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You searched for subject:(duopolistic competition). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

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University of Southern California

1. Thomas-zadeh, Maroudeen. Pricing strategy in a duopolistic market: aviation industry in Middle East.

Degree: MA, Economics, 2014, University of Southern California

As developing economies in and around the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) are growing rapidly, the market for aviation industry in the region is also expanding rapidly. Currently Emirates Airlines and Turkish Airlines are the leading commercial and cargo carriers in the region. Both airlines are growing rapidly and competing with each other especially in long distance flights, which are the most profitable. This study examines how each firm reacts to a price change by the other competitor either increase or decrease their airfares in response to the other, in such a way as to optimize their profit. This study aims to analyze the pricing strategies for both firms in this duopolistic market using Bertrand model of game theory and its implications in this particular market. Advisors/Committee Members: Nugent, Jeffrey B. (Committee Chair), Wilkie, Simon J. (Committee Member), Kocer, Yilmaz (Committee Member).

Subjects/Keywords: using VAR; duopolistic competition; Bertrand model

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Thomas-zadeh, M. (2014). Pricing strategy in a duopolistic market: aviation industry in Middle East. (Masters Thesis). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/412542/rec/5223

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Thomas-zadeh, Maroudeen. “Pricing strategy in a duopolistic market: aviation industry in Middle East.” 2014. Masters Thesis, University of Southern California. Accessed November 28, 2020. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/412542/rec/5223.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Thomas-zadeh, Maroudeen. “Pricing strategy in a duopolistic market: aviation industry in Middle East.” 2014. Web. 28 Nov 2020.

Vancouver:

Thomas-zadeh M. Pricing strategy in a duopolistic market: aviation industry in Middle East. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Southern California; 2014. [cited 2020 Nov 28]. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/412542/rec/5223.

Council of Science Editors:

Thomas-zadeh M. Pricing strategy in a duopolistic market: aviation industry in Middle East. [Masters Thesis]. University of Southern California; 2014. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/412542/rec/5223


University of Michigan

2. Rodriguez, Roberto. Quantity discounts, loyalty and price competition in segmented duopolistic markets.

Degree: PhD, Social Sciences, 1998, University of Michigan

In the first part of the Dissertation, we focus on analyzing whether a incumbent can use quantity discounts to deter a more efficient but capacity constrained rival from entering the market. Although entry can profitably be deterred, the incumbent's optimal strategy is to accommodate entry. In a dynamic framework, when the incumbent faces sequential entry by short-lived entrants, we find that entry deterrence is an equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game if the discount factor is large enough. In the second part of the Dissertation, we have analyzed price competition in duopolistic segmented markets when each firm has a loyal customer base. Loyal customers buy only from the firm to which they are loyal. The unique equilibrium of the price-setting game is in mixed strategies. The equilibrium probability distributions have a common support but they are different. The firm with the larger customer base, in equilibrium, chooses a probability distribution that has an atom of positive probability at the reservation price. The distribution of the firm with the larger customer base stochastically dominates that of the firm with the smaller costumer base, indicating that, on average, we should expect higher prices charged by the firm with the higher costumer base. When we endogenize the segmentation of the market by adding a prior stage in which the firms select the media through which they provide information, we find that the subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies are asymmetric. We have applied the model to study price competition between rival cafes, taking as given their smoking policies, when consumers are divided between smokers, radical non-smokers and non-radical non-smokers. Radical non-smokers only patronize smoke-free cafes while smokers avoid them. The non-radical non-smokers compare prices regardless of the smoking policies. We find that smoke-free cafes charge higher (lower) expected prices when the population of radical non-smokers is larger (smaller) than the population of smokers. When smoking policies are endogenous, depending on the parameters of the model, we find that selecting the same policy can be an equilibrium of the game. Advisors/Committee Members: Salant, Stephen W. (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Duopolistic; Loyalty; Price Competition; Quantity Discounts; Segmented Markets

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Rodriguez, R. (1998). Quantity discounts, loyalty and price competition in segmented duopolistic markets. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Michigan. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/131317

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Rodriguez, Roberto. “Quantity discounts, loyalty and price competition in segmented duopolistic markets.” 1998. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan. Accessed November 28, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/131317.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Rodriguez, Roberto. “Quantity discounts, loyalty and price competition in segmented duopolistic markets.” 1998. Web. 28 Nov 2020.

Vancouver:

Rodriguez R. Quantity discounts, loyalty and price competition in segmented duopolistic markets. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Michigan; 1998. [cited 2020 Nov 28]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/131317.

Council of Science Editors:

Rodriguez R. Quantity discounts, loyalty and price competition in segmented duopolistic markets. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Michigan; 1998. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/131317

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