▼ This thesis provides a reinterpretation of J.A.G. Griffith’s lecture ‘The Political Constitution’—a reinterpretation that stresses the commitment Griffith expressed in that lecture to the normative dimension of legal positivism. I call this normative dimension ‘normative positivism’. Identifying Griffith as a normative positivist serves to clarify a number of debates surrounding Griffith’s arguments in ‘The Political Constitution’ and serves to clarify our understanding of the concept that has come to be known in UK public law scholarship in recent years as ‘political constitutionalism’, of which Griffith is regarded as a leading exemplar. The thesis argues that Griffith’s political constitutionalism is best understood as a form of normative positivism and is very different from some more recent defences of political constitutionalism available in the scholarly literature. The thesis also considers how the big constitutional questions of the age in the UK—questions relating, for example, to bills of rights and devolution—play out in the light of our discovery and appreciation of Griffith’s normative positivism.

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES

The present thesis intends to defend, mainly, the possibility of differentiation between Law and Moral proposed by the tradition of legal positivism. In this way, we will defend what is now called ―exclusive legal positivism‖. In a second moment, the ―normative‖ view will be added to this positivism. For contemporary legal positivists, it is true that the separation thesis does not mean that law does not have connections, necessary or not, to morality. What the contemporary legal positivists assert is that the existence and validity of law can not depend on moral criteria. The existence and validity of law depend only on social facts. Which brings us to the question of the sources of law. We will affirm, therefore, that the thesis that conjugates or names legal positivism is the thesis of social sources of law. The separation thesis is at best a sub-thesis of legal positivism. The first chapter deals with the ―Evolution of Legal Positivism‖, seeking to trace a historical course of the debate between law and morals and the characterization and changes of the two main schools of legal thinking: natural law theory and legal positivism. Thus, we begin with the reference to Greek culture and we come to the current debate between inclusivists and exclusivists. The second chapter delves deeper into the first in some ways. It deals specifically with the ―Challenges of Legal Positivism‖, that is, the arguments of its main opponent - Ronald Dworkin - as well as the counter-arguments and renewal of legal positivism in the new currents that have been established: exclusive legal positivism, inclusive legal positivism and (exclusive) normative legal positivism. The third chapter is the broadest and addresses ―The relationship between law and morality‖ from both the analytical and normative perspectives. It seeks from the influences of the first utilitarians on legal positivism, going through the importance of the distinction between positive moral and critical moral and ending with the replacement of the problem of the separation of law and moral in legal positivism. Finally, according to the arguments of exclusive legal positivism, especially the practical difference thesis, we opt for the best formulation that appears in the title of this thesis: the differentiation between law and morality from the sources thesis.

A presente tese pretende defender, principalmente, a possibilidade de diferenciação entre direito e moral proposta pela tradição do positivismo jurídico. Neste caminho, defenderemos o que se chama, hoje, ―positivismo jurídico exclusivo‖. Em um segundo momento, será agregado o viés ―normativo‖ a este positivismo. Para os positivistas jurídicos contemporâneos, é certo que a tese da separação não quer dizer que o direito não tenha conexões, necessárias ou não, com a moralidade. O que os positivistas jurídicos contemporâneos afirmam é que a existência e a validade do direito não podem depender de critérios morais. A existência e a validade do…

Advisors/Committee Members: Sautter, Frank Thomas, Fonseca, Renato Duarte, Rocha, Ronai Pires da, Ghidolin, Clodoveo, Struchiner, Noel.

▼ In this dissertation I develop and defend a version of a general theory of the nature of law inspired by the classical natural law tradition, with special intellectual debt to the articulation of that tradition by John Finnis. I develop that theory by addressing two major "challenges" to natural law as a theory of law presented by writers in the legal positivist tradition: (1) the claim that theories in the legal positivist tradition are descriptively superior to theories in the natural law tradition, and (2) that theories in the legal positivist tradition are methodologically superior to theories in the natural law tradition. Addressing those two claims, I demonstrate not only that there is significant common ground between the version of natural law as a theory about the nature of law I defend and the most tenable versions of legal positivism but also that the version of natural law I defend possesses explanatory power that even the best versions of legal positivism do not. Advisors/Committee Members: Johnson, Robert N. (advisor).

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Društvene nauke / Pravna teorija

Као доминантан правац проучавања правне појаве, правни позитивизам је трпео критике првенствено од стране представника природноправне школе. Ипак, најсложенија критика правног позитивизма дошла је од стране Роналда Дворкина. Дворкин је за главну мету своје критике одабрао Хартову верзију позитивизма, будући да Хартова теорија и након више од педесет година од како је настала, представља парадигму позитивистичког приступа проучавању права, док се Харт сматра најугледнијим и најутицајнијим представником тог правца. Дворкин је своју критику Хартове верзије позитивизма развијао више од двадесет година, да би на основу те критике коначно поставио сопствену теорију права. Већ сама та чињеница указује на изузетну комплексност Дворкинове критике Хартове верзије позитивизма. Због тога је она у главном делу ове докторске дисертације подељена на два дела: дескриптивну и методолошку критику. У дескриптивној критици која је представљена у Двокиновом првом великом делу под називом „Taking Rights Seriously“ (1977. год.), Дворкин тврди да правни позитивизам описује право узимајући у обзир само правна правила, али не и правне принципе. По Дворкину, утицај правних принципа посебно је видљив у тзв. тешким случајевима који се пресуђују не на основу правних правила, већ на основу правних принципа. Због тога Дворкин износи тврдњу да правни позитивизам није способан да одговори на главни задатак који пред њим стоји – да правилно опише правну праксу. Дворкинова дескриптивна критика поделила је правне позитивисте у два табора – оне који заступају инклузивну и оне који заступају ексклузивну варијанту правног позитивизма. Она представља изузетан допринос у оквиру модерне јуриспруденције пошто су њоме отворена нека од најзначајнијих питања правне теорије и филозофије. Другом врстом критике која је уобличена у „Law’s Empire“ (1986. год.), нападнуте су саме основе правног позитивизма, тј. његове главне методолошке поставке. Позивајући се на први наук позитивизма који право схвата као чињеницу, Дворкин тврди да, ако је то схватање тачно, међу правницима не може бити спорења око права, осим ако неко од њих чини емпиријску грешку приликом утврђивања чињеница. Пошто то није случај, Дворкин доказује да је у питању теоријско неслагање које није неслагање око самог права, већ око његове моралности.

Advisors/Committee Members: Mitrović, Dragan, 1953-.

▼ No legal tradition in history has developed an account of law and legal validity that compares in significance to that of legal positivism. Its most celebrated theorist in the 20th century, Hans Kelsen, conceptualizes legal validity as produced and reproduced within a self-referential system of law. Yet, by focusing on law’s self-referentiality, i.e., norms legitimating other norms, his theory fails to account for the complex interplay between positive and non-positive norms, and how this interplay is related to legal validity. More specifically, the positivist conception of law cannot account for how non-positive practices of legal adjudication produce and reproduce legal validity. To address this problem, I develop a “post-positivist” approach to legal validity grounded in non-positive norms of legal adjudication. I discuss three normative theories of legal adjudication that provide non-positive, practice-based accounts of legal validity. The three theories of adjudication I discuss are those of Ronald Dworkin, Jürgen Habermas, and Rainer Forst. In conclusion, a post-positivist approach to law means keeping positivism’s notion of self-referential legal validity, but introducing other normative inputs that compete with it without negating it in an on-going fashion.

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O presente trabalho busca fazer uma análise do status quaestionis do positivismo jurídico na atualidade, compreendido em dois planos: primeiro, enquanto construção teórica que busca se renovar e se reafirmar dentro das ciências jurídicas após a ampla repercussão da famosa - e já bem assentada - crítica de Dworkin ao positivismo; segundo, na forma de práticas que continuam presentes no senso comum teórico dos juristas brasileiros, dentre as quais se destaca a questão da discricionariedade judicial. Deseja-se, com isso, superar o debate clássico Hart-Dworkin de trinta anos atrás e analisar como esse debate evoluiu, ou seja, como os positivistas contemporâneos lidaram com as críticas de Dworkin e o que este autor, hoje, tem a dizer do positivismo jurídico que ainda sobrevive no meio acadêmico. Pretendemos, também, demonstrar que a discricionariedade judicial que herdamos do positivismo normativista pós-Kelsen possui um Calcanhar de Aquiles filosófico, qual seja, a sua necessária vinculação com o ceticismo filosófico, uma postura historicamente superada dentro da filosofia desde os tempos de Platão e Aristóteles. Além dessa má fundamentação filosófica, sustentaremos ainda que a discricionariedade judicial positivista é intrinsecamente incompatível com o Estado Democrático de Direito, nascido no Século XX dentro do paradigma do neoconstitucionalismo (Constitucionalismo Contemporâneo) do segundo pós-Guerra.

The present study attempts to analyze the status quaestionis of legal positivism today, understood on two levels: first, while theoretical construct that seeks to reassert itself within the legal sciences after the famous and well established critics of Ronald Dworkin. Second, in the form of practices that are still present in the common sense of Brazilian jurists, among which highlights the issue of judicial discretion. This study seeks to overcome the classic Hart-Dworkin debate of thirty years ago to look at how this debate evolved. In other words: how today positivists dealt with the critics of Dworkin and what this author now has to say about contemporary positivist theories in Law academy. We also wanted to demonstrate that judicial discretion inherited from Kelsens normativism has an Achilles Heel philosophy, namely, its necessary connection with the philosophical skepticism, a position historically overcome within the philosophy since the times of Plato and Aristotle. In addition to this poor philosophical background, the positivist judicial discretion is inherently incompatible with the modern models of democratic rule of law, born in the twentieth century within the paradigm of neoconstitutionality (Contemporary Constitutionalism) after the Second World War

Advisors/Committee Members: Fernanda Frizzo Bragato.

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The present work has as objective to delineate the paper of the legal speech in the one after-positivism, using itself of analysis of sentences selected of the Supreme Federal Court. After-positivism dimencions appears in the cradle of after-modernity with a requirement of the multiple social contemporaries and if it establishes as overcoming of the positivista paradigm for affirmation of a new form to interpret and to apply the right. It considers a value perspective, inserting in the power to decide process elements beyond the letter of the law, the example of the principles, the precedents judicial and information pertinent techniques to the facts taken to the decomposition of the judge, everything in search of a decision more reasonable joust and. This scene it enters the legal speech as materializador instrument of this new optics of the right, through the argumentative construction that makes possible the judge to bind to the system of rules and principles to the procedures, more specifically, the action at law. For evidence of the hypothesis raised in the research, bibliographical research was carried through that forms the theoretical ballast, on the basis of the authors Robert Alexy, Theodor Viehweg, Chaim Perelman and Neil MacCormick, as well as, had been analyzed three sentences intentionally selected, for a practical boarding of the central question. One concluded that the paper of the legal speech in the right after-positivism is to function as facilitator of a differentiated logic of reasoning and legislator of sentences.

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo delinear o papel do discurso jurídico no pós-positivismo, utilizando-se de análise de acórdãos selecionados do Supremo Tribunal Federal. O pós-positivismo surge no berço da pós-modernidade com uma exigência das múltiplas facetas sociais contemporâneas e se estabelece como superação do paradigma positivista para afirmação de uma nova forma de interpretar e aplicar o direito. Considera uma perspectiva mais valorativa, inserindo no processo decisório elementos além da letra da lei, a exemplo dos princípios, dos precedentes judiciais e de informações técnicas pertinentes aos fatos levados à decomposição do juiz, tudo em busca de uma decisão mais justa e razoável. Neste cenário ingressa o discurso jurídico como instrumento materializador dessa nova ótica do direito, através da construção argumentativa que possibilita ao julgador ligar o sistema de regras e princípios aos procedimentos, mais especificamente, o processo judicial. Para comprovação da hipótese levantada na pesquisa, foi realizada pesquisa bibliográfica que forma o lastro teórico, com base nos autores Robert Alexy, Theodor Viehweg, Chaim Perelman e Neil MacCormick, bem como, foram analisados três acórdãos intencionalmente selecionados, para uma abordagem prática da questão central. Concluiu-se que o papel do discurso jurídico no direito pós-positivista é funcionar como facilitador de uma lógica diferenciada de raciocínio e legitimador de decisões judiciais.

Advisors/Committee Members: Nelson Cerqueira.

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Partindo da idéia de que a concepção filosófica adotada, de forma consciente ou inconsciente, sobre o Direito determina, ou ao menos condiciona significativamente, o ensino jurídico, o autor examina os atos normativos que disciplinam as diretrizes curriculares dos cursos de Direito no Brasil, bem como as grades curriculares e conteúdos programáticos de algumas disciplinas dos cursos de graduação em Direito da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo e das Faculdades Integradas de São Carlos, e ainda questões de alguns exames de admissão na Seção de São Paulo da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil. Essa análise, que inclui ainda o exame de referências bibliográficas adotadas, e outras práticas de ensino, é feita visando identificar a existência de determinações ou condicionamentos do positivismo jurídico tido como concepção filosófica do Direito dominante no Brasil sobre o modo de ensino. Para tanto, o autor delineia conceitualmente o positivismo jurídico e identifica suas principais características, notadamente em sua corrente teoricamente mais sofisticada, valendo-se da obra de Hans KELSEN, e em especial no que se refere à distinção entre direito natural e direito positivo, bem como com relação à supremacia da lei como fonte do Direito, e quanto às peculiaridades da sua hermenêutica. Nesse esforço, o autor estabelece ainda distinções e similitudes entre o positivismo jurídico e o positivismo comteano, bem como entre o positivismo jurídico e o neo-positivismo. A questão da viabilidade de uma ciência do Direito tida como paradigma atualmente dominante e como característica relevante do positivismo jurídico é tratada pelo autor incidentalmente, sendo feitas críticas quanto ao tema da verificabilidade objetiva das proposições jurídicas sobre a existência das normas jurídicas, e sobre a licitude das condutas humanas; e também quanto o tema da possibilidade de desenvolvimento de lógicas jurídicas; e da delimitação do objeto da ciência do Direito, com base na concepção de ciência empírica de Karl POPPER. Para a crítica da delimitação do objeto da ciência do Direito, na concepção juspositivista, o autor desenvolve, como categoria de análise, o conceito de fetichismo da lei, inspirado no conceito de fetichismo da mercadoria de Karl MARX. Mediante o exame dos dados empíricos referidos, inclusive utilizando-se de análises comparativas com textos legais, o autor estabelece as características do que denomina ensino positivista do Direito, quanto às diretrizes curriculares, ao modo de elaboração do currículo, ao conteúdo programático, à doutrina e ao modo de avaliação. Por fim, o autor aponta conseqüências do ensino positivista do Direito, quanto ao reducionismo normativista, ao normativismo abstrato, ao a-historicismo, e ao tecnicismo jurídico, e formula propostas para uma nova abordagem do ensino do Direito, quanto ao abandono do paradigma cientificista, e quanto à ampliação dos limites do objeto de estudo.

Starting from the idea that the philosophical law conception accepted, consciously or unconsciously, determines, or…

Advisors/Committee Members: João Virgílio Tagliavini.

▼ Legal positivism posits that the observation of how officials and citizens treat the legal system’s rules combine to constitute law’s existence. This is not an understanding verified by cases such as Nigeria’s legal system. Using historical evidence from the UK National Archives, and examples of recent court cases, I attempt to show that although such legal systems do, in fact, exist, they defy positivism’s conceptualization. They suggest that while the legal legitimacy of law is one thing, it does not account for obedience; and neither is the social fact of obedience necessary in defining legal validity. This thesis aims to suggest that far from being an outlying case, Nigeria provides interesting philosophical illumination about what positivism does not explain about legal systems in general—namely, what determines obedience. This thesis uses the political philosophies of Aristotle and Rousseau to construct a philosophical understanding of the basis for obedience to law. It suggests that it is by participation in the function of a legal system, that law is shown to a given population to have a specific purpose that is tied to the moral nature of the state. This thesis asserts that participation serves to illuminate law’s moral legitimacy as an especial type of legitimacy that is, in a sense, prior to its legal legitimacy and as what explains obedience separately from law’s legal validity, which simply explains its plain existence. This thesis further uses a field experiment centred on a transportation system in Lagos, Nigeria to test, empirically, the hypotheses generated by its theoretical investigations that: 1: the greater a people’s direct participation in creating their laws, the greater they perceive of the law’s moral legitimacy. and 2: The greater the people’s belief in the law’s moral legitimacy, the greater their free obedience to the law. The results suggest that the manner in which citizens are allowed to participate on the formulation and enactment of rules affects the extent to which they go on to obey those rules. These results, further, give empirical grounds for the thesis’ theoretical combination of an Aristotelian understanding of law’s authority with a reformulation of Rousseau’s argument that participation is necessary for, and derived from, freedom. Advisors/Committee Members: Swanson, Judith A. (advisor).

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Nesta dissertação pretendo reler o debate entre Ronald Dworkin e o positivismo jurídico. Farei isto sob o prisma da filosofia analítica, especificamente, contextualizando o debate no âmbito de uma discussão travada entre três teorias semânticas específicas: a descricional, o externalismo semântico e o bi-dimensionalismo ambicioso. Há algum tempo Dworkin lançou uma crítica ao positivismo, qual seja, o positivismo jurídico pretende reduzir a forma direito de como as coisas são à conformação puramente descritiva de como o mundo é. Disse, ainda, que somente quando concebido como uma teoria semântica é que o positivismo jurídico tornar-se-ia inteligível. Os posivistas, a seu turno, argumentam que a Jurisprudência analítica é um projeto teórico pelo direito e não pelo significado do termo direito e que, portanto, deveríamos manter separados dois tipos de questionamentos: O que é direito? e O que é direito?. Se tudo correr bem, ao reler o debate entre os positivistas e Ronald Dworkin a partir do instrumental obtido no âmbito da teoria semântica, poderemos perceber que pode ser verdade que o positivismo jurídico, enquanto projeto teórico, é sobre o direito, o referente, e não sobre o direito, o termo; entretanto, a forma pela qual o positivismo concebe o questionamento O que é direito?, ele mesmo, parece acabar por qualificá-lo, num sentido não trivial, como semântico.

I intend to reread the debate between Ronald Dworkin and legal positivism. I will do that through the prism of analytic philosophy, specifically in the context of the debate between three specific semantic theories: descriptional, externalism and the ambitious bidimensionalism. Dworkin criticized legal positivism: the legal positivism aims to reduce the law-way of things to the purely descriptive form of the world. He also said that only when conceived as a semantic theory is that legal positivism would become intelligible. The posivists argue that analytical Jurisprudence is a theoretical project about law and not about the meaning of \"law\", therefore we should keep separated two types of questions: \"What is law?änd \"What is \'law\'?\". If all goes well, when rereading the debate through the prism of the discussion in the context of semantic theories, we will realize that it may be true that legal positivism is about law, the referent, and not about \"law\". However, the way in which positivism conceives the question \"What is law?s̈eems to qualify it as semantic in a nontrivial sense.

Advisors/Committee Members: Juliano Souza de Albuquerque Maranhão, Dimitri Dimoulis, Ronaldo Porto Macedo Júnior.

▼ Le travail ici présenté offre une approche originelle des notions juridiques développées par Hans Kelsen dans ses efforts vers l'élaboration d'une théorie "pure" du droit. Cette étude est basée sur une analyse philosophique des principaux concepts juridiques qui ont, à leur tour, des caractéristiques philosophiques pertinentes, principalement les notions qui sont apparemment "partagées" entre les domaines juridique et philosophique, sans pour autant garder les mêmes significations sémantiques. La notion la plus pertinente à avoir ces caractéristiques est peut-être celle de "validité", étant donné qu'il s'agit d'une notion présente tant dans le domaine de la logique quant dans le domaine juridique; Dans ce sens, nous prétendons approcher aussi les notions de fiction normative, de science du droit, de conflits entre normes (qui sont aussi erronément appelés "contradictions entre normes"), et la règle d'inférence comme elle est appliquée dans le contexte de la création normative, donnant lieu à des notions trompeuses comme celle de raisonnement pratique. La notion de raisonnement pratique est d'ailleurs très riche concernant ce contexte de comparaison, et elle sera particulièrement traitée en fonction des autres notions problématiques qu'elle génère dans le champ normatif, telles que le Dilemme de Jørgensen; Cette notion, étant employée dans différents cas problématiques du droit, nous offre une opportunité de présenter une approche alternative pour le traitement logique du processus de justification dans la création d'une norme. Nous avons pour objectif aussi d'analyser les notions de condition logique et juridique, qui représentent un changement dans la perspective de Kelsen concernant l'utilité et la légitimité de l'application de la logique dans le champ normatif du droit. Une telle étude comparative, même si elle semble être fondamentale pour éclaircir les notions en question dans ces domaines respectifs, reste une tâche jamais réalisée dans une telle manière systématique. L'objectif de cette étude est de fournit un panorama clair concernant les limites entre les champs de la philosophie (spécialement la logique) et les normes juridiques. La compréhension des relations entre les notions "homonymes" doit aussi expliquer pourquoi elles sont utilisées de forme erronée aussi fréquemment quand les philosophes discutent du droit, mais aussi quand les juristes cherchent des justifications pour les concepts dans leurs théories. Ainsi, le contexte de cette étude est le positivisme juridique tel qu'il est présenté par le philosophe du droit Hans Kelsen. Notre choix est justifié par le fait que lathéorie de Kelsen s'avère l plus conforme à notre approche philosophique d'orientation logique et analytique. L’œuvre qui servira de base à notre investigation est la "Théorie Générale des Normes" (1979), surtout dû au fait de représenter l'intensité des efforts de son auteur pour traiter les problèmes juridiques liés à des aspect philosophiques ou logiques. Cela est particulièrement remarquable dans le cas de la possibilité… Advisors/Committee Members: Rahman, Shahid (thesis director).

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The dissertation has as its theme the teaching of humanities and proposes a study of juridical formation with a view to hermeneutics as an overcoming of the dominant positivist paradigm of Law. The contribution of the humanistic disciplines to legal formation is outlined as a general objective, in order to emphasize the (im) dispensability of the humanistic component in the composition of the fundamental training axis. As specific objectives, it delineates: [a] circumscribe, in an epistemological context, the context of Brazilian legal education; [b] to examine the Curricular Guidelines and Pedagogical Projects of four courses of Law of Santa Maria / RS to identify the space destined to humanistic disciplines in legal formation; [c] analyze the syllabus, syllabus, syllabus, skills and competences and egress profile to understand the importance of humanistic disciplines in the formation of the future legal thinker; [d] confront the study of the documents with the epistemological and educational foundations, and; [and] lecture on the reflexes of a humanistic formation in the professional's work in the legal area and application of the law. It is a qualitative and quantitative paradigm, allying the quantitative (objectivity) and interpretative (subjectivity) paradigm in a hermeneutical approach, whose descriptive and exploratory strategy consists in investigating the influence of humanistic disciplines on legal education from the space assigned to them in the Pedagogical Project of Law course of Institutions of Higher Education of Santa Maria / RS. For this, it adopts: the Documentary Analysis due to the corpus of the research, composed of the Pedagogical Projects; Content Analysis, which supports the linguistic materiality present in the communication; and Discursive Analysis, with a focus on the lexicon, latent meanings and values of the humanities in legal formation, from the hermeneutic categories. The discussion starts from the change of the dominant positivist paradigm in the Law, which corresponds to what is put by the State in the description of social facts (objective social phenomenon), with hermeneutics as the conduit of the interpretation of Law under assumptions of analysis and understanding of discourse and the very subject to which it is inserted, in a game of signification and re-signification of knowledges, senses and values. The law, in the hermeneutic scope, metaphorically assumes a similarity to the game, as a ludic dimension (aesthetic), so it is constituted as…

Advisors/Committee Members: Alves, Marcos Alexandre, Lisowski, Carolina Salbego, Garcia, Jaci Rene Costa.

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O presente trabalho busca sustentar a tese de que o Estado Democrático de Direito, oriundo do Constitucionalismo Contemporâneo, representa um novo paradigma político-jurídico que se mostra radicalmente transformador na comparação com as encarnações anteriores do Estado Moderno. Sustenta, todavia, que este novo paradigma político-jurídico não veio acompanhado de um novo paradigma epistemológico (apesar de o chamado “neoconstitucionalismo” ter representado uma tentativa - frustrada e insuficiente - neste sentido). Na medida em que a última grande epistemologia jurídica de influência universal, a Teoria Pura do Direito própria do normativismo positivista kelseniano, se mostra absolutamente inadequada e insuficiente para explicar o Direito dentro daquele novo paradigma político-jurídico, se faz necessária uma (re)construção epistemológica do Direito no contexto do Constitucionalismo Contemporâneo. Uma epistemologia jurídica efetivamente pós-positivista, aliada ao paradigma metodológico-interpretativo da hermenêutica jurídica, deve ser capaz de dar as condições de legitimidade discursiva e científica para que o Direito evite ser instrumentalizado pela política ou pelo poder econômico e, sobretudo, para que desfrute da autonomia necessária para atuar como instrumento qualificado na concretização do Estado Democrático de Direito e na proteção de direitos e garantias fundamentais.

The present work seeks to support the thesis that the Democratic Rule of Law, coming from Contemporary Constitutionalism, represents a new political-legal paradigm that is radically transformative in comparison with the previous incarnations of the Modern State. It argues, however, that this new political-legal paradigm was not accompanied by a new legal epistemological paradigm (although the so-called "neo-constitutionalism" represented a failed and insufficient attempt in this sense). Given the fact that the last major legal epistemology of universal influence, Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, is today absolutely inadequate and insufficient to explain the Law within that new political-legal framework, a legal epistemological (re)construction - adequate to Contemporary Constitutionalism - is much needed. An effectively post-positivist legal epistemology, coupled with the methodological-interpretative paradigm of legal hermeneutics, must be capable of giving the conditions of discursive and scientific legitimacy for the Law, in the sense of been capable to avoid being manipulated or distorted by political or economic power. Above all, it must assure the Law's discursive autonomy necessary for it to act as a qualified instrument of concretization…

Advisors/Committee Members: http://lattes.cnpq.br/8264155510478374, Barretto, Vicente de Paulo.

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This dissertation offers a critical analysis of the dominant philosophical theory of law today: Hartian positivism. The arguments proffered are not meant to strike at the underlying methodology of that account. Rather, they are intended to demonstrate that it performs sub-optimally with regard to its own jurisprudential aspirations. More specifically, this thesis contends that the Hartian position is unable to model the law in a way that captures the de facto terms of institutional governance, while also being able to give due theoretical credence to the normative structures and mechanisms that are widely deployed to regulate it. With this conclusion in hand, a new theory of law is suggested – one that seeks to stay true to the methods and aspirations of its predecessor, but which has been constructed so as to surpass its descriptive-explanatory capabilities. In this way, the following dissertation means to push analytic jurisprudence beyond the Hartian pale, and into new areas of theoretical discourse.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Advisors/Committee Members: Waluchow, Wilfrid, Sciaraffa, Stefan, Igneski, Violetta, Philosophy.

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The purpose of this thesis, based on philosophical hermeneutic, is developing the constitutional dirigisme philosophic grounds, in the context of surpassing the dominant paradigm of legal positivism of Brazilian Law. Founded on the Gadamerian structural model of art and play, and on the Heideggerian ontological phenomenology, the text intends to analyze critically the components of the dominant legal imaginary, aiming to show the ways to deconstruct the legal imaginary and consequently to surpass the legal positivism. The accomplishment of this task makes the recognition of the normative force of the dirigent Constitution possible. The constitutional dirigisme is conceived in the context of the surpassing of the metaphysical dualism of the subject-object scheme derived from the Cartesian philosophy of conscience, coherently with a material theory of Constitution, understood as a constitutionally appropriated Constitution theory. The theory of Constitution developed in the text is adapted to the needs of a society that is still in process of democratic consolidation, as the Brazilian one

A presente dissertação tem por objetivo construir, a partir da hermenêutica filosófica, uma justificação filosófica ao dirigismo constitucional, no contexto da superação do paradigma positivista que impera no Direito brasileiro. Com base no modelo estrutural do jogo e na noção de arte, de matriz gadameriana, e com suporte na fenomenologia ontológica heideggeriana, o texto se propõe a analisar criticamente os elementos que formatam e sustentam o imaginário jurídico positivista dominante, para posteriormente apresentar, por meio da hermenêutica filosófica, caminhos à desconstrução desse imaginário e à conseqüente superação do positivismo jurídico, possibilitando o reconhecimento da força normativa da Constituição dirigente. O dirigismo constitucional é concebido a partir da superação do dualismo metafísico do esquema sujeito-objeto oriundo da filosofia cartesiana da consciência, de forma coerente com uma teoria material da Constituição, entendida como uma teoria da Constituição constitucionalmente adequada, adaptada às necessidades de uma sociedade que, como a brasileira, ainda se encontra em processo de consolidação democrática

Advisors/Committee Members: Lenio Luiz Streck.

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La présente thèse porte sur la question de l’intelligibilité de la traduction juridique pour un praticien du droit. Notre hypothèse de travail consiste à dire que l’échec de la traduction juridique s’explique par l’absence de pertinence de la traduction pour son utilisateur. Pour éclairer cet aspect, une approche interdisciplinaire est adoptée. Méthodologiquement, nous partons de la critique de la notion d’équivalence et de la conception de la traduction comme recherche d’équivalents. Notre état de l’art se déploie en trois volets. Le premier volet traite de la théorie de la pertinence de Sperber et Wilson. Le second volet expose le traitement de la notion de pertinence en sciences de l’information. Le troisième volet présente la théorie de la pertinence et la théorie des connaissances élaborées par le sociologue Alfred Schütz Notre corpus d’étude comporte 145 bitextes allemand-français servant de base à des analyses contrastives. Dans la dernière partie, nous proposons une définition de la notion de pertinence et de ses conditions en traduction. Enfin, une méthode pratique de traduction fondée sur les notions de pertinence et d’usage est esquissée.

This thesis deals with the question of the intelligibility of legal translation for a legal practitioner. Our working hypothesis is that the failure of the legal translation is explained by the lack of relevance of the translation for its user. To shed light on this aspect, an interdisciplinary approach is adopted. Methodologically, we start from the criticism of the notion of equivalence and the conception of translation as a search for equivalents. Our state of the art is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the relevance theory of Sperber and Wilson. The second part describes the treatment of relevance in information science. The third part presents the theory of relevance and the theory of knowledge developed by sociologist Alfred Schütz. Our corpus includes 145 French-German texts used as a basis for contrasts analyses. In the personal contribution, we propose a definition of relevance and its conditions in translation. Finally, a practical method of translation based on the notions of relevance and usage is outlined.

Advisors/Committee Members: Grass, Thierry (thesis director).

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O presente trabalho propõe a aplicação do princípio da eficiência na atividade jurisdicional como decorrência do novo papel do Poder Judiciário na sociedade brasileira. O pós-positivismo jurídico e a superação do modelo teórico do Estado liberal trouxeram à sociedade contemporânea uma mudança de perspectiva. A clássica divisão de poderes oriunda do paradigma do Estado moderno ofuscou em certa medida a percepção de algo evidente: o Poder Judiciário no exercicio integral de todas as suas atividades ou seja não apenas daquelas tipicamente administrativas mas também e principalmente no que tangencia às precípuas e finalísticas integra efetivamente a Administração Pública. Dessa premissa considerando ainda a força normativa do princípio da eficiência administrativa que é inerente ao próprio Estado Democrático de Direito deriva a consequência da existência de um dever do Poder Judiciário perante os cidadaos de apresentar uma gestão de resultados efetivos em termos de acesso à Justiça para a concretização de direitos fundamentais. O alcance de tais resultados por seu turno é diretamente fomentado pela observância da eficiência administrativa na própria prestação jurisdicional. A argumentação utilizada nos fundamentos das decisões jurisdicionais deve ser vetorizada por este princípio na direção da plena concretização do direito de ter acesso à Justiça o que em última análise confere condições concretas de fazer valer direitos fundamentais ao cidadão.

This dissertation proposes the application of the principle of efficiency in the judicial activity as a result of the new role of the judiciary in Brazilian society. The legal post-positivism and the overcoming of the theoretical model of the liberal state has brought a change of perspective to contemporary society. The classic division of powers as per the paradigm of the modern state has obscured the perception of something evident: the Judiciary in the full exercise of all their activities that is not just those typically administrative but also and especially with regard to main attributions effectively integrates th public administration. Given this premise and considering the normative force of the principle of administrative efficiency that is inherent to democratic rule of law derives the consequence of the existence of a duty of the judiciary to the citzens to present a management results in terms of access to justice for the achievement of fundamental rights. The achievement of such results in turn is directly promoted by the observance of administrative efficiency in the adjudication inself. The arguments used in the foundations of judicial decisions should be vectored by this principle towards the full realization of the right of access to justice which ultimately gives the concrete conditions of enforcing fundamental rights to citzens.

Advisors/Committee Members: Celso Luiz Braga de Castro, Rodolfo Mário da Veiga Pamplona Filho.

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Within legal positivism, the theory which holds that there is no necessary connection between legal validity and morality, there is dissensus about whether there can be a contingent connection. Inclusive legal positivists suggest that it is possible for morality to play a role in determining a norm’s legal validity while exclusive legal positivists argue for the opposite. This dissertation examines this debate between inclusive legal positivism and exclusive legal positivism focusing on how paying attention to all of the fundamental secondary rules in a legal system can affect arguments about the coherence of either theory. The fundamental secondary rules being the rules which identify other rules, identify authority and authorize changes. I will be demonstrating that three exclusive legal positivist arguments against inclusive legal positivism are unconvincing because of the role that fundamental secondary rules play in our legal systems. Shapiro and Raz offer arguments against inclusive legal positivism based on different important features that they believe the law possesses. However, given their commitment to a particular type of fundamental secondary rule, specifically a directed power, exclusive legal positivism is unable to better capture these important features. Himma suggests that inclusive legal positivism cannot explain how a court can have final authority to determine constitutional cases involving moral criteria. Again, however, we examine what fundamental rules an inclusive legal positivist could employ to explain the phenomenon, we find that exclusive legal positivism is in no better position. At the end of the dissertation, I will suggest why I think continuing with these types of arguments will continue to be fruitless and briefly examine how similar inclusive and exclusive legal positivism are through investigating how one might determine whether a given legal system had an inclusive rule of recognition or exclusive one.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Advisors/Committee Members: Waluchow, Wilfrid, Sciaraffa, Stefan, Giudice, Michael, Philosophy.

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This dissertation explores the way in which different conceptions of human agency have helped to shape the course of jurisprudential thought. The overarching aim is to bring to the surface the deeper commitments of Hartian positivism in its various engagements with rival accounts of the nature of law. In particular, I argue that although contemporary positivists take their account of law to be metaphysically noncommittal, views of what it is to be a human agent continue to motivate, if implicitly, their positions on such enduring jurisprudential questions as the nature and source of law’s normativity, the relationship between law and morality, and so on. In order to better understand these debates, we must therefore understand better the relationship between a theory of law and the conception of human nature that drives it.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Advisors/Committee Members: Sciaraffa, Stefan, Waluchow, Wilfrid, Gedge, Elisabeth, Philosophy.

▼ The work of Hans Kelsen has been largely discussed without the unity between its different questions has been plainly revealed. This unity is what we aim to demonstrate. In our opinion, an attentive and critical reading of Kelsen’s late works allows such a possibility since it is in these works that the scholar himself tries to achieve this unification. To be able to understand this try and its sense, one must read Kelsen’s late works with the perspective of the moral relativism he defends. Indeed, this relativism can be interpreted as a symptom of modernity. Moreover, it can be defined as a modern humanism. In the Kelsenian thought, what links the legal positivism, the moral relativism and the political conception of democracy is the concept of equality that underlies them implicitly. Under this perspective, the Kelsenian moral relativism reveals itself as an agnosticism that is a philosophy of perpetual questioning. This interpretation is what allows one to render explicit the systematic character of the Kelsenian work. Moreover, such a reading render also explicit the importance of this work. Kelsenian agnosticism expresses the essence of modern philosoph. Since it defines itself as a questioning, it becomes the condition of possibility of both an authentic recognition of the Other and of democracy itself. Advisors/Committee Members: Sosoe, Lukas [superviser], Maesschalck, Marc [superviser].

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Le droit naturel a servi tout au long de la Troisième République d’outil épistémologique qui a permis de discuter le droit de manière rationnelle. La doctrine civiliste a fourni à cette époque de multiples séries des discours examinant les prises de position juridico-politiques dans le langage du droit naturel. L’intérêt d’écrire l’histoire d’un concept, celui du droit naturel, conçu le plus souvent comme éternel, universel et absolu, est non seulement de découvrir les mutations et les incohérences existant dans les discours portant sur ce concept mais aussi de constater ce que nous pouvons apprendre à propos des interactions entre l’histoire socio-politique, l’histoire juridique, et l’histoire doctrinale. Les usages de la notion démontrent à quel point ceux-ci varient selon les époques et selon les auteurs qui la mettent forme. L’idée du droit naturel implique l’existence d’un système juridique idéal et universel. Les législations nationales, considérées à la lumière du droit naturel, ne peuvent être que des créations arbitraires limitées par les frontières d’un État. Par conséquent, la recherche scientifique du droit ne devrait plus se borner à l’examen des textes législatifs. Les règles coutumières et jurisprudentielles sont devenues aussi la source du droit. Cette démarche, en réalité, a accordé à la doctrine le pouvoir de décider la source et l’interprétation du droit. Partant d’une telle observation, nous nous intéressons sur le rôle du droit naturel dans les discours des juristes face aux crises politiques, sociaux, mais aussi scientifiques.

If “natural law” is understood as a set of principles, legal or moral, that is eternal, immutable and universal, human understandings of this idea never cease to change in different time and location. These understandings, existing in form of discourse, enters into the interaction in context and circumstance. The dissertation examines the usages of natural law in the Third French Republic. It argues that French jurists use the idea of universal and ideal law as the response to socio-political issues: the establishment of republican regime and its anticlericalism, the rise of social sciences and social problems, and the construction of an international order after the WWI. Their responses, in turn, enrich the conceptions of natural law: metaphysically secular justifications of natural law are made by lawyers who are deeply catholic. This old idea is made compatible with social progress, and the universalism and idealism consisted in this idea are used to serve the patriotic cause.

Advisors/Committee Members: Jamin, Christophe (thesis director).

▼ This study challenges the positivist view of the Korean Constitution, which sees it merely as an assemblage of rules and statutes defining its citizens’ status and setting out codes of conduct for the government, or mapping the government’s institutional arrangements. Prevalent in Korean constitutional thought and practice, this view wholly fails to capture what it implies for how the polity governs or is governed. Because it assumes that the state and its constitutional law came into being prior to any structure of political entitlement, Korean constitutional scholarship has focused only its textual meaning and assessing the relative weight of individual statutes or articles of the Constitution. This has narrowed scholarly inquiry into the political significance of the Constitution into a dispute over the source of sovereignty. The dissertation aims to (re)discover the political nature of the Korean constitution with the 1962 and 1972 constitutions.

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[pt] Poucas questões têm sido tão abordadas ao se discutir teoria do direito e direito constitucional como a a crise do positivismo jurídico. A publicação de O Conceito de Direito de Hart em 1961 representou um marco na teoria do direito do século XX, tanto pelas inovações teóricas que aportou, representando um refinamento da teoria juspositivista, como pelo fecundo debate que gerou. Tal debate, que se inicia com as primeiras críticas de Dworkin ao positivismo de Hart em Modelo de Regras I e II, compiladas em Levando os direitos a sério, se desenvolve até hoje com fortes debates internos ao próprio positivismo jurídico. Dentre elas, centraremos a análise no positivismo inclusivo, termo cunhado por Wilfrid Waluchow, mas cujas origens remontam ao início dos anos 70. A principal proposta de tal corrente é conciliar alguma das críticas de Dworkin com as bases da tradição positivista. A corrente se constrói refutando de um lado, teses não positivistas como as de Dworkin e, de outro, teses exclusivas como as de Raz, buscando assim manter as bases do positivismo jurídico e dar conta de uma das principais características dos estados constitucionais contemporâneos - a ampla incorporação de valores ao direito, especialmente nas cartas constitucionais. Inicialmente, serão abordados os fundamentos da teoria juspositivista, encarando-a como uma tradição. Em seguida será situado o debate Hart/Dworkin nesse cenário para analisar seus desdobramentos, focando no surgimento e consolidação do Positivismo Inclusivo. Finalmente, abordam-se as contribuições recentes ao debate, fazendo um balanço das teses envolvidas e discutindo a sua relevância atual.

[en] Few issues have been so intensively discussed in legal theory and constitutional aw as the crisis of legal positivism. The publication of The Concept of Law by Hart in 1961 represented a milestone in the theory of law of the twentieth century, both for the theoretical innovations that it contributed, representing a refinementf the theory juspositivista, as for the fruitful discussions that resulted. This debate, which begins with the first criticism of Dworkin to Hart s positivism in the Model of Rules I and II, and is developed till today with very strong internal debates in legal positivism. Among them, the analysis focus on inclusive positivism, a term created by Wilfrid Waluchow but whose origins date back to the early 70ths The main proposal of this version is to reconcile some of the criticisms of Dworkin with the tenants of positivist tradition. The proposal was, on one hand, to reject part of, Dworkin critics to legal positivism, and on the other, exclusive theories such as Raz s conception of law, seeking thereby to maintain the foundations of legal positivism and give an account of the main features of contemporary constitutional states - the extensive incorporation of moral values, especially in constitutional charters. Initially, this dissertation seeks for the grounds of positivist tradition. Then the debate will be located in Hart/Dworkin scenario to analyze its…

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The paper presents the bases for a theory of how the rules of law are formed, based on the only concept of substantive law already outlined, by Claudio Souto. According to the said author, Law is the externalization of the human feeling of being-oriented by the currently insuperable information or, simplifying, the compound SIV (Feeling, Idea and Will). The existence of this intrinsic feeling to the human condition has already been empirically proven by the work of Paul Bloom. However, further details, such as the proof of Claudio Souto's theory for Paul Bloom's work and the confirmation of the theory that will be presented, are scheduled for the next work, in Doctorate Degree. In the present work we present the fundamental bases of what has come to be called by us of “Legisgênesis” or the human social phenomenon of the configuration of the duty-to-be. This phenomenon differs from the legislator considered by the legal tradition, it is that it is exclusively formalist. The legislator idealized by tradition can be divided into two genres: legislator stricto sensu and legislator lato sensu. By legislator stricto sensu we mean the official agents responsible for drawing up the equally official laws and by legislator stricto sensu the strategies of argumentation, by rationalization, used in legal practice. These genre, on the other hand, present subdivisions in species that we classify and try to explain in the course of the present work.The fundamental difference between the conceptions raised is established between what can be called a formal legislator (legal myth) and real legislator (human phenomenon). Formal legislator, understood as the source of rules and law, is a modern legal myth about which a reality is artificially created, a reality that corresponds to what tradition calls the legal world. The real legislator, or rather, the legislature, takes care to explain how human societies formulate imperatives of conduct classifiable as Law. In order to allow and explain this fundamental difference and the reasons that hold the myth of the legislator in force, we are concerned with explaining the political and philosophical reasons why law has been operated through rhetoric in order to provide official leaders with a Mechanism of social control. The main purpose of the paper was to answer the question: if the law is admittedly prior to the laws formulated by the official authorities, who or what is the legislator in fact? The result was what we call the Theory of Legislation. The method used was transdisciplinary, correlating works and theses, from different areas, in order to configure a theory, or rather, the basis of…

Advisors/Committee Members: Oliveira, José Luciano Góis de, Pereira, Francisco Caetano, Souto, Cláudio Fernando da Silva, Maia, Mirian de Sá Pereira.

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Thomas Hobbes é considerado o pai do conceito moderno de Estado. O núcleo de seu pensamento nasce do esforço de construir as bases da convivência a partir da demonstração dos fundamentos racionais da autoridade política. O liame entre o debate contemporâneo, polarizado entre interpretativistas e positivistas, e o pensamento moderno, simbolizado pelo pensamento hobbesiano, identifica-se com a seguinte pergunta: sob qual justificativa devemos obedecer os mandamentos da autoridade ainda que eles nos pareceram injustos?

Thomas Hobbes is considered the father of the modern concept of state. The core of his thinking arises from the effort to build the foundations of acquaintanceship from the demonstration of the rational foundation of political authority. The link between the contemporary debate which is polarized between positivists and interpretativists and the modern thought, which is symbolized by hobbesian thinking relates to the following question: \'Under which justification must we obey the commandments of the authority even if they seemed unfair to us ?

Advisors/Committee Members: Juliano Souza de Albuquerque Maranhão, Samuel Rodrigues Barbosa, José Rodrigo Rodriguez.

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The purpose of this paper is, after analyzing the concepts of jusnaturalism, legal positivism, post-positivism, hermeneutics, interpretation and the question of justice, to demonstrate that the legal operators have all the necessary instruments to deal with the legal system in a way that allows it to achieve its greater objective: the justice. All the activity of the legal expert will be under the analysis, covering the stricto sensu interpretation, integration, construction, creation of the system in opposition to the theory of mechanistic interpretation, supported by legal positivism, which highlights the declarative element about the productive or creative in law

O objetivo deste trabalho é, após análise do jusnaturalismo, do positivismo jurídico, do pós-positivismo, da hermenêutica, da interpretação e da questão da justiça, demonstrar se os operadores do direito possuem todos os instrumentos necessários para manejar o sistema jurídico de maneira a alcançar o fim maior do direito: a justiça. Estará em análise toda a atividade do jurista, abarcando a interpretação stricto sensu, integração, construção, criação do sistema em oposição à teoria da interpretação mecanicista, sustentada pelo positivismo jurídico, que tem como destaque o elemento declarativo sobre o produtivo ou criativo do direito

Advisors/Committee Members: Garcia, Maria.

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES

This dissertation has the scope of the analysis of the paper: "An introduction to the principals of morals and legislation" by the philosopher Jeremy Bentham, the discussion of his theory and the application of it within a system in which legal positivism prevails. For this purpose, the descriptive method was used, based on an accurate bibliographic analysis of national and foreign papers about the author’s masterpiece and backbone of his work. We started from the hypothesis that the application of this theory could result in greater legal certainty. The application of utilitarianism in our legal system would remove arbitrariness and insecurity from the application of law as it does in the common law system. As so, the concepts of hedonistic and eudaimonist happiness were studied in order to verify what kind of individualistic happiness, utilitarianism can be embedded. In the following act, David Hume's principle of causality was analyzed in order to integrate those concepts, since Jeremy Bentham, in the first chapter of the work under analysis, states textually that the human being would be inextricably linked to the chain cause and effect. Finally, in order to insert in this research a counterpoint to the thought of Jeremy Bentham, the theory of Hebert Hart was analyzed, in his paper: "The concept of right", being verified that, while the first one takes care of the construction of a theory which would guarantee the elaboration of norms that lead to happiness, the second concerns about the application of law, concluding that utilitarianism is a theory directed to the legislators with the application in a positivist system, so that through it, society can achieve happiness without compromising legal security, social order, and caring, on the other hand, for causal relations

Esta dissertação tem por escopo a análise da obra: “An introduction to the principals of morals and legislation” da lavra do filósofo Jeremy Bentham, a discussão de sua teoria e a aplicação da mesma dentro de um sistema em que prevalece o positivismo jurídico. Utilizou-se, para tanto, o método descritivo, a partir da efetivação de uma acurada análise bibliográfica de obras nacionais e estrangeiras que comentam a obra mestra e espinha dorsal deste trabalho. Parte-se da hipótese de que a aplicação desta teoria traria, como conseqüência, uma maior segurança jurídica. A aplicação do utilitarismo em nosso sistema jurídico afastaria a arbitrariedade e a insegurança da aplicação do direito tal como ocorre no sistema do common law. Para tanto, foram estudados os…

Advisors/Committee Members: Fonseca, Marcio Alves da.

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A discussão acerca da judicialização de políticas públicas ganhou um espaço cada vez maior no cenário jurídico nacional. À medida que as demandas judiciais se multiplicam, vai se firmando um entendimento que se identifica como doutrina brasileira do controle judicial de políticas públicas. Os autores que formam esse posicionamento majoritário concordam com a legitimidade do Judiciário para exercer a referida função de controle e apresentam os fundamentos que devem embasar a decisão judicial nos casos concretos. Para esses casos difíceis, a doutrina brasileira propõe uma decisão com base no princípio da proporcionalidade na forma pela qual foi idealizado por Robert Alexy, tendo em vista que as controvérsias devem ser resolvidas pela ponderação de princípios. Incentiva-se, com apoio na teoria neoconstitucionalista, o protagonismo do juiz na tarefa de controle. As políticas públicas ambientais, quando judicializadas, encontram decisões bastante diversificadas, muitas delas antagônicas, resultantes da aplicação do princípio da proporcionalidade ou de raciocínios silogísticos como a subsunção. A análise das decisões permite verificar uma inconsistência na sua fundamentação. Por sua vez, o estudo mais acurado das propostas da doutrina brasileira do controle judicial de políticas públicas demonstra a maneira pela qual a teoria é dependente da discricionariedade judicial, a mais marcante característica do positivismo jurídico. O mesmo problema está presente na teoria de Robert Alexy. Pretende-se comprovar que os vícios de justificação encontrados nos precedentes jurisprudenciais são resultados de problemas paradigmáticos, tal qual o poder discricionário do juiz para o positivismo normativista, bem como o método e a filosofia da consciência para a metafísica moderna. A teoria da decisão judicial necessita de uma ruptura paradigmática tanto no campo do Direito como no da filosofia, de modo que possa absorver a invasão da filosofia pela linguagem operada pelo giro ontológico-linguístico e a busca pela legitimidade que é marca do paradigma pós-positivista, diante das inegáveis vinculações existentes entre a filosofia e o Direito. A fim de construir uma teoria da decisão adequada a esses propósitos, busca-se no Direito como conceito interpretativo de Ronald Dworkin, à luz das contribuições proporcionadas pela hermenêutica filosófica e a crítica hermenêutica do Direito, a possibilidade de edificar uma decisão antidiscricionária. O controle judicial de políticas públicas ambientais deve ser pautado pela existência de um argumento de princípio, além de uma justificação decisória que consagre a integridade e coerência na aplicação do Direito.

The discussion about public policies judicialization won an increasingly larger space in the national legal setting. As the lawsuits multiply, there is an agreement that is identified as Brazilian doctrine of judicial review of public policies. Authors who make up this majority position agree with the legitimacy of the judiciary to exercise this control function and feature the arguments that…

Advisors/Committee Members: Trindade, André Karam, Rech, Adir Ubaldo, Augustin, Sérgio, Marin, Jeferson Dytz.