subject:(game theoretic applications with incomplete information)

McMaster University

1. Wu, Sandy Huyu. Contributions to Reverse Logistics with Game theoretic Applications.

Degree: PhD, 2012, McMaster University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/11999

►

The last two decades witnessed an increasing emphasis on reverse logistics (RL). Our thesis attempts to investigate two research problems in RL and explore… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Reverse logistics; inventory management with resalable returns; competition in remanufacturing; game theory; game theoretic applications with incomplete information; Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods; Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Wu, S. H. (2012). Contributions to Reverse Logistics with Game theoretic Applications. (Doctoral Dissertation). McMaster University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11375/11999

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Wu, Sandy Huyu. “Contributions to Reverse Logistics with Game theoretic Applications.” 2012. Doctoral Dissertation, McMaster University. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/11999.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Wu, Sandy Huyu. “Contributions to Reverse Logistics with Game theoretic Applications.” 2012. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Wu SH. Contributions to Reverse Logistics with Game theoretic Applications. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. McMaster University; 2012. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/11999.

Council of Science Editors:

Wu SH. Contributions to Reverse Logistics with Game theoretic Applications. [Doctoral Dissertation]. McMaster University; 2012. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/11999

2. Zhang, Xin. An Information-Theoretic Framework for Consistency Maintenance in Distributed Interactive Applications.

Degree: 2011, RIAN

URL: http://eprints.maynoothuniversity.ie/2564/

► Distributed Interactive Applications (DIAs) enable geographically dispersed users to interact with each other in a virtual environment. A key factor to the success of a… (more)

▼ Distributed Interactive Applications (DIAs) enable geographically dispersed users to interact with each other in a virtual environment. A key factor to the success of a DIA is the maintenance of a consistent view of the shared virtual world for all the participants. However, maintaining consistent states in DIAs is difficult under real networks. State changes communicated by messages over such networks suffer latency leading to inconsistency across the application. Predictive Contract Mechanisms (PCMs) combat this problem through reducing the number of messages transmitted in return for perceptually tolerable inconsistency. This thesis examines the operation of PCMs using concepts and methods derived from information theory. This information theory perspective results in a novel information model of PCMs that quantifies and analyzes the efficiency of such methods in communicating the reduced state information, and a new adaptive multiple-model-based framework for improving consistency in DIAs. The first part of this thesis introduces information measurements of user behavior in DIAs and formalizes the information model for PCM operation. In presenting the information model, the statistical dependence in the entity state, which makes using extrapolation models to predict future user behavior possible, is evaluated. The efficiency of a PCM to exploit such predictability to reduce the amount of network resources required to maintain consistency is also investigated. It is demonstrated that from the information theory perspective, PCMs can be interpreted as a form of information reduction and compression. The second part of this thesis proposes an Information-Based Dynamic Extrapolation Model for dynamically selecting between extrapolation algorithms based on information evaluation and inferred network conditions. This model adapts PCM configurations to both user behavior and network conditions, and makes the most information-efficient use of the available network resources. In doing so, it improves PCM performance and consistency in DIAs.

Subjects/Keywords: Electronic Engineering; Information-Theoretic; Framework for Consistency Maintenance; Distributed Interactive Applications

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Zhang, X. (2011). An Information-Theoretic Framework for Consistency Maintenance in Distributed Interactive Applications. (Thesis). RIAN. Retrieved from http://eprints.maynoothuniversity.ie/2564/

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Zhang, Xin. “An Information-Theoretic Framework for Consistency Maintenance in Distributed Interactive Applications.” 2011. Thesis, RIAN. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://eprints.maynoothuniversity.ie/2564/.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Zhang, Xin. “An Information-Theoretic Framework for Consistency Maintenance in Distributed Interactive Applications.” 2011. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Zhang X. An Information-Theoretic Framework for Consistency Maintenance in Distributed Interactive Applications. [Internet] [Thesis]. RIAN; 2011. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://eprints.maynoothuniversity.ie/2564/.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Zhang X. An Information-Theoretic Framework for Consistency Maintenance in Distributed Interactive Applications. [Thesis]. RIAN; 2011. Available from: http://eprints.maynoothuniversity.ie/2564/

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

3. Zhang, Xin. An Information-Theoretic Framework for Consistency Maintenance in Distributed Interactive Applications.

Degree: 2011, RIAN

URL: http://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/2564/

► Distributed Interactive Applications (DIAs) enable geographically dispersed users to interact with each other in a virtual environment. A key factor to the success of a… (more)

▼ Distributed Interactive Applications (DIAs) enable geographically dispersed users to interact with each other in a virtual environment. A key factor to the success of a DIA is the maintenance of a consistent view of the shared virtual world for all the participants. However, maintaining consistent states in DIAs is difficult under real networks. State changes communicated by messages over such networks suffer latency leading to inconsistency across the application. Predictive Contract Mechanisms (PCMs) combat this problem through reducing the number of messages transmitted in return for perceptually tolerable inconsistency. This thesis examines the operation of PCMs using concepts and methods derived from information theory. This information theory perspective results in a novel information model of PCMs that quantifies and analyzes the efficiency of such methods in communicating the reduced state information, and a new adaptive multiple-model-based framework for improving consistency in DIAs. The first part of this thesis introduces information measurements of user behavior in DIAs and formalizes the information model for PCM operation. In presenting the information model, the statistical dependence in the entity state, which makes using extrapolation models to predict future user behavior possible, is evaluated. The efficiency of a PCM to exploit such predictability to reduce the amount of network resources required to maintain consistency is also investigated. It is demonstrated that from the information theory perspective, PCMs can be interpreted as a form of information reduction and compression. The second part of this thesis proposes an Information-Based Dynamic Extrapolation Model for dynamically selecting between extrapolation algorithms based on information evaluation and inferred network conditions. This model adapts PCM configurations to both user behavior and network conditions, and makes the most information-efficient use of the available network resources. In doing so, it improves PCM performance and consistency in DIAs.

Subjects/Keywords: Electronic Engineering; Information-Theoretic; Framework for Consistency Maintenance; Distributed Interactive Applications

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Zhang, X. (2011). An Information-Theoretic Framework for Consistency Maintenance in Distributed Interactive Applications. (Thesis). RIAN. Retrieved from http://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/2564/

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Zhang, Xin. “An Information-Theoretic Framework for Consistency Maintenance in Distributed Interactive Applications.” 2011. Thesis, RIAN. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/2564/.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Zhang, Xin. “An Information-Theoretic Framework for Consistency Maintenance in Distributed Interactive Applications.” 2011. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Zhang X. An Information-Theoretic Framework for Consistency Maintenance in Distributed Interactive Applications. [Internet] [Thesis]. RIAN; 2011. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/2564/.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Zhang X. An Information-Theoretic Framework for Consistency Maintenance in Distributed Interactive Applications. [Thesis]. RIAN; 2011. Available from: http://mural.maynoothuniversity.ie/2564/

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Anna University

4. Vetrivelan P. Game theoretic and weighted ranking Approaches for seamless Vertical handover in 4g Heterogeneous networks;.

Degree: Game theoretic and weighted ranking Approaches for seamless Vertical handover in 4g Heterogeneous networks, 2015, Anna University

URL: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/49592

►

Fourth Generation 4G or Next Generation Wireless Networks newline NGWN enables the integration and interworking of current wireless newlineSystems With 4G NGWNs user demands various… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: 4g Heterogeneous; Game theoretic; Information and communication engineering

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

P, V. (2015). Game theoretic and weighted ranking Approaches for seamless Vertical handover in 4g Heterogeneous networks;. (Thesis). Anna University. Retrieved from http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/49592

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

P, Vetrivelan. “Game theoretic and weighted ranking Approaches for seamless Vertical handover in 4g Heterogeneous networks;.” 2015. Thesis, Anna University. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/49592.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

P, Vetrivelan. “Game theoretic and weighted ranking Approaches for seamless Vertical handover in 4g Heterogeneous networks;.” 2015. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

P V. Game theoretic and weighted ranking Approaches for seamless Vertical handover in 4g Heterogeneous networks;. [Internet] [Thesis]. Anna University; 2015. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/49592.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

P V. Game theoretic and weighted ranking Approaches for seamless Vertical handover in 4g Heterogeneous networks;. [Thesis]. Anna University; 2015. Available from: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/49592

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Iowa

5. He, Wei. Essays in economic theory.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2016, University of Iowa

URL: https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3098

► This thesis is composed of three chapters. Chapter 1 considers the existence of equilibria in games with complete information, where players may have non-ordered… (more)

▼ This thesis is composed of three chapters. Chapter 1 considers the existence of equilibria in games with complete information, where players may have non-ordered and discontinuous preferences. Chapter 2 studies the issues on the existence of pure and behavioral strategy equilibria in games with incomplete information and discontinuous payoffs. We consider the standard setting with Bayesian preferences as well as the case in which players may face ambiguity. Chapter 3 extends the classical results on the Walras-core existence and equivalence to an ambiguous asymmetric information economy, where agents maximize maximin expected utilities (MEU). These results are based on the papers He and Yannelis (2014, 2015a,b,c, 2016a,b). In the first chapter, we propose the condition of "continuous inclusion property" to handle the difficulty of discontinuous payoffs in various general equilibrium and game theory models. Such discontinuities arise naturally in economic situations, including auction, price competition of firms and also patent races. Based on the continuous inclusion property, we establish the equilibrium existence result in a very general framework with discontinuous payoffs. On one hand, this condition is sufficiently general from the methodological point of view, as it unifies almost all special conditions proposed in the literature. On the other hand, our condition is also potentially useful from the realistic point of view, as it could be applied to deal with many economic models which cannot be studied before because of the presence of the discontinuity. In the second chapter, I study the existence problem of pure and behavioral strategy equilibria in discontinuous games with incomplete information. The framework of games with incomplete information is standard as in the literature, except for that we allow players' payoffs to be discontinuous. We illustrate by examples that the Bayesian equilibria may not exist in such games and the previous results are not applicable to handle this problem. We propose some general conditions to retain the existence of both pure strategy and behavioral strategy Bayesian equilibrium, and show that our condition is tight. In addition, we study the equilibrium existence problem in discontinuous games under incomplete information and ambiguity, and show that the maximin framework solves the equilibrium existence issue without introducing any additional condition. In the last chapter, I study a general equilibrium model with incomplete information by adopting the maximin expected utilities. The model is powerful enough to describe the behaviors of risk averse agents that cannot be explained by the standard assumption of subjective expected utilities. I use this new formulation to extend many classical results in general equilibrium theory by incorporating ambiguity into the model. In addition, the desirable incentive compatibility property is shown in our model with maximin expected utilities, while this property will typically fail in… Advisors/Committee Members: Yannelis, Nicholas C. (supervisor).

Subjects/Keywords: publicabstract; Ambiguity; Game Theory; General Equilibrium Theory; Incomplete Information; Economics

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

He, W. (2016). Essays in economic theory. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Iowa. Retrieved from https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3098

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

He, Wei. “Essays in economic theory.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Iowa. Accessed January 19, 2021. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3098.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

He, Wei. “Essays in economic theory.” 2016. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

He W. Essays in economic theory. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Iowa; 2016. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3098.

Council of Science Editors:

He W. Essays in economic theory. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Iowa; 2016. Available from: https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3098

University of Minnesota

6. Ruiz Gómez, David. Robust Predictions in Dynamic Games.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2018, University of Minnesota

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/201116

► This dissertation is about understanding the robustness property of predictions to misspecification of higher-order beliefs in dynamic games with payoff uncertainty. In particular, it asks:… (more)

▼ This dissertation is about understanding the robustness property of predictions to misspecification of higher-order beliefs in dynamic games with payoff uncertainty. In particular, it asks: Which simplifying assumptions about beliefs provide robust predictions in dynamic games? The most important result of this dissertation, presented in the second chapter, is to show that lack of robustness is a generic property of predictions consistent with (interim) sequential rationalizability (ISR) unless the prediction is unique. I consider this to be an essential and novel contribution to the literature of robustness in game theory since it challenges the validity of the standard approach to modeling uncertainty in dynamic games because it gives rise, for almost every model of uncertainty, to spurious predictions. Typically, when analyzing a model, different parameters represent different assumptions of the model, and therefore, predictions from the model are sensitive to the specification of those parameters. For example, it is well known that in the standard Bayesian approach to games with incomplete information, a crucial parameter that requires to be specified, and at the same time is neither observable nor verifiable without any error from the point of view of researchers, is players beliefs and hierarchies of beliefs; hence, because of the previous observation, it happens that in many applications hierarchies of beliefs encode strong (informational) assumptions, and as I already mentioned, behavioral predictions (e.g., in the form of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Interim Sequential Rationalizability, among others) depend on those assumptions; moreover, in some cases, this dependence can be very sensitive at the tails of the hierarchies of beliefs specified in the model. The robustness property refers, in this case, to the possibility of guarantee that slight changes in the specification of the parameters do not lead to significant changes in predictions, since at least from a methodological point of view, if the property holds generically it would provide a justification for the validity of the standard approach to model uncertainty. One approach to understanding the robustness property of set-valued solution concepts in games is to ask: Which predictions remain valid after all common certain-belief assumptions are relaxed? Penta (2012) have shown that in (finite) dynamic games with incomplete information the only predictions that remain valid after relaxing all the assumptions about beliefs and hierarchies of beliefs are those consistent with (interim) sequential rationalizability. In other words, ISR is the strongest solution concept such that, for every model of beliefs it is possible to guarantee that an outcome that was ruled out by ISR is ruled out for every approximation of the model. This result implies lack of robustness of any refinement of ISR as, for example, any of the familiar equilibrium concepts. In this dissertation, a stronger notion of robustness is considered, that is if, in addition, it is possible…

Subjects/Keywords: Game Theory; Higher-order Beliefs; Incomplete Information; Robustness

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Ruiz Gómez, D. (2018). Robust Predictions in Dynamic Games. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Minnesota. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11299/201116

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Ruiz Gómez, David. “Robust Predictions in Dynamic Games.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Minnesota. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11299/201116.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Ruiz Gómez, David. “Robust Predictions in Dynamic Games.” 2018. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Ruiz Gómez D. Robust Predictions in Dynamic Games. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Minnesota; 2018. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/201116.

Council of Science Editors:

Ruiz Gómez D. Robust Predictions in Dynamic Games. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Minnesota; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/201116

Virginia Tech

7. Yi, Ming. Three Essays on Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information and Strategic Complementarities.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2014, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/47917

► This dissertation consists of three essays that adopt both theoretical and empirical methods of analysis to study certain economies in which the incomplete information and… (more)

▼ This dissertation consists of three essays that adopt both theoretical and empirical methods of analysis to study certain economies in which the incomplete information and the strategic complementarities between players are important. Chapter 1 explains the topics discussed in the subsequent chapters and gives a brief survey on the literature. In Chapter 2, I revise a traditional global game model by dividing the continuum of players into a group of speculators and a group of stakeholders. It is found that the uniqueness property remains in the new game. Then I extend the static game to a two-stage game and investigate the efficacies of certain label changing mechanisms proposed by the authority to stabilize the regime in the dynamic context. It is shown that a label changing mechanism allowing for downward social mobility may not work, whereas a label changing mechanism allowing for upward social mobility generally makes the regime more stable. In Chapter 3, I add a speculator and an authority to a bank-run model to investigate how the speculator endangers a business or an economy, and what the authority can do about it. In particular, I show that the speculator can increase the financial system's vulnerability by serving as a coordinating device for the investors and thus triggering the crisis. It is further shown that deterring the speculator may not undo the speculator's impact because of multiplicity problem; rewarding holding investors is useless; and eliminating the preemption motives among investors works given enough effort. A discussion of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the IMF's role in it is also included. Chapter 4 develops a repeated beauty-contest game to investigate the effect of previous winners' actions on the spread of subsequent players' actions. I first characterize the unique equilibrium of the game. Then I focus on the equilibrium dynamics of several variances depicting different forms of action variability. It is found that whether or not a specific variance diminishes over time depends on the relative precision of public and private signals. To illustrate the theoretical results, I conduct an empirical study on the Miss Korea contest. It is found that the contestants' faces have been converging to the ``true beauty'' overall, but diverging from each other over the last 20 years. Chapter 5 concludes. Advisors/Committee Members: Haller, Hans H. (committeechair), Bahel, Eric A. (committeechair), Macieira, Joao C. (committee member), Yang, Zhou (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: global game; beauty-contest game; incomplete information; strategic complementarity; regime change; financial crisis

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Yi, M. (2014). Three Essays on Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information and Strategic Complementarities. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/47917

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Yi, Ming. “Three Essays on Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information and Strategic Complementarities.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/47917.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Yi, Ming. “Three Essays on Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information and Strategic Complementarities.” 2014. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Yi M. Three Essays on Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information and Strategic Complementarities. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2014. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/47917.

Council of Science Editors:

Yi M. Three Essays on Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information and Strategic Complementarities. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/47917

8. HE WEI. Theory of Correspondences and Games.

Degree: 2014, National University of Singapore

URL: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/118631

Subjects/Keywords: Large game/economy; Setwise coarseness; Conditional distributions/expectations of correspondences; Game with incomplete information; Stochastic game

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

WEI, H. (2014). Theory of Correspondences and Games. (Thesis). National University of Singapore. Retrieved from http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/118631

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

WEI, HE. “Theory of Correspondences and Games.” 2014. Thesis, National University of Singapore. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/118631.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

WEI, HE. “Theory of Correspondences and Games.” 2014. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

WEI H. Theory of Correspondences and Games. [Internet] [Thesis]. National University of Singapore; 2014. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/118631.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

WEI H. Theory of Correspondences and Games. [Thesis]. National University of Singapore; 2014. Available from: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/118631

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Texas – Austin

9. Tang, Qianfeng. Essays in economic theory.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2011, University of Texas – Austin

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-05-3232

► This dissertation consists of three essays in Economic Theory. The rst essay proposes and studies a new solution concept for games with incomplete information. In… (more)

▼ This dissertation consists of three essays in Economic Theory. The rst essay proposes and studies a new solution concept for games with incomplete information. In game theory, there is a basic methodological dichotomy between Harsanyi's \game-theoretic" view and Aumann's \Bayesian decision-theoretic" view of the world. We follow the game theoretic view, propose and study interim partially correlated rationalizability for games with incomplete information. We argue that the distinction between this solution concept and the interim correlated rationalizability studied by Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007) is fundamental, in that the latter implicitly follows Aumann's Bayesian view. Our main result shows that two types provide the same prediction in interim partially correlated rationalizability if and only if they have the same in nite hierarchy of beliefs over conditional beliefs. We also establish an equivalence result between this solution concept and the Bayesian solution{a notion of correlated equilibrium proposed by Forges (1993). The second essay studies the relationship between correlated equilibrium the redundancy embedded in type spaces. The Bayesian solution is a notion of correlated equilibrium proposed by Forges (1993), and hierarchies of beliefs over conditional beliefs are introduced by Ely and Peski (2006) in their study of interim rationalizability. We study the connection between the two concepts. We say that two type spaces are equivalent if they represent the same set of hierarchies of beliefs over conditional beliefs. We show that the correlation embedded in equivalent type spaces can be characterized by partially correlating devices, which send correlated signals to players in a belief invariant way. Since such correlating devices also implement the Bayesian solution, we establish that the Bayesian solution is invariant across equivalent type spaces. The third essay studies the existence of equilibria for rst-price sealed bid auctions when bidders form a network and each bidder observes perfectly their neighbors' private valuations. Asymmetry in bidders' positions in the network creates asymmetry in bidders' knowledge. We show the existence of pure-strategy equilibrium. Advisors/Committee Members: Pȩski, Marcin (advisor), Stinchcombe, Maxwell (committee member), Norman, Alfred (committee member), Wiseman, Thomas (committee member), Whinston, Andrew (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Games with incomplete information; Rationalizability; Hierarchies of beliefs; Auction; Social networks

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Tang, Q. (2011). Essays in economic theory. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Texas – Austin. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-05-3232

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Tang, Qianfeng. “Essays in economic theory.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Texas – Austin. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-05-3232.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Tang, Qianfeng. “Essays in economic theory.” 2011. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Tang Q. Essays in economic theory. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Texas – Austin; 2011. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-05-3232.

Council of Science Editors:

Tang Q. Essays in economic theory. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Texas – Austin; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-05-3232

10. Suzuki, Takeshi. Mechanism Design and Assignment Games under Incomplete Information.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2014, Brown University

URL: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:386222/

► In this dissertation, I explain how socially desirable outcomes can be realized in the presence of incomplete information scenarios, through the design of a robust… (more)

▼ In this dissertation, I explain how socially desirable outcomes can be realized in the presence of incomplete information scenarios, through the design of a robust mechanism (Chapters 2 and 3), through competitive markets (Chapter 4), or through coalitional agreements (Chapter 4). In Chapter 2, I attempt to relax the strong conditions for full robust implementation, identified by Bergemann and Morris (2011), focusing on undominated equilibria. By applying mechanisms constructed by Palfrey and Srivastava (1989b, 1991), I show that ex post incentive compatibility is generally necessary for full undominated robust implementation and is almost sufficient under private values. Thus, although some famous rules are not fully robustly implementable, they are fully robustly implementable in undominated strategies under private values. In Chapter 3, I explore the robustness of full robust implementation in terms of robustness of equilibria. I illustrate an example in which a mechanism fully robustly implements a social choice function, but there exists an interim equilibrium that is not an ex post equilibrium. However, I prove that every robust mechanism admits the existence of an ex post equilibrium, and, if the ex post best response property is satisfied in the mechanism, every interim equilibrium must be an ex post equilibrium. For this result, it is not sufficient to consider only payoff type spaces. Full robust implementation guarantees the existence of such a good mechanism. In Chapter 4, I study the assignment games of Shapley and Shubik (1972) under uncertainty at the ex ante stage. With symmetric uncertainty, the Shapley-Shubik equivalence of core and competitive equilibrium allocations breaks down. I show that the ex ante core contains strictly the set of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocations. However, one replica suffices to restore equivalence. Without the assumption of indispensability of wealth, the failure of equivalence is more severe. The results extend also to non-exclusive asymmetric information versions of the model. Advisors/Committee Members: Vohra, Rajiv (Director), Serrano, Roberto (Reader), de Clippel, Geoffroy (Reader).

Subjects/Keywords: Incomplete information

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Suzuki, T. (2014). Mechanism Design and Assignment Games under Incomplete Information. (Doctoral Dissertation). Brown University. Retrieved from https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:386222/

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Suzuki, Takeshi. “Mechanism Design and Assignment Games under Incomplete Information.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, Brown University. Accessed January 19, 2021. https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:386222/.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Suzuki, Takeshi. “Mechanism Design and Assignment Games under Incomplete Information.” 2014. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Suzuki T. Mechanism Design and Assignment Games under Incomplete Information. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Brown University; 2014. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:386222/.

Council of Science Editors:

Suzuki T. Mechanism Design and Assignment Games under Incomplete Information. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Brown University; 2014. Available from: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:386222/

11. Grün, Christine. Jeux différentiels stochastiques à information incomplète : Stochastic differential games with incomplete information.

Degree: Docteur es, Mathématiques, 2012, Brest

URL: http://www.theses.fr/2012BRES0017

►

L'objectif de cette thèse est l'étude des jeux différentiels stochastiques à information incomplète. Nous considérons un jeu à deux joueurs adverses qui contrôlent une diffusion… (more)

▼

L'objectif de cette thèse est l'étude des jeux différentiels stochastiques à information incomplète. Nous considérons un jeu à deux joueurs adverses qui contrôlent une diffusion afin de minimiser, respectivement de maximiser un paiement spécifique. Pour modéliser l'incomplétude des informations, nous suivrons la célèbre approche d'Aumann et Maschler. Nous supposons qu'il existe des états de la nature différents dans laquelle le jeu peut avoir lieu. Avant que le jeu commence, l'état est choisi au hasard. L'information est ensuite transmise à un joueur alors que le second ne connaît que les probabilités respectives pour chaque état.Dans cette thèse nous établissons une représentationduale pour les jeux différentiels stochastiques à information incomplète. Ici, nous utilisons largement la théorie des équations différentielles stochastiques rétrogrades (EDSRs), qui se révèle être un outilindispensable dans cette étude. En outre, nous montrons comment, sous certaines restrictions, cette représentation permetde construire des stratégies optimales pour le joueur informé. Ensuite, nous donnons, en utilisant la représentation duale, une preuve particulièrement simple de la semiconvexité de la fonction valeur des jeux différentiels à information incomplète.Un autre partie de la thèse est consacré à des schémas numériques pour les jeux différentiels stochastiques à informationincomplète. Dans la dernière partie nous étudions des jeux d'arrêt optimal en temps continue, appelés jeux de Dynkin, à information incomplète. Nous établissons également une représentation duale, qui est utilisé pour déterminer des stratégies optimales pour le joueur informé dans ce cas.

The objective of this thesis is the study of stochastic differential games with incomplete information. We consider a game with two opponent players who control a diffusion in order to minimize, respectively maximize a certain payoff. To model the information incompleteness we will follow the famous ansatz of Aumann and Maschler. We assume that there are different states of nature in which the game can take place. Before the game starts the state is chosen randomly. The information is then transmitted to one player while the second one only knows the respective probabilities for each state. In this thesis we establish a dual representation for stochastic differential games with incomplete information. Therein we make a vast use of the theory of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs), which turns out to be an indispensable tool in this study. Moreover we show how under some restrictions that this representation allows to construct optimal strategies for the informed player.Morover we give - using the dual representation - a strikingly simple proof for semiconvexity of the value function of differential games with incomplete information. Another part of this thesis is devoted to numerical schemes for stochastic differential games with incomplete information. In the last part we investigate continuous time optimal stopping games, so called Dynkin games, with…

Advisors/Committee Members: Cardaliaguet, Pierre (thesis director), Rainer, Catherine (thesis director).

Subjects/Keywords: Jeux différentiels stochastiques à information incomplète; Stochastic differential games with incomplete information; 519.32

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Grün, C. (2012). Jeux différentiels stochastiques à information incomplète : Stochastic differential games with incomplete information. (Doctoral Dissertation). Brest. Retrieved from http://www.theses.fr/2012BRES0017

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Grün, Christine. “Jeux différentiels stochastiques à information incomplète : Stochastic differential games with incomplete information.” 2012. Doctoral Dissertation, Brest. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://www.theses.fr/2012BRES0017.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Grün, Christine. “Jeux différentiels stochastiques à information incomplète : Stochastic differential games with incomplete information.” 2012. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Grün C. Jeux différentiels stochastiques à information incomplète : Stochastic differential games with incomplete information. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Brest; 2012. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://www.theses.fr/2012BRES0017.

Council of Science Editors:

Grün C. Jeux différentiels stochastiques à information incomplète : Stochastic differential games with incomplete information. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Brest; 2012. Available from: http://www.theses.fr/2012BRES0017

McMaster University

12. Hu, Kun. Using Reputation in Repeated Selfish Routing with Incomplete Information.

Degree: MCS, 2013, McMaster University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13009

►

We study the application of reputation as an instigator of beneficial user behavior in selfish routing and when the network users rely on the… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Selfish Routing; Repeated Game; Incomplete Information; Reputation; Theory and Algorithms; Theory and Algorithms

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Hu, K. (2013). Using Reputation in Repeated Selfish Routing with Incomplete Information. (Masters Thesis). McMaster University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13009

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Hu, Kun. “Using Reputation in Repeated Selfish Routing with Incomplete Information.” 2013. Masters Thesis, McMaster University. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13009.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Hu, Kun. “Using Reputation in Repeated Selfish Routing with Incomplete Information.” 2013. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Hu K. Using Reputation in Repeated Selfish Routing with Incomplete Information. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. McMaster University; 2013. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13009.

Council of Science Editors:

Hu K. Using Reputation in Repeated Selfish Routing with Incomplete Information. [Masters Thesis]. McMaster University; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13009

Luleå University of Technology

13. Rad, Parvaneh Afrasiabi. Measuring Trust in Online Social Networks : The Effects of Network Parameters on the Level of Trust in Trust Games with Incomplete Information.

Degree: 2011, Luleå University of Technology

URL: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-49103

►

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the methodological foundation of the studies aiming to assess trust between people who interact through… (more)

▼

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the methodological foundation of the studies aiming to assess trust between people who interact through Computer Mediated Communication (CMC), specifically those who create a set of online relationships which is commonly called Online Social Networks. The most popular method that is currently employed by researchers in this area is Trust Game, one form of the social dilemma games. The major studies that assess trust in social networks have established results that are mainly formed into hypotheses for the effects of a number of network parameters on the extent to which individuals would place trust on each other. However, hypotheses for the effects of a few number of network parameters is not deducible since the restrictive game-theoretic assumptions that are imposed into the model do not let any such evidence available. In addition, these assumptions inhibit the analysis of the trust situations in a more realistic environment than one in which actors are instructed by the axioms of the Trust Game. One way to relax the game-theoretic assumptions so that the trust situations take place in a more realistic environment is to introduce noise into the context of information transmission. Assuming that the information is not accurately transmitted between different individuals in an online social network makes it possible to argue that the rate of information that is obtained from different sources would influence the level of trust. Here, I conduct a series of computer simulation of a model of Iterated Heterogeneous Trust Games (IHTG), developed by Buskens (1998), adding the assumptions of incomplete information on 6 network structures sampled from Youtube, to investigate the effects of Indegree and Link-strength as the influential network parameters for the noisy environments. The results of regression analysis provide that both Indegree and Link-strength have positive effects on the level of trust, while in the same situation, the positive effects of Link-Strength on trust are more promising and unyielding than those of Indegree. In addition, I argue that the current model by Buskens (1998) carries a deficiency when it is applied to the noisy environments, since it can be fooled by inactive users (i.e. those who have a very low Outdegree compared to a high Indegree) to consider them as influential on the level of trust.

Validerat; 20111214 (anonymous)

Subjects/Keywords: Technology; Level of Trust; Online Social Network; Trust Game; Incomplete Information; Network Parameters; Simulation; Teknik

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Rad, P. A. (2011). Measuring Trust in Online Social Networks : The Effects of Network Parameters on the Level of Trust in Trust Games with Incomplete Information. (Thesis). Luleå University of Technology. Retrieved from http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-49103

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Rad, Parvaneh Afrasiabi. “Measuring Trust in Online Social Networks : The Effects of Network Parameters on the Level of Trust in Trust Games with Incomplete Information.” 2011. Thesis, Luleå University of Technology. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-49103.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Rad, Parvaneh Afrasiabi. “Measuring Trust in Online Social Networks : The Effects of Network Parameters on the Level of Trust in Trust Games with Incomplete Information.” 2011. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Rad PA. Measuring Trust in Online Social Networks : The Effects of Network Parameters on the Level of Trust in Trust Games with Incomplete Information. [Internet] [Thesis]. Luleå University of Technology; 2011. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-49103.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Rad PA. Measuring Trust in Online Social Networks : The Effects of Network Parameters on the Level of Trust in Trust Games with Incomplete Information. [Thesis]. Luleå University of Technology; 2011. Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-49103

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Pennsylvania

14. Hwang, Ilwoo. Essays on Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information.

Degree: 2014, University of Pennsylvania

URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1316

► This dissertation consists of three essays that study the dynamic games with incomplete information. In the first chapter, I study a dynamic trading game where… (more)

▼ This dissertation consists of three essays that study the dynamic games with incomplete information. In the first chapter, I study a dynamic trading game where a seller and potential buyers start out symmetrically uninformed about the quality of a good, but the seller becomes informed about the quality, so that the asymmetric information between the agents increases over time. The introduction of a widening information gap results in several new phenomena. In particular, the interaction between screening and learning generates nonmonotonic price and trading patterns, contrary to the standard models in which asymmetric information is initially given. If the seller's effective learning speed is high, the equilibrium features "collapse-and-recovery" behavior: Both the equilibrium price and the probability of a trade drop at a threshold time and then increase later. The seller's payoff is nonmonotonic in his learning speed, as a slower learning speed can lead to higher payoff for the seller. In the second chapter, I study a dynamic one-sided-offer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under incomplete information. The seller knows the quality of his product while the buyer does not. During bargaining, the seller randomly receives an outside option, the value of which depends on the hidden quality. If the outside option is sufficiently important, there is an equilibrium in which the uninformed buyer fails to learn the quality and continues to make the same randomized offer throughout the bargaining process. As a result, the equilibrium behavior produces an outcome path that resembles the outcome of a bargaining deadlock and its resolution. The equilibrium with deadlock has inefficient outcomes such as a delay in reaching an agreement and a breakdown in negotiations. Bargaining inefficiencies do not vanish even with frequent offers, and they may exist when there is no static adverse selection problem. In the third chapter, I address the following question: when does an incumbent party have an incentive to experiment with a risky reform policy in the presence of future elections? I study a continuous-time game between two political parties with heterogeneous preferences and a median voter. I show that while infrequent elections are surely bad for the median voter, too frequent elections can also make him strictly worse off. When the election frequency is low, a standard agency problem arises and the incumbent party experiments with its preferred reform policy even if its outlook is not promising. On the other hand, when the election frequency is too high, in equilibrium the incumbent stops experimentation too early because the imminent election increases the incumbent's potential loss of power if it undertakes risky reform. The degree of inefficiency is large enough that too frequent elections are worse for the median voter than a dictatorship.

Subjects/Keywords: Bargaining; Experimentation; Game Theory; Incomplete Information; Learning; Microeconomic Theory; Economics; Economic Theory

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Hwang, I. (2014). Essays on Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information. (Thesis). University of Pennsylvania. Retrieved from https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1316

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Hwang, Ilwoo. “Essays on Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information.” 2014. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania. Accessed January 19, 2021. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1316.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Hwang, Ilwoo. “Essays on Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information.” 2014. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Hwang I. Essays on Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Pennsylvania; 2014. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1316.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Hwang I. Essays on Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information. [Thesis]. University of Pennsylvania; 2014. Available from: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1316

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

15. Aziz, Farhan Muhammad. Resilience of LTE networks against smart jamming attacks: A game-theoretic approach.

Degree: PhD, Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2017, Georgia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/58635

► The objectives of this research are to identify security vulnerabilities in LTE/LTE-A air interface; model the network and the smart jammer dynamics under realistic constraints;… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: LTE/LTE-advanced; Smart jamming; Repeated game with asymmetric information; Threat mechanism; Game-theoretic learning; Regret minimization; Algorithms

…horizon Repeated Bayesian Game with Asymmetric Information… …Repeated Bayesian Game with Asymmetric Information… …game with asymmetric information, with the network being the uninformed player. This research… …network is modeled as the uninformed xix player in an asymmetric information game with almost… …general-sum (non-zero-sum) Bayesian game with asymmetric information (cf. [8…

11 more images…

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Aziz, F. M. (2017). Resilience of LTE networks against smart jamming attacks: A game-theoretic approach. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1853/58635

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Aziz, Farhan Muhammad. “Resilience of LTE networks against smart jamming attacks: A game-theoretic approach.” 2017. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia Tech. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/58635.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Aziz, Farhan Muhammad. “Resilience of LTE networks against smart jamming attacks: A game-theoretic approach.” 2017. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Aziz FM. Resilience of LTE networks against smart jamming attacks: A game-theoretic approach. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia Tech; 2017. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/58635.

Council of Science Editors:

Aziz FM. Resilience of LTE networks against smart jamming attacks: A game-theoretic approach. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia Tech; 2017. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/58635

University of Georgia

16. Anderson, Gregory Brian. Confronting incomplete detection to address questions about distribution and reproductive season for four imperiled stream fishes.

Degree: 2014, University of Georgia

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10724/25731

► Geographical and ecological restrictions are the primary drivers of freshwater fish imperilment within the southeastern United States. To effectively manage existing populations and implement regulatory… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Percidae; Etheostoma; Percina; Ulocentra; Nothonotus; Alvordius; Holiday darter; Etowah darter; Bridled darter; Amicalola Creek; Etowah River; Occupancy modeling; Incomplete detection; Information theoretic; Land use

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Anderson, G. B. (2014). Confronting incomplete detection to address questions about distribution and reproductive season for four imperiled stream fishes. (Thesis). University of Georgia. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10724/25731

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Anderson, Gregory Brian. “Confronting incomplete detection to address questions about distribution and reproductive season for four imperiled stream fishes.” 2014. Thesis, University of Georgia. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10724/25731.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Anderson, Gregory Brian. “Confronting incomplete detection to address questions about distribution and reproductive season for four imperiled stream fishes.” 2014. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Anderson GB. Confronting incomplete detection to address questions about distribution and reproductive season for four imperiled stream fishes. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Georgia; 2014. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10724/25731.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Anderson GB. Confronting incomplete detection to address questions about distribution and reproductive season for four imperiled stream fishes. [Thesis]. University of Georgia; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10724/25731

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Indian Institute of Science

17. Nath, Swaprava. Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing.

Degree: PhD, Faculty of Engineering, 2013, Indian Institute of Science

URL: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2497

► This thesis looks into the economics of crowdsourcing using game theoretic modeling. The art of aggregating information and expertise from a diverse population has been… (more)

▼ This thesis looks into the economics of crowdsourcing using game theoretic modeling. The art of aggregating information and expertise from a diverse population has been in practice since a long time. The Internet and the revolution in communication and computational technologies have made this task easier and given birth to a new era of online resource aggregation, which is now popularly referred to as crowdsourcing. Two important features of this aggregation technique are: (a) crowdsourcing is always human driven, hence the participants are rational and intelligent, and they have a payoff function that they aim to maximize, and (b) the participants are connected over a social network which helps to reach out to a large set of individuals. To understand the behavior and the outcome of such a strategic crowd, we need to understand the economics of a crowdsourcing network. In this thesis, we have considered the following three major facets of the strategic crowdsourcing problem. (i) Elicitation of the true qualities of the crowd workers: As the crowd is often unstructured and unknown to the designer, it is important to ensure if the crowdsourced job is indeed performed at the highest quality, and this requires elicitation of the true qualities which are typically the participants' private information. (ii) Resource critical task execution ensuring the authenticity of both the information and the identity of the participants: Due to the diverse geographical, cultural, socio-economic reasons, crowdsourcing entails certain manipulations that are unusual in the classical theory. The design has to be robust enough to handle fake identities or incorrect information provided by the crowd while performing crowdsourcing contests. (iii) Improving the productive output of the crowdsourcing network: As the designer's goal is to maximize a certain measurable output of the crowdsourcing system, an interesting question is how one can design the incentive scheme and/or the network so that the system performs at an optimal level taking into account the strategic nature of the individuals. In the thesis, we design novel mechanisms to solve the problems above using game theoretic modeling. Our investigation helps in understanding certain limits of achievability, and provides design protocols in order to make crowdsourcing more reliable, effective, and productive. Advisors/Committee Members: Narahari, Y (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Mechanism Design; Game Theory; Crowdsourcing; Game Theory Modelling; Crowdsourcing Network; Crowd Workers; Dynamic Mechanism Design; Strategic Crowd; Game Theoretic Modeling; Computer and Information Science

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Nath, S. (2013). Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing. (Doctoral Dissertation). Indian Institute of Science. Retrieved from http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2497

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Nath, Swaprava. “Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, Indian Institute of Science. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2497.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Nath, Swaprava. “Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing.” 2013. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Nath S. Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Indian Institute of Science; 2013. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2497.

Council of Science Editors:

Nath S. Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Indian Institute of Science; 2013. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2497

Anna University

18. Deisy C. Information theoretic based Interactive algorithms for Feature selection;.

Degree: Information theoretic based Interactive algorithms for Feature selection, 2015, Anna University

URL: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/43509

►

newline Feature selection is one of the important techniques in data newlinepreprocessing for data mining It reduces the number of features removes newlineirrelevant redundant or… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Information theoretic; Interactive algorithms

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

C, D. (2015). Information theoretic based Interactive algorithms for Feature selection;. (Thesis). Anna University. Retrieved from http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/43509

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

C, Deisy. “Information theoretic based Interactive algorithms for Feature selection;.” 2015. Thesis, Anna University. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/43509.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

C, Deisy. “Information theoretic based Interactive algorithms for Feature selection;.” 2015. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

C D. Information theoretic based Interactive algorithms for Feature selection;. [Internet] [Thesis]. Anna University; 2015. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/43509.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

C D. Information theoretic based Interactive algorithms for Feature selection;. [Thesis]. Anna University; 2015. Available from: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/43509

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Hawaii – Manoa

19. Miller, Lisa Jane. Information theoretic clustering of astrobiology documents.

Degree: 2016, University of Hawaii – Manoa

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/100993

►

M.S. University of Hawaii at Manoa 2012.

Astrobiology is a new and highly interdisciplinary field encompassing research from a diversity of disciplines including astrophysics, biology,… (more)

▼

M.S. University of Hawaii at Manoa 2012.

Astrobiology is a new and highly interdisciplinary field encompassing research from a diversity of disciplines including astrophysics, biology, chemistry, and geology. The AIRFrame project has been funded by NASA as part of an attempt to connect astrobiology research and researchers across disciplinary and institutional boundaries. One of the major tasks in building the AIRFrame system is to identify the major topics of research in astrobiology across disciplines and how existing work fits into these topics. While there are two astrobiology-specific scholarly journals, most researchers choose to publish in journals of their own discipline. In this work, an unsupervised learning method was applied to a corpus of astrobiology-related journal articles originating from a variety of disciplines with a goal of discovering common themes and topics. Unsupervised learning, or clustering, discovers groupings within a dataset without the aid of labeled data samples. The Information Bottleneck method [43] was employed for this project because it has been shown to be one of the most accurate and robust methods of clustering unlabeled multi-dimensional data such as text [40, 4]. Within this same framework, it also is possible to determine the maximum number of meaningful clusters that can be resolved in a finite dataset [41]. This work was the first application of this method to document clustering. Additionally, a new related algorithm was developed for preprocessing data. This new method was evaluated on its ability to indicate which words from the document data are best for use in clustering. These methods were combined to produce a dataset grouped by common topics present in 479 abstracts and full-text articles listed as publications in the NASA Astrobiology Institute 2009 Annual Report. The resulting clusters revealed several themes present in the data and groups of documents that are strongly connected on many levels through different numbers of clusters.

Subjects/Keywords: clustering; information theoretic clustering

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Miller, L. J. (2016). Information theoretic clustering of astrobiology documents. (Thesis). University of Hawaii – Manoa. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10125/100993

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Miller, Lisa Jane. “Information theoretic clustering of astrobiology documents.” 2016. Thesis, University of Hawaii – Manoa. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10125/100993.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Miller, Lisa Jane. “Information theoretic clustering of astrobiology documents.” 2016. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Miller LJ. Information theoretic clustering of astrobiology documents. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Hawaii – Manoa; 2016. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/100993.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Miller LJ. Information theoretic clustering of astrobiology documents. [Thesis]. University of Hawaii – Manoa; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/100993

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

20. Wu, Zhenhua. Essays in Organizational Economics: Information Sharing and Organizational Behavior.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2014, Arizona State University

URL: http://repository.asu.edu/items/25180

► One theoretical research topic in organizational economics is the information issues raised in different organizations. This has been extensively studied in last three decades. One… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Economic theory; Finance; Political Science; Corporate board; Dynamic game with incomplete information; Information sharing; Majority rule; Multilateral bargaining; Reputation

…members. However, with information sharing, there may exist conflicts between party members… …collusion is modeled with a bargaining game, where the board and the management bargain over the… …x28;1) Information is shared among directors with the same interests; (2) the… …the board is composed of directors with diverse interests. For the first one, information… …information is difficult to be observed by others. However, when directors with the same interest…

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Wu, Z. (2014). Essays in Organizational Economics: Information Sharing and Organizational Behavior. (Doctoral Dissertation). Arizona State University. Retrieved from http://repository.asu.edu/items/25180

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Wu, Zhenhua. “Essays in Organizational Economics: Information Sharing and Organizational Behavior.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, Arizona State University. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://repository.asu.edu/items/25180.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Wu, Zhenhua. “Essays in Organizational Economics: Information Sharing and Organizational Behavior.” 2014. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Wu Z. Essays in Organizational Economics: Information Sharing and Organizational Behavior. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Arizona State University; 2014. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://repository.asu.edu/items/25180.

Council of Science Editors:

Wu Z. Essays in Organizational Economics: Information Sharing and Organizational Behavior. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Arizona State University; 2014. Available from: http://repository.asu.edu/items/25180

University of Rochester

21. Zhou, Jianer (1977 - ); Rudi, Nils. Essays in interfaces of operations and finance in supply chains.

Degree: PhD, 2011, University of Rochester

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/14512

► This dissertation is a collection of three essays addressing interface issues of operations and finance in supply chains. In the first essay, we study pricing… (more)

▼ This dissertation is a collection of three essays addressing interface issues of operations and finance in supply chains. In the first essay, we study pricing of financial hedging contracts used by firms to better respond to uncertainty in product markets. We consider a single-period problem in which a firm has only one opportunity for resource acquisition before demand uncertainty is resolved, and he makes the product pricing decision based on the realized demand function. To offset the risk of his real investment, the firm buys a tailor-made hedging contract from an issuer with an underlying payoff partially correlated with the uncertainty in the product market. We show the contract effect by formulating the negotiation process between both parties in the framework of a Stackelberg game and price equilibrium. For each game-theoretic setting, we derive the equilibrium solution and present the comparative statics. We also investigate the case in which the issuer lays off her risk from one contract by writing another contract with a second firm, and compare contract performance with a benchmark case in which two firms trade directly rather than through the issuer. In the second essay, we study a supply chain in which a retailer faces a classic newsvendor problem with a financial constraint on his capacity to order inventory. To sell more products, the manufacturer teams up with a bank to offer an interest-free loan program. We formulate the interaction between the retailer and the manufacturer as a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer has the dominant pricing power. Our results indicate that the loan program can significantly improve each party's profit. The retailer becomes more aggressive in ordering when equilibrium order quantity is low but demand risk is high. We also investigate open account financing in which the manufacturer allows a partial and delayed payment, equivalent to a loan to the retailer. Compared with open account financing, bank financing improves the entire supply chain profit. Numerical experiments demonstrate the supply chain performance under bank financing and indicate that demand volatility may actually improve contract efficiency. We propose two contract forms that coordinate the supply chain of these three parties. In the last essay, we continue to consider such a supply chain in a multi-period setting. The retailer may be financially constrained or even distressed in each period. Either the manufacturer or the bank can offer a loan program and ultimately bear the retailer's bankruptcy risk. Formulating these two scenarios in Markov decision processes with a finite horizon and employing a Stackelberg game in each period, we show that the bank may "under-lend" to the small retailer in bank-led financing and that manufacturer-led financing outperforms its counterpart. The manufacturer, however, may "over-lend" to the retailer, which raises a concern of excessive credit risk. Debt relief is a better alternative to the manufacturer who is more willing to save…

Subjects/Keywords: Financial hedging; Financial collaboration; Game theoretic application

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Zhou, Jianer (1977 - ); Rudi, N. (2011). Essays in interfaces of operations and finance in supply chains. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Rochester. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1802/14512

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Zhou, Jianer (1977 - ); Rudi, Nils. “Essays in interfaces of operations and finance in supply chains.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Rochester. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1802/14512.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Zhou, Jianer (1977 - ); Rudi, Nils. “Essays in interfaces of operations and finance in supply chains.” 2011. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Zhou, Jianer (1977 - ); Rudi N. Essays in interfaces of operations and finance in supply chains. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2011. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/14512.

Council of Science Editors:

Zhou, Jianer (1977 - ); Rudi N. Essays in interfaces of operations and finance in supply chains. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/14512

Georgia Tech

22. Lim, Yusun. Game theoretic distributed coordination: drifting environments and constrained communications.

Degree: PhD, Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2014, Georgia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/52986

► The major objective of this dissertation is extending the capabilities of game theoretic distributed control to more general settings. In particular, we are interested in… (more)

▼ The major objective of this dissertation is extending the capabilities of game theoretic distributed control to more general settings. In particular, we are interested in drifting environments and/or constrained communications. The first part of the dissertation concerns slowly varying dynamics, i.e., drifting environments. A standard assumption in game theoretic learning is a stationary environment, e.g., the game is fixed. We investigate the case of slow variations and show that for sufficiently slow time variations, the limiting behavior “tracks” the stochastically stable states. Since the analysis is regarding Markov processes, the results could be applied to various game theoretic learning rules. In this research, the results were applied to log-linear learning. A mobile sensor coverage example was tested in both simulation and laboratory experiments. The second part considers a problem of coordinating team players' actions without any communications in team-based zero-sum games. Generally, some global signalling devices are required for common randomness between players, but communications are very limited or impossible in many practical applications. Instead of learning a one-shot strategy, we let players coordinate a periodic sequence of deterministic actions and put an assumption on opponent's rationality. Since team players' action sequences are periodic and deterministic, common randomness is no longer required to coordinate players. It is proved that if a length of a periodic action sequence is long enough, then opponents with limited rationality cannot recognize its pattern. Because the opponents cannot recognize that the players are playing deterministic actions, the players' behavior looks like a correlated and randomized joint strategy with empirical distribution of their action sequences. Consequently players can coordinate their action sequences without any communications or global signals, and the resulting action sequences have correlated behavior. Moreover, the notion of micro-players are introduced for efficient learning of long action sequences. Micro-player matching approach provides a new framework that converts the original team-based zero-sum game to a game between micro-players. By introducing a de Bruijn sequence to micro-player matching, we successfully separate the level of opponent's rationality and the size of the game of micro-players. The simulation results are shown to demonstrate the performance of micro-player matching methods. Lastly, the results of the previous two topics are combined by considering a problem of coordinating actions without communications in drifting environments. More specifically, it is assumed that the opponent player in the team-based zero-sum games tries to adjust its strategy in the set of bounded recall strategies. Then the time-varying opponent's strategy can be considered as a dynamic environment parameter in a coordination game between the team players. Additionally, we develop a human testbed program for further study regarding a human as an… Advisors/Committee Members: Shamma, Jeff S. (advisor), Wardi, Yorai (committee member), Fekri, Faramarz (committee member), Feron, Eric (committee member), Howard, Ayanna M. (committee member), Bloch, Matthieu R. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Game theoretic learning; Cooperative control; Distributed control

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Lim, Y. (2014). Game theoretic distributed coordination: drifting environments and constrained communications. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1853/52986

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Lim, Yusun. “Game theoretic distributed coordination: drifting environments and constrained communications.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia Tech. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/52986.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Lim, Yusun. “Game theoretic distributed coordination: drifting environments and constrained communications.” 2014. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Lim Y. Game theoretic distributed coordination: drifting environments and constrained communications. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia Tech; 2014. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/52986.

Council of Science Editors:

Lim Y. Game theoretic distributed coordination: drifting environments and constrained communications. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia Tech; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/52986

University of Southern California

23. Lu, Shijie. Essays on online advertising markets.

Degree: PhD, Business Administration, 2015, University of Southern California

URL: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/548697/rec/2472

► My dissertation examines novel interactions between consumers and advertisers enabled by Internet platforms with new targeting technologies in online advertising markets. As paid‐search and display… (more)

▼ My dissertation examines novel interactions between consumers and advertisers enabled by Internet platforms with new targeting technologies in online advertising markets. As paid‐search and display become two most prevalent forms of online advertising, this dissertation empirically investigates the consumer and advertiser interactions in these two online advertising markets. ❧ In my first essay, I examine the determinant of competition and its impact on click‐volume and cost‐per‐clicks in paid‐search advertising. I regard each keyword as a market and measure the competition by the number of ads on the paid‐search listings. I build an integrative model of the number entrant advertisers, the realized click‐volume and cost‐per‐clicks of each entrant. The proposed model is applied to data of keywords associated with digital camera/video and accessories. Results indicate that the number of competing ads has a significant impact on baseline click‐volume, decay factor, and value‐per‐click. These findings help search advertisers assess the impact of competition on their entry decisions and advertising profitability. The proposed framework can also provide profit implications to the search host regarding two polices: raising the decay factor by encouraging consumers to engage in more in‐depth search/click‐through, and providing coupons to advertisers. ❧ As Internet advertising infomediaries now provide rich competition‐related information, search advertisers are becoming more strategic in their keyword decisions. In the second essay, I explore whether positive or negative spillover effects occur in advertisers’ keyword entry decisions, which lead to assimilation or differentiation in their keyword choices. I develop a model of advertisers’ keyword decisions based on the incomplete‐information and simultaneous‐move game with two novel extensions: (i) I allow the strategic interactions to vary with advertisement positions to reflect consumers’ top‐down search pattern; and (ii) I infer potential entrants of a keyword by modeling the advertisers’ keyword consideration process to capture their limited capacity in analyzing all existing keywords. Using a panel dataset of laptop‐related keywords mainly used by 28 manufacturers, retailers, and comparison websites that advertise on Google, I find both assimilation and differentiation tendencies, which vary across firm types and the expected ranking of competing firms. A counterfactual simulation suggests that the more accurate competition information provided by infomediaries leads to a market‐expansion effect. ❧ Behavioral targeting, displaying personalized advertisements based on consumers’ past online behaviors, has become a popular practice in the online advertising industry. Yet, empirical research on behavioral targeting remains relatively nascent. The final essay studies the impact of targeting level on three key players (users, advertisers, and the advertising host) in behaviorally targeted display advertising. The targeting level is defined as an inverse scale of the number… Advisors/Committee Members: Yang, Sha (Committee Chair), Dukes, Anthony (Committee Member), Shum, Matthew (Committee Member), Yang, Botao (Committee Member).

Subjects/Keywords: online advertising; Internet marketing; paid search; competition; generalized second-price auction; entry; incomplete-information game; infomediary; behavioral targeting; Bayesian estimation

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Lu, S. (2015). Essays on online advertising markets. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/548697/rec/2472

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Lu, Shijie. “Essays on online advertising markets.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/548697/rec/2472.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Lu, Shijie. “Essays on online advertising markets.” 2015. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Lu S. Essays on online advertising markets. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2015. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/548697/rec/2472.

Council of Science Editors:

Lu S. Essays on online advertising markets. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2015. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/548697/rec/2472

University of Waterloo

24. Shew, James. Guidance Under Uncertainty: Employing a Mediator Framework in Bilateral Incomplete-Information Negotiations.

Degree: 2008, University of Waterloo

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10012/4017

► Bilateral incomplete-information negotiations of multiple issues present a difficult yet common negotiation problem that is complicated to solve from a mechanism design perspective. Unlike multilateral… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Negotiations; Mediator; Bilateral; Incomplete-Information; Game Theory; Mechanism Design

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Shew, J. (2008). Guidance Under Uncertainty: Employing a Mediator Framework in Bilateral Incomplete-Information Negotiations. (Thesis). University of Waterloo. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10012/4017

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Shew, James. “Guidance Under Uncertainty: Employing a Mediator Framework in Bilateral Incomplete-Information Negotiations.” 2008. Thesis, University of Waterloo. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10012/4017.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Shew, James. “Guidance Under Uncertainty: Employing a Mediator Framework in Bilateral Incomplete-Information Negotiations.” 2008. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Shew J. Guidance Under Uncertainty: Employing a Mediator Framework in Bilateral Incomplete-Information Negotiations. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Waterloo; 2008. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10012/4017.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Shew J. Guidance Under Uncertainty: Employing a Mediator Framework in Bilateral Incomplete-Information Negotiations. [Thesis]. University of Waterloo; 2008. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10012/4017

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of New South Wales

25. Chitizadeh, Armin. Solving General Game Playing with Incomplete Information Problem using Iterative Tree Search and Language Learning.

Degree: Computer Science & Engineering, 2020, University of New South Wales

URL: http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/67169 ; https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:67796/SOURCE02?view=true

► General Game Playing with Incomplete Information (GGP-II) is about developing a system capable of successfully playing incomplete information games without human intervention by just receiving… (more)

▼ General Game Playing with Incomplete Information (GGP-II) is about developing a system capable of successfully playing incomplete information games without human intervention by just receiving their rules at runtime. Different algorithms (players) have been provided to play games in GGP-II. This research is concerned with three main limitations of algorithms in the literature: valuing-information, generating mixed strategy and cooperating in games which require implicit communication.In this thesis, I theoretically and experimentally show why past GGP-II players suffer from these problems and introduce four algorithms to overcome these problems and discuss the advantages and limitations of each algorithm.Firstly, I introduce the Iterative Tree Search (ITS) algorithm. ITS learns the best strategy by simulating different plays with itself. I show theoretically and experimentally how ITS correctly values information and models opponents by generating mixed strategies in different games. However, ITS fails to play large games and also the cooperative games which require implicit communication.Secondly, I present the Monte Carlo Iterative Tree Search (MCITS). This algorithm uses Monte Carlo Tree Search technique to focus the search on a more promising part of the game. I experimentally show the success of this algorithm on different games from the literature. MCITS fails to generate mixed strategies and to correctly play games which require implicit communication.Thirdly, I introduce a communication language learning technique called General Language (GL). GL is capable of generating an implicit communication language for cooperative players to share their information. The GL technique sees a communication language as an additional game rule. It can be used on top of any existing GGP-II player. This feature makes it a general algorithm. The main limitation of GL is its inability to solve large problems.Finally, I present the General Language Tree Search algorithm (GLTS). This algorithm extends the GL technique to be applicable to large games. It prioritises the communication languages according to their closeness to the most successful one. To validate my claim, I perform an experiment using GLTS by providing it with a Multi-Agent Path Finding with Destination Uncertainty problem. The GLTS algorithm successfully discovers the desired strategies by utilising the implicit communication among agents. Advisors/Committee Members: Thielscher, Michael, Computer Science & Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, UNSW, Blair, Alan David, Computer Science & Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, UNSW.

Subjects/Keywords: GGP; General Game Playing; Incomplete Information; Language Learning; Multi-agent; Monte Carlo; GGP-II; Implicit communication; Multi-Agent Path Finding

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Chitizadeh, A. (2020). Solving General Game Playing with Incomplete Information Problem using Iterative Tree Search and Language Learning. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of New South Wales. Retrieved from http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/67169 ; https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:67796/SOURCE02?view=true

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Chitizadeh, Armin. “Solving General Game Playing with Incomplete Information Problem using Iterative Tree Search and Language Learning.” 2020. Doctoral Dissertation, University of New South Wales. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/67169 ; https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:67796/SOURCE02?view=true.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Chitizadeh, Armin. “Solving General Game Playing with Incomplete Information Problem using Iterative Tree Search and Language Learning.” 2020. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Chitizadeh A. Solving General Game Playing with Incomplete Information Problem using Iterative Tree Search and Language Learning. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of New South Wales; 2020. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/67169 ; https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:67796/SOURCE02?view=true.

Council of Science Editors:

Chitizadeh A. Solving General Game Playing with Incomplete Information Problem using Iterative Tree Search and Language Learning. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of New South Wales; 2020. Available from: http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/67169 ; https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:67796/SOURCE02?view=true

Texas A&M University

26. Sharma, Priyanka. The Impact of Asymmetric Information: Applications in Enterpreneurship and Finance.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2013, Texas A&M University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/151121

► This dissertation consists of three essays examining the impact of information asymmetries in context of entrepreneurship and finance. Chapter 2, coauthored with Silvana Krasteva and… (more)

▼ This dissertation consists of three essays examining the impact of information asymmetries in context of entrepreneurship and finance. Chapter 2, coauthored with Silvana Krasteva and Liad Wagman, focuses on the asymmetries between a firm and its (researcher) employee and studies the problem faced by a (researcher) employee when choosing whether to pursue an innovative idea as part of his employment at a firm or to form a start-up. An idea by its stand-alone value and by the degree of (positive or negative) externality that it may impose on the employing firm’s existing profits if brought to market. The employee has private information about the innovation and his ability to independently develop it. Internal exploration, while allowing the employee to take advantage of any exploration support offered by the firm, reduces the employee’s claim over his idea. We find that external exploration takes place for ideas weakly related to the firm’s existing offerings, with other ideas being explored internally. We show that if the firm increases its support for exploration, it can induce the internal research of a wider range of ideas; however, by doing so, the firm also increases the likelihood of employees departing to pursue independent ventures at a later stage of development. Chapter 3 analyzes the benefits of reducing information asymmetry in the credit markets. In their attempt to make more informed decisions, lenders of- ten use a variety of information contained in a borrower ’s credit report. We find that if a borrower expects his future lenders to base their decisions not only on his repayment history but also on other factors like his income, length of history, etc., then his incentives to repay his present loan are weakened. In this case, he is more likely to strategically default on his loan especially for very high levels of interest rates. However, use of this extra information assists the lender in expeditious screening of the borrowers. Based on our results, we recommend that, in order to minimize defaults, more repayment history based products should be offered by the lenders. Evidence supporting the validity of this recommendation is provided in Chapter 4, coauthored with Vijetha Koppa. Using data from Prosper.com, we analyze the effect of reporting repayment histories to an additional credit bureau on borrowers’ default rates and lenders’ internal rates of return. A differences- in-differences comparison between high risk and low risk borrowers reveals that for high risk borrowers, the default rates were 9 to 11 percentage points greater and the internal rates of return were 13 percentage points lower in the pre-change period. Advisors/Committee Members: Krasteva, Silvana (advisor), Tian, Guoqiang (advisor), Wiseman, Thomas (committee member), Houghton, Stephanie (committee member), Mahajan, Arvind (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Games of Incomplete Information

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Sharma, P. (2013). The Impact of Asymmetric Information: Applications in Enterpreneurship and Finance. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/151121

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Sharma, Priyanka. “The Impact of Asymmetric Information: Applications in Enterpreneurship and Finance.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/151121.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Sharma, Priyanka. “The Impact of Asymmetric Information: Applications in Enterpreneurship and Finance.” 2013. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Sharma P. The Impact of Asymmetric Information: Applications in Enterpreneurship and Finance. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2013. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/151121.

Council of Science Editors:

Sharma P. The Impact of Asymmetric Information: Applications in Enterpreneurship and Finance. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/151121

Indian Institute of Science

27. Shelke, Sunil Sitaram. A Novel Game Theoretic And Voting Mechanism Based Approach For Carbon Emissions Reduction.

Degree: MSc Engg, Faculty of Engineering, 2014, Indian Institute of Science

URL: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2361

► Global warming is currently a major challenge facing the world. There are widespread ongoing efforts in the form of summits, conferences, etc., to find satisfactory… (more)

▼ Global warming is currently a major challenge facing the world. There are widespread ongoing efforts in the form of summits, conferences, etc., to find satisfactory ways of surmounting this challenge. The basic objective of all such efforts can be summarized as conception and formation of protocols to reduce the pace of global carbon levels. Game theory and mechanism design provide a natural modeling tool for capturing the strategic dynamics involved in global warming related problems. This dissertation explores for the first time the use of voting mechanisms in the context of solving the central problems, namely, allocation of emission caps and reduction quotas to strategic emitting agents (countries). The contribution of this dissertation is two-fold. The first contribution is to develop an elegant game theoretic model that accurately captures the strategic interactions among different emitting agents in a global warming setting. This model facilitates a convenient way of exploring a mechanism design approach for solving important allocation problems in the global warming context. The second contribution is to propose and explore a novel approach, based on voting mechanisms, to solve two problems: (1) allocating emission caps and (2) allocating reduction quotas to strategic agents. Our work investigates the use of voting mechanisms that satisfy four desirable properties: (1) non-dictatorship, (2) strategy-proofness, (3) efficiency, and (4) anonymity. In particular, we explore the median selection, maximum order statistic selection, and general Kth order statistic selection voting mechanisms. Our results clearly show that only trivial allocations satisfy all the above properties simultaneously. We next investigate the use of voting mechanisms for the dual problem, namely, allocation of emission reductions to emitting agents. Here, we show that non-trivial allocations are possible, however an important property, individual rationality, might be compromised. The investigations in the thesis bring out certain limitations in applying voting mechanisms that satisfy all the four properties above. Nevertheless, the insights obtained provide valuable guidelines for solving emission allocation related problems in a principled and informed way. Advisors/Committee Members: Narahari, Y (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Game Theory; Carbon Emissions; Global Warming - Game Theoretic Model; Global Warming - Voting Mechanism; Carbon Emissions - Allocation and Reduction; Game Theoretic Approach; Game Theoretic Model; Computer Science

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Shelke, S. S. (2014). A Novel Game Theoretic And Voting Mechanism Based Approach For Carbon Emissions Reduction. (Masters Thesis). Indian Institute of Science. Retrieved from http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2361

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Shelke, Sunil Sitaram. “A Novel Game Theoretic And Voting Mechanism Based Approach For Carbon Emissions Reduction.” 2014. Masters Thesis, Indian Institute of Science. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2361.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Shelke, Sunil Sitaram. “A Novel Game Theoretic And Voting Mechanism Based Approach For Carbon Emissions Reduction.” 2014. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Shelke SS. A Novel Game Theoretic And Voting Mechanism Based Approach For Carbon Emissions Reduction. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Indian Institute of Science; 2014. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2361.

Council of Science Editors:

Shelke SS. A Novel Game Theoretic And Voting Mechanism Based Approach For Carbon Emissions Reduction. [Masters Thesis]. Indian Institute of Science; 2014. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2361

University of Minnesota

28. Wagner, Kyle. Examination Of Three Practice Schedules for Single Digit Math.

Degree: PhD, Educational Psychology, 2019, University of Minnesota

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/209020

► The primary goal of this project is to expand and generalize the literature base for interleaved practice. This study compares interleaved practice to repetitive practice… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: incramental rehearsal; information theoretic; interleaved; math; practice

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Wagner, K. (2019). Examination Of Three Practice Schedules for Single Digit Math. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Minnesota. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11299/209020

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Wagner, Kyle. “Examination Of Three Practice Schedules for Single Digit Math.” 2019. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Minnesota. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11299/209020.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Wagner, Kyle. “Examination Of Three Practice Schedules for Single Digit Math.” 2019. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Wagner K. Examination Of Three Practice Schedules for Single Digit Math. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Minnesota; 2019. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/209020.

Council of Science Editors:

Wagner K. Examination Of Three Practice Schedules for Single Digit Math. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Minnesota; 2019. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/209020

Anna University

29. Vetrivelan P. Game theoretic and weightedranking approaches for seamless vertical handover in 4g heterogeneous networks; -.

Degree: Information and communication engineering, 2014, Anna University

URL: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/54061

Abstract available

Reference p.231-240 and publication p.241-243

Advisors/Committee Members: Narayanasamy, P.

Subjects/Keywords: Game; Heterogeneous; Theoretic; Weightedranking

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

P, V. (2014). Game theoretic and weightedranking approaches for seamless vertical handover in 4g heterogeneous networks; -. (Thesis). Anna University. Retrieved from http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/54061

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

P, Vetrivelan. “Game theoretic and weightedranking approaches for seamless vertical handover in 4g heterogeneous networks; -.” 2014. Thesis, Anna University. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/54061.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

P, Vetrivelan. “Game theoretic and weightedranking approaches for seamless vertical handover in 4g heterogeneous networks; -.” 2014. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

P V. Game theoretic and weightedranking approaches for seamless vertical handover in 4g heterogeneous networks; -. [Internet] [Thesis]. Anna University; 2014. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/54061.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

P V. Game theoretic and weightedranking approaches for seamless vertical handover in 4g heterogeneous networks; -. [Thesis]. Anna University; 2014. Available from: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/54061

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Adelaide

30. Otumawu-Apreku, Kofi. Matters of management, sustainability, and efficiency: essays in fisheries.

Degree: 2013, University of Adelaide

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/83828

► This thesis addresses three main issues in fisheries management: monitoring and enforcement; profit efficiency; and factors determining profit efficiency. The overall objective is to provide… (more)

▼ This thesis addresses three main issues in fisheries management: monitoring and enforcement; profit efficiency; and factors determining profit efficiency. The overall objective is to provide broad theoretical and empirical analysis of fisheries management issues that seek to address sustainability and efficiency questions in the industry. The first issue investigated is whether monitoring and enforcement, as management policy instruments, can lower illegal harvesting and therefore preserve fish stocks. Using a game theoretic approach the strategic interaction between management and fishers, in the presence of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU), is examined. Results of the analysis show that equilibrium compliance strategies of fishers affect stocks over time. It is further observed that increasing the cost of engaging in illegal activities, through punishment, may be sound economic policy. The second issue examined is efficiency in the South Australian Rock Lobster Fishery. To do this a new approach, in the context of fisheries, is used to overcome the small sample sizes and negative profit challenges inherent in fisheries. Specifically, the Nerlovian and Directional Distance Function methods are used to decompose profits of the fisheries into technical and allocative efficiencies. In addition, the meta-frontier efficiency technique is used to compare the Northern and Southern Zones, the two fisheries in the South Australian Rock Lobster Fishery. Results show that profit inefficiency in this fishery can be largely attributed to allocative inefficiency. Further, it is observed that there is significant variability between efficiency levels in the Northern and Southern Zones. The final issue considered is the natural question of what factors, besides technical and allocative inefficiency, may possibly explain profit inefficiencies in the South Australian Rock Lobster Fishery. To answer this question we investigate the effects of incorporating a fixed input on equilibrium profits and biomass. We first set up a theoretical model with an input that is fixed in the short-run (vessel size) but that can be used with a variable input at sub-optimal capacity. We use this model to get predictions for the impact on profits of exogenous changes in biomass, output price and vessel size. These give us interesting theoretical insights into why it is important to incorporate fixed inputs into profit analysis. We then conduct an empirical investigation to gain an understanding of the effects of these non-discretionary factors on profit efficiency. In particular, we apply a truncated regression with bootstrap methodology to data on individual firm profit efficiency from the South Australian Rock Lobster Fishery. We find empirical support for our predictions that increased biomass and smaller vessel length are associated with higher profits. An additional empirical result is that individual quota management is positively associated with profit efficiency. Advisors/Committee Members: McWhinnie, Stephanie Faye (advisor), Kvasov, Dmitriy (advisor), Findlay, Christopher Charles (advisor), School of Economics (school).

Subjects/Keywords: violation; compliance; game-theoretic efficiency; Nerlovian; truncation; bootstrap

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Otumawu-Apreku, K. (2013). Matters of management, sustainability, and efficiency: essays in fisheries. (Thesis). University of Adelaide. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2440/83828

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Otumawu-Apreku, Kofi. “Matters of management, sustainability, and efficiency: essays in fisheries.” 2013. Thesis, University of Adelaide. Accessed January 19, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/2440/83828.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Otumawu-Apreku, Kofi. “Matters of management, sustainability, and efficiency: essays in fisheries.” 2013. Web. 19 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Otumawu-Apreku K. Matters of management, sustainability, and efficiency: essays in fisheries. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Adelaide; 2013. [cited 2021 Jan 19]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/83828.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Otumawu-Apreku K. Matters of management, sustainability, and efficiency: essays in fisheries. [Thesis]. University of Adelaide; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/83828

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Open Access Theses and Dissertations