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You searched for subject:(System trespassing). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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University of Maryland

1. Remrey, Lizabeth Paige. Surveillance in Cyberspace: Applying Natural and Place Manager Surveillance to System Trespassing.

Degree: Criminology and Criminal Justice, 2016, University of Maryland

Research on the criminological side of system trespassing (i.e. unlawfully gaining access to a computer system) is relatively rare and has yet to examine the effect of the presence of other users on the system during the trespassing event (i.e. the time of communication between a trespasser’s system and the infiltrated system). This thesis seeks to analyze this relationship drawing on principles of Situational Crime Prevention, Routine Activities Theory, and restrictive deterrence. Data were collected from a randomized control trial of target computers deployed on the Internet network of a large U.S. university. This study examined whether the number (one or multiple) and type (administrative or non-administrative) of computer users present on a system reduced the seriousness and frequency of trespassing. Results indicated that the type of user (administrative) produced a restrictive deterrent effect and significantly reduced the frequency and duration of trespassing events. Advisors/Committee Members: Maimon, David (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Criminology; Situational Crime Prevention; Surveillance; System Trespassing

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Remrey, L. P. (2016). Surveillance in Cyberspace: Applying Natural and Place Manager Surveillance to System Trespassing. (Thesis). University of Maryland. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1903/18387

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Remrey, Lizabeth Paige. “Surveillance in Cyberspace: Applying Natural and Place Manager Surveillance to System Trespassing.” 2016. Thesis, University of Maryland. Accessed January 20, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1903/18387.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Remrey, Lizabeth Paige. “Surveillance in Cyberspace: Applying Natural and Place Manager Surveillance to System Trespassing.” 2016. Web. 20 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Remrey LP. Surveillance in Cyberspace: Applying Natural and Place Manager Surveillance to System Trespassing. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Maryland; 2016. [cited 2021 Jan 20]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1903/18387.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Remrey LP. Surveillance in Cyberspace: Applying Natural and Place Manager Surveillance to System Trespassing. [Thesis]. University of Maryland; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1903/18387

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation


University of Cambridge

2. Vetterl, Alexander. Honeypots in the age of universal attacks and the Internet of Things.

Degree: PhD, 2020, University of Cambridge

Today's Internet connects billions of physical devices. These devices are often immature and insecure, and share common vulnerabilities. The predominant form of attacks relies on recent advances in Internet-wide scanning and device discovery. The speed at which (vulnerable) devices can be discovered, and the device monoculture, mean that a single exploit, potentially trivial, can affect millions of devices across brands and continents. In an attempt to detect and profile the growing threat of autonomous and Internet-scale attacks against the Internet of Things, we revisit honeypots, resources that appear to be legitimate systems. We show that this endeavour was previously limited by a fundamentally flawed generation of honeypots and associated misconceptions. We show with two one-year-long studies that the display of warning messages has no deterrent effect in an attacked computer system. Previous research assumed that they would measure individual behaviour, but we find that the number of human attackers is orders of magnitude lower than previously assumed. Turning to the current generation of low- and medium-interaction honeypots, we demonstrate that their architecture is fatally flawed. The use of off-the-shelf libraries to provide the transport layer means that the protocols are implemented subtly differently from the systems being impersonated. We developed a generic technique which can find any such honeypot at Internet scale with just one packet for an established TCP connection. We then applied our technique and conducted several Internet-wide scans over a one-year period. By logging in to two SSH honeypots and sending specific commands, we not only revealed their configuration and patch status, but also found that many of them were not up to date. As we were the first to knowingly authenticate to honeypots, we provide a detailed legal analysis and an extended ethical justification for our research to show why we did not infringe computer-misuse laws. Lastly, we present honware, a honeypot framework for rapid implementation and deployment of high-interaction honeypots. Honware automatically processes a standard firmware image and can emulate a wide range of devices without any access to the manufacturers' hardware. We believe that honware is a major contribution towards re-balancing the economics of attackers and defenders by reducing the period in which attackers can exploit vulnerabilities at Internet scale in a world of ubiquitous networked `things'.

Subjects/Keywords: Network security; Honeypot; Fingerprinting; Attackers; Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS); Malware; Threat analysis; Honware; Network measurement; Internet of Things (IoT); Firmware; Emulation; Virtualisation; Warning messages; Deterrence; Detection; System trespassing; Unauthorized access; Customer Premise Equipment (CPE); Zero days; Network protocols

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Vetterl, A. (2020). Honeypots in the age of universal attacks and the Internet of Things. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Cambridge. Retrieved from https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/303171

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Vetterl, Alexander. “Honeypots in the age of universal attacks and the Internet of Things.” 2020. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Cambridge. Accessed January 20, 2021. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/303171.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Vetterl, Alexander. “Honeypots in the age of universal attacks and the Internet of Things.” 2020. Web. 20 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Vetterl A. Honeypots in the age of universal attacks and the Internet of Things. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Cambridge; 2020. [cited 2021 Jan 20]. Available from: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/303171.

Council of Science Editors:

Vetterl A. Honeypots in the age of universal attacks and the Internet of Things. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Cambridge; 2020. Available from: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/303171


University of Cambridge

3. Vetterl, Alexander. Honeypots in the age of universal attacks and the Internet of Things.

Degree: PhD, 2020, University of Cambridge

Today's Internet connects billions of physical devices. These devices are often immature and insecure, and share common vulnerabilities. The predominant form of attacks relies on recent advances in Internet-wide scanning and device discovery. The speed at which (vulnerable) devices can be discovered, and the device monoculture, mean that a single exploit, potentially trivial, can affect millions of devices across brands and continents. In an attempt to detect and profile the growing threat of autonomous and Internet-scale attacks against the Internet of Things, we revisit honeypots, resources that appear to be legitimate systems. We show that this endeavour was previously limited by a fundamentally flawed generation of honeypots and associated misconceptions. We show with two one-year-long studies that the display of warning messages has no deterrent effect in an attacked computer system. Previous research assumed that they would measure individual behaviour, but we find that the number of human attackers is orders of magnitude lower than previously assumed. Turning to the current generation of low- and medium-interaction honeypots, we demonstrate that their architecture is fatally flawed. The use of off-the-shelf libraries to provide the transport layer means that the protocols are implemented subtly differently from the systems being impersonated. We developed a generic technique which can find any such honeypot at Internet scale with just one packet for an established TCP connection. We then applied our technique and conducted several Internet-wide scans over a one-year period. By logging in to two SSH honeypots and sending specific commands, we not only revealed their configuration and patch status, but also found that many of them were not up to date. As we were the first to knowingly authenticate to honeypots, we provide a detailed legal analysis and an extended ethical justification for our research to show why we did not infringe computer-misuse laws. Lastly, we present honware, a honeypot framework for rapid implementation and deployment of high-interaction honeypots. Honware automatically processes a standard firmware image and can emulate a wide range of devices without any access to the manufacturers' hardware. We believe that honware is a major contribution towards re-balancing the economics of attackers and defenders by reducing the period in which attackers can exploit vulnerabilities at Internet scale in a world of ubiquitous networked 'things'.

Subjects/Keywords: Network security; Honeypot; Fingerprinting; Attackers; Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS); Malware; Threat analysis; Honware; Network measurement; Internet of Things (IoT); Firmware; Emulation; Virtualisation; Warning messages; Deterrence; Detection; System trespassing; Unauthorized access; Customer Premise Equipment (CPE); Zero days; Network protocols

Record DetailsSimilar RecordsGoogle PlusoneFacebookTwitterCiteULikeMendeleyreddit

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Vetterl, A. (2020). Honeypots in the age of universal attacks and the Internet of Things. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Cambridge. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.50250 ; https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.801825

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Vetterl, Alexander. “Honeypots in the age of universal attacks and the Internet of Things.” 2020. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Cambridge. Accessed January 20, 2021. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.50250 ; https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.801825.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Vetterl, Alexander. “Honeypots in the age of universal attacks and the Internet of Things.” 2020. Web. 20 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Vetterl A. Honeypots in the age of universal attacks and the Internet of Things. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Cambridge; 2020. [cited 2021 Jan 20]. Available from: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.50250 ; https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.801825.

Council of Science Editors:

Vetterl A. Honeypots in the age of universal attacks and the Internet of Things. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Cambridge; 2020. Available from: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.50250 ; https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.801825

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