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University of Rochester
1.
Kim, Hye-Sung (1980 - ).
Ethnicity, distributive politics, and voting in
Uganda.
Degree: PhD, 2014, University of Rochester
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/28866 
► This dissertation examines the link between ethnicity, distributive politics, and voting in Uganda, one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world. Until recently,…
(more)
▼ This dissertation examines the link between
ethnicity, distributive politics, and voting in Uganda, one of the
most ethnically diverse countries in the world. Until recently, the
scholarship on ethnic politics have been somewhat narrowly focused
on the effects of coethnicity, including whether voters vote for
coethnic candidates, what explains voters' tendency to vote for
their coethnics, and whether leaders' coethnics benefit more
favorably from targeted resource distribution. The dissertation is
motivated by observations that ethnicity influences voters'
preferences for non-coethnic candidates as well as coethnic
candidates. Voters who do not have a coethnic candidate may still
make voting decisions influenced by existing ethnic preferences for
non-coethnic candidates. Even voters who have a coethnic candidate
may have ethnic preferences that influence them to vote for a
non-coethnic candidate under certain circumstances.
The first
chapter of the dissertation illustrates the patterns of ethnic
preference for both coethnic and non-coethnic candidates and the
degree of persistence of ethnic preference for non-coethnic
candidates as opposed to ethnic preference for coethnic candidates.
Ethnic preferences for a coethnic candidate-especially an incumbent
coethnic-are found to be substantially persistent whereas ethnic
preferences for non-coethnic candidates are generally not
persistent. These findings are closely linked to the other parts of
the dissertation. The subsequent chapters present how voters'
ethnic preferences and the persistence of ethnic preferences
influence voters' responsiveness to presidential candidates'
clientelistic appeals and the provision of targeted distribution of
public resources to different electoral areas.
In the second
chapter, I discuss a survey experiment I conducted in the eastern
region of Uganda and the related finding: voters without persistent
ethnic preferences are more likely to defect because of
clientelistic appeals. This chapter finds that targeting
non-coethnics with clientelistic promises is more effective in
gaining votes than targeting coethnic voters. This strategy becomes
even more effective when no coethnic candidate is on the ballot.
Because voters generally have weaker ethnic preferences for
non-coethnic candidates, defections occur more frequently when a
coethnic candidate is not running.
The last chapter examines the
conditions under which a vote-seeking incumbent provides a targeted
benefit for his own strongholds, swing areas, and opposition
strongholds, where the incumbent and opposition strongholds are
measured by (a) the previous electoral outcomes, and (b) the ethnic
composition of electoral areas. In this chapter I argue that the
incumbent seldom faces incentives to target his own stronghold when
voters' preferences are persistent. The empirical examination of
how electoral calculations influence the allocation of local
service delivery, including electricity supply, local public roads,
health and medical facilities, and local primary universal
education…
Subjects/Keywords: Africa; Clientelism; Distributive Politics; Ethnicity; Uganda; Voting
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APA (6th Edition):
Kim, H. (. -. ). (2014). Ethnicity, distributive politics, and voting in
Uganda. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Rochester. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1802/28866
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Kim, Hye-Sung (1980 - ). “Ethnicity, distributive politics, and voting in
Uganda.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Rochester. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1802/28866.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Kim, Hye-Sung (1980 - ). “Ethnicity, distributive politics, and voting in
Uganda.” 2014. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Kim H(-). Ethnicity, distributive politics, and voting in
Uganda. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2014. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/28866.
Council of Science Editors:
Kim H(-). Ethnicity, distributive politics, and voting in
Uganda. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/28866
Texas A&M University
2.
Bonneau, Emily Morgan.
The influence of politics and institutional position on distributive policies.
Degree: MA, Political Science, 2005, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/2376
► Central to the distributive theory is the idea that members of Congress can use strategic committee assignments to fund pork projects for their districts. Committees…
(more)
▼ Central to the
distributive theory is the idea that members of Congress can use
strategic committee assignments to fund pork projects for their districts. Committees
that are primarily constituency service based are considered most susceptible to pork
barrel
politics. The Public Works and Transportation Committee, in particular, has
developed a reputation for distributing pork projects. Adler??s (2002) study of six
committees found impressive evidence that members of certain committees are able to
channel disproportionate benefits to their districts??the lone exception was the Public
Works and Transportation Committee. Given the folklore about Public Works and
??pork,?? this result seems odd. In this study, I make two major adjustments to the
research design. First, I isolate the dollars spent on committee programs that were not
allocated by a formula. Formulas have prior built-in controls that are not
subject to
bargaining after the formula has been set, and thus are not illustrative of the pork
process. Second, I expand the years studied (1983-1996) and analyze the data with a
pooled cross-section/time series design, which better controls the potential effects of
time on the distribution of federal funds. These modifications do not produce results to
reconcile the conflict with congressional folklore, instead they question the
generalizability of allocation decisions for constituency service committees.
Advisors/Committee Members: Bond, Jon R. (advisor), Hurley, Patricia A. (committee member), Meier, Kenneth J. (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Congress; Distributive Politics
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APA (6th Edition):
Bonneau, E. M. (2005). The influence of politics and institutional position on distributive policies. (Masters Thesis). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/2376
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Bonneau, Emily Morgan. “The influence of politics and institutional position on distributive policies.” 2005. Masters Thesis, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/2376.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Bonneau, Emily Morgan. “The influence of politics and institutional position on distributive policies.” 2005. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Bonneau EM. The influence of politics and institutional position on distributive policies. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Texas A&M University; 2005. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/2376.
Council of Science Editors:
Bonneau EM. The influence of politics and institutional position on distributive policies. [Masters Thesis]. Texas A&M University; 2005. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/2376
University of Rochester
3.
Malik, Rabia.
Electoral incentives, distributive politics, and tax
evasion in Pakistan.
Degree: PhD, 2016, University of Rochester
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/31463
► How do electoral incentives shape officeholding politicians' decisions and behavior? Though political science has long analyzed how governments distribute development resources among different parties and…
(more)
▼ How do electoral incentives shape officeholding
politicians' decisions and behavior?
Though political science has
long analyzed how governments distribute
development resources
among different parties and districts, the focus
has primarily
been on stable political systems. The first two chapters
of this
dissertation extend our understanding of how political
considerations
affect resource distribution by incumbent parties
in politically competitive
but institutionally unstable
democracies. The third chapter shifts attention
to how electoral
pressures condition legislators' own behavior in terms of
tax
payments in response to increased information about tax evasion to
citizens.
Empirically, the dissertation focuses on Pakistan, which
is an unstable
democracy but one that has nonetheless experienced
frequent elections with
high competition. All three chapters use
new data that I collected myself
doing fieldwork in Pakistan.
In
the first chapter, I argue that the specter of regime instability
shortens
politicians' time horizons when they are in power in
countries that have
faced frequent regime alternation. The
consequent expectation that democracy, when in place, is unlikely
to last in the long term incentivizes higher
levels of resource
distortion than in stable systems because it lowers the
expected
future costs of punishment for such behavior. Thus, in unstable
democracies, we should see legislators from the ruling party having
disproportionately
high access to development resources compared
to opposition
legislators. Using the first comprehensive dataset
on two decades of federal
development resource allocation and
national elections in Pakistan, and implementing
a regression
discontinuity design, I show that the ruling party
greatly
distorts access to resources in order to benefit its own party
members
and punish opposition legislators. I also present evidence
that this distortion
is driven by the treat of regime instability
rather than by legislator quality,
economic differences between
districts, the timing of elections, or ideological
differences
between the main political parties.
The first chapter's findings
lead to the question of whether the lower
access to resources for
opposition legislators is driven by all opposition legislators
being discriminated against equally or whether other factors
influence
the distributive pattern within opposition districts. I
argue in the second
chapter that high electoral competition and a
patronage-heavy political environment
act as a constraint on the
ruling party such that it will not discriminate
against the
strongest opposition legislators when distributing resources.
A
simple formalization of the main mechanism shows that, under such
conditions,
the difference in resource access for ruling party
versus opposition
legislators is driven by high discrimination
against opposition swing legislators rather than opposition core
legislators who, in fact, are treated similarly
to the ruling
party's own districts. Using district- and…
Subjects/Keywords: Comparative politics; Developing countries; South Asia; Elections; Corruption; Distributive politics
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APA (6th Edition):
Malik, R. (2016). Electoral incentives, distributive politics, and tax
evasion in Pakistan. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Rochester. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1802/31463
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Malik, Rabia. “Electoral incentives, distributive politics, and tax
evasion in Pakistan.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Rochester. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1802/31463.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Malik, Rabia. “Electoral incentives, distributive politics, and tax
evasion in Pakistan.” 2016. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Malik R. Electoral incentives, distributive politics, and tax
evasion in Pakistan. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2016. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/31463.
Council of Science Editors:
Malik R. Electoral incentives, distributive politics, and tax
evasion in Pakistan. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/31463
Boise State University
4.
Albert, Benjamin.
Presidential Influence and Competitive Grant Funding: Reexamining Presidential Pork.
Degree: 2020, Boise State University
URL: https://scholarworks.boisestate.edu/td/1678
► How does partisan alignment with the president affect the distribution of federal competitive grant funding? This analysis contributes to the literature on distributive politics by…
(more)
▼ How does partisan alignment with the president affect the distribution of federal competitive grant funding? This analysis contributes to the literature on distributive politics by reexamining the relationship between alignment with the president and competitive grant funding over the time period of 2001 to 2017. Furthermore, the analysis will test if the relationship between alignment and competitive grant funding changed after the enactment of the 2011 earmark moratorium. Fractional probit regression is used to model the relationship between a representative’s partisan alignment with the president and the portion of annual competitive grant funding that their district receives. The results suggest that there is no relationship between alignment and competitive grant funding when looking at grant funding across all federal agencies. However, when only examining agencies that are susceptible to presidential influence a weak relationship emerges. Findings also suggest that this relationship developed after the enactment of the earmark moratorium.
Subjects/Keywords: pork; president; distributive politics; American Politics; Public Economics
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APA (6th Edition):
Albert, B. (2020). Presidential Influence and Competitive Grant Funding: Reexamining Presidential Pork. (Thesis). Boise State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.boisestate.edu/td/1678
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Albert, Benjamin. “Presidential Influence and Competitive Grant Funding: Reexamining Presidential Pork.” 2020. Thesis, Boise State University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
https://scholarworks.boisestate.edu/td/1678.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Albert, Benjamin. “Presidential Influence and Competitive Grant Funding: Reexamining Presidential Pork.” 2020. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Albert B. Presidential Influence and Competitive Grant Funding: Reexamining Presidential Pork. [Internet] [Thesis]. Boise State University; 2020. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: https://scholarworks.boisestate.edu/td/1678.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Albert B. Presidential Influence and Competitive Grant Funding: Reexamining Presidential Pork. [Thesis]. Boise State University; 2020. Available from: https://scholarworks.boisestate.edu/td/1678
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
UCLA
5.
Koo, Bon Sang.
A Bayesian Multilevel Linear Regression Model and Its Application to Distributive Politics in Korea, 2005-2006.
Degree: Statistics, 2013, UCLA
URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3x77k2z6
► This thesis aims to properly test three hypotheses derived fromexisting political theories about distributive politics by employingBayesian multilevel modeling. The specific case ofintergovernmental grants, the…
(more)
▼ This thesis aims to properly test three hypotheses derived fromexisting political theories about distributive politics by employingBayesian multilevel modeling. The specific case ofintergovernmental grants, the Special Local Allocation Grants,in Korea at two nested levels (districts and provinces) from 2005 to2006, verifies that unlike classical regression models, the Bayesianmultilevel regression model can capture regional variations in theallocation and utilize substantive knowledge from previousliterature. In particular, the model finds that a significant positiveassociation between the amount of intergovernmental grants and beingan electorally unstable province in a broad region affected byregional voting behavior (i.e., Electorally Unstable Provinces Hypothesis) evenafter controlling for the need-based criteria. It justifies the chiefexecutive's strategy to target an electorally unstable [swing]province even within a supporter region because people in theelectorally stable province are strongly affiliated with a regional(or ethnic) identity so that they may be satisfied with the allocationof grants even if they are not the main beneficiaries. Thus, while theallocation is concentrated on core supporters that are well knownquantities at the district level, the allocation at the higher levelcan be decided by the efficient targeting strategy. This finding provides astrong implication for decentralized democratic governments undercircumstances where significant regionally (or ethnically)affiliated-voting is observed. In Korea, the disproportionalallocations of central government grants to electorally unstableprovince within its supporter region (Jeolla) from 2005 to 2008 helpedthe government party to increase its vote share in the unstableprovince (Jeonam) by 20% in 2008. The vote share in the electorally stable province (Jeonbuk) reduced only by 2.9% in comparison with that in the previous election. It was a remarkable outcome, considering the the government party was defeated by the wide margin 13% nationwide and experienced a swing against it by 20.3% across the country in the election.
Subjects/Keywords: Statistics; Bayesian Statistics; Distributive Politics; Multilevel Linear Regression
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Koo, B. S. (2013). A Bayesian Multilevel Linear Regression Model and Its Application to Distributive Politics in Korea, 2005-2006. (Thesis). UCLA. Retrieved from http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3x77k2z6
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Koo, Bon Sang. “A Bayesian Multilevel Linear Regression Model and Its Application to Distributive Politics in Korea, 2005-2006.” 2013. Thesis, UCLA. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3x77k2z6.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Koo, Bon Sang. “A Bayesian Multilevel Linear Regression Model and Its Application to Distributive Politics in Korea, 2005-2006.” 2013. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Koo BS. A Bayesian Multilevel Linear Regression Model and Its Application to Distributive Politics in Korea, 2005-2006. [Internet] [Thesis]. UCLA; 2013. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3x77k2z6.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Koo BS. A Bayesian Multilevel Linear Regression Model and Its Application to Distributive Politics in Korea, 2005-2006. [Thesis]. UCLA; 2013. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3x77k2z6
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Texas A&M University
6.
Philips, Andrew Q.
Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2017, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/161357
► Despite a large literature on political cycles, many theories and empirical results conflict with one another. I address this disconnect through three interrelated contributions. I…
(more)
▼ Despite a large literature on political cycles, many theories and empirical results conflict with one another. I address this disconnect through three interrelated contributions. I first conduct an extensive quantitative survey of the political budget cycle literature through a meta-analysis. I find that overall there exists a positive, though substantively small political budget cycle effect. Second, I examine how incumbents may use alternatives to fiscal manipulation, such as the passage of redistributive policies, since these send a key signal to voters. Third, I examine how incumbents may not only time fiscal manipulation, but control their placement spatially. This ties in the political budget cycle literature with the literature on
distributive politics. Although these findings call into question some of the existing views of political budget cycles, they show that cycles manifest themselves in alternative fashions.
Advisors/Committee Members: Whitten, Guy D (advisor), Lipsmeyer, Christine S (committee member), Escobar-Lemmon, Maria (committee member), Goidel, Kirby (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Political cycles; political budget cycles; political business cycles; distributive politics
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Philips, A. Q. (2017). Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/161357
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Philips, Andrew Q. “Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles.” 2017. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/161357.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Philips, Andrew Q. “Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles.” 2017. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Philips AQ. Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2017. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/161357.
Council of Science Editors:
Philips AQ. Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2017. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/161357
UCLA
7.
Mantegna, Agostino.
The Territorial Logic of Political Clientelism: Southern Italy and California, 1870-1992.
Degree: Geography, 2014, UCLA
URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/8z79f48t
► This research investigate the geographical logic of political clientelism. It show how political clientelism works in a macro-comparative perspective using the contrasting cases of Southern…
(more)
▼ This research investigate the geographical logic of political clientelism. It show how political clientelism works in a macro-comparative perspective using the contrasting cases of Southern Italy and California as examples of two ideal-types in which clientelistic politics operates. The main finding is that the allocation and flow of financial funds related to public and infrastructural spending is influenced by clientelistic political strategies. This means that variations in the territorial distribution of public and infrastructural spending structure and govern electoral outcomes - e.g. exchange of votes in return for allocation of resources (favors). Decreasing expenditures in Southern Italy lead to increase in preference voting, whereas increasing availability of state and federal resources increase incumbent advantage and push for increasing role of lobbying and special-interests politics in the state of California. This contrasting patterns demonstrate how the different forms in which territorial politics is being constructed plays out in in two macro-regions in a global world dominated by incipient processes of decentralization and state restructuring.
Subjects/Keywords: Geography; Political Science; California; Distributive politics; Political clientelism; Political geography; Southern Italy; Territorial politics
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Mantegna, A. (2014). The Territorial Logic of Political Clientelism: Southern Italy and California, 1870-1992. (Thesis). UCLA. Retrieved from http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/8z79f48t
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Mantegna, Agostino. “The Territorial Logic of Political Clientelism: Southern Italy and California, 1870-1992.” 2014. Thesis, UCLA. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/8z79f48t.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Mantegna, Agostino. “The Territorial Logic of Political Clientelism: Southern Italy and California, 1870-1992.” 2014. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Mantegna A. The Territorial Logic of Political Clientelism: Southern Italy and California, 1870-1992. [Internet] [Thesis]. UCLA; 2014. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/8z79f48t.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Mantegna A. The Territorial Logic of Political Clientelism: Southern Italy and California, 1870-1992. [Thesis]. UCLA; 2014. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/8z79f48t
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
UCLA
8.
Koo, Bon Sang.
Three Essays: Elections, Legislatures, and Ideal Principles.
Degree: Political Science, 2014, UCLA
URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9gm773hj
► Essay I: What differences in public policy can be made by an establishment of a legislature through an election in authoritarian regime? In particular, how…
(more)
▼ Essay I: What differences in public policy can be made by an establishment of a legislature through an election in authoritarian regime? In particular, how high tax rates can be formed in authoritarian regimes with a legislature? Paying attention to a legislature's role of a signal which conveys information about dictator's economic policy preferences to capital owners, this essay revisits Escriba Folch's simple signaling game. By relaxing some restrictive assumptions about dictator types, and considering the dictator's capability of achieving his tax rate through the legislative process, the model gives answers to some empirical puzzles: 1) why some dictators are willing to maintain the legislature formed through elections; and 2) why capital owners would move their mobile assets abroad in some conditions even when a dictator allows a legislature to be established through a competitive election. The model claims that a dictator who is not tax-benevolent has an incentive to misrepresent his actual tax rate, and the probability is inversely associated with his capability in the legislature. After observing thelegislature not dissolved, capital owners who believe the dictator is not tax-benevolent are not willing to move their mobile assets away. On the other hand, after observing the legislature maintained by a dictator who is less capable of achieving his tax rate, capital owners consider moving their mobile assets away only when they believe that the dictator is tax-benevolent. Thus, it is more likely to see relatively low tax rates under capable dictatorships with legislatures. It is ironical that dictators who inherently have low tax rates to invigorate the economy by inducing a higher level of investment cannot enjoy the benefits of maintaining (or creating) a legislature. Case studies of two military regimes in Korea (1961-1987) demonstrate that the predictions made by the theoretical model are empirically supported in the Korean cases. Essay II: Assuming that electoral incentives of three political actors (individual legislators, a ruling party, and a president) may not be aligned with each other in common institutional settings, this essay attempts to construct an integrated theory about the relationship between the allocation of intergovernmental grants and the political actors. It empirically tests three hypotheses derived from the theory by examining the case of theSpecial Local Allocation Grants in Korea (2005-2006). To properly capture regional variation in the allocation, this essay employs the multilevel linear regression model in the Bayesian framework. First, the individual legislator's membership of the specific committee to monitor the execution of the intergovernmental grants is positively associated with the amount of the grants, which supports the Legislators' capability hypothesis, as in the classical regression models. Second, vote margin at the district level is positively associated with the amount of the grants, which provides strong evidence against the Unstable Electoral Districts…
Subjects/Keywords: Political Science; authoritarian regime; Bayesian statistics; distributive politics; ideal principle; Korea; legislature
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APA ·
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Export
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Koo, B. S. (2014). Three Essays: Elections, Legislatures, and Ideal Principles. (Thesis). UCLA. Retrieved from http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9gm773hj
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Koo, Bon Sang. “Three Essays: Elections, Legislatures, and Ideal Principles.” 2014. Thesis, UCLA. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9gm773hj.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Koo, Bon Sang. “Three Essays: Elections, Legislatures, and Ideal Principles.” 2014. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Koo BS. Three Essays: Elections, Legislatures, and Ideal Principles. [Internet] [Thesis]. UCLA; 2014. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9gm773hj.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Koo BS. Three Essays: Elections, Legislatures, and Ideal Principles. [Thesis]. UCLA; 2014. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9gm773hj
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
University of California – Berkeley
9.
Hegde, Deepak.
Essays on Institutions and Innovation.
Degree: Business Administration, Ph, 2010, University of California – Berkeley
URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0sp3n4sk
► The three chapters of this dissertation analyze the influence of three fundamental institutions - markets, law, and politics - on the generation and commercialization of…
(more)
▼ The three chapters of this dissertation analyze the influence of three fundamental institutions - markets, law, and politics - on the generation and commercialization of new ideas (innovation). The analyses are empirical, and apply the theoretical perspectives of economics, law, and political science. The first chapter asks: how do real world managers deal with adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the market for ideas? To answer this question, the chapter analyzes a new sample of 505 of arm's-length contracts, negotiated during the 1995-2008 years, between inventors and developers of biomedical inventions. The statistical findings are consistent with agency theories that propose mitigating the information problems with two-part payments consisting of upfront fees and output-based royalty rates. But I also find that licenses include other types of payments (viz. minimum royalty payments and milestone payments) to address the transaction costs of verifying outputs and the uncertainty associated with developing novel inventions.The second chapter investigates political influence in the allocation of public funds for the generation of ideas. The chapter studies U.S. Congressional appropriations committee bills and documents, and argues that although appropriators do not earmark federal funds for biomedical research performers, they support allocations for those research fields that are most likely to benefit performers in their constituencies. The econometric analysis uses data on peer reviewed grants by the National Institutes of Health during the years 1984-2003, and finds that performers in the states of certain House appropriations committee members receive 5.9-10.3% more research funds as compared to unrepresented institutions. Members appear to support funding for the projects of represented research performers in fields in which they are relatively weak, and counteract the distributive effect of the peer review process. The third chapter (coauthored with Professors David C. Mowery and Stuart J. H. Graham) exploits the Y1995 change in U.S. patent term to understand the use of continuations by firms in the prosecution of their patents during the years 1981-2000. The findings suggest that biomedical firms use continuations to lengthen the duration of patents protecting their most valuable ideas, while electronics and semiconductor firms use the process to augment the size of their patent portfolios. Firms use different types of continuations - the Continuation Application, the Continuations-In-Part, and Divisions - for different ends. Hence, U.S. patent laws, and their reform, can benefit from a closer consideration of the type of continuation filed by applicants.
Subjects/Keywords: Business Administration, Management; Economics, Commerce-Business; Public Policy; Biomedical; Distributive politics; Innovation; Licensing; Patents; Technical change
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APA (6th Edition):
Hegde, D. (2010). Essays on Institutions and Innovation. (Thesis). University of California – Berkeley. Retrieved from http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0sp3n4sk
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Hegde, Deepak. “Essays on Institutions and Innovation.” 2010. Thesis, University of California – Berkeley. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0sp3n4sk.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Hegde, Deepak. “Essays on Institutions and Innovation.” 2010. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Hegde D. Essays on Institutions and Innovation. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of California – Berkeley; 2010. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0sp3n4sk.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Hegde D. Essays on Institutions and Innovation. [Thesis]. University of California – Berkeley; 2010. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0sp3n4sk
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
University of Michigan
10.
Shehaj, Albana.
Essays on the Political Economy of Distributive Politics.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2019, University of Michigan
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/149893
► Despite democratic theory’s fundamental expectation that voters punishing corruption at the polls is a key mechanism whereby democracies secure accountability, voters in many countries fail…
(more)
▼ Despite democratic theory’s fundamental expectation that voters punishing corruption at the polls is a key mechanism whereby democracies secure accountability, voters in many countries fail to vote out corrupt parties, even while expressing indignation at its pervasiveness. Instead, the pattern that emerges across transitioning and consolidated democracies is that while in some countries corrupt parties and representatives are effectively voted out of office, in others they are able to maintain voters’ electoral support and even consolidate their hold on power. Why is this the case? What types of strategies, resources, and policies do corrupt governing parties employ to assuage voters’ electoral wrath, counter electoral backlash, and optimize their political payoffs? And how do international actors and organizations respond to migration pressures that often arise as a consequence of the underperforming economies of corrupt states?
My dissertation examines the relationship between political corruption, electoral accountability,
distributive politics, and the political economy of fiscal lending by international organizations in the age of migration. The research revolves around three major questions which I examine via a combination of qualitative and empirical methods: “What types of
distributive strategies do corrupt political parties adopt to curtail voters’ electoral wrath?”, “Do fiscal funds allocated by the European Union to member states deliver an electoral advantage to corrupt incumbent parties?”, and “Do migration pressures faced by the IMF’s major shareholder states affect the size and conditions attached to the loans granted by the IMF to migrant sending countries?”
My first chapter examines the types of strategies, resources, and policies that corrupt governing parties employ to deter electoral accountability. I develop a model of “corruption compensation” whereby, in a bid to preempt electoral backlash, corrupt incumbents strategically target higher shares of government resources to regions where corruption perceptions are higher and demands for political accountability are more likely to emerge. To systematically examine the theory I engage in a cross-time, within-country analysis of the highly corrupt, post-socialist state of Albania. Using an originally constructed, district-level data set, I employ a methodological approach that combines qualitative evidence with a multivariate empirical analysis and find support for my hypotheses.
The second chapter builds on these findings to examine additional sources of funds available to corrupt governing parties and the impact they have on their electoral advantage. Focusing on the EU’s geopolitical space, this chapter takes into account the degree of executive corruption in EU member states to examine and confirm the novel theoretical expectation that higher fiscal allocations to corrupt recipient states deliver political latitude that incumbents utilize to advance their electoral outcomes and governing authority.
The third chapter assesses the migration…
Advisors/Committee Members: Hicken, Allen D (committee member), Min, Brian K (committee member), Page, Scott E (committee member), Grzymala-Busse, Anna (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Political Economy; Distributive Politics; Corruption Compensation Theory; Political Corruption; Electoral Accountability; International Organizations; Political Science; Social Sciences
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Shehaj, A. (2019). Essays on the Political Economy of Distributive Politics. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Michigan. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/149893
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Shehaj, Albana. “Essays on the Political Economy of Distributive Politics.” 2019. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/149893.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Shehaj, Albana. “Essays on the Political Economy of Distributive Politics.” 2019. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Shehaj A. Essays on the Political Economy of Distributive Politics. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Michigan; 2019. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/149893.
Council of Science Editors:
Shehaj A. Essays on the Political Economy of Distributive Politics. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Michigan; 2019. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/149893
University of Michigan
11.
Park, No-Wook.
Empirical essays on patronage, decentralization, and distributive politics.
Degree: PhD, Social Sciences, 2003, University of Michigan
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/123768
► This dissertation addresses three questions: existence of patronage in the public administration, the effect of decentralization on distributive politics, and the effect of political decentralization…
(more)
▼ This dissertation addresses three questions: existence of patronage in the public administration, the effect of decentralization on
distributive politics, and the effect of political decentralization on the fiscal management of local governments. The fist chapter provides unique evidence on parochial corruption, the second chapter presents a possibility that decentralization process may activate political factors in distribution of government-controlled resources, and the third chapter suggests that elected local officials may behave differently in the fiscal management of local governments. The first chapter examines how presidential changes affect position assignments of Korean public prosecutors by utilizing personnel data on them during 1992 – 2000. After controlling for unobservable but fixed characteristics of individual prosecutors, I find that prosecutors who shared birth and school environments with the incumbent president were about twice as likely to be assigned to a variety of influential positions. The second chapter examines whether political factors are more active in the
distributive policy after decentralization reforms. Utilizing the resumption of local elections in Korea as an exogenous institutional change and constructing city, county, and district level panel data during 1991 – 1999, I find that political factors become more active in the distribution of intergovernmental transfers after decentralization reforms. In particular, districts closely contested in elections receive favorable distribution of intergovernmental transfers after decentralization. The third chapter examines whether elected local officials behave differently in their fiscal management as compared to appointed ones. For empirical purpose, fiscal data of Korean local governments during 1991 – 1999 is employed and the resumption of local elections in 1995 is utilized as a natural experiment. After constructing some fiscal indices reflecting ways of fiscal managements, I find that elected local officials enhance their fiscal independence by raising more non-tax revenues relative to local tax revenues and face softer budget constraints. In particular, local officials in closely contested districts face softer budget constraints and decrease their fiscal independence.
Advisors/Committee Members: Somanathan, Rohini (advisor).
Subjects/Keywords: Decentralization; Distributive Politics; Empirical; Essays; Korea; Local Governments; Patronage
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Park, N. (2003). Empirical essays on patronage, decentralization, and distributive politics. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Michigan. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/123768
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Park, No-Wook. “Empirical essays on patronage, decentralization, and distributive politics.” 2003. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/123768.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Park, No-Wook. “Empirical essays on patronage, decentralization, and distributive politics.” 2003. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Park N. Empirical essays on patronage, decentralization, and distributive politics. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Michigan; 2003. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/123768.
Council of Science Editors:
Park N. Empirical essays on patronage, decentralization, and distributive politics. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Michigan; 2003. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/123768
University of Oxford
12.
Jurado, Ignacio.
The politics of distribution.
Degree: PhD, 2012, University of Oxford
URL: http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a9da1efe-7b7c-41df-aa5a-96ff380b955b
;
http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.567930
► This dissertation presents a theoretical framework about which voters parties distribute to and with which policies. To develop this full framework of distributive policies, the…
(more)
▼ This dissertation presents a theoretical framework about which voters parties distribute to and with which policies. To develop this full framework of distributive policies, the dissertation proceeds in two stages. First, it analyses which voters parties have more incentives to target distributive policies. Second, it also develops the conditions under which political parties can focus exclusively on these voters or need to combine this strategy with appeals to a broader electorate. The first part of the argument analyses which voters parties have at the centre of their distributive strategies, or, in the words of Cox and McCubbins (1986) to whom parties will give an available extra dollar for distribution. The argument is that core voters provide more efficient conditions for distribution, contradicting Stokes’ (2005) claim that a dollar spent on core voters is a wasted dollar. The explanation is twofold. First, core supporters might not vote for another party, but they can get demobilised. Once we include the effects on turnout, core voters are more responsive. Their party identification makes them especially attentive and reactive to economic benefits provided by their party. Secondly, incumbents cannot individually select who receives a distributive policy, and not all voters are equally reachable with distributive policies. When a party provides a policy, it cannot control if some of those resources go to voters the party is not interested in. Core supporters are more homogenous groups with more definable traits, whereas swing voters are a residual category composed by heterogeneous voters with no shared interests. This makes it easier for incumbents to shape distributive benefits that target core voters more exclusively. These mechanisms define the general distribution hypothesis: parties will focus on core voters, by targeting their distributive strategies to them. The second part of the dissertation develops the conditions under which politicians stick to this distributive strategy or, instead, would provide more universalistic spending to a more undefined set of recipients. The conventional argument explaining this choice relies on the electoral system, arguing that proportional systems give more incentives to provide universalistic policies than majoritarian systems. This dissertation challenges this argument and provides two other contextual conditions that define when parties have a stronger interest in their core supporters or in a more general electorate. First, the geographic distribution of core supporters across districts is a crucial piece of information to know the best distributive strategy. When parties’ core supporters are geographically concentrated, they cannot simply rely on them, as the party will always fall short of districts to win the election. Therefore, parties will have greater incentives to expand their electorate by buying off other voters. This should reduce the predicted differences between electoral systems in the provision of universalistic programmes. Secondly, the policy…
Subjects/Keywords: 320.6; Democratic government; Public policy; Social policy & social work; Congressional; American politics; distributive policies; electoral behaviour; party strategies; social policies
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Jurado, I. (2012). The politics of distribution. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Oxford. Retrieved from http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a9da1efe-7b7c-41df-aa5a-96ff380b955b ; http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.567930
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Jurado, Ignacio. “The politics of distribution.” 2012. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oxford. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a9da1efe-7b7c-41df-aa5a-96ff380b955b ; http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.567930.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Jurado, Ignacio. “The politics of distribution.” 2012. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Jurado I. The politics of distribution. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Oxford; 2012. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a9da1efe-7b7c-41df-aa5a-96ff380b955b ; http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.567930.
Council of Science Editors:
Jurado I. The politics of distribution. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Oxford; 2012. Available from: http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a9da1efe-7b7c-41df-aa5a-96ff380b955b ; http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.567930
13.
Kuhn, Brian M.
The End of the Earmark Era: The New Politicization of
Federal Agency Spending.
Degree: MPA, Public Administration, 2017, Bowling Green State University
URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1510834473511441
► Political concerns have long played a determinative role in the distributive spending decisions of federal agencies. There exists a robust literature on mechanisms of distributive…
(more)
▼ Political concerns have long played a determinative
role in the
distributive spending decisions of federal agencies.
There exists a robust literature on mechanisms of
distributive
influence, exercised by both members of congress and the president;
each is motivated to secure forms of particularistic spending to
gain an electoral advantage. But recent research indicates that the
ban on Congressional earmarks has resulted in federal agencies
having more control over the allocation of
distributive benefits
(Mills et al 2015). How has the ban on legislative earmarks shifted
the balance of competing influences over the
distributive
landscape? Using data on federal spending from the Federal
Assistance Awards Data System (FAADS), I assess the impact of the
earmark ban by examining the relationship between indicators of
congressional and executive influence and
distributive spending. My
findings suggest the ban on congressional earmarks weakens some
means of party-centric congressional influence, particularly the
distributive advantage enjoyed by the majority, while leaving those
of the president unaffected. I also find no relationship between an
agency’s level of independence and
distributive outcomes as a
result of the ban on earmarks.
Advisors/Committee Members: Kalaf-Hughes, Nicole (Advisor).
Subjects/Keywords: Public Administration; Political Science; public administration; distributive politics; earmarks; earmarking; distributive spending; FAADS
…Distributive politics
emerged as an area of academic interest with David Mayhew’s seminal work… …politics also extends to the role of the president in influencing
distributive outcomes. While… …presented in Chapter 2. It outlines the
current understanding of distributive politics—without… …earmarks affect the landscape of distributive politics
7
CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE… …the field of political
science. The logic underlying distributive politics was first…
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Kuhn, B. M. (2017). The End of the Earmark Era: The New Politicization of
Federal Agency Spending. (Masters Thesis). Bowling Green State University. Retrieved from http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1510834473511441
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Kuhn, Brian M. “The End of the Earmark Era: The New Politicization of
Federal Agency Spending.” 2017. Masters Thesis, Bowling Green State University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1510834473511441.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Kuhn, Brian M. “The End of the Earmark Era: The New Politicization of
Federal Agency Spending.” 2017. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Kuhn BM. The End of the Earmark Era: The New Politicization of
Federal Agency Spending. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Bowling Green State University; 2017. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1510834473511441.
Council of Science Editors:
Kuhn BM. The End of the Earmark Era: The New Politicization of
Federal Agency Spending. [Masters Thesis]. Bowling Green State University; 2017. Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1510834473511441
14.
Lee, Su-Hyun.
Interests, Institutions, and Trade Politics in Democracies.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2012, University of Michigan
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/95938
► My dissertation develops a theoretical framework explaining variations in the structure of trade protection within and across countries. Much of the literature on trade policy…
(more)
▼ My dissertation develops a theoretical framework explaining variations in the structure of trade protection within and across countries. Much of the literature on trade policy has exclusively focused on either interest group influence on sectoral protection or the effects of domestic political institutions on trade openness at the national level. Unlike previous research, my dissertation aims to explain the ways in which the partisan and electoral incentives of representative policymakers affect the allocation of protectionist rents across domestic constituencies. I argue that the structure of trade barriers depends on the strategic context shaped by two factors: first, the economic characteristics of domestic constituencies that shape their trade policy preferences; second, electoral institutions and conditions which define the political importance of domestic constituencies to representative policymakers.
To test the validity of my arguments, I conduct a set of empirical tests. Chapters 3-5 analyze within-country variation in protection across electoral constituencies and industries in the United States from 1989 through 2004. Using sectoral data on tariff and nontariff protection, district-level election outcomes, and geographical data on the distribution of industrial employment, I evaluate the extent to which protectionist demands of domestic constituencies and their electoral characteristics explain the allocation of protectionist rents across the electorate. My findings demonstrate that competitive constituencies tends to receive higher levels of tariff protection than safe constituencies and that electoral competitiveness increases the marginal effects of protectionist interests on trade policy outcomes both at the district and industry level. Chapter 6 examines variation in the skill-bias of tariff protection across countries. I maintain that the extent to which governments provide higher tariff rates for skill-intensive industries over unskilled-intensive industries is influenced by two factors: first, a country’s factor endowments that determine the median voter’s sector-specific trade policy preference; and, second, the level of political particularism in electoral systems. My empirical analysis shows that the skill-bias of tariff protection tends to be lower in candidate-centered electoral systems which induce legislators to build personal support bases and that an increase in the national capital-labor ratio moderates the effects of political particularism on the skill-bias of tariff structure.
Advisors/Committee Members: Franzese, Jr., Robert J. (committee member), Deardorff, Alan V. (committee member), Clark, William Robert (committee member), Hicken, Allen (committee member), Tsebelis, George (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Trade Policy; Distributive Politics; Political Institutions; Political Science; Social Sciences
…context of interest group politics in the United States.
To fill this gap in the literature, my… …incentives of
representative policymakers affect the allocation of distributive benefits generated… …translated into trade policy outcomes.
Distributive benefits generated from trade barriers induce… …trade politics. The existing literature on the
political economy of trade policy is dominated… …already suggested that distributive benefits generated from trade barriers allow
protectionist…
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APA ·
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MLA ·
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Export
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Lee, S. (2012). Interests, Institutions, and Trade Politics in Democracies. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Michigan. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/95938
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Lee, Su-Hyun. “Interests, Institutions, and Trade Politics in Democracies.” 2012. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/95938.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Lee, Su-Hyun. “Interests, Institutions, and Trade Politics in Democracies.” 2012. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Lee S. Interests, Institutions, and Trade Politics in Democracies. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Michigan; 2012. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/95938.
Council of Science Editors:
Lee S. Interests, Institutions, and Trade Politics in Democracies. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Michigan; 2012. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/95938
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
15.
BERNARDO BARBOZA RIBEIRO.
[en] POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT ADVERTISING: EVIDENCE FROM
BRAZIL.
Degree: 2017, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
URL: http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=31792
► [pt] Usando uma base de dados inédita com informações sobre o gasto do governo federal brasileira com propaganda, nós lançamos luz sobre o comportamento de…
(more)
▼ [pt] Usando uma base de dados inédita com informações
sobre o gasto do governo federal brasileira com propaganda, nós
lançamos luz sobre o comportamento de anunciantes do setor público
a relação entre propaganda governamental e voto. Em particular, nós
investigamos possíveis motivações políticas por trás da alocação do
orçamento dedicado à propaganda governamental e seu impacto sobre
voto. No espírito da literatura de distributive politics, primeiro
nós calculamos a correlação entre gasto com anúncios por entes
públicos e votos no partido do governo no nível local. Em seguida,
nós exploramos a variação exógena gerada pela cobertura de sinais
de rádio para testar a hipótese de que o gasto com propaganda
aumenta os votos recebidos pelo partido do governo. Nossos
resultados sugerem que, ainda que resultados de eleições passadas
prevêem onde no território o governo anuncia, os eleitores não
parecem ser persuadidos pelos anúncios a votar em favor do partido
no poder.
[en] Using a unique data set of central government
expenditure on advertising in Brazil, we shed light on the behavior
of public advertisers and the relation between government ads and
voting. In particular, we investigate political motivations behind
the allocation of the advertisement budget by the federal
government and its impacts on voting. Borrowing insights from the
literature of distributive politics, we first correlate ad money
and votes for the government s party on the local level. Next, we
exploit plausible exogenous variation on radio signal coverage to
test if money spent on ads turn into votes for the government s
party. Our findings show that although past presidential election
outcomes predict where in the territory the government places ads,
voters do not seem to be persuaded by those ads to favor the party
in power.
Advisors/Committee Members: CLAUDIO ABRAMOVAY FERRAZ DO AMARAL, CLAUDIO ABRAMOVAY FERRAZ DO AMARAL.
Subjects/Keywords: [pt] ECONOMIA POLITICA; [en] POLITICAL ECONOMY; [pt] RADIO; [en] RADIO; [pt] ELEICOES PRESIDENCIAIS; [en] PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS; [pt] PROPAGANDA GOVERNAMENTAL; [en] GOVERNMENT ADVERTISING; [pt] POLITICA DE DISTRIBUICAO; [en] DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS
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APA (6th Edition):
RIBEIRO, B. B. (2017). [en] POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT ADVERTISING: EVIDENCE FROM
BRAZIL. (Thesis). Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. Retrieved from http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=31792
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
RIBEIRO, BERNARDO BARBOZA. “[en] POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT ADVERTISING: EVIDENCE FROM
BRAZIL.” 2017. Thesis, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=31792.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
RIBEIRO, BERNARDO BARBOZA. “[en] POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT ADVERTISING: EVIDENCE FROM
BRAZIL.” 2017. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
RIBEIRO BB. [en] POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT ADVERTISING: EVIDENCE FROM
BRAZIL. [Internet] [Thesis]. Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro; 2017. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=31792.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
RIBEIRO BB. [en] POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT ADVERTISING: EVIDENCE FROM
BRAZIL. [Thesis]. Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro; 2017. Available from: http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=31792
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
16.
Duru, Maya.
The Politics of Economic Risk.
Degree: Political Science, 2016, University of California – San Diego
URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/2z4156cp
► This dissertation asks how political economy concerns, namely that politicians face strong incentives to provide citizens with disaster relief, affects the uptake of crop insurance.…
(more)
▼ This dissertation asks how political economy concerns, namely that politicians face strong incentives to provide citizens with disaster relief, affects the uptake of crop insurance. It shows that pre-existing government incentives to provide citizens with disaster relief impede index insurance market formation. If citizens know that they get free relief from the government when they experience shocks then they have no incentive to purchase an index insurance product. From a social welfare perspective, however, government relief programs are inefficient and expensive compared to index insurance products. The political dynamic necessitates a public insurance system, where the government purchases index insurance on behalf of farmers. Yet, this dissertation also shows that once put in politicians’ hands, politicians will be apt to allocate index insurance according to their own political objectives. Political economy concerns thus very much need to be at the forefront of any discussion about how to scale up index insurance.
Subjects/Keywords: Political science; Agriculture economics; distributive politics; governance; index insurance; risk
…distributive politics in developing
4
countries. The findings in this dissertation are applicable… …public index insurance provision. Distributive politics occurs across
contexts: from… …Review, forthcoming.
x
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
The Politics of Economic Risk
by
Maya… …ideal case to test for evidence of the effects of dis-
tributive politics. Agriculture is a…
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APA (6th Edition):
Duru, M. (2016). The Politics of Economic Risk. (Thesis). University of California – San Diego. Retrieved from http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/2z4156cp
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Duru, Maya. “The Politics of Economic Risk.” 2016. Thesis, University of California – San Diego. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/2z4156cp.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Duru, Maya. “The Politics of Economic Risk.” 2016. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Duru M. The Politics of Economic Risk. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of California – San Diego; 2016. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/2z4156cp.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Duru M. The Politics of Economic Risk. [Thesis]. University of California – San Diego; 2016. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/2z4156cp
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Université de Grenoble
17.
Riachi, Roland.
Institutions et régulation d'une ressource naturelle dans une société fragmentée : Théorie et applications à une gestion durable de l'eau au Liban. : Institutions and regulation of a natural resource in a fragmented society : a case study for a sustainable management of water in Lebanon.
Degree: Docteur es, Sciences économiques, 2013, Université de Grenoble
URL: http://www.theses.fr/2013GRENE008
► Cette thèse analyse les fondements et l'évolution de l'économie et de la gestion de l'eau au Liban dans ses cadres juridiques, institutionnels et politiques. L'étude…
(more)
▼ Cette thèse analyse les fondements et l'évolution de l'économie et de la gestion de l'eau au Liban dans ses cadres juridiques, institutionnels et politiques. L'étude s'appuie sur une méthodologie mixte, à la fois qualitative, à travers des études de terrains et celle de la littérature existante, et quantitative, en utilisant des outils d'analyse économétrique. Nous avons pris comme grille de lecture les liens entre les modes de production et d'usage de l'eau, la nature de la propriété foncière et sa structure dans une démarche d'économie politique. L'étude se compose de cinq chapitres. Notre premier chapitre, élaboré à partir d'une lecture critique de la littérature économique qui traite de la valeur de la ressource et de sa rareté, remet en cause la notion de crise de l'eau. Il propose une critique des paradigmes globalisés, notamment la gestion par bassin et la bonne gouvernance, qui sont à la base de la notion de Gestion Intégrée des Ressources en Eau (GIRE) d'inspiration libérale. En dépassant ces théories à l'aide d'une approche historico-matérialiste, ce chapitre construit notre grille de lecture d'un "paysage de l'eau" en mobilisant la théorie de Wittfogel des sociétés hydrauliques et la théorie des "moments" développée par David Harvey. Le deuxième chapitre suit chronologiquement et sur un temps long l'évolution juridico-institutionnelle de la gestion de la ressource depuis l'Empire ottoman et le mandat français sur le Liban jusqu'à la construction nationale entre l'indépendance et la guerre civile libanaise. Notre analyse reconstitue les fondements historiques de la relation du pouvoir aux régimes fonciers durant ces périodes. Nous développons en particulier les éléments qui sont à la source de la formulation de la vision de la mission hydraulique libanaise afin de présenter une interprétation de la relation de l'Etat à l'eau et le discours dominant de la gestion de la ressource. Le troisième chapitre expose les caractéristiques socio-spatiales du service d'eau potable et d'assainissement dans la phase de reconstruction. Il analyse la nature de la fragmentation institutionnelle des autorités publiques ainsi que la politique de l'eau engendrée par l'ajustement structurel et par les paradigmes néolibéraux, notamment, l'adoption des principes de la GIRE par le gouvernement libanais et la préparation du terrain pour des contrats de Partenariat Public-Privé. Le quatrième chapitre propose un modèle formalisé d'économie publique qui nous informe par ses résultats économétriques sur les critères d'allocation des projets de l'eau durant les deux dernières décennies. Les résultats économétriques de ce modèle vont confirmer notre hypothèse de base en montrant que seule la distance politique apparaît comme facteur décisionnel dans l'allocation des fonds aux régions, sans prise en compte de leurs caractéristiques socio-économiques et environnementales. Le cinquième chapitre étudie la question de l'irrigation et sa place dans les politiques agricoles du pays. Dans le fil de notre analyse sur la relation du pouvoir à…
Advisors/Committee Members: Gerbier, Bernard (thesis director).
Subjects/Keywords: Gestion de l'eau; Liban; Mission hydraulique; Politiques distributives; Ecologie politique de l'eau; 'Water grabbing'; Water management and institutions; Lebanon; Hydraulic mission; Distributive politics; Political ecology of water; Water grabbing
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APA (6th Edition):
Riachi, R. (2013). Institutions et régulation d'une ressource naturelle dans une société fragmentée : Théorie et applications à une gestion durable de l'eau au Liban. : Institutions and regulation of a natural resource in a fragmented society : a case study for a sustainable management of water in Lebanon. (Doctoral Dissertation). Université de Grenoble. Retrieved from http://www.theses.fr/2013GRENE008
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Riachi, Roland. “Institutions et régulation d'une ressource naturelle dans une société fragmentée : Théorie et applications à une gestion durable de l'eau au Liban. : Institutions and regulation of a natural resource in a fragmented society : a case study for a sustainable management of water in Lebanon.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, Université de Grenoble. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://www.theses.fr/2013GRENE008.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Riachi, Roland. “Institutions et régulation d'une ressource naturelle dans une société fragmentée : Théorie et applications à une gestion durable de l'eau au Liban. : Institutions and regulation of a natural resource in a fragmented society : a case study for a sustainable management of water in Lebanon.” 2013. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Riachi R. Institutions et régulation d'une ressource naturelle dans une société fragmentée : Théorie et applications à une gestion durable de l'eau au Liban. : Institutions and regulation of a natural resource in a fragmented society : a case study for a sustainable management of water in Lebanon. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Université de Grenoble; 2013. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://www.theses.fr/2013GRENE008.
Council of Science Editors:
Riachi R. Institutions et régulation d'une ressource naturelle dans une société fragmentée : Théorie et applications à une gestion durable de l'eau au Liban. : Institutions and regulation of a natural resource in a fragmented society : a case study for a sustainable management of water in Lebanon. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Université de Grenoble; 2013. Available from: http://www.theses.fr/2013GRENE008
Leiden University
18.
Mazepus, H.
What makes authorities legitimate in the eyes of citizens? : an investigation of perceived legitimacy in different political regimes.
Degree: 2016, Leiden University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1887/42940
► The thesis examines what factors contribute to perceiving political authorities as legitimate by individuals socialized in different political regimes. Using experimental vignettes and original survey…
(more)
▼ The thesis examines what factors contribute to perceiving political authorities as legitimate by individuals socialized in different political regimes. Using experimental vignettes and original survey data, the thesis investigates to what extent normative qualities of political authorities play a role in citizens’ evaluations of these authorities. It challenges the claim that citizens in non-democratic regimes have unique or special expectations about political authorities. It does so by comparing the factors influencing perceived legitimacy of governments in different political regimes: two post-Soviet non-democracies (Russia and Ukraine) and old and new democracies in Europe (France, Netherlands, and Poland). The findings in all five countries support the theoretical model of a citizen who is concerned with both her personal material well-being and the fairness of authorities. The factor that had the largest positive effect on perceived legitimacy across countries was
distributive justice—fairness in providing goods and services across the individuals in a society. Furthermore, respondents’ beliefs about what makes political authorities legitimate were similar across regimes and suggest that for evaluating legitimacy, the output aspects of governing (e.g. welfare, order, and stability) are less important than the input (e.g. elections, trust, representation) and throughput aspects (e.g. fair procedures,transparency, and integrity of authorities).
Advisors/Committee Members: Supervisor: A.W.M. Gerrits Co-Supervisor: I.C. van Biezen.
Subjects/Keywords: Political legitimacy; Comparative politics; Distributive justice; Procedural justice; Experimental design
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APA (6th Edition):
Mazepus, H. (2016). What makes authorities legitimate in the eyes of citizens? : an investigation of perceived legitimacy in different political regimes. (Doctoral Dissertation). Leiden University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1887/42940
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Mazepus, H. “What makes authorities legitimate in the eyes of citizens? : an investigation of perceived legitimacy in different political regimes.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, Leiden University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1887/42940.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Mazepus, H. “What makes authorities legitimate in the eyes of citizens? : an investigation of perceived legitimacy in different political regimes.” 2016. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Mazepus H. What makes authorities legitimate in the eyes of citizens? : an investigation of perceived legitimacy in different political regimes. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Leiden University; 2016. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1887/42940.
Council of Science Editors:
Mazepus H. What makes authorities legitimate in the eyes of citizens? : an investigation of perceived legitimacy in different political regimes. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Leiden University; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1887/42940
University of Toronto
19.
Joanis, Marcelin.
Essays on the Political Economy of the Centralized Provision of Local Public Goods.
Degree: 2008, University of Toronto
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/16751
► This thesis explores the political economy aspects of the provision of local public goods by higher levels of government. Chapter 1 focuses on local public…
(more)
▼ This thesis explores the political economy aspects of the provision of local public goods by higher levels of government.
Chapter 1 focuses on local public goods as instruments for special interest politics at the supra-local level, with an emphasis on public infrastructure. To capture the implications of long-run relationships between political parties and their loyal supporters, I set out a dynamic probabilistic voting model which predicts that the geographic pattern of spending depends on the way the government balances long-run `machine politics' considerations with the more immediate concern to win over swing voters. To assess the empirical relevance of both forces, I analyse rich data on road spending from a panel of electoral districts in Québec. Empirical results exploiting the province's linguistic fragmentation provide robust evidence that partisan loyalty is a key driver of the geographic allocation of spending.
Chapter 2 proposes a theoretical framework to analyse the coexistence of multiple tiers of government in local public good provision. I study the effects of such partial decentralization on accountability using a two-period political agency model, in which two levels of government are involved in public good provision and voters are imperfectly informed about each government's contribution to the public good. The model predicts that the net effect of a departure from complete centralization (or decentralization) balances the benefits of vertical complementarity against the loss of accountability following from imperfect information and detrimental vertical interactions.
Chapter 3 investigates the impact of partial decentralization on local electoral accountability in the context of California's school finance system. I exploit the peculiarities California's school finance system and the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 to estimate the extent to which politicians are punished or rewarded for observed policy outcomes, and how this channel is affected by the degree of centralization. Results show that voters are responsive to differences in dropout rates and pupil-teacher ratios, and that incumbents are less likely to be reelected when a district's degree of centralization is high. Increased federal involvement after 2001 is associated with sharper local electoral accountability.
PhD
Advisors/Committee Members: McMillan, Robert, Economics.
Subjects/Keywords: local public goods; political economy; fiscal federalism; distributive politics; school finance; accountability; No Child Left Behind; infrastructure spending; Quebec; California; 0501
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APA ·
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MLA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Joanis, M. (2008). Essays on the Political Economy of the Centralized Provision of Local Public Goods. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Toronto. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1807/16751
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Joanis, Marcelin. “Essays on the Political Economy of the Centralized Provision of Local Public Goods.” 2008. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Toronto. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1807/16751.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Joanis, Marcelin. “Essays on the Political Economy of the Centralized Provision of Local Public Goods.” 2008. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Joanis M. Essays on the Political Economy of the Centralized Provision of Local Public Goods. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Toronto; 2008. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/16751.
Council of Science Editors:
Joanis M. Essays on the Political Economy of the Centralized Provision of Local Public Goods. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Toronto; 2008. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/16751
20.
Saxton, Gregory W.
PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE FACE OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY.
Degree: 2019, University of Kentucky
URL: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/polysci_etds/28
► In this dissertation, I investigate two key questions: 1) What are the specific conditions under which economic inequality undermines democratic legitimacy; and 2) How does…
(more)
▼ In this dissertation, I investigate two key questions: 1) What are the specific conditions under which economic inequality undermines democratic legitimacy; and 2) How does inequality map onto individuals’ perceptions of fairness and subsequently affect satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions? I first argue that individuals’ perceptions of distributive unfairness are key factors whereby economic inequality undermines democratic legitimacy. Inequality - and subsequent perceptions that the economic distribution is unfair - undermine political support by signaling that the democratic process is not functioning properly and by challenging people’s normative expectations about what democracy should do in practice.
I next draw from a diverse literature on social and political psychology, as well as governance quality, to derive new hypotheses about how people form their fairness judgments and use them to evaluate democracy. Right-leaning and upper-class individuals should be less upset with inequality in the first place, but even when these individuals perceive distributive unfairness, they should be less likely to express political dissatisfaction as a result. Additionally, the context in which individuals form their fairness perceptions should condition the relationship between fairness judgments and political support. In a context of good governance, individuals should be less likely to perceive inequality as unfair, and subsequently less likely to express political dissatisfaction for any perceived distributive unfairness in society. Governance quality provides alternative evidence that democracy is in fact functioning properly and should allay citizens’ concerns about inequality and distributive unfairness, at least when it comes to evaluating democratic legitimacy.
To test my theory and hypotheses, I take a mixed-methods approach that combines large-N analysis of public opinion data and original survey experiments. To contextualize my quantitative results, I draw on motivating examples from original open-ended surveys, newspapers, and elite interviews. In the first empirical chapter, I conduct a multilevel analysis of data from 18 Latin American and show that perceptions of distributive unfairness are negatively correlated with trust in government and satisfaction with democracy, yet good governance significantly mitigates this negative relationship. In the second empirical chapter, I use original survey experiments in Argentina, Mexico, and the US to show that perceptions of distributive unfairness are key causal factors linking inequality to political dissatisfaction. In the third empirical chapter, I use a second set of survey experiments to investigate how governance quality moderates the relationship between inequality and political support. When individuals are presented with information about declining corruption, they are less likely to perceive their country’s income distribution as unfair, and less likely to link inequality to political dissatisfaction.
Subjects/Keywords: Inequality; Distributive Fairness; Satisfaction with Democracy; Trust in Government; Corruption; Latin America; Comparative Politics
…16
2.3 Economic Inequality, Distributive Fairness, and Political Support… …50
3.3 Perceptions of Distributive Unfairness and Satisfaction with Democracy… …59
3.4 Perceptions of Distributive Unfairness and Trust in Government… …115
5.3.3 Inequality, Corruption, and Perceived Distributive Unfairness… …35
Table 3.1 Perceived Distributive Unfairness and Satisfaction with Democracy, Baseline…
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Saxton, G. W. (2019). PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE FACE OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Kentucky. Retrieved from https://uknowledge.uky.edu/polysci_etds/28
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Saxton, Gregory W. “PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE FACE OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY.” 2019. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Kentucky. Accessed March 05, 2021.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/polysci_etds/28.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Saxton, Gregory W. “PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE FACE OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY.” 2019. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Saxton GW. PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE FACE OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Kentucky; 2019. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/polysci_etds/28.
Council of Science Editors:
Saxton GW. PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE FACE OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Kentucky; 2019. Available from: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/polysci_etds/28
21.
Atkinson, James E.
Signals, Channels, and Political Connections in Government Disaster Response.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2014, University of Michigan
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/110365
► This dissertation analyzes the motivations of governments, both foreign and domestic, in responding to natural disasters. I address government responses to natural disasters in the…
(more)
▼ This dissertation analyzes the motivations of governments, both foreign and domestic, in responding to natural disasters. I address government responses to natural disasters in the following contexts: 1) the use of signaling by aid-giving donor countries in providing humanitarian relief to non-strategic recipients; 2) the effect of donor types and recipient democratic institutions on the channels of relief aid delivery; and 3) the influence of political connections between upper-level and lower-level politicians on reconstruction fund distribution in a disaster-prone country.
Advisors/Committee Members: Clark, William R. (committee member), Hicken, Allen (committee member), Yang, Dean (committee member), Min, Brian K. (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: disaster response; foreign aid; distributive politics; Political Science; Southeast Asian and Pacific Languages and Cultures; Social Sciences
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Atkinson, J. E. (2014). Signals, Channels, and Political Connections in Government Disaster Response. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Michigan. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/110365
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Atkinson, James E. “Signals, Channels, and Political Connections in Government Disaster Response.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/110365.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Atkinson, James E. “Signals, Channels, and Political Connections in Government Disaster Response.” 2014. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Atkinson JE. Signals, Channels, and Political Connections in Government Disaster Response. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Michigan; 2014. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/110365.
Council of Science Editors:
Atkinson JE. Signals, Channels, and Political Connections in Government Disaster Response. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Michigan; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/110365
22.
Verissimo, Marcos Paulo.
A judicialização dos conflitos de justiça distributiva no Brasil: o processo judicial no pós-1988.
Degree: PhD, Direito Processual, 2006, University of São Paulo
URL: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2137/tde-10042007-153328/
;
► O Brasil tem visto um forte processo de judicialização de sua vida pública. Hoje, a Justiça exerce um papel político importante no país, mas é…
(more)
▼ O Brasil tem visto um forte processo de judicialização de sua vida pública. Hoje, a Justiça exerce um papel político importante no país, mas é marcada pela ineficiência na solução de disputas e cobrança de créditos. Críticas à expansão desse papel político são, pois, abundantes. Diz-se que (i) geraria instabilidade institucional e um ambiente hostil ao desenvolvimento (crítica institucional); (ii) produziria resultados ilegítimos (preferências judiciais substituiriam decisões majoritárias - crítica de legitimidade) e (iii) resultaria em ações inefetivas, pois o aparato das cortes não é adequado a resolver conflitos policêntricos e prospectivos (crítica instrumental). Este trabalho analisa o processo brasileiro de judicialização e os argumentos centrais da crítica instrumental. Sugere que ela refere-se a um modelo de direito e justiça que está em transformação. No modelo emergente, a justiça distributiva é reintroduzida na dinâmica legal e a administração de interesses sobrepuja, aos poucos, a tutela de direitos. Essas mudanças, mais a judicialização, levam a alterações importantes no processo judicial. Reconhecendo os problemas daí decorrentes, a tese sugere um caráter virtuoso desse novo contencioso de direito público emergente. Ele parece forjar um mecanismo de reforço de participação política que pode avançar a democracia e melhorar condições de igualdade política.
From democratization in the mid 80? on, Brazilian public life has been forced into an increasingly intense process of judicialization. Lack of confidence in representative institutions, a very open-texted charter of social and economic rights, an important political use of the Judiciary by the oppositions, and other related factors seem to be implicated in this. Brazilian justice holds today a considerable political power, but that is just part of a story. It is also astonishingly inefficient as a services provider, and fails to respond to most of its dispute-solving and credit-enforcement functions. Criticism about the expansion of the political role of the Judiciary in this context is profuse. First, it is said to generate institutional instability, which in turn would bring out a hostile environment for economic growth. Second, it is said to be illegitimate, as far as politicized judges may often replace majoritarian decisions by their own. Third, it is said that litigation involving political issues and social reform tend to be erratic and ineffective, because the institutional designs of both courts and their processes are not adequate to regulate polycentric and prospective conflicts. This work puts Brazilian judicialization into context, and analyses the main arguments of the institutional capacity critique (which is called in here the instrumental critique). The author suggests that the instrumental critique refers to a certain model of law and justice that has been changing (both globally and in Brazil) since the end of the last century. In the emergent model, distributive justice is reintroduced into the dynamics of law, and the…
Advisors/Committee Members: Bedaque, Jose Roberto dos Santos.
Subjects/Keywords: Adjudicação; civil courts in Brazil; civil procedure; Direito Processual; distributive justice; Função Jurisdicional; Instituições Políticas; judicialization of politics; Justiça; Poder Judiciário; public interest litigation; public policies; rights and interests; structural reform litigation
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Verissimo, M. P. (2006). A judicialização dos conflitos de justiça distributiva no Brasil: o processo judicial no pós-1988. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of São Paulo. Retrieved from http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2137/tde-10042007-153328/ ;
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Verissimo, Marcos Paulo. “A judicialização dos conflitos de justiça distributiva no Brasil: o processo judicial no pós-1988.” 2006. Doctoral Dissertation, University of São Paulo. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2137/tde-10042007-153328/ ;.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Verissimo, Marcos Paulo. “A judicialização dos conflitos de justiça distributiva no Brasil: o processo judicial no pós-1988.” 2006. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Verissimo MP. A judicialização dos conflitos de justiça distributiva no Brasil: o processo judicial no pós-1988. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of São Paulo; 2006. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2137/tde-10042007-153328/ ;.
Council of Science Editors:
Verissimo MP. A judicialização dos conflitos de justiça distributiva no Brasil: o processo judicial no pós-1988. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of São Paulo; 2006. Available from: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2137/tde-10042007-153328/ ;
University of Oxford
23.
Heimburger, Robert Whitaker.
A theological response to the "illegal alien" in federal United States law.
Degree: PhD, 2014, University of Oxford
URL: http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:43010cbe-32a9-4ecd-abcf-cf57f729bbd5
;
https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.618523
► Today, some twelve million immigrants are unlawfully present in the United States. What response to this situation does Christian theology suggest for these immigrants and…
(more)
▼ Today, some twelve million immigrants are unlawfully present in the United States. What response to this situation does Christian theology suggest for these immigrants and those who receive them? To this question about the status of immigrants before the law, the theological literature lacks an understanding of how federal U.S. immigration law developed, and it lacks a robust theological account of the governance of immigration. To fill this gap, the thesis presents three stages in the formation of the laws that designate some immigrants as aliens unlawfully present or illegal aliens, drawing out the moral argumentation in each phase and responding with moral theology. In the first stage, non-citizens were called aliens in U.S. law. In response to the argument that aliens exist as a consequence of natural law, Christian teaching indicates that immigrants are not alien either in creation or for the church. In the second stage, the authority of the federal government to exclude and expel aliens was established, leaving those who do not comply to be designated illegal aliens. To the claim that the federal government has unlimited sovereignty over immigration, interpretations of the Christian Scriptures respond that divine sovereignty limits and directs civil authority over immigration. In the third stage, legal reforms that were intended to end discrimination between countries allowed millions from countries neighboring the U.S. to become illegal aliens. These reforms turn out to be unjust on philosophical grounds and unneighborly on theological grounds. While federal law classes many as aliens unlawfully present in the United States, Christian political theology indicates that immigrants are not alien, the government of immigration is limited by divine judgment, and nationals of neighboring countries deserve special regard.
Subjects/Keywords: 342.08; Theology and Religion; American politics; Migration; Law; Ethics and philosophy of law; Public policy; illegal immigration; aliens; migrants; nationhood; Karl Barth; 1 Corinthians; legal history; common law; Edward Coke; territory; sovereignty; 1880's Chinese immigration; Mexico-US migration; Martin Luther; Book of Genesis; Book of Psalms; deuteronomy; international relations; Aristotle; Hugo Grotius; Gospel of Luke; Christian ethics; moral theology; Thomas Hobbes; Emer de Vattel; William Blackstone; political theology; political theory; corrective justice; distributive justice; attributive justice
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APA ·
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MLA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Heimburger, R. W. (2014). A theological response to the "illegal alien" in federal United States law. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Oxford. Retrieved from http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:43010cbe-32a9-4ecd-abcf-cf57f729bbd5 ; https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.618523
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Heimburger, Robert Whitaker. “A theological response to the "illegal alien" in federal United States law.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oxford. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:43010cbe-32a9-4ecd-abcf-cf57f729bbd5 ; https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.618523.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Heimburger, Robert Whitaker. “A theological response to the "illegal alien" in federal United States law.” 2014. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Heimburger RW. A theological response to the "illegal alien" in federal United States law. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Oxford; 2014. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:43010cbe-32a9-4ecd-abcf-cf57f729bbd5 ; https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.618523.
Council of Science Editors:
Heimburger RW. A theological response to the "illegal alien" in federal United States law. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Oxford; 2014. Available from: http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:43010cbe-32a9-4ecd-abcf-cf57f729bbd5 ; https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.618523
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
24.
Jarocinska, Elena.
Political economy of intergovernmental grants.
Degree: Departament d'Economia i Empresa, 2006, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10803/7343
► This thesis investigates the political economy view of intergovernmental grants. It centers on the political factors that determine allocation of funds under the control of…
(more)
▼ This thesis investigates the political economy view of intergovernmental grants. It centers on the political factors that determine allocation of funds under the control of central governments to different regions. The first chapter contributes to this topic by a novel analysis of panel data and a comprehensive measure of expenditure "needs" for the case of Russia. The second chapter develops new methodological tools for analyzing multi-party political systems. These tools allow to measure swing voters on two "ideological" dimensions using individual survey data. In the third chapter the measures of swing voters are used to test theories of
distributive politics for the case of Spain. This chapter shows that political variables are significant in the allocation of state subventions, and the magnitude of the effect is comparable to that of economic variables.
Advisors/Committee Members: [email protected] (authoremail), true (authoremailshow), Hogarth, Robin M. (director), García-Milà, Teresa (director).
Subjects/Keywords: sistemas electorales del multi-partido; comportamiento de votación; votantes leales; votantes cambiantes; Rusia; España; transferencias intergubernamentales; política distributiva; bi-dimensional political preferences; multiparty electoral systems; voting behaviour; loyal voters; swing voters; Spain; Russia; intergovernmental grants; distributive politics; preferencias políticas bidimensionales; 32; 336; 338
Record Details
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Record Details
Similar Records
Cite
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❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Jarocinska, E. (2006). Political economy of intergovernmental grants. (Thesis). Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10803/7343
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Jarocinska, Elena. “Political economy of intergovernmental grants.” 2006. Thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/10803/7343.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Jarocinska, Elena. “Political economy of intergovernmental grants.” 2006. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Jarocinska E. Political economy of intergovernmental grants. [Internet] [Thesis]. Universitat Pompeu Fabra; 2006. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10803/7343.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Jarocinska E. Political economy of intergovernmental grants. [Thesis]. Universitat Pompeu Fabra; 2006. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10803/7343
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
25.
Snake-Beings, Emit.
The DiY ['Do it yourself'] Ethos: A participatory culture of material engagement
.
Degree: 2016, University of Waikato
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10289/9973
► Do it Yourself (DiY) is a participatory culture which exemplifies a particular ethos in its approach to technology and materials. Rather than engage with ‘complete’…
(more)
▼ Do it Yourself (DiY) is a participatory culture which exemplifies a particular ethos in its approach to technology and materials. Rather than engage with ‘complete’ technologies, such as a technology supplied as ready-to-go item, the DiY practitioners examined in this thesis engage with the raw materials of garbage and recycling, ‘incomplete’, broken and discarded technologies. In this type of DiY practice the emphasis is towards creating individualised and custom-built forms of technology: often made from components and materials which have been re-functioned from their original intention to produce new and unexpected functionalities; practices which disrupt the dominant discourses of technology. This thesis involves a situated application of theory to DiY practices in the field: focusing on three case studies featuring New Zealand-based DiY sound practitioners and their embracing of functional ‘errors’ as a means of increasing the participatory potential of materials.
My initial argument is, that the social perspectives and ‘human-biased’ view examined in current literature on DiY culture, depicts an attitude towards power and knowledge which obscures the recognition of material agency. In this thesis, ‘power’ is defined within a social constructivist, or as a ‘human-biased’ view, whereas ‘agency’, as the ability to make something happen, is more expansive and incorporates the capacities of materials to become active participants in the production of cultural artefacts. Through engaging with the work of contemporary theorists relevant to material agency (including Karen Barad, Jane Bennett, Levi R. Bryant, Susan Kelly, Lambros Malafouris and Bruno Latour), the limitations of the ‘human-biased’ view of DiY culture are highlighted and the emphasis is shifted from DiY participatory culture as a social phenomenon towards the idea of ‘extended agency’: agency which includes both human and material actants within the entangled assemblages of DiY practices and the material environment.
When extended agency is applied in the three case studies, the initial question asked is: ‘How does the intra-action of human and material environment influence the processes of DiY practices and what specific strategies are used to increase the participatory potential of materials?’.
In this sense, DiY culture challenges the way we see ‘power’ and ‘structure’ as being exclusively human traits, influencing our way of relating to the material environment and creating consequences and considerations which extend from the localised DiY practices examined in this thesis. The suggestion is that the extended agency of DiY culture represents a timely re-evaluation of the relationship between the human and the material environment, challenging prevalent discourses which place the human at the centre of power and knowledge.
Advisors/Committee Members: Lealand, Geoff (advisor), Schott, Gareth R (advisor), Yeatman, Bevin (advisor).
Subjects/Keywords: Material agency;
Techno-Animism;
Animism;
Multi-Author;
Do it Yourself culture;
DiY;
Do-it-yourself;
music;
robotics and sound;
noise music;
New Zealand sound culture;
Extended mind;
extended agency;
machines;
re-functioning;
participatory culture;
garbage and new media;
recycling;
upcycling;
trash;
re-use;
machine talk;
Material Entanglement;
SteamPunk;
de-territorialisation;
insider research;
error and inefficiency;
negative identity;
tacit knowledge;
dominant discourse of technology;
intra-action;
non-idiomatic music;
random aleatory sound;
generative art;
generative sound;
Bingodisiac machine;
The Trons: Robot garage band;
Oscillators;
electronic music;
electronic sound;
perpetual prototype;
The Womble ethic;
material engagement;
non-human actants;
DiY politics and the avant-garde;
Practice-based theory;
non-totalising assemblage;
insider researcher;
DiY electronics;
community of difference;
material practices;
material analysis;
actants;
community of practice;
Hamilton music;
Hamilton sound culture;
distributive agency;
tinkering and tinkerers;
xtreme waste;
material environment;
human and the material environment;
re-functioned materials;
recycled art;
digital analogue;
electroacoustic music;
sonic art;
computer music;
digital music aesthetics and practice
Record Details
Similar Records
Cite
Share »
Record Details
Similar Records
Cite
« Share
❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Snake-Beings, E. (2016). The DiY ['Do it yourself'] Ethos: A participatory culture of material engagement
. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Waikato. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10289/9973
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Snake-Beings, Emit. “The DiY ['Do it yourself'] Ethos: A participatory culture of material engagement
.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Waikato. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/10289/9973.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Snake-Beings, Emit. “The DiY ['Do it yourself'] Ethos: A participatory culture of material engagement
.” 2016. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Snake-Beings E. The DiY ['Do it yourself'] Ethos: A participatory culture of material engagement
. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Waikato; 2016. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10289/9973.
Council of Science Editors:
Snake-Beings E. The DiY ['Do it yourself'] Ethos: A participatory culture of material engagement
. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Waikato; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10289/9973
. 
Open Access Theses and Dissertations
