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University of Rochester
1.
Kenny, Patrick Christopher (1974 - ).
It takes two : defending a two category solution to the
problem of material constitution.
Degree: PhD, 2011, University of Rochester
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/14469
► My dissertation evaluates the merits of a Two Category solution to the problem of material constitution as it arises for artifacts. The problem of material…
(more)
▼ My dissertation evaluates the merits of a Two
Category solution to the problem of material constitution as it
arises for artifacts. The problem of material constitution arises
for cases in which it appears that there are two things in the same
place at the same time. For example, my statue of Boris Yeltsin
seems to exactly coincide with the portion of clay that composes
it. A coincidentalist solution to the problem allows for two
distinct, exactly coinciding, spatial entities. A Two Category
solution is a coincidentalist solution that proposes that the
coinciding entities belong to two distinct ontological categories.
This sort of solution to the problem of material constitution has
been under-represented in the philosophical literature. My
dissertation goes some way towards rectifying this situation.
Two
Category solutions to the problem of material constitution differ
on the ontological category to which each of the coinciding
entities belongs. I argue that at least one of the coinciding
entities – the lump of clay, or CLAY is a concrete object. The key
question then is: to what ontological category does the statue, or
BORIS, belong? My dissertation examines in detail some candidate
answers to this question. The first of these candidates is what I
call the property solution, according to which BORIS is a property
had by CLAY. I argue that such a solution does not work, no matter
what view of properties one holds. Neither universalist nor
trope-theoretic accounts provide us with the resources to
adequately individuate BORIS. I also examine an event solution
(according to which BORIS is an event in which CLAY participates),
a state of affairs solution (according to which BORIS is a state of
affairs of which CLAY is a part), a state solution (according to
which BORIS is a state that CLAY is in), and two different process
solutions, (one of which has BORIS being a process of which CLAY is
a part, the other construing BORIS as a process that passes through
CLAY). I argue that no account of the metaphysics of events, states
of affairs, states or processes allows for a satisfactory Two
Category solution. Again, the main general problem pertains to the
individuation of BORIS: no plausible view that enables us to
individuate any of the entities that belong to these ontological
categories can provide the resources for individuating artifacts
like statues.
My dissertation concludes by offering suggestions
for what any successful Two Category solution to the problem of
material constitution needs to do. We need to more closely examine
how BORIS and CLAY must be related, before going on to see what
categories of entities subsequently come into view. Ultimately, I
suggest, we should consider BORIS to be involved in not one, but
two, ontological dependence relations: it is ontologically
dependent on CLAY, and it is ontologically dependent on my
intention to create it out of CLAY.
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics
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APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
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Export
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APA (6th Edition):
Kenny, P. C. (. -. ). (2011). It takes two : defending a two category solution to the
problem of material constitution. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Rochester. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1802/14469
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Kenny, Patrick Christopher (1974 - ). “It takes two : defending a two category solution to the
problem of material constitution.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Rochester. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1802/14469.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Kenny, Patrick Christopher (1974 - ). “It takes two : defending a two category solution to the
problem of material constitution.” 2011. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Kenny PC(-). It takes two : defending a two category solution to the
problem of material constitution. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2011. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/14469.
Council of Science Editors:
Kenny PC(-). It takes two : defending a two category solution to the
problem of material constitution. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/14469

University of Cambridge
2.
Wildman, Nathan.
Essential properties: analysis and extension.
Degree: PhD, 2011, University of Cambridge
URL: http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/236596https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/2/license.txt
;
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/3/Wildman%20-%20Essential%20Properties%20Analysis%20%26%20Extension.pdf.txt
;
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/5/Wildman%20-%20Essential%20Properties%20Analysis%20%26%20Extension.pdf.txt
;
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/6/Wildman%20-%20Essential%20Properties%20Analysis%20%26%20Extension.pdf.jpg
► This thesis is an attempt to understand the essential properties of concrete objects. The underlying motivation of this investigation is the hope that by understanding…
(more)
▼ This thesis is an attempt to understand the essential properties of concrete objects. The
underlying motivation of this investigation is the hope that by understanding essential
properties we will be in a better position to construct a satisfactory metaphysical account of the things that populate the world around us.
The initial chapter introduces two questions that this thesis will attempt to answer.
The first, ‘what are essential properties?’ is the Analysis Question. Answering it occupies chapters two through five. The second, ‘what essential properties are there?’ is the Extension Question. This is dealt with in the final three chapters.
Chapter two provides the beginnings of an answer to the Analysis question,
introducing the modal analysis of essential properties. Eight ways modality and essentiality might be related are raised. Of these, two entail the modal analysis. By eliminating the undesirable six, justification for the modal analysis could be provide. In the remainder of the chapter, five of the six are quickly dismissed.
Chapter three is an examination of Fundamentalism. Focusing upon the views of E.J. Lowe and Kit Fine, I argue that there are modal facts which cannot be grounded upon essence facts and that certain modal concepts are employed in the construction of the Fundamentalist account. Consequently, Fundamentalism cannot succeed in grounding modality, and therefore cannot be the correct way to understand essentiality. This concludes the argument by elimination, thereby justifying accepting the modal analysis.
Chapter four explores the modal analysis. After distinguishing between various
formulations, it is argued that an existence-dependent version of the modal analysis is best.
An objection by McLeod concerning contingent existence and essential properties is then
dealt with, setting the stage for a more troubling objection from Kit Fine. Fine argues that all forms of the modal analysis ‘get the essential properties wrong’, relying upon a series of example properties, including the relation between Socrates and {Socrates}. After breaking down Fine’s argument, the remainder of the chapter concerns examining and dismissing several bad responses to Fine’s argument, including attempts by Della Rocca and Gorman.
In chapter five I advance a new response to Fine which centres upon appealing to the
sparse/abundant property distinction. Incorporating this distinction into the modal criteria, I demonstrate that a form of the modal analysis can avoid Fine’s attack. I then conclude that this suitably modified modal analysis is an excellent answer to the Analysis Question.
The remaining three chapters are part of an attempt to answer the Extension Question. Chapter six critically examines Wiggins’ sortal essentialism, the position that
objects are essentially instances of their sorts. After rendering Wiggins’ essentialist argument, I demonstrate that it is either inconclusive or question begging. As such, there is no reason to accept sortal essentialism.
Chapter seven looks at the Byzantine…
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Wildman, N. (2011). Essential properties: analysis and extension. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Cambridge. Retrieved from http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/236596https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/2/license.txt ; https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/3/Wildman%20-%20Essential%20Properties%20Analysis%20%26%20Extension.pdf.txt ; https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/5/Wildman%20-%20Essential%20Properties%20Analysis%20%26%20Extension.pdf.txt ; https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/6/Wildman%20-%20Essential%20Properties%20Analysis%20%26%20Extension.pdf.jpg
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Wildman, Nathan. “Essential properties: analysis and extension.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Cambridge. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/236596https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/2/license.txt ; https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/3/Wildman%20-%20Essential%20Properties%20Analysis%20%26%20Extension.pdf.txt ; https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/5/Wildman%20-%20Essential%20Properties%20Analysis%20%26%20Extension.pdf.txt ; https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/6/Wildman%20-%20Essential%20Properties%20Analysis%20%26%20Extension.pdf.jpg.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Wildman, Nathan. “Essential properties: analysis and extension.” 2011. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Wildman N. Essential properties: analysis and extension. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Cambridge; 2011. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/236596https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/2/license.txt ; https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/3/Wildman%20-%20Essential%20Properties%20Analysis%20%26%20Extension.pdf.txt ; https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/5/Wildman%20-%20Essential%20Properties%20Analysis%20%26%20Extension.pdf.txt ; https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/6/Wildman%20-%20Essential%20Properties%20Analysis%20%26%20Extension.pdf.jpg.
Council of Science Editors:
Wildman N. Essential properties: analysis and extension. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Cambridge; 2011. Available from: http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/236596https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/2/license.txt ; https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/3/Wildman%20-%20Essential%20Properties%20Analysis%20%26%20Extension.pdf.txt ; https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/5/Wildman%20-%20Essential%20Properties%20Analysis%20%26%20Extension.pdf.txt ; https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/1810/236596/6/Wildman%20-%20Essential%20Properties%20Analysis%20%26%20Extension.pdf.jpg

University of Colorado
3.
Demetriou (Mickelson), Kristin Marie.
Free Will Fundamentals: Agency, Determinism, and (In)compatibility.
Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2012, University of Colorado
URL: https://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/20
► The concepts of agency, determinism, compatibility and incompatibility are the stock-in-trade of the free will debate. Stifling debate, however, are commonplace mistakes and oversights…
(more)
▼ The concepts of agency, determinism, compatibility and incompatibility are the stock-in-trade of the free will debate. Stifling debate, however, are commonplace mistakes and oversights related to each of these key concepts. In this dissertation, I focus my attention on three serious but widely unrecognized misunderstandings/mischaracterizations related to each of these key concepts. By identifying and resolving these fundamental problems in the contemporary literature on free will, I hope to open the door for greater progress towards the resolution of one of philosophy's oldest debates, what I call "The Primary Free-Will (In)compatibility Debate".
Advisors/Committee Members: Robert Hanna, Michael Huemer, Robert Rupert.
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics
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APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
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APA (6th Edition):
Demetriou (Mickelson), K. M. (2012). Free Will Fundamentals: Agency, Determinism, and (In)compatibility. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Colorado. Retrieved from https://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/20
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Demetriou (Mickelson), Kristin Marie. “Free Will Fundamentals: Agency, Determinism, and (In)compatibility.” 2012. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Colorado. Accessed April 22, 2021.
https://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/20.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Demetriou (Mickelson), Kristin Marie. “Free Will Fundamentals: Agency, Determinism, and (In)compatibility.” 2012. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Demetriou (Mickelson) KM. Free Will Fundamentals: Agency, Determinism, and (In)compatibility. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Colorado; 2012. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: https://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/20.
Council of Science Editors:
Demetriou (Mickelson) KM. Free Will Fundamentals: Agency, Determinism, and (In)compatibility. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Colorado; 2012. Available from: https://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/20

Rutgers University
4.
Wilsch, Tobias, 1985-.
Laws in metaphysics.
Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2015, Rutgers University
URL: https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/47611/
► The first two chapters of this dissertation defend the Deductive-Nomological Account of metaphysical explanation. Chapter 1 develops the Nomological Account of ground, – p1, …,…
(more)
▼ The first two chapters of this dissertation defend the Deductive-Nomological Account of metaphysical explanation. Chapter 1 develops the Nomological Account of ground, – p1, …, pn ground q if and only if the laws of metaphysics determine q on the basis of p1, …, pn, – and the constructional theory of the metaphysical laws, – the laws are general principles that characterize construction-operations. Chapter 2 offers an analysis of the notion of determination involved in the Nomological Account: the laws determine q based on p1, …, pn if and only if q follows from p1, …, pn and the laws in the grounding-calculus. The grounding-calculus is characterized in terms of two inference rules and a suitable notion of ‘proof’. The rules are designed to analyze the input- and output notions that are intuitively associated with laws: the laws take some facts as input and deliver some other facts as output. Chapters 1 and 2 also go beyond the development of the positive view. Chapter 1 shows how the Nomological Account explains general patterns among grounding-truths, the modal force of ground, and certain connections between ground and construction. Chapter 2 shows why the Deductive-Nomological Account of metaphysical explanation escapes the objections to the traditional DN-account of scientific explanation, and it also outlines two views on logical explanation that are available to the proponent of the Nomological Account. Chapter 3 focuses on laws of nature and presents the Circularity Puzzle, which is a generalized version of a familiar circularity-based objection to Humeanism about the laws of nature. The three solutions to the Circularity Puzzle correspond to three different general views on the laws, one Anti-Humean and two Humean views. I argue that for the Anti-Humean, the Circularity Puzzle collapses into the familiar inference-problem, and for the Standard Humean, the solution to circularity-related worries lies in the rejection of the governing-conception of laws. I explain what I take to be the strongest response to the inference-problem.
Advisors/Committee Members: Schafer, Jonathan (chair), Zimmerman, Dean (internal member), Lin, Martin (internal member), Paul, Laurie (outside member).
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics
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APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Wilsch, Tobias, 1. (2015). Laws in metaphysics. (Doctoral Dissertation). Rutgers University. Retrieved from https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/47611/
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Wilsch, Tobias, 1985-. “Laws in metaphysics.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, Rutgers University. Accessed April 22, 2021.
https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/47611/.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Wilsch, Tobias, 1985-. “Laws in metaphysics.” 2015. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Wilsch, Tobias 1. Laws in metaphysics. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Rutgers University; 2015. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/47611/.
Council of Science Editors:
Wilsch, Tobias 1. Laws in metaphysics. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Rutgers University; 2015. Available from: https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/47611/

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
5.
Johnson, Andrew A.
Projection, Detection, and the Relevant Reasons Account of Realism.
Degree: 2011, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
URL: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3477560
► Believing ordinary objects like tables and chairs to be real seems to be a matter of believing that they exist and are independent of…
(more)
▼ Believing ordinary objects like tables and chairs to be real seems to be a matter of believing that they exist and are independent of our minds. However, the idea that realism about a domain is a matter of taking on certain mind-independent ontological commitments falters when we consider other domains. Realism about minds, for example, clearly does not require a commitment to mind-independence. And realism about morality does not seem to require believing in the existence of any special moral entities. The way to explain these varying intuitions, I believe, is to give up the idea that realism, at its heart, has anything to do with existence or mind-independence. I argue that believing a domain to be real is fundamentally a matter of forming one’s beliefs about the domain in a certain fashion. It is a matter of deeming certain kinds of reasons more relevant to the task of belief formation than others. I call this the Relevant Reasons Account of Realism. It explains why ontology and mind-independence seem crucial to some kinds of realism, and why they seem irrelevant to others. It also explains various other intuitions that we encounter along the way. A number of philosophers have thought that the realist about a domain has to believe the domain to be <i>detected </i>rather than <i> projected.</i> I argue that the most promising attempts to pinpoint a detection/projection distinction (including the concept of response-dependence, Crispin Wright’s conception of judgment-dependence, and Kit Fine’s conception of non-factuality) all fall short of the mark, in one way or another. None of these proposals give us a distinction that is relevant to the question of realism. I then develop a new (and dialectically fruitful) way of making the projection/detection distinction. On my account, for a domain to be a projection of our epistemic practice is for our epistemic success with respect to the domain to be explained in a certain kind of way. I argue that, if a domain is a projection of our epistemic practice in this sense, it is less than fully real for us.
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics; Philosophy
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Johnson, A. A. (2011). Projection, Detection, and the Relevant Reasons Account of Realism. (Thesis). The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Retrieved from http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3477560
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Johnson, Andrew A. “Projection, Detection, and the Relevant Reasons Account of Realism.” 2011. Thesis, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3477560.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Johnson, Andrew A. “Projection, Detection, and the Relevant Reasons Account of Realism.” 2011. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Johnson AA. Projection, Detection, and the Relevant Reasons Account of Realism. [Internet] [Thesis]. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; 2011. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3477560.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Johnson AA. Projection, Detection, and the Relevant Reasons Account of Realism. [Thesis]. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; 2011. Available from: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3477560
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
6.
Wilcox, Sally.
A fractal topology of the transcendent experience.
Degree: 2012, California Institute of Integral Studies
URL: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3539760
► This theoretical dissertation explores boundary conditions at the edge of individual consciousness during the transcendent experience. The unique characteristics in the transcendent experience are…
(more)
▼ This theoretical dissertation explores boundary conditions at the edge of individual consciousness during the transcendent experience. The unique characteristics in the transcendent experience are compared to those found in other natural boundary conditions. Analogous patterns are identified that suggest far from equilibrium conditions are present during subjective transcendent experiences which spontaneously reorder the boundary itself. The transdisciplinary method employed is tri-pronged relating dialectic philosophy, depth psychology and natural science to this investigation of boundary conditions in the transcendent experience. Carl Jung's transcendent function (Miller, 2004) is utilized in describing boundary conditions between conscious and unconscious aspects of the psyche. The transformative potential in the transcendent function suggests a dynamic process with porous tensegrity that I posit alters the architecture and function of the boundary itself. This psychic tensegrity is compared to Donald Ingber's thesis of structural distortion of the cell membrane that profoundly alters cellular behaviour (1993, 1997, 2003). It is suggested that distortion of the cytoskeleton in microtubules may have an effect on consciousness. In that light, the Penrose-Hameroff model of conscious processes at the microtubule level (Penrose, 1994) is included in this discussion. This dissertation research suggests that during a transcendent experience, an individual's consciousness is driven into a far from equilibrium condition where the boundary at the edge of individual consciousness does not rupture, as presumed, but unfurls and spontaneously reorders to increase its fractal dimensionality. This change from a bounded consciousness that is rigid, dualistic and excluding, to one that is richly textured; having a nearly infinite surface area, alters the fundamental role of the boundary from that of separating—to that of unifying; reconciling the self to the universal. The fractal, ubiquitous in non-linear systems of our physical world, is invoked to provide a description of the topology of the boundary of our inner being. In this way, the fractal topology of the transcendent experience provides a model where individual consciousness transcends itself in a state of non-duality.
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics; Philosophy
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Wilcox, S. (2012). A fractal topology of the transcendent experience. (Thesis). California Institute of Integral Studies. Retrieved from http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3539760
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Wilcox, Sally. “A fractal topology of the transcendent experience.” 2012. Thesis, California Institute of Integral Studies. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3539760.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Wilcox, Sally. “A fractal topology of the transcendent experience.” 2012. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Wilcox S. A fractal topology of the transcendent experience. [Internet] [Thesis]. California Institute of Integral Studies; 2012. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3539760.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Wilcox S. A fractal topology of the transcendent experience. [Thesis]. California Institute of Integral Studies; 2012. Available from: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3539760
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Loyola University Chicago
7.
Anderson, Travis Tenney.
Heidegger and Levinas and the Crisis of Phenomenology:
Thinking the Propriety and a-Propriety of Time.
Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 1992, Loyola University Chicago
URL: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3206
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics
Record Details
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Record Details
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Anderson, T. T. (1992). Heidegger and Levinas and the Crisis of Phenomenology:
Thinking the Propriety and a-Propriety of Time. (Doctoral Dissertation). Loyola University Chicago. Retrieved from https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3206
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Anderson, Travis Tenney. “Heidegger and Levinas and the Crisis of Phenomenology:
Thinking the Propriety and a-Propriety of Time.” 1992. Doctoral Dissertation, Loyola University Chicago. Accessed April 22, 2021.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3206.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Anderson, Travis Tenney. “Heidegger and Levinas and the Crisis of Phenomenology:
Thinking the Propriety and a-Propriety of Time.” 1992. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Anderson TT. Heidegger and Levinas and the Crisis of Phenomenology:
Thinking the Propriety and a-Propriety of Time. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Loyola University Chicago; 1992. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3206.
Council of Science Editors:
Anderson TT. Heidegger and Levinas and the Crisis of Phenomenology:
Thinking the Propriety and a-Propriety of Time. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Loyola University Chicago; 1992. Available from: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3206

Cornell University
8.
Rowe, Eric.
Deflationary Metaphysics.
Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2015, Cornell University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/40921
► This dissertation consists of three papers on a handful of related metaphysical and metametaphysical topics. The first examines the connection between analyticity and ontology. Some…
(more)
▼ This dissertation consists of three papers on a handful of related metaphysical and metametaphysical topics. The first examines the connection between analyticity and ontology. Some hold that we can trivially resolve longstanding ontological debates by appealing to "ampliative" analytic truths (e.g. 'if Socrates is wise, then wisdom is characteristic of Socrates'). I argue that once we clarify the theoretical role that analyticity needs to play for this view, it turns out that analyticity is ill-suited to play it; rather, what is motivating these theorists is a distinctive sort of equivalence claim - for instance, that 'Socrates is wise' and 'wisdom is characteristic of Socrates' merely provide different means of describing the same fact. I go on to argue that equivalencies of this sort are independent of controversial claims about analyticity, and threaten to hold important consequences for ontological inquiry. The second paper explores the metaphysical underpinnings of this type of equivalence claim. Part of the project is to clarify the content and consequences of such claims, and part is to canvass some motivations for accepting them; but the main goal is to explore two importantly ways of understanding their metametaphysical import. Briefly, one such view allows that 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates instantiates wisdom' can describe the same fact, but goes on to suggest that one of these sentences does a better job of carving that fact at its metaphysical joints. Another denies that such distinctions in joint-carvingness can be drawn (these sentences merely provide different means of "carving up" that fact). Although both views face serious challenges, I ultimately recommend the latter. The third paper develops a positive account of this equivalence relation. In contrast to one prominent view found in the literature, according to which this relation is cashed out in terms of a coarse-grained relation of necessary or truthconditional equivalence, I recommend a fine-grained alternative, motivated by way of some traditional assumptions about the connection between facts and truthbearers. I go on to discuss several metaphysical and metametaphysical consequences of this position.
Advisors/Committee Members: Sider,Theodore R. (chair), Bennett,Karen (committee member), Eklund,Matti (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics; Metaontology
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APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Rowe, E. (2015). Deflationary Metaphysics. (Doctoral Dissertation). Cornell University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1813/40921
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Rowe, Eric. “Deflationary Metaphysics.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1813/40921.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Rowe, Eric. “Deflationary Metaphysics.” 2015. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Rowe E. Deflationary Metaphysics. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Cornell University; 2015. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/40921.
Council of Science Editors:
Rowe E. Deflationary Metaphysics. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Cornell University; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/40921
9.
Fowler, Thomas.
The role of the simple natures and method in Descartes' meditations.
Degree: 2014, State University of New York at Albany
URL: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3633631
► My topic is the continuity of thought from Descartes' earliest writings to his mature thought as expressed in the <i>Meditations.</i> In the early work,…
(more)
▼ My topic is the continuity of thought from Descartes' earliest writings to his mature thought as expressed in the <i>Meditations.</i> In the early work, the <i>Rules,</i> Descartes replaces the scholastic form-matter model of the physical world with a quantitative description of the physical as matter in a Euclidian space. In the first two chapters I examine the early work showing its break with scholasticism and the structure of his new vision. The <i>Rules </i> was Descartes first major work; it was to consist of thirty six rules. It was neither completed nor published. He stopped working on it in 1628, completing only twenty one rules with commentary on the first eighteen. The first twelve are the philosophically interesting ones. In those he develops a method based on mathematical proofs and introduces a set of basic principles he calls `simple natures' which are intuitively known. This model has the simple principles (natures) analogous to the postulates and axioms of Euclidian geometry. From the principles complex problems are solved by reducing the terms to those of the simple natures and re-constructing the problem in those terms. While the <i>Rules</i> emphasizes material natures as the basis for physical science, he also introduces a definition of mind as thought. In the next two chapters I argue that this basic structure of method and simple natures carries over into the <i>Meditations.</i> The goal is different but the tools are the same. The definitions of matter and mind that Descartes sets in Meditation II are the same as in the <i> Rules:</i> mind as thought and matter as extension. Doubt, which is often taken as the new method is shown to be just a part of the early stage of the original method. It is used to reduce a complex to simples by eliminating any uncertainties until an indubitable simple nature is reached: the <i> cogito.</i> In the final chapter I examine the problem of apparent contrasting explanations of true and immutable natures in Meditation V and the First Reply. I argue that they are compatible if we understand natures in terms of the principles of the <i>Rules.</i>
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics; Philosophy
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Fowler, T. (2014). The role of the simple natures and method in Descartes' meditations. (Thesis). State University of New York at Albany. Retrieved from http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3633631
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Fowler, Thomas. “The role of the simple natures and method in Descartes' meditations.” 2014. Thesis, State University of New York at Albany. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3633631.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Fowler, Thomas. “The role of the simple natures and method in Descartes' meditations.” 2014. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Fowler T. The role of the simple natures and method in Descartes' meditations. [Internet] [Thesis]. State University of New York at Albany; 2014. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3633631.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Fowler T. The role of the simple natures and method in Descartes' meditations. [Thesis]. State University of New York at Albany; 2014. Available from: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3633631
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Addis Ababa University
10.
Nahom, Solomon.
NIETZSCHE’S DISCOURSE ON NIHILISM
.
Degree: 2014, Addis Ababa University
URL: http://etd.aau.edu.et/dspace/handle/123456789/5376
► Friedrich Nietzsche’s contribution to philosophy is mostly recognized in relation to moral philosophy. His distinction of master and slave morality, critique of the Judeo-Christian morality…
(more)
▼ Friedrich Nietzsche’s contribution to philosophy is mostly recognized in relation to moral philosophy. His distinction of master and slave morality, critique of the Judeo-Christian morality is what is commonly considered as the main contribution of his philosophy. How-ever, on the other hand, his examination of metaphysics and epistemology comprises fun-damental constituents to apprehend his philosophy. Accordingly, it can be said, Nietzsche’s approach towards morality and politics is a demonstration of his analysis of metaphysics and epistemology. Since the construction of metaphysical and epistemological grounds precedes the construction of ethical systems, the critique of morality is presupposed by the critique of its metaphysical and epistemological foundations.
Therefore, the focus of this paper will not be Nietzsche’s critique of morality and politics. Rather, it will critically examine his criticism of the metaphysical and epistemological ba-sis that by virtue of their structural fundamentalist acquired the generative potential of values (moral, political, economic, etc.). In view of that, by exposing the vitality of Nie-tzsche’s critique in his discourse on nihilism, the analysis will try to claim the conceptual centrality of nihilism in his philosophy. Furthermore, assert the possible understandability of his critique and discourse, which is mostly concentrated on the advent of European nigh-hilism and its counter movement.
Subjects/Keywords: METAPHYSICS;
EPISTEMOLOGY
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Nahom, S. (2014). NIETZSCHE’S DISCOURSE ON NIHILISM
. (Thesis). Addis Ababa University. Retrieved from http://etd.aau.edu.et/dspace/handle/123456789/5376
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Nahom, Solomon. “NIETZSCHE’S DISCOURSE ON NIHILISM
.” 2014. Thesis, Addis Ababa University. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://etd.aau.edu.et/dspace/handle/123456789/5376.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Nahom, Solomon. “NIETZSCHE’S DISCOURSE ON NIHILISM
.” 2014. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Nahom S. NIETZSCHE’S DISCOURSE ON NIHILISM
. [Internet] [Thesis]. Addis Ababa University; 2014. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://etd.aau.edu.et/dspace/handle/123456789/5376.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Nahom S. NIETZSCHE’S DISCOURSE ON NIHILISM
. [Thesis]. Addis Ababa University; 2014. Available from: http://etd.aau.edu.et/dspace/handle/123456789/5376
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Florida State University
11.
Miller, Daniel.
Blameworthiness and Ignorance.
Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2016, Florida State University
URL: http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_2016SP_Miller_fsu_0071E_13207
;
► Sometimes ignorance functions as a legitimate excuse, and sometimes it doesn't. It is widely maintained that, when the ignorance an agent acts or omits from…
(more)
▼ Sometimes ignorance functions as a legitimate excuse, and sometimes it doesn't. It is widely maintained that, when the
ignorance an agent acts or omits from is blameless, it excuses an agent. Call this claim the Blameless Ignorance Principle, or (BI). This
principle is at the heart of questions concerning the epistemic condition on blameworthiness; my project explores a number of these with
the aim of developing the literature in three areas. I first explore the epistemic condition on derivative blameworthiness. An agent's
blameworthiness for something is derivative when it depends upon his blameworthiness for some prior thing that it resulted from. However,
not just any negative consequence that a blameworthy action or omission results in is something for which the agent is thereby also
blameworthy. It is often maintained that, in addition, the consequence must have been foreseeable for the agent. I develop a two-part
argument against this view. First, I argue that agents can be blameless for failing to foresee what was reasonably foreseeable for them.
Second, I explain that, if this is so and if (BI) is true, then the foreseeability view is false. Consequently, I consider an alternative
view that requires actual foresight and is consistent with (BI).
A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Spring Semester 2016.
April 13, 2016.
Blameworthiness, Culpable Ignorance, Foresight, Ignorance, Quality of Will
Randolph Clarke, Professor Directing Dissertation; John Kelsay, University Representative; Alfred
Mele, Committee Member; David McNaughton, Committee Member.
Advisors/Committee Members: Randolph K. Clarke (professor directing dissertation), John Kelsay (university representative), Alfred R. Mele (committee member), David McNaughton (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Ethics; Metaphysics
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Miller, D. (2016). Blameworthiness and Ignorance. (Doctoral Dissertation). Florida State University. Retrieved from http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_2016SP_Miller_fsu_0071E_13207 ;
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Miller, Daniel. “Blameworthiness and Ignorance.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, Florida State University. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_2016SP_Miller_fsu_0071E_13207 ;.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Miller, Daniel. “Blameworthiness and Ignorance.” 2016. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Miller D. Blameworthiness and Ignorance. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Florida State University; 2016. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_2016SP_Miller_fsu_0071E_13207 ;.
Council of Science Editors:
Miller D. Blameworthiness and Ignorance. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Florida State University; 2016. Available from: http://purl.flvc.org/fsu/fd/FSU_2016SP_Miller_fsu_0071E_13207 ;
12.
Dowling, Sarah.
“The imaging of the invisible”: Narrative, pilgrimage and “the metaphysics of the quotidian” in Charles Wright’s poetry.
Degree: PhD, 2014, Australian Catholic University
URL: https://researchbank.acu.edu.au/theses/495
► This dissertation presents an analysis of the whole body of poetry by contemporary American poet Charles Wright to date. Building on existing scholarship, I argue…
(more)
▼ This dissertation presents an analysis of the whole body of poetry by contemporary American poet Charles Wright to date. Building on existing scholarship, I argue that his poetry can be read as having a single focus, which I label “the invisible” (a term from Wright’s poems) and which represents the object of Wright’s pilgrim’s metaphysical longings. The invisible names a multifaceted sense of something ultimate, ungraspable and often absent. It is commensurate with what Wright calls “the metaphysics of the quotidian”—the otherworldly quality of the mundane material world—and “the idea of God”, an agnostic sense of ultimate realities that remains half-begrudgingly reliant on religious terms. To reveal the centrality of the invisible to Wright’s poems I present an analysis of their recurrent symbols and metaphors, demonstrating that visions of the invisible are ubiquitous and consistent throughout his oeuvre. I also argue that an implicit, repeating narrative of “pilgrimage” persists all the way through Wright’s body of work. This pilgrimage is an ongoing quest of spiritual aspiration towards the invisible. It amounts to the kind of concealed storyline that Wright calls “undernarrative”. As I make clear, the pilgrimage constitutes the paradigmatic pattern of Wright’s poetry, a sequence of drawing near and falling back that recurs in an almost fractal manner in every part of his oeuvre. I trace this undernarrative within Wright’s whole body of poetry, not just his famous “trilogy of trilogies”, to reveal how his recurrent themes produce an implicit, repeated movement towards and then away from transcendence. From a perspective informed by Derrida’s deconstruction of Western logocentrism, I focus on Wright’s many meditations on the past, contemplations of the present and speculations on death. I consider the way that Wright entertains a particularly Southern, place-bound sense of origins, even while confounding that prioritisation of origins with a motif of rise-and-fall that destabilises “place”. The fluidity of memory reflected in tumultuous landscapes, as exemplified by the poem “The Southern Cross”, challenges the ideal of origins by revealing them to be elusive, uncovering a lack of consistency between the past and the present and rendering the past irretrievable. I explore Wright’s sense of being in time in relation to his poem The Journal of the Year of the Ox. This poem demonstrates two key patterns in Wright’s poetry: the perpetual renewal embodied in the cycle of seasons and the tragic fact of decay and rising entropy evinced by the poet-figure’s experience of ageing. Both concepts of time attest to the inapprehensible nature of the invisible, which is envisioned as an elusive eternal instant of time. Furthermore, the conflation of the idyllic origin with heaven in Wright’s poetry means that his pilgrim’s journey towards transcendence has a unique direction. Passing time both drags him away from paradise and conveys him back to his birthplace. Finally, I consider Wright’s multiple visions of death, which are…
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics; Poetry
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Dowling, S. (2014). “The imaging of the invisible”: Narrative, pilgrimage and “the metaphysics of the quotidian” in Charles Wright’s poetry. (Doctoral Dissertation). Australian Catholic University. Retrieved from https://researchbank.acu.edu.au/theses/495
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Dowling, Sarah. ““The imaging of the invisible”: Narrative, pilgrimage and “the metaphysics of the quotidian” in Charles Wright’s poetry.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, Australian Catholic University. Accessed April 22, 2021.
https://researchbank.acu.edu.au/theses/495.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Dowling, Sarah. ““The imaging of the invisible”: Narrative, pilgrimage and “the metaphysics of the quotidian” in Charles Wright’s poetry.” 2014. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Dowling S. “The imaging of the invisible”: Narrative, pilgrimage and “the metaphysics of the quotidian” in Charles Wright’s poetry. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Australian Catholic University; 2014. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: https://researchbank.acu.edu.au/theses/495.
Council of Science Editors:
Dowling S. “The imaging of the invisible”: Narrative, pilgrimage and “the metaphysics of the quotidian” in Charles Wright’s poetry. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Australian Catholic University; 2014. Available from: https://researchbank.acu.edu.au/theses/495

Boston College
13.
Duns, Ryan G.
Is Metaphysics Viable in a Secular Age?.
Degree: STL, Sacred Theology, 2018, Boston College
URL: http://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir:108067
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Duns, R. G. (2018). Is Metaphysics Viable in a Secular Age?. (Thesis). Boston College. Retrieved from http://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir:108067
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Duns, Ryan G. “Is Metaphysics Viable in a Secular Age?.” 2018. Thesis, Boston College. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir:108067.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Duns, Ryan G. “Is Metaphysics Viable in a Secular Age?.” 2018. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Duns RG. Is Metaphysics Viable in a Secular Age?. [Internet] [Thesis]. Boston College; 2018. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir:108067.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Duns RG. Is Metaphysics Viable in a Secular Age?. [Thesis]. Boston College; 2018. Available from: http://dlib.bc.edu/islandora/object/bc-ir:108067
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
14.
LAI, Pak Him.
Metaphysical reduction of necessity : a modified account.
Degree: MPHIL, Philosophy, Lingnan University
URL: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd/51
► This thesis investigates the metaphysical nature of necessity. My study focuses primarily on the reduction of metaphysical necessity and the question of whether a…
(more)
▼ This thesis investigates the metaphysical nature of necessity. My study focuses primarily on the reduction of metaphysical necessity and the question of whether a necessary truth can be reductively defined. Theodore Sider (2011) develops a new reductive account of metaphysical necessity. Unfortunately, the multiple realizability problem posed by Jonathan Schaffer (2013) undermines the credibility of Sider’s account. This underlies my motivation to search for a revised Siderian account of necessity. On this basis, I propose a modified version of Sider’s account and argue that analytic, natural-kind and micro-reduction truths are necessary truths if and only if they express the same states of affairs as logical truths. Since logical truths are necessary truths, analytic, natural-kind and micro-reduction truths are necessary truths as well.
In this thesis, I will proceed as follows. Chapter 1 introduces Sider’s account of necessity. In particular, I focus on his analysis of the necessity of a micro-reduction truth. His analysis is largely constitutive of the notion of a metaphysical semantics and some associated notions. I reconstruct his analysis and articulate his metaphysical semantics and the associated notions. Chapter 2 presents and clarifies the multiple realizability problem of Schaffer. His critique shows that Sider’s metaphysical semantics cannot handle multiple realizability. Sider (2013e) refutes this claim by arguing that the multiple realizability problem is a problem for his analysis of the necessity of a micro-reduction truth, not for his metaphysical semantics itself. This is a good starting point to propound a modified account of necessity. Chapter 3 proposes and articulates my modified analysis of the necessity of a micro-reduction, where I show that the necessity of a micro-reduction truth can be reductively defined without appeal to Sider’s metaphysical semantics. I argue that analytic, natural-kind and microreduction truths are necessary truths if and only if they express the same states of affairs as logical truths. Logical truths are necessary and so are they. After that, I consider a potential objection to my modified account and attempt to respond to it.
Advisors/Committee Members: Prof. MARSHALL Daniel Graham.
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
LAI, P. H. (n.d.). Metaphysical reduction of necessity : a modified account. (Thesis). Lingnan University. Retrieved from https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd/51
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
No year of publication.
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
LAI, Pak Him. “Metaphysical reduction of necessity : a modified account.” Thesis, Lingnan University. Accessed April 22, 2021.
https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd/51.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
No year of publication.
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
LAI, Pak Him. “Metaphysical reduction of necessity : a modified account.” Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
No year of publication.
Vancouver:
LAI PH. Metaphysical reduction of necessity : a modified account. [Internet] [Thesis]. Lingnan University; [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd/51.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
No year of publication.
Council of Science Editors:
LAI PH. Metaphysical reduction of necessity : a modified account. [Thesis]. Lingnan University; Available from: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd/51
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
No year of publication.

University of Cambridge
15.
Wildman, Nathan.
Essential properties : analysis and extension.
Degree: PhD, 2011, University of Cambridge
URL: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.15913
;
https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.541847
► This thesis is an attempt to understand the essential properties of concrete objects. The underlying motivation of this investigation is the hope that by understanding…
(more)
▼ This thesis is an attempt to understand the essential properties of concrete objects. The underlying motivation of this investigation is the hope that by understanding essential properties we will be in a better position to construct a satisfactory metaphysical account of the things that populate the world around us. The initial chapter introduces two questions that this thesis will attempt to answer. The first, 'what are essential properties?' is the Analysis Question. Answering it occupies chapters two through five. The second, 'what essential properties are there?' is the Extension Question. This is dealt with in the final three chapters. Chapter two provides the beginnings of an answer to the Analysis question, introducing the modal analysis of essential properties. Eight ways modality and essentiality might be related are raised. Of these, two entail the modal analysis. By eliminating the undesirable six, justification for the modal analysis could be provided. In the remainder of the chapter, five of the six are quickly dismissed. Chapter three is an examination of Fundamentalism. Focusing upon the views of E.J. Lowe and Kit Fine, I argue that there are modal facts which cannot be grounded upon essence facts and that certain modal concepts are employed in the construction of the Fundamentalist account. Consequently, Fundamentalism cannot succeed in grounding modality, and therefore cannot be the correct way to understand essentiality. This concludes the argument by elimination, thereby justifying accepting the modal analysis. Chapter four explores the modal analysis. After distinguishing between various formulations, it is argued that an existence-dependent version of the modal analysis is best. An objection by McLeod concerning contingent existence and essential properties is then dealt with, setting the stage for a more troubling objection from Kit Fine. Fine argues that all forms of the modal analysis 'get the essential properties wrong', relying upon a series of example properties, including the relation between Socrates and {Socrates}. After breaking down Fine's argument, the remainder of the chapter concerns examining and dismissing several bad responses to Fine's argument, including attempts by Della Rocca and Gorman. In chapter five I advance a new response to Fine which centres upon appealing to the sparse/abundant property distinction. Incorporating this distinction into the modal criteria, I demonstrate that a form of the modal analysis can avoid Fine's attack. I then conclude that this suitably modified modal analysis is an excellent answer to the Analysis Question. The remaining three chapters are part of an attempt to answer the Extension Question. Chapter six critically examines Wiggins' sortal essentialism, the position that objects are essentially instances of their sorts. After rendering Wiggins' essentialist argument, I demonstrate that it is either inconclusive or question begging. As such, there is no reason to accept sortal essentialism. Chapter seven looks at the Byzantine arguments…
Subjects/Keywords: 100; Metaphysics
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Wildman, N. (2011). Essential properties : analysis and extension. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Cambridge. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.15913 ; https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.541847
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Wildman, Nathan. “Essential properties : analysis and extension.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Cambridge. Accessed April 22, 2021.
https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.15913 ; https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.541847.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Wildman, Nathan. “Essential properties : analysis and extension.” 2011. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Wildman N. Essential properties : analysis and extension. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Cambridge; 2011. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.15913 ; https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.541847.
Council of Science Editors:
Wildman N. Essential properties : analysis and extension. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Cambridge; 2011. Available from: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.15913 ; https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.541847

Loyola University Chicago
16.
Crimmin, Patrick Edward.
A Statement and Criticism of the Doctrine on Human
Freedom Proposed by Some Recent Evolutionists.
Degree: MA, Philosophy, 1937, Loyola University Chicago
URL: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/611
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Crimmin, P. E. (1937). A Statement and Criticism of the Doctrine on Human
Freedom Proposed by Some Recent Evolutionists. (Thesis). Loyola University Chicago. Retrieved from https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/611
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Crimmin, Patrick Edward. “A Statement and Criticism of the Doctrine on Human
Freedom Proposed by Some Recent Evolutionists.” 1937. Thesis, Loyola University Chicago. Accessed April 22, 2021.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/611.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Crimmin, Patrick Edward. “A Statement and Criticism of the Doctrine on Human
Freedom Proposed by Some Recent Evolutionists.” 1937. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Crimmin PE. A Statement and Criticism of the Doctrine on Human
Freedom Proposed by Some Recent Evolutionists. [Internet] [Thesis]. Loyola University Chicago; 1937. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/611.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Crimmin PE. A Statement and Criticism of the Doctrine on Human
Freedom Proposed by Some Recent Evolutionists. [Thesis]. Loyola University Chicago; 1937. Available from: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/611
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of British Columbia
17.
Johnston, Elizabeth Lee.
The Alexandria quartet : love as metaphysical enquiry.
Degree: MA- MA, English, 1976, University of British Columbia
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2429/19979
► This thesis is based on a conviction that Lawrence Durrell's The Alexandria Quartet is a metaphysical romance in a truly modern sense; a parable which…
(more)
▼ This thesis is based on a conviction that Lawrence Durrell's The Alexandria Quartet is a metaphysical romance in a truly modern sense; a parable which uses the terminology of modern psychology and romantic love to describe a search for gnosis, or self-knowledge. The characters are prototypes whose enemies are the warring forces within the psyche: the romantic imagination, which manufactures the Illusions of love, and the intellectual examination which may destroy the illusion, but leaves nothing in its place. Durrell shows that his prototype characters must learn to value the naked experience of an emotional moment with a balanced spontaneity of perception divorced from the extremes of both the romantic imagination and the intellect.
The first chapter describes the psychological equilibrium which Durrell calls "the heraldic universe," which is concretized by statements from The Black Book, excerpts from Durrell's poems and allusions (from The Alexandria Quartet) to C. P. Cavafy, D. H. Lawrence and C. G. Jung. The final paragraphs deal with the dual approach to character and the corresponding polarities of the landscape of Alexandria.
The second chapter concentrates on Durrell's use of the novel for therapeutic enquiry, as a means of looking at the dark side of the psyche. The chapter explains the relation of the Quartet to moral allegory as
well as its concern with the dualism of instinct and ideal, reason and passion, which Aldous Huxley and Wyndham Lewis describe in a more expository style.
The third chapter contrasts the destructive will-to-power and the passion of political conspirators with the creative will of the poet and artist, the seeker after self-identity. The final paragraphs deal with images of madness and psychic disintegration resulting from obsessional love.
The fourth chapter discusses the major characters in relation to the life of their imaginations. In the case of the writers in the Quartet, the literary imagination distorts perceptions of love and experience. Pursewarden, the central artistic figure, is viewed in relation to the other prototypes who make a "story" out of their lives.
The final chapter attempts to show that Clea is a culmination of a psychological battle within the characters, an active drama instead of a reflection upon emotional experience. Love becomes depersonalized, a force which exists apart from the egotism of personality.
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Johnston, E. L. (1976). The Alexandria quartet : love as metaphysical enquiry. (Masters Thesis). University of British Columbia. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2429/19979
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Johnston, Elizabeth Lee. “The Alexandria quartet : love as metaphysical enquiry.” 1976. Masters Thesis, University of British Columbia. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/2429/19979.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Johnston, Elizabeth Lee. “The Alexandria quartet : love as metaphysical enquiry.” 1976. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Johnston EL. The Alexandria quartet : love as metaphysical enquiry. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of British Columbia; 1976. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2429/19979.
Council of Science Editors:
Johnston EL. The Alexandria quartet : love as metaphysical enquiry. [Masters Thesis]. University of British Columbia; 1976. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2429/19979

McMaster University
18.
Pikkert, Owen.
Contemporary Challenges to Quinean Ontology.
Degree: MA, 2012, McMaster University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/12399
► In this master’s thesis I defend a Quinean approach to ontology. I first describe the Quinean approach as consisting of three steps and three…
(more)
▼ In this master’s thesis I defend a Quinean approach to ontology. I first describe the Quinean approach as consisting of three steps and three theses. All three theses have been challenged in the contemporary literature. In each chapter I describe one such challenge, and then provide a response. The first challenge states that ontology is actually easy. Proponents of this challenge include Matti Eklund’s maximalist, as well as Amie Thomasson. In response, I argue that the maximalist cannot consistently determine whether abstract entities exist. I also argue that Thomasson’s account involves a certain slide in logic and is, in certain cases, ontologically uninformative. I then turn to the second challenge, which states that traditional ontological questions are not even worth pursuing. Here I discuss the work of Rudolf Carnap and of Jonathan Schaffer. I argue that Carnap fails to provide a cogent argument for the meaninglessness of ontological questions. Furthermore, I argue that one should not adopt Schaffer’s Aristotelian view of metaphysics and ontology. I do so by constructing an argument, logically parallel to one of Schaffer’s own, to demonstrate that there are no fundamental grounds. Finally, I consider the challenge posed by an ambiguity in ‘existence’. According to Eli Hirsch, such an ambiguity results in verbal disputes. Hirsch argues that the remedy is to adopt ordinary English. In response, I accept that ‘existence’ is ambiguous. But I deny that this poses a significant problem for Quinean ontology.
Master of Philosophy (MA)
Advisors/Committee Members: Griffin, Nicholas, Garrett, Brian, David Hitchcock, Mark Vorobej, Philosophy.
Subjects/Keywords: Ontology; Metametaphysics; Existence; Quine; Carnap; Metaphysics; Metaphysics
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Pikkert, O. (2012). Contemporary Challenges to Quinean Ontology. (Masters Thesis). McMaster University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11375/12399
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Pikkert, Owen. “Contemporary Challenges to Quinean Ontology.” 2012. Masters Thesis, McMaster University. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/11375/12399.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Pikkert, Owen. “Contemporary Challenges to Quinean Ontology.” 2012. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Pikkert O. Contemporary Challenges to Quinean Ontology. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. McMaster University; 2012. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/12399.
Council of Science Editors:
Pikkert O. Contemporary Challenges to Quinean Ontology. [Masters Thesis]. McMaster University; 2012. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/12399

University of Connecticut
19.
Capps, David Christopher.
The Problem of Meta-epistemic Disagreement.
Degree: 2011, University of Connecticut
URL: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3476644
► In this work I develop what I call the problem of meta-epistemic disagreement. I argue that there is a kind of apparent intractable disagreement,…
(more)
▼ In this work I develop what I call the problem of meta-epistemic disagreement. I argue that there is a kind of apparent intractable disagreement, embodied in recent disputes between internalists and externalists about epistemic justification, which calls for an explanation. I claim that such disagreement suggests adopting some form of antirealism about justification, construed as the denial of a single objective property denoted by 'justification'. I argue that each of the following antirealist positions about justification fails to explain meta-epistemic disagreement: nihilism, an ambiguity view, contextualism, relativism, and expressivism. In the final chapter I suggest a form of pluralism about justification that vindicates epistemic realism and addresses the problem of meta-epistemic disagreement.
Subjects/Keywords: Epistemology; Metaphysics; Philosophy
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Capps, D. C. (2011). The Problem of Meta-epistemic Disagreement. (Thesis). University of Connecticut. Retrieved from http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3476644
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Capps, David Christopher. “The Problem of Meta-epistemic Disagreement.” 2011. Thesis, University of Connecticut. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3476644.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Capps, David Christopher. “The Problem of Meta-epistemic Disagreement.” 2011. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Capps DC. The Problem of Meta-epistemic Disagreement. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Connecticut; 2011. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3476644.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Capps DC. The Problem of Meta-epistemic Disagreement. [Thesis]. University of Connecticut; 2011. Available from: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3476644
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
20.
Compton, Elizabeth Ashley Zeron.
A dispositional account of aesthetic properties.
Degree: 2012, State University of New York at Buffalo
URL: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3516527
► Delicacy, vibrancy, garishness, and other aesthetic properties feature prominently in our aesthetic experiences, and we intuitively speak of them as if they were real…
(more)
▼ Delicacy, vibrancy, garishness, and other aesthetic properties feature prominently in our aesthetic experiences, and we intuitively speak of them as if they were real properties of the objects of those experiences. We also frequently disagree in our aesthetic judgments, however, leading to worries about subjectivism. I argue that Aesthetic properties are dispositions and genuine properties of objects in the external world in virtue of which those objects cause aesthetic experiences for humans under the right conditions. Aesthetic dispositions are defined by their manifestations (the characteristic qualities they impart to aesthetic experience), by reference to which we identify and classify them. They are, nevertheless, properties of objects rather than observers; as such, they serve an explanatory role with reference to aesthetic experience, serve as truthmakers for aesthetic claims, and underwrite the normative elements of aesthetic discourse. Given the inescapable subjective elements in human aesthetic experience, some have concluded that if aesthetic properties can be said to exist at all, they depend for their existence on observers. On the contrary, I argue that aesthetic properties depend for their existence solely on the objects in the external world that instantiate them. I support this claim by arguing for a dispositional model where the aesthetic disposition is carefully distinguished from its manifestation (the aesthetic response it causes) and the conditions for manifestation (a qualified observer in appropriate background conditions). Aesthetic properties, like non-aesthetic sense-perceptible properties such as colors and sounds, are dispositions whose conditions for manifestation require the presence of a qualified observer. The qualified observer, in turn, possesses dispositions to respond to such properties, such as normal color vision or hearing in the case of sense-perceptible properties, and aesthetic taste (in Frank Sibley's sense) in the case of aesthetic properties. These observer dispositions form reciprocal pairs with the dispositions of the objects of sense or aesthetic perception, where each meets the conditions of manifestation for the other, and a joint manifestation event occurs. I contend that differences in aesthetic judgment regarding the (descriptive) aesthetic character of an artwork or other object can in many cases be resolved by pointing to differences in observers or conditions of observation. In other cases, however, we have little reason to privilege one kind of response over another, and I conclude that objects may well have multiple sets of aesthetic dispositions, only some of which will manifest to any given observer. These aesthetic properties may even manifest themselves in nearly opposite sorts of responses; I conclude that this does not defeat a realism about aesthetic properties because it is possible for an object to have dispositions to bring about opposing states, relative to the conditions that obtain. This explains…
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics; Philosophy; Aesthetics
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Compton, E. A. Z. (2012). A dispositional account of aesthetic properties. (Thesis). State University of New York at Buffalo. Retrieved from http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3516527
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Compton, Elizabeth Ashley Zeron. “A dispositional account of aesthetic properties.” 2012. Thesis, State University of New York at Buffalo. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3516527.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Compton, Elizabeth Ashley Zeron. “A dispositional account of aesthetic properties.” 2012. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Compton EAZ. A dispositional account of aesthetic properties. [Internet] [Thesis]. State University of New York at Buffalo; 2012. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3516527.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Compton EAZ. A dispositional account of aesthetic properties. [Thesis]. State University of New York at Buffalo; 2012. Available from: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3516527
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of California – San Diego
21.
Garbini, Adrienne.
Metaphysics.
Degree: Visual Arts, 2013, University of California – San Diego
URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3sz0q86x
Metaphysics is a Master's thesis in Visual Arts regarding the face, in the form of a 9 channel video installation with accompanying publication and thesis document.
Subjects/Keywords: Fine arts; Metaphysics
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Garbini, A. (2013). Metaphysics. (Thesis). University of California – San Diego. Retrieved from http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3sz0q86x
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Garbini, Adrienne. “Metaphysics.” 2013. Thesis, University of California – San Diego. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3sz0q86x.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Garbini, Adrienne. “Metaphysics.” 2013. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Garbini A. Metaphysics. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of California – San Diego; 2013. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3sz0q86x.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Garbini A. Metaphysics. [Thesis]. University of California – San Diego; 2013. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3sz0q86x
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Tulane University
22.
Calhoun, Zachary.
Metaphysica Naturalis: Kant on History and the Discipline of Reason.
Degree: 2020, Tulane University
URL: https://digitallibrary.tulane.edu/islandora/object/tulane:120566
► [email protected]
The most commonly ignored doctrine in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is his defense of his own critical methodology. This dissertation analyzes Kant’s statements…
(more)
▼ [email protected]
The most commonly ignored doctrine in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is his defense of his own critical methodology. This dissertation analyzes Kant’s statements on method in the “Discipline of Pure Reason” and a series of lectures from the 1760s and 1770s to prepare the way for a reinterpretation of the argumentative strategy of the Critique and its emancipatory aims. Reconsidering its argumentative strategy also requires reconsidering its substantive claims and achievements. “Discipline” is Kant’s name for the method that elevates the natural predisposition to metaphysics (“metaphysica naturalis”) to the secure status of science (“metaphysica generalis”) because the discipline accounts for the inescapable historicity of pure reason, achieving a revolution in rational history by making use of that historicity while eliminating its worst consequences. After disciplining the tumultuous unrest Kant finds everywhere in reason’s historical search for self- knowledge, reason can finally enter a period of “perpetual peace in philosophy.” Given Kant’s reservations about political revolution, this dissertation asks how the revolutionary turn in rational history is meant to enable peace. After Kant makes headway on the question of reason’s end by considering the dispute between ancient and modern philosophy, he considers the aprioricity of space, time, and the categories from a similarly historical perspective. This dissertation argues that Kantian reason is historical in such a way that it requires the negative legislation of critical discipline to reach the status of science, a result that contributes to the discussion about Kant’s thoughts on revolution.
1
Zachary Calhoun
Advisors/Committee Members: Velkley, Richard (Thesis advisor), School of Liberal Arts Philosophy (Degree granting institution).
Subjects/Keywords: Enlightenment; Kant; Metaphysics
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Calhoun, Z. (2020). Metaphysica Naturalis: Kant on History and the Discipline of Reason. (Thesis). Tulane University. Retrieved from https://digitallibrary.tulane.edu/islandora/object/tulane:120566
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Calhoun, Zachary. “Metaphysica Naturalis: Kant on History and the Discipline of Reason.” 2020. Thesis, Tulane University. Accessed April 22, 2021.
https://digitallibrary.tulane.edu/islandora/object/tulane:120566.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Calhoun, Zachary. “Metaphysica Naturalis: Kant on History and the Discipline of Reason.” 2020. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Calhoun Z. Metaphysica Naturalis: Kant on History and the Discipline of Reason. [Internet] [Thesis]. Tulane University; 2020. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: https://digitallibrary.tulane.edu/islandora/object/tulane:120566.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Calhoun Z. Metaphysica Naturalis: Kant on History and the Discipline of Reason. [Thesis]. Tulane University; 2020. Available from: https://digitallibrary.tulane.edu/islandora/object/tulane:120566
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Rochester
23.
Hodson, Sommer.
A hybrid view of personal identity.
Degree: PhD, 2013, University of Rochester
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/27998
► Personal identity is unlike many other metaphysical issues in that it is something that ordinary people understand and have rational beliefs about, but most leading…
(more)
▼ Personal identity is unlike many other metaphysical
issues in that it is something that ordinary people understand and
have rational beliefs about, but most leading accounts of personal
identity ignore our pre-philosophical beliefs, as evidenced by the
highly counterintuitive results they yield. I argue that the
conflict between these accounts and our pre-philosophical beliefs
should not be taken as evidence that our ordinary beliefs are
incorrect, but that the accounts which contradict our existing
beliefs fail to capture the thing we are actually concerned with
when it comes to our own existence through time. After defending
this central role for our beliefs, I survey several representative
accounts of personal identity, arguing that each clashes
irreconcilably with reasonable and deeply-held beliefs about our
own existence through time.
My positive claim is that a successful
account incorporates elements from both of the two major types of
personal identity account, psychological continuity and physical
continuity. I argue that a hybrid view, according to which a person
continues to exist so long as she has the same psychology in virtue
of having the same physical brain, is the best fit for our actual
pre-philosophical understanding of our own existence through time.
The hybrid view yields the expected results in typical situations
and provides more plausible results in hypothetical scenarios than
its competitors, while withstanding objections as well as its
competitors.
Finally, I discuss consequences that acceptance of
the hybrid view may have for related questions. I argue that the
hybrid view does not require acceptance of any particular theory
concerning related metaphysical questions, and can thus be accepted
without committing to a position on other matters. I also discuss
the ethical implications of the hybrid view, with particular
emphasis on how the hybrid view relates to moral
responsibility.
Subjects/Keywords: Metaphysics; Personal identity
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Hodson, S. (2013). A hybrid view of personal identity. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Rochester. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1802/27998
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Hodson, Sommer. “A hybrid view of personal identity.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Rochester. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1802/27998.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Hodson, Sommer. “A hybrid view of personal identity.” 2013. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Hodson S. A hybrid view of personal identity. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2013. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/27998.
Council of Science Editors:
Hodson S. A hybrid view of personal identity. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/27998
24.
Giusti, Igor.
The Transformation of the Body Through Spiritual Somatic Liquid-like Phenomena in the Path to Enlightenment, or Union with God, in Eight Mystical Paths| A Comparative Analysis.
Degree: 2019, California Institute of Integral Studies
URL: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=13427835
► What if it was possible to attain enlightenment, or union with God, in the physical body? What if instead of using meditation or prayer…
(more)
▼ What if it was possible to attain enlightenment, or union with God, in the physical body? What if instead of using meditation or prayer to merely transcend embodied existence, practitioners were to transform the experience of their body in order to bring a sense of transcendence into their very physicality and the world itself? These questions are timely. There is much dialogue around the relationship of enlightenment, or union with God, and the body. Using a hermeneutic methodology, this study first explores 8 spiritual concepts (in 8 different spiritual traditions) that refer to subtle spiritual phenomena occurring in the body. These phenomena are alternatively described as a liquid, oil, nectar, or water that penetrates the body, and hypothesized to relate to consciousness as experienced through somatic awareness or awareness occupying the body. These concepts and traditions are as follows: <i>amata</i> (and rapture and pleasure) in Theravada Buddhism, <i>amr&dotbelow;ita </i> in Vajrayāna Buddhism according to the Nyingma and Geluk school, <i> amr&dotbelow;ita</i> in Hinduism according to Hat&dotbelow;ha Yoga, <i> amr&dotbelow;ita</i> in neo-Advaita Vedānta, "the descending force" in Śri Aurobindo's Integral Yoga, the "water of life" in Christianity according to St. Teresa of Avila, <i>shefa</i> in Judaism according to the <i>Zohar,</i> and "presence" in A. H. Almaas' Diamond Approach. The first part of the study uses canonical texts and authoritative commentaries for hermeneutical analysis. Subsequently, by adopting a comparative methodological approach, the second part compares and contrasts the findings to understand the differences, similarities, and role of the experiences to which these 8 concepts refer in relation to the body and enlightenment, or union with God, as these spiritual goals are understood by each tradition.
Subjects/Keywords: Religion; Metaphysics; Spirituality
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Giusti, I. (2019). The Transformation of the Body Through Spiritual Somatic Liquid-like Phenomena in the Path to Enlightenment, or Union with God, in Eight Mystical Paths| A Comparative Analysis. (Thesis). California Institute of Integral Studies. Retrieved from http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=13427835
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Giusti, Igor. “The Transformation of the Body Through Spiritual Somatic Liquid-like Phenomena in the Path to Enlightenment, or Union with God, in Eight Mystical Paths| A Comparative Analysis.” 2019. Thesis, California Institute of Integral Studies. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=13427835.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Giusti, Igor. “The Transformation of the Body Through Spiritual Somatic Liquid-like Phenomena in the Path to Enlightenment, or Union with God, in Eight Mystical Paths| A Comparative Analysis.” 2019. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Giusti I. The Transformation of the Body Through Spiritual Somatic Liquid-like Phenomena in the Path to Enlightenment, or Union with God, in Eight Mystical Paths| A Comparative Analysis. [Internet] [Thesis]. California Institute of Integral Studies; 2019. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=13427835.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Giusti I. The Transformation of the Body Through Spiritual Somatic Liquid-like Phenomena in the Path to Enlightenment, or Union with God, in Eight Mystical Paths| A Comparative Analysis. [Thesis]. California Institute of Integral Studies; 2019. Available from: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=13427835
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Columbia University
25.
Pop, Ariadna.
Making Sense of Faultless Disagreement.
Degree: 2013, Columbia University
URL: https://doi.org/10.7916/D89P3108
► This dissertation examines the phenomenon of faultless disagreement: situations in which it seems that neither of two opposing sides has made a mistake in upholding…
(more)
▼ This dissertation examines the phenomenon of faultless disagreement: situations in which it seems that neither of two opposing sides has made a mistake in upholding their respective positions. I explore the way in which we ought to conceive of the nature of the kinds of claims that give rise to faultless disagreement and what the possibility of such disagreement reveals with a view to the rationality of tolerance. My starting point is a rather simple observation: persistent disagreements about ordinary empirical claims, say, that it's now raining outside or that Columbia's Philosophy Department is located at 1150 Amsterdam Avenue, are significantly more puzzling than persistent disagreements about matters of taste and value. Suppose you and I are standing at 1150 Amsterdam Avenue and you deny that this is where Columbia's Philosophy Department is located. My immediate – and I believe justifiable – reaction is to suspect that you suffer from some sort of cognitive shortcoming: bad eyesight, the influence of drugs, or what have you. As opposed to that, I am not particularly shocked to see that our disagreement about the tastiness of snails persists. More importantly, I would not want to say that you are mistaken in any real way if you call snails tasty. The problem is of course that if we are prepared to allow for the possibility of faultless disagreement, it seems inevitable to conclude that for certain subject matters the law of non-contradiction does not hold. The tension between this rather uncomfortable consequence and what seems to be a datum of our linguistic practices motivates the guiding question of my dissertation – namely, if there is a way to make sense of the phenomenon of faultless disagreement. In trying to do so, I make three central claims. First, I argue that the possibility of faultless disagreement is characteristic of what I call "basic evaluations." Evaluations are basic, on my account, not by being fundamental or universal, but by being rooted in the agent's sensibilities. Such evaluations are basic insofar as the agent cannot step outside of her inner frame of personal tastes and preferences. Second, I argue that what characterizes faultless disagreements is that there are no established methods of determining who has gotten things right. This is why we tend to think that the opponents may rationally stick to their respective positions – or, as I put in my dissertation, why we do not epistemically downgrade each other whenever we encounter such disagreements. The absence of established methods of resolution entails various epistemological challenges for realist accounts of the kinds of claims that give rise to faultless disagreement. The realist insists that despite the appearance that these disagreements are rationally irresolvable, at least one of the opposing sides must have made a mistake. But then she is forced to maintain either that we might lack epistemic access to the realm of evaluative facts and properties, or that we have access to this realm due to special evaluative capacities.…
Subjects/Keywords: Philosophy; Ethics; Metaphysics
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APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Pop, A. (2013). Making Sense of Faultless Disagreement. (Doctoral Dissertation). Columbia University. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.7916/D89P3108
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Pop, Ariadna. “Making Sense of Faultless Disagreement.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, Columbia University. Accessed April 22, 2021.
https://doi.org/10.7916/D89P3108.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Pop, Ariadna. “Making Sense of Faultless Disagreement.” 2013. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Pop A. Making Sense of Faultless Disagreement. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Columbia University; 2013. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: https://doi.org/10.7916/D89P3108.
Council of Science Editors:
Pop A. Making Sense of Faultless Disagreement. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Columbia University; 2013. Available from: https://doi.org/10.7916/D89P3108

University of Exeter
26.
Thebolt, Gabriel Arthur.
Emergent wholes and the porosity of dynamic objects.
Degree: PhD, 2013, University of Exeter
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10871/15718
► Claims in the metaphysics of strong emergence, featuring autonomous and possibly reflexive downward causal capacity, methodologically require, though ultimately ignore, units of analysis qua unified…
(more)
▼ Claims in the metaphysics of strong emergence, featuring autonomous and possibly reflexive downward causal capacity, methodologically require, though ultimately ignore, units of analysis qua unified wholes. I argue that this avoidance of mereological and wider metaphysical debates denies the metaphysics of emergence clarity and cohesion and urgent application to conceptions of structure and agency. In this thesis, using a refined, non-linear, irreproducible, non-ontologically reductionist open-system physicalism and empiricism, I show that claims in the metaphysics of emergence hastily assume first the integration and subsequently the individuation of objects that become the subject of these strong claims. These assumptions, I believe, are actually the cause for the insurmountable gap between pure ontological reduction on the one side, and pure ontological and irreducible property emergence on the other. Furthermore, in using this new physicalism in the context of strong emergence, the traditional boundary between ontology and epistemology—going far beyond the standard weak-strong divide in the emergence discourse—can no longer be respected. As such, the nature of emergent properties is critical to assessing the nature of objects qua wholes with respect to the conditions for their integration and individuation. The major contribution to the metaphysics of emergence that this thesis provides is the realisation that, when we assume all physical objects are open and porous, all claims for persisting, emergent wholes are necessarily based on physical assumptions of integration and individuation. Synthetically I offer a method for understanding the individuation of ‘quidditious’ objects via properties when such a physicalist framework is employed.
Subjects/Keywords: 320; emergence metaphysics
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Thebolt, G. A. (2013). Emergent wholes and the porosity of dynamic objects. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Exeter. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10871/15718
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Thebolt, Gabriel Arthur. “Emergent wholes and the porosity of dynamic objects.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Exeter. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/10871/15718.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Thebolt, Gabriel Arthur. “Emergent wholes and the porosity of dynamic objects.” 2013. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Thebolt GA. Emergent wholes and the porosity of dynamic objects. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Exeter; 2013. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10871/15718.
Council of Science Editors:
Thebolt GA. Emergent wholes and the porosity of dynamic objects. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Exeter; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10871/15718
27.
GE, TIANQIN.
The Relation between the What-It-Is and the Why-It-Is in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, On the Parts of Animals, and Metaphysics.
Degree: School of Social Sciences & Philosophy. Discipline of Philosophy, 2020, Trinity College Dublin
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2262/92335
► In this dissertation, my aim is to answer the following main question: 'What is the relation between the what-it-is and the why-it-is in Aristotle?' I…
(more)
▼ In this dissertation, my aim is to answer the following main question: 'What is the relation between the what-it-is and the why-it-is in Aristotle?' I focus on Aristotle's three treatises: Posterior Analytics, On the Parts of Animals, and
Metaphysics. The answer I will defend in this thesis can be formulated as follows:
1. In the Posterior Analytics, the enquiry into the what-it-is is inter-transformable to the enquiry into the why-it-is (This is what I call 'the Analytics Model').
2. In the Parts of Animals, the enquiry into the what-it-is depends on the enquiry into the why-it-is, but the enquiry into the why-it-is need not depend on the enquiry into the what-it-is (This I regard as 'the Biology Model').
3. In
Metaphysics ZH, the final enquiry into the what-it-is depends on the enquiry into the why-it-is, and the enquiry into the why-it-is further depends on earlier enquiry into the what-it-is (This is 'the
Metaphysics Model').
4. The Analytics Model provides a general framework for the relation between the what-it-is and the why-it-is, and both the Biology Model and the
Metaphysics Model develop this general framework in different ways, which conform to Aristotle's different agendas in these two domains of philosophical enquiry.
The issue of the what-it-is and the why-it-is is of great significance for Aristotle's philosophy, and, in the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle proposes a close relation between the two. However, it is unclear how he conceives of this relation, both in Posterior Analytics, in the biological works, and the
Metaphysics.
In Chapter 1, I consider the relation between the what-it-is and the why-it-is in the Posterior Analytics. I argue against David Charles' interpretation of this relation, according to which the definition must always be based on the demonstration, and the demonstration must depend on the definition. I will defend an alternative interpretation, which is distinctive in that maintains that it should be determined on a case-by-case basis whether we should begin with the enquiry into an explanation or with the enquiry into a definition.
In Chapter 2, I consider the relation between the Analytics Model and the Parts of Animals. Contra Charles, I defend the 'multiple causes thesis', according to which there exist several causally unrelated proper causes for some parts and features of animals. I argue that in the Parts of Animals, the enquiry into a definition needs to depend on the enquiry into the explanation(s), but not conversely.
In Chapter 3, I consider the relation between the Posterior Analytics and
Metaphysics Z17. I argue that, first, the claim that the essence is the primary cause is related to foregoing discussions in
Metaphysics Book Zeta; and, secondly, there is good reason to think that Aristotle does introduce a new apparatus, namely, the explanatory syllogism derived from the Posterior Analytics.
In Chapter 4, I argue that, in
Metaphysics ZH, first, the final differentia obtained from the method of division in Z12 provide the middle term in a sound explanatory…
Advisors/Committee Members: Politis, Vasilis.
Subjects/Keywords: Aristotle; Metaphysics; Biology
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
GE, T. (2020). The Relation between the What-It-Is and the Why-It-Is in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, On the Parts of Animals, and Metaphysics. (Thesis). Trinity College Dublin. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2262/92335
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
GE, TIANQIN. “The Relation between the What-It-Is and the Why-It-Is in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, On the Parts of Animals, and Metaphysics.” 2020. Thesis, Trinity College Dublin. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/2262/92335.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
GE, TIANQIN. “The Relation between the What-It-Is and the Why-It-Is in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, On the Parts of Animals, and Metaphysics.” 2020. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
GE T. The Relation between the What-It-Is and the Why-It-Is in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, On the Parts of Animals, and Metaphysics. [Internet] [Thesis]. Trinity College Dublin; 2020. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2262/92335.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
GE T. The Relation between the What-It-Is and the Why-It-Is in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, On the Parts of Animals, and Metaphysics. [Thesis]. Trinity College Dublin; 2020. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2262/92335
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Victoria University of Wellington
28.
Field, Christopher J.
Being and Becoming: A Metaphysics of Aesthetic Experience.
Degree: 2011, Victoria University of Wellington
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10063/2685
► In the tragedies of Greek antiquity occurred a rare phenomenological event that shaped its people, producing what the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche argued as the highest…
(more)
▼ In the tragedies of Greek antiquity occurred a rare phenomenological event that shaped its people, producing what the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche argued as the highest culture and art of Occidental civilization. Distilling the tragic dramas to a metaphysic of time, the origins of a bed rock of aesthetic experience is exposed in the dual presence of what has commonly been referred to since antiquity as ‘being’ and ‘becoming’. These two temporal phenomena are approached as qualitative experiences, which present two extreme polls of a basic spectrum of aesthetic experience. In understanding their underlying temporal origins, a direct and clear line of translation is found between these elements and their aesthetic import through the mechanisms of physical, tangible architectural properties. In addressing how architecture mediates each, two precedents are attended to which present pronounced ends of the œuvre of architectural conditions; Greek or ‘classic’ architecture, and that of the Brazilian slums or ‘Favelas’. Through an in-depth study of the temporality of Greek architecture we are offered a raw reflection into both the nature of ‘being’ and the fundamental ways it finds a presence through architecture - it is a look into the built languages of our own aesthetic and architectural sensibility. The study of ‘becoming’ in the Favelas is of particular significance, in that it affords access to a more rare, and yet markedly important, spectrum of the built environment; in understanding its deeper aesthetic import, we inevitably approach persuasive grounds of a value that questions conventional practices of architecture. A design based project in the final section of the thesis attempts an amalgamation of architectures of both being and becoming, as a means to understand deeper relations and tensions between them through the more subtle language of visual representation. Approaching architecture through the theoretical and phenomenological lens of being and becoming, we gain a valuable insight into the less concrete aspects of the art; into what we feel within it, and consequently a deeper and more conscious understanding of why we make things as they are; and potentially, through such understanding, how they can be made better.
Advisors/Committee Members: Wood, Peter.
Subjects/Keywords: Time; Aesthetics; Metaphysics
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Field, C. J. (2011). Being and Becoming: A Metaphysics of Aesthetic Experience. (Masters Thesis). Victoria University of Wellington. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10063/2685
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Field, Christopher J. “Being and Becoming: A Metaphysics of Aesthetic Experience.” 2011. Masters Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/10063/2685.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Field, Christopher J. “Being and Becoming: A Metaphysics of Aesthetic Experience.” 2011. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Field CJ. Being and Becoming: A Metaphysics of Aesthetic Experience. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Victoria University of Wellington; 2011. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10063/2685.
Council of Science Editors:
Field CJ. Being and Becoming: A Metaphysics of Aesthetic Experience. [Masters Thesis]. Victoria University of Wellington; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10063/2685

University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign
29.
Hendricksen, Christopher.
An analysis of the grounding relation.
Degree: PhD, 0332, 2014, University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/49701
► This dissertation is an analysis of the grounding relation and its use in contemporary metaphysics. In the first three chapters, I consider the relation itself…
(more)
▼ This dissertation is an analysis of the grounding relation and its use in contemporary
metaphysics. In the first three chapters, I consider the relation itself and its formal features. In the first chapter, I argue that there is such a grounding relation and that it is distinct from other relations. Having defended the grounding relation from skeptics, I turn to a discussion of the various features of the relation, starting with its candidate relata. In the second chapter, I analyze the nature and formal features of the grounding relation. In the third, I argue that there is a fundamental level consisting of entities which are ungrounded, and I discuss various proposals about what exists at that fundamental level.
The last two chapters focus on the role that grounding can play in contemporary
metaphysics. In the fourth chapter, I consider claims that certain relations, including the grounding relation, can yield an ontological free lunch. I examine what it might mean to get such a free lunch, and argue that there is no such thing. Finally, in the fifth chapter, I consider the grounding problem from material object
metaphysics. The use of the grounding relation in this debate illustrates how the grounding relation can be used in
metaphysics generally, and in the later part of the fifth chapter, I examine that role that the grounding relation can play.
Advisors/Committee Members: Korman, Daniel Z. (advisor), Korman, Daniel Z. (Committee Chair), McCarthy, Timothy G. (committee member), Arana, Andrew P. (committee member), Livengood, Jonathan M. (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Philosophy; Metaphysics; Grounding
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Hendricksen, C. (2014). An analysis of the grounding relation. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2142/49701
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Hendricksen, Christopher. “An analysis of the grounding relation.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/2142/49701.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Hendricksen, Christopher. “An analysis of the grounding relation.” 2014. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Hendricksen C. An analysis of the grounding relation. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign; 2014. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/49701.
Council of Science Editors:
Hendricksen C. An analysis of the grounding relation. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/49701

University of Southern California
30.
Weil, Jonathan Munich.
Dispositions: properties of powers.
Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2011, University of Southern California
URL: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/158828/rec/2043
► There is an intuitive distinction between dispositional properties—which involve powers to act in certain ways, and non-dispositional ones—which comprise strictly categorical qualities. However, this distinction…
(more)
▼ There is an intuitive distinction between
dispositional properties—which involve powers to act in certain
ways, and non-dispositional ones—which comprise strictly
categorical qualities. However, this distinction is resistant to
analysis, particularly on the side of dispositions, in ways that to
many suggest all dispositions should be explained away in terms of
categorical properties. I argue that dispositions cannot be
entirely accounted for in this manner. Instead, dispositions are
among the most fundamental properties of the world. As such they
are crucial components of any successful ontology. ❧ In particular,
I maintain that certain kinds of properties are exclusively
dispositional. To argue for this position I first detail some
important conceptual space in the philosophical literature on
dispositions. Doing so involves precisely elucidating several major
points of contention. These include epistemological and linguistic
concerns regarding the necessary and sufficient conditions for
ascriptions of dispositions. In addition certain metaphysical
questions about dispositions are at issue—most important whether
fundamental properties can be purely dispositional. Ultimately I
appeal to a characterization of the scientific project to support
the claim that brute powers do exist, and argue that this in turn
counts in favor of a related account of dispositions. Along the way
I detail more general theories of dispositions reflected by various
approaches to answering these contentious questions.
Advisors/Committee Members: Van Cleve, James (Committee Chair), Higginbotham, James (Committee Member), Schein, Barry (Committee Member).
Subjects/Keywords: dispsitions; philosophy; metaphysics
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Weil, J. M. (2011). Dispositions: properties of powers. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/158828/rec/2043
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Weil, Jonathan Munich. “Dispositions: properties of powers.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. Accessed April 22, 2021.
http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/158828/rec/2043.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Weil, Jonathan Munich. “Dispositions: properties of powers.” 2011. Web. 22 Apr 2021.
Vancouver:
Weil JM. Dispositions: properties of powers. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2011. [cited 2021 Apr 22].
Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/158828/rec/2043.
Council of Science Editors:
Weil JM. Dispositions: properties of powers. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2011. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/158828/rec/2043
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