subject:(Strategic Crowd)

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Linnaeus University

1. Rudnick, Torben; Velly, Anna. Crowdsourcing's Impacts on Private Organizations' Strategic Capabilities.

Degree: Organisation and Entrepreneurship, 2015, Linnaeus University

URL: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-43749

The following Bachelor’s thesis explores the different uses of crowdsourcing by private organisations and analyses them internally, in terms of strategic capabilities. The purpose of this Bachelor’s thesis is to show the reader the different internal strategic issues resulting from the use of crowdsourcing by private organisations. The authors focused namely on crowd creation, crowdfunding and crowd voting through three private organisations using one of these types respectively in their business processes. The qualitative research was conducted through a multiple case study design and through interviews for the primary data collection. The results from the research varied from case to case. Firstly, the Ricola case has shown that crowd creation can especially have impacts on its physical strategic capabilities. Secondly, La Biscuiterie Jeannette’s case has indicated that crowdfunding strongly impacts its financial strategic capabilities. Thirdly, the case of Schneider has enabled to highlight on the one hand the growing importance of crowd voting and on the other hand that crowd voting had no major impacts on its strategic capabilities, yet. Finally, this research intended to give inspiration to other researchers into the field of crowdsourcing and its three subtypes. Therefore, this thesis can be a basis for further researches in this field.

Subjects/Keywords: Crowdsourcing; Crowd Creation; Crowdfunding; Crowd Voting; Private Organisations; Strategic Capabilities; Business Administration; Företagsekonomi

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APA (6^th Edition):

Rudnick, Torben; Velly, A. (2015). Crowdsourcing's Impacts on Private Organizations' Strategic Capabilities. (Thesis). Linnaeus University. Retrieved from http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-43749

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Rudnick, Torben; Velly, Anna. “Crowdsourcing's Impacts on Private Organizations' Strategic Capabilities.” 2015. Thesis, Linnaeus University. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-43749.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Rudnick, Torben; Velly, Anna. “Crowdsourcing's Impacts on Private Organizations' Strategic Capabilities.” 2015. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Rudnick, Torben; Velly A. Crowdsourcing's Impacts on Private Organizations' Strategic Capabilities. [Internet] [Thesis]. Linnaeus University; 2015. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-43749.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Rudnick, Torben; Velly A. Crowdsourcing's Impacts on Private Organizations' Strategic Capabilities. [Thesis]. Linnaeus University; 2015. Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-43749

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Indian Institute of Science

2. Nath, Swaprava. Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing.

Degree: PhD, Faculty of Engineering, 2013, Indian Institute of Science

URL: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2497

This thesis looks into the economics of crowdsourcing using game theoretic modeling. The art of aggregating information and expertise from a diverse population has been in practice since a long time. The Internet and the revolution in communication and computational technologies have made this task easier and given birth to a new era of online resource aggregation, which is now popularly referred to as crowdsourcing. Two important features of this aggregation technique are: (a) crowdsourcing is always human driven, hence the participants are rational and intelligent, and they have a payoff function that they aim to maximize, and (b) the participants are connected over a social network which helps to reach out to a large set of individuals. To understand the behavior and the outcome of such a strategic crowd, we need to understand the economics of a crowdsourcing network. In this thesis, we have considered the following three major facets of the strategic crowdsourcing problem. (i) Elicitation of the true qualities of the crowd workers: As the crowd is often unstructured and unknown to the designer, it is important to ensure if the crowdsourced job is indeed performed at the highest quality, and this requires elicitation of the true qualities which are typically the participants' private information. (ii) Resource critical task execution ensuring the authenticity of both the information and the identity of the participants: Due to the diverse geographical, cultural, socio-economic reasons, crowdsourcing entails certain manipulations that are unusual in the classical theory. The design has to be robust enough to handle fake identities or incorrect information provided by the crowd while performing crowdsourcing contests. (iii) Improving the productive output of the crowdsourcing network: As the designer's goal is to maximize a certain measurable output of the crowdsourcing system, an interesting question is how one can design the incentive scheme and/or the network so that the system performs at an optimal level taking into account the strategic nature of the individuals. In the thesis, we design novel mechanisms to solve the problems above using game theoretic modeling. Our investigation helps in understanding certain limits of achievability, and provides design protocols in order to make crowdsourcing more reliable, effective, and productive. Advisors/Committee Members: Narahari, Y (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Mechanism Design; Game Theory; Crowdsourcing; Game Theory Modelling; Crowdsourcing Network; Crowd Workers; Dynamic Mechanism Design; Strategic Crowd; Game Theoretic Modeling; Computer and Information Science

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Nath, S. (2013). Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing. (Doctoral Dissertation). Indian Institute of Science. Retrieved from http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2497

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Nath, Swaprava. “Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, Indian Institute of Science. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2497.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Nath, Swaprava. “Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing.” 2013. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Nath S. Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Indian Institute of Science; 2013. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2497.

Council of Science Editors:

Nath S. Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Indian Institute of Science; 2013. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2497

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