 31]. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/5975.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Izmalkov S. Essays on Auctions and Efficiency. [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2008. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/5975

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation


Texas A&M University

2. Kang, Boo-Sung. Empirical study on the Korean treasury auction focusing on the revenue comparison in multiple versus single price auction.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2006, Texas A&M University

This dissertation pursues to find an answer empirically to the question of the revenue ranking between the multiple price auction and the single price auction. I also attempt to get empirical clues in terms of the efficiency ranking between the two. Under the assumptions of symmetric bidders and private independent value (PIV), I derive the optimal bidding conditions for both auction formats. Following the structural model estimation approach, I estimate the underlying distribution of market clearing price using the nonparametric resampling strategy and recover the bidders’ unknown true valuations corresponding to each observed bid point. With these estimated valuations of the bidders, I calculate what the upper bound of the revenue would have been under the Vickery auction to perform the counterfactual revenue comparison with the actual revenue. I find that, ex-post, the multiple price auction yields more revenue to the Korean Treasury than the alternative. I also investigate the efficiency ranking by comparing the number of bids switched and the amount of surplus change which would occur when the bidders are assumed to report their true valuations as their bids. I find that the multiple price auction is also superior to the alternative in efficiency which supports the current theoretical prediction. Finally, I investigate the robustness of my model and empirical results by relaxing the previous assumptions. I, first, extend the model and estimation to the case of asymmetric bidders where the bidders are divided into two groups based on their size. It shows that the model and estimation framework are still valid and that the empirical findings are very similar to the symmetric case. I also test for the presence of common value (CV) component in the bidders’ valuation function. I propose the simple regression model adopting the idea of the policy experimental approach. I obtain quite an inconclusive result in general but find some evidence supporting PIV for relatively higher bid prices while supporting CV for lower bid prices. Advisors/Committee Members: Puller, Steven (advisor), Gawande, Kishore (committee member), Li, Qi (committee member), Neilson, William S. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Treasury auction; multiple price auction; single price auction; structural model estimation; revenue comparison; private independent value

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Kang, B. (2006). Empirical study on the Korean treasury auction focusing on the revenue comparison in multiple versus single price auction. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/3051

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Kang, Boo-Sung. “Empirical study on the Korean treasury auction focusing on the revenue comparison in multiple versus single price auction.” 2006. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed October 31, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/3051.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Kang, Boo-Sung. “Empirical study on the Korean treasury auction focusing on the revenue comparison in multiple versus single price auction.” 2006. Web. 31 Oct 2020.

Vancouver:

Kang B. Empirical study on the Korean treasury auction focusing on the revenue comparison in multiple versus single price auction. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2006. [cited 2020 Oct 31]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/3051.

Council of Science Editors:

Kang B. Empirical study on the Korean treasury auction focusing on the revenue comparison in multiple versus single price auction. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2006. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/3051

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