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You searched for subject:(all pay auction). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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University of Iowa

1. Gelder, Alan Bruce. Multi-stage contests : theory and experiments.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2014, University of Iowa

In a multi-stage contest known as a two-player race, players display two fundamental behaviors: (1) The laggard will make a last stand in order to avoid the cost of losing; and (2) the player who is ahead will defend his lead if it is threatened. Last stand behavior, in particular, contrasts with previous research where the underdog simply gives up. The distinctive results are achieved by introducing losing penalties and discounting into the racing environment. This framework permits the momentum effect, typically ascribed to the winner of early stages, to be more thoroughly examined. I study the likelihood that the underdog will catch up. I find that neck-and-neck races are common when the losing penalty is large relative to the winning prize, while landslide victories occur when the prize is relatively large. Closed-form solutions are given for the case where players have a common winning prize and losing penalty. Chapter 2 then experimentally examines the prediction of last stand behavior in a multi-battle contest with a winning prize and losing penalty, as well as the contrasting prediction of surrendering in the corresponding contest with no penalty. We find varied evidence in support of these hypotheses in the aggregated data, but more conclusive evidence when scrutinizing individual player behavior. Players tend to adopt one of several strategies. We develop a taxonomy to classify player types and study how the different strategies interact. The last stand and surrendering behaviors have implications for winning margins and the likelihood of an upset, which we investigate. Behaviorally, players are typically more aggressive when they reach a state in the contest by winning rather than by losing. The third and final chapter is a distinct departure from the study of multi-battle contests. Using comprehensive census data for Cornwall County, England, I create a panel dataset that spans six censuses (1841 – 1891)—possibly the largest panel dataset for Victorian England at present. I present the methodology for linking individuals and families across these censuses. This methodology incorporates recent advances in census linking (including the use of machine learning) and introduces new methods for tracking migration and changes in household composition. I achieve a forward matching rate of 43%. The additional inclusion of marriage and death records could allow for well over 60% of the population to be accounted for from one census to the next. Using this new panel, I investigate the frequency with which sons pursue the same occupations that they observed their fathers doing while growing up. For sons that did not follow in their father's footsteps, I identify some correlates that may have contributed to the change. Advisors/Committee Members: Kovenock, Daniel J. (supervisor).

Subjects/Keywords: All-Pay Auction; Census Matching; Dynamic Contest; Experiment; Last Stand; Multi-Battle Contest; Economics

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APA (6th Edition):

Gelder, A. B. (2014). Multi-stage contests : theory and experiments. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Iowa. Retrieved from https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1323

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Gelder, Alan Bruce. “Multi-stage contests : theory and experiments.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Iowa. Accessed September 23, 2020. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1323.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Gelder, Alan Bruce. “Multi-stage contests : theory and experiments.” 2014. Web. 23 Sep 2020.

Vancouver:

Gelder AB. Multi-stage contests : theory and experiments. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Iowa; 2014. [cited 2020 Sep 23]. Available from: https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1323.

Council of Science Editors:

Gelder AB. Multi-stage contests : theory and experiments. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Iowa; 2014. Available from: https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1323

2. LIU XUYUAN. Strategy and Incentive in Contest and Tournament.

Degree: 2014, National University of Singapore

Subjects/Keywords: contest; tournament; all pay auction; scoring contest; incomplete information; strategy

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

XUYUAN, L. (2014). Strategy and Incentive in Contest and Tournament. (Thesis). National University of Singapore. Retrieved from http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/107400

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

XUYUAN, LIU. “Strategy and Incentive in Contest and Tournament.” 2014. Thesis, National University of Singapore. Accessed September 23, 2020. http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/107400.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

XUYUAN, LIU. “Strategy and Incentive in Contest and Tournament.” 2014. Web. 23 Sep 2020.

Vancouver:

XUYUAN L. Strategy and Incentive in Contest and Tournament. [Internet] [Thesis]. National University of Singapore; 2014. [cited 2020 Sep 23]. Available from: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/107400.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

XUYUAN L. Strategy and Incentive in Contest and Tournament. [Thesis]. National University of Singapore; 2014. Available from: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/107400

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

3. Nigam, Pulkit K. Essays on Asymmetric Contests and Urbanization in India.

Degree: PhD, Moore School of Business, 2019, University of South Carolina

I study asymmetric all-pay auction contests where the prize has the same value for all players, but players might have different cost functions. I allow for the cost functions to be discontinuous as long as they are right-continuous. In that setting, I determine sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium. Employing this framework, I discuss the implementation of a soft cap on bids and the effect that has on the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium and players’ bidding behavior, especially with respect to a situation where there is no cap on bids. I also determine the total cost and expected aggregate bids which would influence, and also have an effect on the organizing of such contests. Drawing from the framework mentioned above, I analyze the implementation of a rigid cap on bids. Rigid cap being one which simply cannot be breached. I determine the players’ bidding behavior in the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium and compute the total cost and expected aggregate bids in this situation. In the fourth chapter, I explore linguistic explanations for the extremely low labor mobility, but paradoxically high urban wage premium in India. I show how linguistic diversity in India hinders internal migration across state borders. I also find evidence, albeit a weak one, to show that an individual who can speak English is more likely to migrate to an urban center. I find much stronger evidence that links educational attainment with migrating to urban centers. Advisors/Committee Members: Alexander Matros.

Subjects/Keywords: Economics; Social and Behavioral Sciences; asymmetric all-pay auction; mixed-strategy equilibrium; bidding behavior; total cost and expected aggregate bids; rigid bid cap; linguistic diversity in India

…model a contest as a complete information two-player all-pay auction where players have… …aggregate costs incurred by, and aggregate bids made by contestants in large all-pay auction… …in the all-pay auction and obtains the following payoff 𝑢𝑖 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 )… …complete information two-player all-pay auction where players have different valuations for the… …aggregate bids made by contestants in large all-pay auction contests; where a large number of… 

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Nigam, P. K. (2019). Essays on Asymmetric Contests and Urbanization in India. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of South Carolina. Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/5494

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Nigam, Pulkit K. “Essays on Asymmetric Contests and Urbanization in India.” 2019. Doctoral Dissertation, University of South Carolina. Accessed September 23, 2020. https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/5494.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Nigam, Pulkit K. “Essays on Asymmetric Contests and Urbanization in India.” 2019. Web. 23 Sep 2020.

Vancouver:

Nigam PK. Essays on Asymmetric Contests and Urbanization in India. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of South Carolina; 2019. [cited 2020 Sep 23]. Available from: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/5494.

Council of Science Editors:

Nigam PK. Essays on Asymmetric Contests and Urbanization in India. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of South Carolina; 2019. Available from: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/5494

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