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You searched for subject:(moral encroachment). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

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University of Waterloo

1. Haydon, Nathan. Moral Encroachment.

Degree: 2011, University of Waterloo

Can practical factors influence a subject's position to know? Traditionally this question has been answered in the negative. A subject's position to know proposition p is not thought to improve merely because the subject wants to know p or has certain practical stakes depend on whether p. Appealing to these wants and practical interests while defending a claim to know is thought to be epistemically inappropriate. We argue, to the contrary, that practical factors can influence (i.e. encroach upon) a subject's position to know and can do so in an epistemically appropriate way. The argument we provide is relatively straightforward. We claim that knowledge of a certain set of propositions requires a prior action taken on behalf of the subject. This prior action can be influenced by practical factors and thus practical factors can influence a subject's position to know. Furthermore, we argue that such a move can be epistemically appropriate if it arises in an instance when the evidence and arguments favoring belief  – at least from the subject's own point of view  – are inconclusive. We conclude with an argument that the provided account offers a new framework to defend moral encroachment. The prior action taken on behalf of a subject, when it is both practically influenced and is epistemically appropriate, can be interpreted as a moral action.

Subjects/Keywords: pragmatic encroachment; moral encroachment

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Haydon, N. (2011). Moral Encroachment. (Thesis). University of Waterloo. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10012/6379

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Haydon, Nathan. “Moral Encroachment.” 2011. Thesis, University of Waterloo. Accessed November 17, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10012/6379.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Haydon, Nathan. “Moral Encroachment.” 2011. Web. 17 Nov 2019.

Vancouver:

Haydon N. Moral Encroachment. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Waterloo; 2011. [cited 2019 Nov 17]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10012/6379.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Haydon N. Moral Encroachment. [Thesis]. University of Waterloo; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10012/6379

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation


The Ohio State University

2. Fritz, James Christopher. Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action.

Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2019, The Ohio State University

This dissertation develops and defends a view of the relationship between knowledge and norms on action. The view I defend is an impurist one; on this view, whether a person knows that p can depend on factors that are unrelated to the truth or likelihood of p. On my impurism, normative facts about actions and options—including, for instance, the costs of relying on a belief in action—are among the non-truth-related factors that can make a difference to knowledge. My view is distinctive, in part, because of the further claim that moral facts about actions and options are among the normative considerations that can make a difference to knowledge. In a slogan: epistemic norms are sensitive to moral considerations. In an even shorter slogan: there is moral encroachment in epistemology. The first half of the dissertation defends the claim that there is moral encroachment in epistemology. In chapter 1 (“Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment”), I argue that moral encroachment is at least as well-motivated as a more familiar view: the view that there is pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. In chapter 2 (“Uncertainty, Belief, and Ethical Weight”), I draw on insights from moral psychology to provide an original argument for moral encroachment.The second half of the dissertation starts from the assumption that there is moral encroachment in epistemology. It is devoted to describing in detail how moral encroachment works. In chapter 3 (“Moral Encroachment and Reasons of the Wrong Kind”), I distinguish between a radical and a moderate version of moral encroachment. I raise a problem for the radical version: it threatens to erase the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic norms on belief. This problem, I note, does not afflict the moderate version of moral encroachment. In chapter 4 (“Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action”), I show that it is no trivial task to explain why knowledge is sensitive to both moral norms and norms of practical coherence. In fact, I argue, existing versions of impurism generally lack the resources to provide the needed explanation. I also make some suggestions about the best ways to for an impurist to meet this challenge.It’s clear that impurists both can and should add texture to their picture of norms on action. They can make significant headway by endorsing two of my primarily conclusions. First: there are multiple distinct families of normative considerations (including, for instance, moral considerations and considerations of practical coherence) that are equally well-placed to make a difference to knowledge. And second: only some of the moral considerations that bear on belief are apt to make a difference to knowledge. These conclusions point the way toward a clearer picture of an impurism worth defending. Advisors/Committee Members: McPherson, Tristram (Advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Philosophy; Epistemology; impurism; pragmatic encroachment; moral encroachment

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Fritz, J. C. (2019). Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action. (Doctoral Dissertation). The Ohio State University. Retrieved from http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu156268632958823

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Fritz, James Christopher. “Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action.” 2019. Doctoral Dissertation, The Ohio State University. Accessed November 17, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu156268632958823.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Fritz, James Christopher. “Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action.” 2019. Web. 17 Nov 2019.

Vancouver:

Fritz JC. Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. The Ohio State University; 2019. [cited 2019 Nov 17]. Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu156268632958823.

Council of Science Editors:

Fritz JC. Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action. [Doctoral Dissertation]. The Ohio State University; 2019. Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu156268632958823

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