▼ 

Društvene nauke / Pravna teorija

Као доминантан правац проучавања правне појаве, правни позитивизам је трпео критике првенствено од стране представника природноправне школе. Ипак, најсложенија критика правног позитивизма дошла је од стране Роналда Дворкина. Дворкин је за главну мету своје критике одабрао Хартову верзију позитивизма, будући да Хартова теорија и након више од педесет година од како је настала, представља парадигму позитивистичког приступа проучавању права, док се Харт сматра најугледнијим и најутицајнијим представником тог правца. Дворкин је своју критику Хартове верзије позитивизма развијао више од двадесет година, да би на основу те критике коначно поставио сопствену теорију права. Већ сама та чињеница указује на изузетну комплексност Дворкинове критике Хартове верзије позитивизма. Због тога је она у главном делу ове докторске дисертације подељена на два дела: дескриптивну и методолошку критику. У дескриптивној критици која је представљена у Двокиновом првом великом делу под називом „Taking Rights Seriously“ (1977. год.), Дворкин тврди да правни позитивизам описује право узимајући у обзир само правна правила, али не и правне принципе. По Дворкину, утицај правних принципа посебно је видљив у тзв. тешким случајевима који се пресуђују не на основу правних правила, већ на основу правних принципа. Због тога Дворкин износи тврдњу да правни позитивизам није способан да одговори на главни задатак који пред њим стоји – да правилно опише правну праксу. Дворкинова дескриптивна критика поделила је правне позитивисте у два табора – оне који заступају инклузивну и оне који заступају ексклузивну варијанту правног позитивизма. Она представља изузетан допринос у оквиру модерне јуриспруденције пошто су њоме отворена нека од најзначајнијих питања правне теорије и филозофије. Другом врстом критике која је уобличена у „Law’s Empire“ (1986. год.), нападнуте су саме основе правног позитивизма, тј. његове главне методолошке поставке. Позивајући се на први наук позитивизма који право схвата као чињеницу, Дворкин тврди да, ако је то схватање тачно, међу правницима не може бити спорења око права, осим ако неко од њих чини емпиријску грешку приликом утврђивања чињеница. Пошто то није случај, Дворкин доказује да је у питању теоријско неслагање које није неслагање око самог права, већ око његове моралности.

Advisors/Committee Members: Mitrović, Dragan, 1953-.

▼ 

Within legal positivism, the theory which holds that there is no necessary connection between legal validity and morality, there is dissensus about whether there can be a contingent connection. Inclusive legal positivists suggest that it is possible for morality to play a role in determining a norm’s legal validity while exclusive legal positivists argue for the opposite. This dissertation examines this debate between inclusive legal positivism and exclusive legal positivism focusing on how paying attention to all of the fundamental secondary rules in a legal system can affect arguments about the coherence of either theory. The fundamental secondary rules being the rules which identify other rules, identify authority and authorize changes. I will be demonstrating that three exclusive legal positivist arguments against inclusive legal positivism are unconvincing because of the role that fundamental secondary rules play in our legal systems. Shapiro and Raz offer arguments against inclusive legal positivism based on different important features that they believe the law possesses. However, given their commitment to a particular type of fundamental secondary rule, specifically a directed power, exclusive legal positivism is unable to better capture these important features. Himma suggests that inclusive legal positivism cannot explain how a court can have final authority to determine constitutional cases involving moral criteria. Again, however, we examine what fundamental rules an inclusive legal positivist could employ to explain the phenomenon, we find that exclusive legal positivism is in no better position. At the end of the dissertation, I will suggest why I think continuing with these types of arguments will continue to be fruitless and briefly examine how similar inclusive and exclusive legal positivism are through investigating how one might determine whether a given legal system had an inclusive rule of recognition or exclusive one.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Advisors/Committee Members: Waluchow, Wilfrid, Sciaraffa, Stefan, Giudice, Michael, Philosophy.

▼ This thesis challenges some of the current limits to the grounds for judicial review of legislation accepted by most Canadian jurists. More specifically, it makes a common law-based argument in favour of the priority over legislation of principles which are implied from the Imperial Constitution Acts 1867-1982 and which originally derive from the English constitution – namely implied constitutional principles. The argument faces two main interrelated legal objections: Parliamentary sovereignty and the Framers’ intentions. The first objection is rebutted by arguing that Parliamentary sovereignty possesses an ability to change in a way that can incorporate substantive legal limitations. The most prevalent common law-based theories of change to Parliamentary sovereignty suggest that the courts can authoritatively determine if implied constitutional principles can check legislation. The second objection is rebutted by reference to the notion of progressive interpretation as conceived under Hartian and Dworkinian theories of law and adjudication. Under these theories, progressive interpretation is an aspect of the courts’ best overall interpretation of the constitution, which includes implied constitutional principles. Such progressive interpretation can result in these principles constraining legislative authority. Justification of the progressive interpretation of implied constitutional principles can be based on the rule of law from which derive a number of these principles. One plausible conception of the Canadian rule of law is that it rejects the view that implied constitutional principles can prevail when in conflict with legislation. However, the better conception is that, as an attempt to adapt implied constitutional principles to relevant changes in society and to protect their underlying values, the judiciary should interpret these principles as capable of checking legislation to the extent that they form part of the core content of the rule of law. Such a conception and an operation of implied constitutional principles can properly be explained by Hartian or Dworkinian common law-based progressive interpretation of these principles and by their relationship with legislative authority.

▼ 

This dissertation outlines a theory of law capable of explaining both the legal systems of domestic states and other types of legal phenomena different from state law that I will call non-state legal phenomena. Central examples of non-state law include indigenous and customary laws, the international legal order, the European Union, and transnational commercial law. This theoretical framework aims to formulate and resolve questions about the common features shared by different types of legality and the distinctive legal character of non-state legal phenomena. It also sets the stage for doctrinal and politico-moral inquiries about these phenomena. My account draws liberally from central themes of HLA Hart’s theory of state law that I deem applicable outside the domestic context. One key idea is the notion of normative order or unified complexes of interrelated rules that regulate specific domains of action. The refined Hartian view that I develop here distinguishes between two kinds of normative orders, sets and systems, which differ in their characteristic features and that allow for different doctrinal and moral inquiries. While these tools can be used to explain both state and non-state normative phenomena, I shall consider as law the normative orders of political communities, i.e. groups whose participants efficaciously employ intense forms of social pressure to secure conformity to norms that regulate pressing politico-moral issues. With these elements in place, the legal domain can be characterized as a constellation of sets and systems that constitute political communities at the state, non-domestic, international, supra-national, and potentially global levels. The argument proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 sets the stage of this inquiry. Chapter 2 explicates the key insights of the Hartian framework. Chapter 3 defends the applicability of this framework to non-state contexts. Chapter 4 illustrates its explanatory virtues by applying it to two regimes of international trade law. The conclusion summarizes the central insights of this view and highlights the avenues for future research.

Thesis

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This dissertation outlines a theory of law capable of explaining both state and non-state legal phenomena. This theoretical framework aims to formulate and resolve questions about the common features shared by different types of legality and the distinctive legal character of non-state legal phenomena, and to help to set the stage for further inquiries about them. My account draws liberally from HLA Hart’s theory of state law. The argument proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 sets the stage of this inquiry. Chapter 2 explicates the key insights of the Hartian framework. Chapter 3 defends the applicability of this framework to non-state contexts. Chapter 4 illustrates its explanatory virtues by applying it to two regimes of international trade law. The conclusion summarizes the central insights of this view and highlights the avenues for future research.

Advisors/Committee Members: Sciaraffa, Stefan, Philosophy.

▼ 

O objetivo desta pesquisa é apresentar o modelo racional jurídico elaborado por Hart e o modelo racional jurídico elaborado por Dworkin, assim como a crítica realizada por Dworkin em face do Conceito de Direito oferecido por Hart. O positivista, Herbert Hart, propõe que o direito é formado por um sistema de regras primárias e regras secundárias, sendo que uma regra de reconhecimento é responsável por identificar quais regras estão ou não incluídas em tal sistema. Caso seja apresentado um problema que não é resolvido por uma regra reconhecida pelo critério, deverá o julgador apelar para a discricionariedade. Dworkin, em um primeiro momento, criticará o conceito de Hart, alegando que o seu critério de demarcação entre o que é direito e o que não é direito é insatisfatório, por deixar de reconhecer vários elementos como jurídicos, uma vez que a regra de reconhecimento, sendo um teste de pedigree, não à capaz de captar princípios de direito não legislados e direitos e deveres controversos. Ademais, há um erro na teoria positivista de Hart, ao afirmar que os casos não claramente resolvidos por uma regra serão resolvidos a partir da arbitrariedade da autoridade estatal. Posteriormente, Dworkin oferecerá um modelo de direito que dê conta da realidade jurídica, em seu entendimento. Um modelo em que o jurista, a partir do equilíbrio reflexivo e do axioma da equidade poderá deduzir teorias possíveis para responder problemas do direito, identificando, dentre estas teorias, qual é a melhor resposta, sendo portanto a resposta exigível para a solução da lide concreta.

The objective of this research is to present the rational legal model presented by Hart and rational legal model presented by Dworkin as well as criticism made by Dworkin in the face of the Concept of Law offered by Hart. The positivist, Herbert Hart, proposes that the right is formed by a system of primary rules and secondary rules, and a rule of recognition is responsible for identifying what rules are or are not included in this system. If presented with a problem that is not resolved by a rule recognized by the criterion, the judge should resort to discretion. Dworkin, at first, criticize the concept of Hart, claiming that his criterion of demarcation between what is right and what is not right is unsatisfactory, for failing to recognize various elements such as legal, as a rule of recognition , being a test of pedigree, not able to capture the principles of law and not legislated rights and duties controversial. Furthermore, there is an error in the positivist theory of Hart, asserting that the cases do not clearly resolved by a rule will be resolved from the arbitrariness of state authority. Later, Dworkin offer a model law that embraces the legal reality in his mind. A model in which the lawyer from the reflective equilibrium and the axiom of justice may deduct possible theories to address problems of law, identifying, among these theories, what is the best answer, the answer is therefore required for the solution of the dispute concrete.

Advisors/Committee Members: Jose Raimundo Novaes Chiappin, Ana Carolina Corrêa da Costa Leister, Osvaldo Frota Pessoa Junior.

▼ 

En ce début de XXIe siècle, le droit international privé intervient dans un contexte caractérisé à la fois par la multiplication des relations familiales internationales, conséquence de la mobilité croissante des personnes privées, et la montée d’un individualisme qui rechigne toujours davantage à composer avec les contraintes collectives. Ces changements conduisent à une contestation croissante des obstacles à la reconnaissance des situations familiales qui impose de repenser à la fois le cadre théorique et les méthodes de la discipline. Sur le premier plan, il est proposé de consacrer un nouveau principe directeur, l’impératif de reconnaissance des situations familiales, qui reflète à la fois la prédominance effective des intérêts privés et la matérialisation d’une discipline autrefois éprise de justice conflictuelle, et permet d’afficher plus clairement ce qui doit désormais constituer la réaction dominante du for face à une situation familiale constituée à l’étranger. Sur le plan des méthodes, l’enjeu est de traduire le nouvel impératif, ce qui doit consister à libéraliser l’accueil des situations familiales constituées à l’étranger sans aller jusqu’à supprimer tous les chefs de contrôle. Plusieurs voies sont envisageables, qui vont du simple infléchissement des méthodes existantes à la consécration d’une nouvelle méthode de la reconnaissance des situations familiales. Entre ces différentes possibilités, des choix s’imposent qui mêlent technique et politique juridiques, et impliquent de prendre en compte tant les enseignements de la théorie générale du droit international privé que la dimension européenne de la problématique.

Private international law today has to contend with social realities that have evolved markedly over the course of the last few decades. As a result of increased mobility across national borders, international families are ever more numerous and so are instances where recognition of a family status acquired abroad is sought. The effects of this change are compounded by a greater focus on individual agency and self-determination, which leads to stronger challenges to State policies that result in non-recognition. A change in how we understand and ‘do’ private international law seems warranted on two levels. The first change relates to the so-called guiding principles which encapsulate the various aims pursued by the field and can thus provide a useful conceptual framework. I suggest that adding a state duty to recognize a family status created abroad to the existing principles would help strike a better balance between private interests in facilitating recognition and the public interest in the regulation of family forms. This shift necessitates changes on another level, that of the private international law’s methods. Combining easier recognition of foreign family relationships with some degree of state control can be achieved in various ways which range from incremental change to existing methodology to a complete overhaul in the form of a new method of automatic recognition. This raises…

Advisors/Committee Members: Lequette, Yves (thesis director).

▼ 

En instituant un système généralisé d’équivalence des législations des Etats membres de l’Union européenne, le principe de reconnaissance mutuelle irrigue l’ensemble du droit européen. En droit bancaire et financier, ce principe fonde deux méthodes bien distinctes. La première, méthode d’interdiction des cumuls de réglementations, est mise en œuvre par les tribunaux nationaux et européens sous l’égide du droit européen originaire. Elle permet de qualifier d’entrave à une liberté de circulation européenne toute réglementation d’un Etat membre d’accueil qui se cumulerait avec une réglementation de l’Etat membre d’origine. La deuxième, qui constitue une méthode de répartition des compétences entre les différents Etats membres européens, a été consacrée par le législateur européen dans plusieurs directives et règlements. Cette méthode, dite du passeport financier, a la particularité d’accorder une compétence de principe à l’Etat membre d’origine. Cette étude propose une analyse et une vue d’ensemble de chacune de ces méthodes, éminemment importantes pour la pratique du droit des affaires. Elle invite, plus généralement, à une réflexion globale sur les méthodes d’intégration des différents marchés bancaires et financiers nationaux.

The principle of mutual recognition is fundamental to European law whereby it stands for the equivalence of the regulations of member States of the European Union. In banking and financial law, the principle of mutual recognition is exemplified in two different applications. The first aims at eliminating duplicative regulations and is used by national and European courts in reliance on European Union primary law. It classifies any regulation of a host state that overlaps with a regulation of a home state that has already been applied to a certain matter as a restriction to a European freedom of movement. The second application is the financial passport, which was set forth by European lawmakers in various directives and regulations. The passport allocates regulatory powers among European member states and gives primary jurisdiction to the home member state within a harmonized field. This thesis describes and analyzes each of these applications which are crucial to the practice of business law. Overall, it calls for a reflection on the different methods of integrating financial markets.

Advisors/Committee Members: Synvet, Hervé (thesis director).

▼ In 2018 the New Zealand Supreme Court issued judgments in three cases which indicated that the Court was reconsidering their role in respect of rights protection in New Zealand; Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Trust v Attorney-General, Attorney-General v Taylor, and Ngaronoa v Attorney-General. Building on the apparent shift in the dominance of the judiciary which is exhibited by these cases, the aim of this thesis is to explain the division of power between the judiciary and Parliament in respect of rights protection in New Zealand. I suggest that this relationship is dictated by, what I term, foundational norms. These foundational norms are social rather than legal rules which exist and draw their authority from outside the legal system but which the legal system reflects. In the context of rights protection by Parliament and the judiciary, the relevant foundational norms are parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. I suggest that these norms exist in a state of constant competition where when one gains a degree of dominance, the other must give way to an equal and opposite degree. This normative zero sum game has emerged due to the rise of human rights. Human rights have effectively supercharged the rule of law and given it a substantive element such that parliamentary sovereignty can no longer be absolute. It is against this backdrop of norms in competition that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) was enacted. I argue that NZBORA, while enacted as a parliamentary bill of rights, failed to clearly define the role of the judiciary. Parliament and the judiciary were left to determine, between themselves, the appropriate level of power for the judiciary to exercise in rights protection. I suggest that Parliament has failed to fulfil the role which it was expected to fulfil in 1990. As a result, the judiciary need to fill the gaps if rights are to be protected. In 2018, the judiciary rose to this challenge by issuing a declaration of inconsistency for the first time but they remain hesitant to use the interpretative method to ‘cure’ inconsistencies. I conclude that, as there has been a shift in the foundational norms, NZBORA has given the judiciary significant interpretative powers and Parliament has failed to fulfil its role in rights protection, it is necessary and acceptable that the judiciary assert further dominance if rights are to be protected. Advisors/Committee Members: Geddis, Andrew (advisor).

▼ In the first part, the author attempts to demonstrate that certain formal criteria of identity of a legal order (the Austin's, Kelsen's and Hart's criteria) are not satisfactory, because they ignore the repercussions of the link between law and politics. The solution can only be found in trying to delineate a material criterion for the identity of legal orders. In the second part, the author defines the identity of legal orders in terms of the identity of political regimes. In this way, he can make use of the analytical tools devised of political theory (from Easton to Morlino). The conclusion: within a certain State order, a legal order maintains its identity as long as the political regime stays the same. The political regime, in turn, maintains its identity until its elements are modified in a way that forces us to attribute it to another category, within a given classification. Advisors/Committee Members: [email protected] (authoremail), true (authoremailshow), Calsamiglia, Albert (director).

▼ American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law. These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism. In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method. This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior. The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent. The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will. Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil. Advisors/Committee Members: McDermott, John J. (advisor), Pappas, Gregory (committee member), Austin, Scott W. (committee member), Welch, Ben D. (committee member).