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You searched for subject:(Single Crossing Property). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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Universidad de Chile

1. Heumann Epstein, Tibor Alejandro. A General Approach for Screening Problems Without The Single-Crossing Property.

Degree: 2011, Universidad de Chile

En este trabajo consideramos el modelo clásico de diseño de mecanismos, con un principal que debe tomar una decisión o determinar la asignación de un bien, y agentes que poseen información privada que es relevante para el principal. Para utilizar de manera ´optima la información de los agentes, el principal diseña un menú de contratos, donde cada uno especifica la decisión que tomará el principal y las transferencias que se le darán al agente. Dado este menú, cada agente elige el contrato que más le favorece. El objetivo del principal es diseñar un menú de contratos que maximice su utilidad, que puede coincidir o no con el bienestar social. Existe una amplia literatura que considera este problema, sin embargo la mayor parte de ´esta toma como suposición fundamental que las preferencias de los agentes satisfacen la propiedad de cruce único (S.C.P. por sus siglas en ingles). Esta propiedad garantiza que la valoración marginal de los agentes por el bien en cuestión cambia monótonamente con su información privada. Para el principal esto simplifica significativamente el diseño del menú ´optimo, ya que garantiza que el problema de maximización que enfrentan los agentes, al elegir el contrato que más les favorece, es cóncavo. Como los agentes enfrentan un problema cóncavo, el principal, al diseñar el menú de contratos, sólo debe preocuparse localmente de la condición de primer y segundo orden de los agentes. En esta tesis consideramos el caso en que las preferencias de los agentes no satisfacen S.C.P. Desde un punto de vista técnico, al relajar este supuesto, se pierde la monotonicidad en las preferencias de los agentes. Esto hace que para el principal no sea suficiente analizar las condiciones de primer y segundo orden de los agentes, y deba analizar su decisión global. Por esto, el problema de maximización para el principal es mucho mas complejo de analizar ya que no basta con maximizar localmente los contratos para cada agente, si no que se debe considerar los efectos globales de cada contrato. En esta tesis, se introduce la condición de “doble cruce”, que es un supuesto más débil que S.C.P. Así, se encuentran condiciones necesarias para que un mecanismo sea implementable y también condición necesarias para la optimalidad de ´este. Estas condiciones son interpretadas desde un punto de vista económico, lo que permite extender las intuiciones a una generalidad de problemas en que no se cumple S.C.P. y entender las limitaciones que impone este supuesto. Por otro lado, ocupando las condiciones necesarias, encontramos un nuevo método para solucionar y encontrar contratos óptimos en el modelo que estudiamos. Este método permite transformar un problema de dimensión infinita en un problema bidimensional que es posible solucionar. Ejemplificamos el método propuesto resolviendo dos ejemplos. La primera situación consiste en encontrar la forma óptima de arrendar una tecnología que queda obsoleta en el tiempo a una tasa desconocida para el principal. La segunda es como regular la tecnología que…

Subjects/Keywords: Economía aplicada; Single crossing property; Diseño de mecanismos; Optimización; Selección adversa

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Heumann Epstein, T. A. (2011). A General Approach for Screening Problems Without The Single-Crossing Property. (Thesis). Universidad de Chile. Retrieved from http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/102512

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Heumann Epstein, Tibor Alejandro. “A General Approach for Screening Problems Without The Single-Crossing Property.” 2011. Thesis, Universidad de Chile. Accessed September 23, 2020. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/102512.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Heumann Epstein, Tibor Alejandro. “A General Approach for Screening Problems Without The Single-Crossing Property.” 2011. Web. 23 Sep 2020.

Vancouver:

Heumann Epstein TA. A General Approach for Screening Problems Without The Single-Crossing Property. [Internet] [Thesis]. Universidad de Chile; 2011. [cited 2020 Sep 23]. Available from: http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/102512.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Heumann Epstein TA. A General Approach for Screening Problems Without The Single-Crossing Property. [Thesis]. Universidad de Chile; 2011. Available from: http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/102512

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

2. Rezaei Khavas, N. Essays in Information Economics.

Degree: 2017, University Utrecht

Three main chapters of this dissertation, Chapters 2, 3, and 4, are written as separate papers. Below, a short summary of each chapter is provided. Chapter 2 studies optimal pricing strategy of a monopolist who faces consumers that have heterogeneous valuations, have reference-dependent preferences, and are subject to loss aversion. There is asymmetric information in that the monopolist does not observe the consumers? valuations. Assuming that the monopolist can make consumers expect to buy the desired variety of the good, and that these expectations determine the consumers? reference points, we obtain two main results. First, with expectation-based loss aversion, menu pricing is possible even if the single-crossing property is violated (i.e., high-valuation consumers do not have a larger marginal utility of quality than low-valuation consumers). Second, when firms face consumers with expectation-based loss aversion, menu pricing may become more desirable to the monopolist compared to selling only to high-valuation consumers. Chapter 3 develops a model of signaling with senders who have reference-dependent preferences and are subject to loss aversion. As is well known, the single-crossing property, saying that high types have lower marginal cost of signaling, is a necessary condition for the existence of separating equilibria in signaling games. However, the single-crossing property is a restrictive condition. In this paper, assuming that expectations form the sender?s reference point, we show that with expectation-based loss aversion, the single-crossing property is no longer a necessary condition for separating equilibria to exist. In Chapter 4, we develop a model of repeated microcredit lending to study how group size affects optimal group-lending contracts with joint liability. In the setting being studied, a benevolent lender provides microcredit to a group of borrowers to invest in projects. The outcome of each risky project is not observable by the lender; therefore, if some borrowers default on their loan repayments, the lender cannot identify strategic default. The group will be entitled to a subsequent loan if total loan obligation is met. We characterize the optimal contract and determine the optimal size of the borrowers? group endogenously. We find that, although joint liability contracts are feasible under a smaller set of parameter values than individual liability contracts, joint liability has positive effects on the borrowers? repayment amount and welfare. Our analysis also suggests that group size should increase with project risk. Furthermore, in this chapter we analyze the effect of less severe punishment and project correlation on the feasibility and characteristics of joint liability contracts. Our results show that, less severe punishment does not affect the borrowers? repayment amount or welfare, but decreases the loan ceiling of joint liability. However, this negative effect can be offset by forming larger groups. Second, we also found that project correlation allows a higher loan ceiling in… Advisors/Committee Members: Rosenkranz, Stephanie, De Jaegher, Kris.

Subjects/Keywords: Screening; Signaling; Single-Crossing Property; Reference-Dependent Preferences; Microcredit; Strategic Default

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APA (6th Edition):

Rezaei Khavas, N. (2017). Essays in Information Economics. (Doctoral Dissertation). University Utrecht. Retrieved from https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/350129 ; URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1874-350129 ; urn:isbn:978-94-91870-25-5 ; URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1874-350129 ; https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/350129

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Rezaei Khavas, N. “Essays in Information Economics.” 2017. Doctoral Dissertation, University Utrecht. Accessed September 23, 2020. https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/350129 ; URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1874-350129 ; urn:isbn:978-94-91870-25-5 ; URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1874-350129 ; https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/350129.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Rezaei Khavas, N. “Essays in Information Economics.” 2017. Web. 23 Sep 2020.

Vancouver:

Rezaei Khavas N. Essays in Information Economics. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University Utrecht; 2017. [cited 2020 Sep 23]. Available from: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/350129 ; URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1874-350129 ; urn:isbn:978-94-91870-25-5 ; URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1874-350129 ; https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/350129.

Council of Science Editors:

Rezaei Khavas N. Essays in Information Economics. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University Utrecht; 2017. Available from: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/350129 ; URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1874-350129 ; urn:isbn:978-94-91870-25-5 ; URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1874-350129 ; https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/350129

3. Barthel, Anne-Christine. Essays on Monotone Comparative Statics for Constrained Optimization Problems with Applications.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2014, University of Kansas

My dissertation consists of three chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 both address extensions to existing monotone comparative statics results for constrained optimization problems using lattice programming techniques. Chapter 3 applies monotone comparative statics results to the question how environmental regulation affects investment in innovation in imperfectly competitive markets. Generally we can distinguish between two types of comparative statics problems. The first type of problem considers the change of the optimal solution to a maximization problem as the objective function changes, the other type considers the change due to a change in the constraint set. Lattice-based comparative statics theorems have been developed for both types of problems in the literature. The strengths of these lattice-theoretic comparative statics results are that they don't depend on the usual smoothness, interiority and concavity assumptions as required by the classical approach based on the Implicit Function Theorem, as well as convexity of the constraint set. Moreover, these comparative statics results also apply in the case of non-unique solutions.Quah (2007) expanded existing results by Milgrom and Shannon (1994) by making them applicable to some non-lattice constraint sets. In the first chapter, I extend existing comparative statics theorems to parametrized objective functions and non-lattice constraint sets. This generalization makes it possible to analyze a variety of economic optimization problems that fall into this class of problems which cannot be addressed using existing lattice-based techniques. I provide examples from consumer theory, producer theory and environmental economics that show the result's broad scope of applications. The second chapter studies monotone comparative statics with respect to price changes in the consumer's utility maximization problem. Most attempts to derive this property rely on aspects of the demand curve, and it has been hard to derive this property using assumptions on the primitive utility function. Using new results on the comparative statics of demand in Quah (2007), I provide simple and easy conditions on utility functions that yield the gross substitutes property. Quah (2007) provides conditions on utility functions that yield normal demand. I add an assumption on elasticity of marginal rate of substitution, which combined with Quah's assumptions yields gross substitutes. I apply this assumption to the family of constant elasticity of substitution preferences. My approach is grounded in the standard comparative statics decomposition of a change in demand due to a change in price into a substitution effect and an income effect. Quah's assumptions are helpful to sign the income effect. Combined with the elasticity assumption, we can sign the overall effect. As a by-product, I also present conditions which yield the gross complements property. Chapter 3 is an application of monotone comparative statics results to the question how environmental regulation affects incentives for R&D investment.… Advisors/Committee Members: Sabarwal, Tarun (advisor), Cornet, Bernard (cmtemember), Sicilian, Joseph (cmtemember), Zhang, Jianbo (cmtemember), Pasik-Duncan, Bożenna (cmtemember).

Subjects/Keywords: Economics; Economic theory; comparative statics; consumer problem; environmental regulation; lattice theory; Single Crossing Property; supermodularity

…versions of the Single Crossing Property to use throughout the remainder of the chapter… …Definition 5. Single Crossing Property 1. Standard Single Crossing Property f satisfies the Single… …x28;∆, ∇)-Single Crossing Property f satisfies the (∆, ∇)-Single Crossing… …x28;>) f (x,t 0 ). 3. i- Single Crossing Property f satisfies the i-Single… …x28;x,t 0 ). The standard Single Crossing Property is implied by increasing differences… 

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Barthel, A. (2014). Essays on Monotone Comparative Statics for Constrained Optimization Problems with Applications. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Kansas. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1808/16840

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Barthel, Anne-Christine. “Essays on Monotone Comparative Statics for Constrained Optimization Problems with Applications.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Kansas. Accessed September 23, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/1808/16840.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Barthel, Anne-Christine. “Essays on Monotone Comparative Statics for Constrained Optimization Problems with Applications.” 2014. Web. 23 Sep 2020.

Vancouver:

Barthel A. Essays on Monotone Comparative Statics for Constrained Optimization Problems with Applications. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Kansas; 2014. [cited 2020 Sep 23]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1808/16840.

Council of Science Editors:

Barthel A. Essays on Monotone Comparative Statics for Constrained Optimization Problems with Applications. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Kansas; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1808/16840

.