You searched for subject:(Practical reason).
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Queens University
1.
Langlois, Christopher.
Relating to Reasons
.
Degree: Philosophy, 2010, Queens University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1974/6026 
► While each of us has an intuitive sense of what a reason is, when considered more carefully the concept is not so clear. There are…
(more)
▼ While each of us has an intuitive sense of what a reason is, when considered more carefully the concept is not so clear. There are a number of questions to which any successful account of reasons will provide some answer. For example, on some accounts reasons may appear to be metaphysically odd entities, unlike other sorts of facts in our world. From here there are very serious questions which spring up regarding the motivational efficacy of reasons: given the nature of reasons, as respective accounts describe them, how is it that reasons get a grip in an agent? Further, whatever reasons are, and in whichever relation agents stand to reasons, how is it that agents get in touch with truths about reasons? How in theory – and importantly, in practice – do agents figure out which reasons apply to them?
I will be defending a view of reasons in which reasons are primitive. This is what T.M. Scanlon calls 'Reasons Fundamentalism'. In particular, I will defend this view against charges which claim that an account of reasons as primitive or fundamental fails us in the following three respects: 1) it cannot provide us with an adequate account of what sorts of facts reasons are, and how they intermingle with other sorts of facts; 2) it cannot provide us with adequate account of how a consideration can count as a reason for an agent even if that agent fails to be gripped by the consideration, and; 3) it cannot provide us with an adequate account of how we figure out, in principle and in practice, what count as reasons and which reasons apply to us.
If reasons are fundamental, existing and applying to us independently of anything already true of particular agents and are the sorts of things we can come to understand through reflection, it seems that such a story also succeeds in capturing our
phenomenological experience of practical reasoning in our every day lives. This, I will suggest, goes some distance toward setting it apart from – and ahead of – other accounts.
Subjects/Keywords: Practical Reason
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APA (6th Edition):
Langlois, C. (2010). Relating to Reasons
. (Thesis). Queens University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1974/6026
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Langlois, Christopher. “Relating to Reasons
.” 2010. Thesis, Queens University. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/1974/6026.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Langlois, Christopher. “Relating to Reasons
.” 2010. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Langlois C. Relating to Reasons
. [Internet] [Thesis]. Queens University; 2010. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1974/6026.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Langlois C. Relating to Reasons
. [Thesis]. Queens University; 2010. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1974/6026
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
University of Utah
2.
Stoehr, Tyler Steven.
Do you have reasons for your reasons? An attempt to make nihilism an attractive alternative to theories of practical reason.
Degree: MA;, Philosophy;, 2009, University of Utah
URL: http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd2/id/401/rec/359
► During the latter half of the 20th century the number of theories being defended in the field of practical reason has proliferated dramatically. This proliferation,…
(more)
▼ During the latter half of the 20th century the number of theories being defended in the field of practical reason has proliferated dramatically. This proliferation, however, threatens to undermine the justificatory aim of practical reason, for if these different theories yield different practical inferences, then we seem to be in a dilemma: we have to either give reasons for our reasons, or accept that there aren't any such reasons, which would render our actions (even if they were made after some sort of rational deliberation) completely arbitrary. This thesis argues that currently in the field of practical reason there isn't any method or set form of argumentation aimed at providing reasons for our reasons, and that therefore nihilism, or the view that we don't have good reasons for doing what we do, seems to be the best attitude to take regarding theories of practical reason and human agency. This conclusion is then defended against three objections that stem from the views of J. David Velleman, Christine M. Korsgaard, and John McDowell.
Subjects/Keywords: Practical reason; Nihilism
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APA (6th Edition):
Stoehr, T. S. (2009). Do you have reasons for your reasons? An attempt to make nihilism an attractive alternative to theories of practical reason. (Masters Thesis). University of Utah. Retrieved from http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd2/id/401/rec/359
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Stoehr, Tyler Steven. “Do you have reasons for your reasons? An attempt to make nihilism an attractive alternative to theories of practical reason.” 2009. Masters Thesis, University of Utah. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd2/id/401/rec/359.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Stoehr, Tyler Steven. “Do you have reasons for your reasons? An attempt to make nihilism an attractive alternative to theories of practical reason.” 2009. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Stoehr TS. Do you have reasons for your reasons? An attempt to make nihilism an attractive alternative to theories of practical reason. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Utah; 2009. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd2/id/401/rec/359.
Council of Science Editors:
Stoehr TS. Do you have reasons for your reasons? An attempt to make nihilism an attractive alternative to theories of practical reason. [Masters Thesis]. University of Utah; 2009. Available from: http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd2/id/401/rec/359
Victoria University of Wellington
3.
Wood, Emma Susan.
Prospects for Moral Success Theory.
Degree: 2014, Victoria University of Wellington
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10063/3659
► In this thesis, I will argue that the existence of moral facts does not rely on the existence of a reason for action, and that…
(more)
▼ In this thesis, I will argue that the existence of moral facts does not rely on the existence of a
reason for action, and that moral facts can be made sense of in other ways. My thesis is both a reply to a type of moral error theory that has been advanced by Richard Joyce and John Mackie, and an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments.
The argument for error theory that I respond to is roughly as follows: moral judgments are judgments about external
practical reasons. But external reasons do not exist, and so no moral judgment is ever true. In the first part of my thesis, I will argue in favour of the latter premise of the error theorist’s argument, but against the former: external reasons do not exist, but moral judgments are not committed to them.
In the second half of my thesis I build up a positive account of what moral judgments involve. If moral judgments are not judgments about reasons, then what are moral judgments about? I develop the widely supported idea that moral judgments are judgments that are based on welfarist considerations, and attempt to give this idea a more precise formulation than what has been previously offered. From this account, I go on to develop an account of the truthmakers of moral judgments. The account I end up with is an ideal observer theory that I believe makes sense of a broad range of intuitions about morality.
My hope is that this thesis will be of interest to others who feel the pull of moral error theory, but would prefer to see moral success theory vindicated.
Advisors/Committee Members: Joyce, Richard, Keller, Simon.
Subjects/Keywords: Metaethics; Moral objectivity; Practical reason
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APA (6th Edition):
Wood, E. S. (2014). Prospects for Moral Success Theory. (Doctoral Dissertation). Victoria University of Wellington. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10063/3659
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Wood, Emma Susan. “Prospects for Moral Success Theory.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/10063/3659.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Wood, Emma Susan. “Prospects for Moral Success Theory.” 2014. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Wood ES. Prospects for Moral Success Theory. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Victoria University of Wellington; 2014. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10063/3659.
Council of Science Editors:
Wood ES. Prospects for Moral Success Theory. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Victoria University of Wellington; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10063/3659
Rutgers University
4.
Antosh, Marcello.
Understanding normative practical reasons.
Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2016, Rutgers University
URL: https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/51183/
► Here I defend a version of internalism about normative practical reasons, which I call discriminative stimulus internalism. Discriminative stimuli feature prominently in explanations of human…
(more)
▼ Here I defend a version of internalism about normative practical reasons, which I call discriminative stimulus internalism. Discriminative stimuli feature prominently in explanations of human and non-human animal learning and behavior. And according to discriminative stimulus internalism, the property of being a reason is the property of being a discriminative stimulus of a special kind. To defend this theory of reasons I first attempt to resolve a much simpler question: what regulates the concept of a normative practical reason? This question can be answered by characterizing both the rule and property that regulate the concept. According to what I call the guidance account, the rule that regulates that concept is explained by a more basic rule which determines how a wide variety of entities - from animals to artificial forms of intelligence - can learn to respond to considerations in particular ways, which, to observers, may appear to be instrumentally rational. These more basic rules are captured by principles of classical and instrumental conditioning and reinforcement learning. Those more basic rules explain when a consideration may come to guide an entity's response. When it can do so it is a discriminative stimulus. According to the guidance account, the property of being a discriminative stimulus regulates the concept of a reason. The guidance account supports discriminative stimulus internalism in two major ways. First, it poses the parsimony challenge to a competing theory of reasons. This challenge casts doubt on the claim that normative beliefs and practices provide evidence for the existence of reasons offered by this competing theory. But it allows that those beliefs and practices provide evidence of the existence of reasons which are discriminative stimuli of a special kind. Second, the guidance account undermines two important objections against discriminative stimulus internalism: the extension and normativity objections. This straightforward, preliminary defense of discriminative stimulus internalism suggests it is well-positioned to emerge as the correct theory of normative practical reasons.
Advisors/Committee Members: Chang, Ruth (chair), Temkin, Larry (internal member), Egan, Andy (internal member), Sobel, David (outside member).
Subjects/Keywords: Normativity (Ethics); Practical reason
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Antosh, M. (2016). Understanding normative practical reasons. (Doctoral Dissertation). Rutgers University. Retrieved from https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/51183/
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Antosh, Marcello. “Understanding normative practical reasons.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, Rutgers University. Accessed December 05, 2019.
https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/51183/.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Antosh, Marcello. “Understanding normative practical reasons.” 2016. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Antosh M. Understanding normative practical reasons. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Rutgers University; 2016. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/51183/.
Council of Science Editors:
Antosh M. Understanding normative practical reasons. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Rutgers University; 2016. Available from: https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/51183/
Dalhousie University
5.
Keddy, Jared.
Reason, Reasons, and Reasoning.
Degree: MA, Department of Philosophy, 2010, Dalhousie University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10222/13064
► Proceduralists about practical rationality and reasons for action argue that practical rationality is only capable of criticizing our reasons for action when, through deliberation, they…
(more)
▼ Proceduralists about
practical rationality and reasons
for action argue that
practical rationality is only capable of
criticizing our reasons for action when, through deliberation, they
are reachable through our current beliefs and desires. Using this
model of
practical rationality, proceduralists also typically argue
that the only reasons for action we have are instrumentally
valuable ones. Substantivists disagree, however, and argue that
practical rationality is capable of criticizing our actions despite
our desires, preferences and interests. Substantivists argue that
although we have instrumental reasons for action, there are also
other reasons for action we have, specific non-instrumental ones,
which we are required to act for on pain of irrationality. In this
thesis I argue that a substantivist model of
practical rationality
and reasons for action is correct, and that understanding
practical
rationality and reasons for action in this way has surprising
consequences for moral theory.
Advisors/Committee Members: none (external-examiner), Mike Hymers (graduate-coordinator), Darren Abramson (thesis-reader), Kirsten Borgerson (thesis-reader), Greg Scherkoske (thesis-supervisor), Not Applicable (ethics-approval), Not Applicable (manuscripts), Not Applicable (copyright-release).
Subjects/Keywords: Practical Reason; Kant; Hume; Ethics;
Meta-Ethics
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APA (6th Edition):
Keddy, J. (2010). Reason, Reasons, and Reasoning. (Masters Thesis). Dalhousie University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10222/13064
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Keddy, Jared. “Reason, Reasons, and Reasoning.” 2010. Masters Thesis, Dalhousie University. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/10222/13064.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Keddy, Jared. “Reason, Reasons, and Reasoning.” 2010. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Keddy J. Reason, Reasons, and Reasoning. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Dalhousie University; 2010. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10222/13064.
Council of Science Editors:
Keddy J. Reason, Reasons, and Reasoning. [Masters Thesis]. Dalhousie University; 2010. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10222/13064
University of Oxford
6.
Brandhorst, Mario.
Foundations of practical reason.
Degree: 2007, University of Oxford
URL: http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:12719f6b-eeb1-404f-8eff-bb5f1782ab84
;
http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.580846
► This thesis is an examination of the foundations of practical reason. Building on the later work of Wittgenstein, I argue for a subjectivist view of…
(more)
▼ This thesis is an examination of the foundations of practical reason. Building on the later work of Wittgenstein, I argue for a subjectivist view of moral judgment and of judgments about reasons for action. On this view, moral judgments and judgments about reasons for action can be true or false, but they are not objective. The argument for this view has the form of an inference to the best explanation. Using a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, I suggest that moral judgments and judgments about reasons for action should not be construed as referring to an ethical or normative reality that exists independently of us. There are ethical facts and facts about our reasons, but these facts arise as the result of our involvement in a linguistic practice. This provides a new way of accounting for these judgments that differs both from moral realism and expressivism. The view of reasons that emerges is closely related to, but not identical with, reasons internalism as described by Bernard Williams. I reject his argument in favour of internalism and provide a new and independent argument to support this view of our reasons. In the course of spelling out that argument, I show why internalism as described by Williams should be modified, and why this does not commit us to externalism. In the final chapters, I show that there is an important parallel between our practical predicament and the account of our epistemic condition as portrayed by Wittgenstein. The inference to the best explanation is completed by considering a number of objections to subjectivism that are based on the idea that a subjectivist account of moral judgment and of reasons fails to do justice to the ethical phenomena. I reject these objections, and suggest that a subjectivist can both be reflectively aware of his subjectivism and continue to live well.
Subjects/Keywords: 100; Ethics; Judgment (Ethics); Philosophy; Practical reason
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APA ·
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MLA ·
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Export
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Brandhorst, M. (2007). Foundations of practical reason. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Oxford. Retrieved from http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:12719f6b-eeb1-404f-8eff-bb5f1782ab84 ; http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.580846
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Brandhorst, Mario. “Foundations of practical reason.” 2007. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oxford. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:12719f6b-eeb1-404f-8eff-bb5f1782ab84 ; http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.580846.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Brandhorst, Mario. “Foundations of practical reason.” 2007. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Brandhorst M. Foundations of practical reason. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Oxford; 2007. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:12719f6b-eeb1-404f-8eff-bb5f1782ab84 ; http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.580846.
Council of Science Editors:
Brandhorst M. Foundations of practical reason. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Oxford; 2007. Available from: http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:12719f6b-eeb1-404f-8eff-bb5f1782ab84 ; http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.580846
Cornell University
7.
Penner, Sydney.
Francisco Suxc3Xa1Rez On Acting For The Sake Of The Ultimate End
.
Degree: 2011, Cornell University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/29483
► Despite standing as one of the most important philosophers at the threshold of early modern philosophy, Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) has been strangely ignored in twentieth-century…
(more)
▼ Despite standing as one of the most important philosophers at the threshold of early modern philosophy, Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) has been strangely ignored in twentieth-century scholarship. In my dissertation, I contribute to our picture of Suárez by exploring his views on
practical reasoning. I argue that Suárez stands in the eudaemonist tradition, rather than moving towards an unappealing legalism, as has been suggested. Attributing such a legalism to Suárez depends on a narrow focus on his De legibus; to balance our picture, I focus on his often-overlooked De fine hominis, in which it quickly becomes evident that it is our happiness that provides us with reasons for action. In Chapter 2, I look at Suárez's taxonomy of different kinds of ends and then look more closely at his conception of happiness. While he recognizes the possibility of a pluralist conception, he adopts a monistic account according to which God is sufficient for happiness. This is, however, in tension with his commitment to there being other things that are intrinsically good. In Chapter 3, I look at his account of four ways in which an agent can act for the sake of an end: with actual, habitual, virtual, or interpretative intention. In Chapter 4, building on distinctions examined in earlier chapters, I look at a sequence of questions that Suárez considers about whether agents have to intend an ultimate end when acting, whether they can intend more than one, and whether they have to intend an unqualifiedly ultimate end and, if so, with what sort of intention. Finally, I look at Suárez's account of the will as a free and rational power. Suárez argues that we can only choose options that we have judged as conducive to our ends, but he insists that the will is free in a libertarian sense and so we need not choose the option judged to be most conducive to our ends. We cannot choose something purely bad but we can choose a lesser good. An appendix includes the first English translation of De fine hominis dd. 1-5 and Disputatio Metaphysica XXIII.2, the key texts on which my arguments rely.
Advisors/Committee Members: Irwin, Terence Henry (committeeMember), Chignell, Andrew (committeeMember).
Subjects/Keywords: Francisco Suxc3xa1rez;
practical reason;
ultimate end
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APA (6th Edition):
Penner, S. (2011). Francisco Suxc3Xa1Rez On Acting For The Sake Of The Ultimate End
. (Thesis). Cornell University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1813/29483
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Penner, Sydney. “Francisco Suxc3Xa1Rez On Acting For The Sake Of The Ultimate End
.” 2011. Thesis, Cornell University. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/1813/29483.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Penner, Sydney. “Francisco Suxc3Xa1Rez On Acting For The Sake Of The Ultimate End
.” 2011. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Penner S. Francisco Suxc3Xa1Rez On Acting For The Sake Of The Ultimate End
. [Internet] [Thesis]. Cornell University; 2011. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/29483.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Penner S. Francisco Suxc3Xa1Rez On Acting For The Sake Of The Ultimate End
. [Thesis]. Cornell University; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/29483
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
University of St. Andrews
8.
Schaab, Janis David.
Kantian constructivism : a restatement
.
Degree: 2019, University of St. Andrews
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/17374
► This thesis provides a restatement of Kantian constructivism, with the aim of avoiding some of the objections and clearing up some of the ambiguities that…
(more)
▼ This thesis provides a restatement of Kantian constructivism, with the aim of avoiding some of the objections and clearing up some of the ambiguities that have haunted previous versions of the view. I restate Kantian constructivism as the view that morality’s normativity has its source in the form of second-personal reasoning, a mode of
practical reasoning in which we engage when we address demands person-to-person.
By advancing a position about the source of moral normativity, Kantian constructivism addresses a metaethical question, albeit one that is distinct from the questions that many traditional metaethical positions, such as moral realism, focus on. Kantian constructivism has an advantage over competing views of the source of moral normativity when it comes to answering the so-called Normative Question, which I interpret as the question of why we are rationally required to do what we take to be our moral obligation. Kantian constructivism can answer this question because, unlike its competitors, it does not conceive of
practical reason as a receptive faculty that is determined by external inputs. Instead, it regards the very form of second-personal reasoning as grounding the fact that morality is normative, thus explaining morality’s rational authority.
Although second-personal reasoning is fundamentally distinct from the merely first-personal mode of reasoning that we must engage in insofar as we are agents, all those agents whom we would ordinarily consider bound by moral obligations seem to engage in it. Indeed, although it involves irreducibly second-personal notions, such as accountability and the authority to address legitimate demands, second-personal reasoning is not to be mistaken for a social practice. Instead, it can be applied to purely self-regarding contexts, such as that of committing oneself to a personal project and thereby holding oneself accountable for pursuing it, as well as to interactions with others.
Advisors/Committee Members: Timmermann, Jens (advisor).
Subjects/Keywords: Ethics;
Kant;
Philosophy;
Metaethics;
Practical reason
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APA ·
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MLA ·
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Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Schaab, J. D. (2019). Kantian constructivism : a restatement
. (Thesis). University of St. Andrews. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10023/17374
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Schaab, Janis David. “Kantian constructivism : a restatement
.” 2019. Thesis, University of St. Andrews. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/17374.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Schaab, Janis David. “Kantian constructivism : a restatement
.” 2019. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Schaab JD. Kantian constructivism : a restatement
. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of St. Andrews; 2019. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/17374.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Schaab JD. Kantian constructivism : a restatement
. [Thesis]. University of St. Andrews; 2019. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/17374
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
University of Notre Dame
9.
David Mark DiQuattro.
Learning to Speak: A Prelude to an Augustinian Conception of
Practical Reason</h1>.
Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2010, University of Notre Dame
URL: https://curate.nd.edu/show/k6439z92b2p
► Augustine has been neglected in contemporary moral philosophy, despite the rise to prominence of virtue-based approaches in ethics. This “virtue revival” has sparked extensive…
(more)
▼ Augustine has been neglected in contemporary
moral philosophy, despite the rise to prominence of virtue-based
approaches in ethics. This “virtue revival” has sparked extensive
examination of ancient and medieval ethics, to the relative neglect
of Augustine, who is an important figure in that tradition. This
dissertation seeks to develop the outline of an Augustinian
approach to ethics by bringing Augustine into contact with
contemporary reflections on
practical reason. In particular, it
engages thinkers who seek to gain traction on issues of moral
philosophy by examining the contours, requirements and
presuppositions of successful human agency. The dissertation
articulates an Augustinian understanding of
practical reason by
discussing ways that these debates can benefit from Augustine’s
insight that all exercises of
practical reason which fail to
recognize that the human heart is restless until it rests in God
are self-defeating. The dissertation explores the usefulness of
this Augustinian idea by examining the phenomenon of the defeasible
goodness of the goods agents pursue in action. It suggests that the
best way for agents to make sense of the defeasible goodness of
good things is by rendering these goods commensurable in terms of
the place they can play within a certain kind of “pilgrim” life
described in the third chapter. However, the commensurability of
goods must be understood as a result of
practical deliberation, not
a precondition of it. This approach requires taking seriously the
possibility that
practical reason comes along too late to be of any
use. That is, agents typically possess the resources for successful
deliberation only after making the relevant decisions. Chapter five
discusses this problem, critiques an influential approach to it,
and suggests an Augustinian approach to the
problem.
Advisors/Committee Members: Alfred Freddoso, Committee Member, Mary Keys, Committee Member, David OConnor, Committee Member, W. David Solomon, Committee Chair.
Subjects/Keywords: practical reason; virtue ethics; commensurability; Augustine; agency
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APA (6th Edition):
DiQuattro, D. M. (2010). Learning to Speak: A Prelude to an Augustinian Conception of
Practical Reason</h1>. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Notre Dame. Retrieved from https://curate.nd.edu/show/k6439z92b2p
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
DiQuattro, David Mark. “Learning to Speak: A Prelude to an Augustinian Conception of
Practical Reason</h1>.” 2010. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Notre Dame. Accessed December 05, 2019.
https://curate.nd.edu/show/k6439z92b2p.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
DiQuattro, David Mark. “Learning to Speak: A Prelude to an Augustinian Conception of
Practical Reason</h1>.” 2010. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
DiQuattro DM. Learning to Speak: A Prelude to an Augustinian Conception of
Practical Reason</h1>. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Notre Dame; 2010. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: https://curate.nd.edu/show/k6439z92b2p.
Council of Science Editors:
DiQuattro DM. Learning to Speak: A Prelude to an Augustinian Conception of
Practical Reason</h1>. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Notre Dame; 2010. Available from: https://curate.nd.edu/show/k6439z92b2p
Columbia University
10.
Lee, Alice.
Rationales in Social Exchange: The Impact of Rationales and the Role of Attachment in Negotiations and Markets.
Degree: 2019, Columbia University
URL: https://doi.org/10.7916/d8-9zwh-6s29
► Negotiations are not solely an exchange of numbers. Rather, negotiators often surround their offers with explanations, accounts, and rationales that seek to justify, explain, and…
(more)
▼ Negotiations are not solely an exchange of numbers. Rather, negotiators often surround their offers with explanations, accounts, and rationales that seek to justify, explain, and legitimize whatever terms they are proposing. However, surprisingly little scholarship has studied the role of these stories and the evidence that does exist seems inconclusive. In this dissertation, I examine how, why, and when the words we use in trying to explain and justify our positions work but also often fail to work in negotiations. In Chapter 2, I distinguish between two kinds of rationales buyers commonly employ—constraint rationales (referring to one’s own limited resources) and critique rationales (involving critiques of the negotiated object)—and demonstrate their divergent effects (Studies 1-4). In Chapter 3, I examine why buyers so often embrace the seemingly-flawed strategy of critique and seek evidence of whether perspective-taking might improve buyers’ ability to effectively offer critiques (Studies 5-7). In Chapter 4, I explore the role of attachment and its interaction with rationales, shedding light on previously unstudied dynamics between attachment and buyer accounts (Studies 8-10). I conclude by discussing the broader implications of these findings for understanding the dynamics of social exchange. Taken together, this research suggests that accounts and rationales matter, sometimes profoundly, and part of that is because of how they interact with a listener’s identity and attachment.
Subjects/Keywords: Management; Business; Negotiation; Practical reason; Social exchange
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APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Lee, A. (2019). Rationales in Social Exchange: The Impact of Rationales and the Role of Attachment in Negotiations and Markets. (Doctoral Dissertation). Columbia University. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.7916/d8-9zwh-6s29
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Lee, Alice. “Rationales in Social Exchange: The Impact of Rationales and the Role of Attachment in Negotiations and Markets.” 2019. Doctoral Dissertation, Columbia University. Accessed December 05, 2019.
https://doi.org/10.7916/d8-9zwh-6s29.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Lee, Alice. “Rationales in Social Exchange: The Impact of Rationales and the Role of Attachment in Negotiations and Markets.” 2019. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Lee A. Rationales in Social Exchange: The Impact of Rationales and the Role of Attachment in Negotiations and Markets. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Columbia University; 2019. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: https://doi.org/10.7916/d8-9zwh-6s29.
Council of Science Editors:
Lee A. Rationales in Social Exchange: The Impact of Rationales and the Role of Attachment in Negotiations and Markets. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Columbia University; 2019. Available from: https://doi.org/10.7916/d8-9zwh-6s29
Harvard University
11.
Langlois, David Joseph.
The Normativity of Structural Rationality.
Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2014, Harvard University
URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13067678
► Many of us take for granted that rationality requires that we have our attitudes combined only in certain ways. For example, we are required not…
(more)
▼ Many of us take for granted that rationality requires that we have our attitudes combined only in certain ways. For example, we are required not to hold inconsistent beliefs or intentions and we are required to intend any means we see as crucial to our ends. But attempts to justify claims like these face two problems. First, it is unclear what unifies the rational domain and determines what is (and is not) rationally required of us. This is the content problem. Second, as philosophers have been unable to find any general reason for us to have our attitudes combined only in certain ways, it is unclear why, or in what sense, we are required to comply with these putative requirements in the first place. This is the normativity problem.
My dissertation offers an account of rationality which solves these problems. I argue that the entire domain of rational requirements can be derived from a single ultimate requirement demanding that we not have sets of intentions and beliefs which cause their own failure. This General Requirement of Structural Rationality explains the unity of the rational domain and directly solves the content problem. But it also solves the normativity problem. I argue that whenever we violate the General Requirement we are engaged in a form of criticizable self-undermining. I propose that this is enough to ground the claim that we ought to comply with the General Requirement's demands. This conclusion can be secured as long as we accept the thesis of normative pluralism, according to which there is more than one fundamentally distinct form of normative 'ought.'
Philosophy
Advisors/Committee Members: Scanlon, Thomas Michael (advisor), Korsgaard, Christine (committee member), Berker, Selim (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Philosophy; ethics; normativity; practical reason; rationality; theoretical reason
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APA ·
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MLA ·
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CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
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APA (6th Edition):
Langlois, D. J. (2014). The Normativity of Structural Rationality. (Doctoral Dissertation). Harvard University. Retrieved from http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13067678
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Langlois, David Joseph. “The Normativity of Structural Rationality.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13067678.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Langlois, David Joseph. “The Normativity of Structural Rationality.” 2014. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Langlois DJ. The Normativity of Structural Rationality. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Harvard University; 2014. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13067678.
Council of Science Editors:
Langlois DJ. The Normativity of Structural Rationality. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Harvard University; 2014. Available from: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13067678
University of Notre Dame
12.
Benjamin Cohen Rossi.
Internalism about Practical Reasons</h1>.
Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2017, University of Notre Dame
URL: https://curate.nd.edu/show/r494vh5710c
► Internalism about practical reasons is the thesis that reasons for action depend upon the goals, aims, desires, and interests of the agent whose reasons…
(more)
▼ Internalism about practical reasons
is the thesis that reasons for action depend upon the
goals, aims, desires, and interests of the agent whose reasons they
are. Proponents of the view argue that its truth would best a
number of important metaphysical facts about
practical reasons: it
would explain the plausible link between normative and motivating
reasons; the intrinsic connection between normative judgments and
motivation; the distinctive semantic import of reasons-claims as
opposed to other kinds of normative claims; and the distinctive
role of reasons in interpersonal practices such as advice giving.
And the view is intuitive: we often point to motivational features
of agents’ psychologies to explain the reasons they have, and it’s
not uncommon that we justify action on the basis of its connection
to one of our interests, cares, or concerns. In this dissertation,
I argue that despite these points in its favor, no interesting
version of
practical reasons internalism is true. Properly
understood, the claims about normative reasons are not best
explained by the truth of internalism. In addition, I argue that
the three most prominent variants of internalism are undermined by
counterexamples—cases where there is a
reason for some agent to
act, but the relevant motivational claim does not obtain. While
practical reasons internalism should be rejected, I show that
examining this view reveals important criteria of adequacy for any
account of
practical reasons. In the last chapter of this work, I
argues for a metaphysical analysis of
practical reasons that I call
the “standards-based” account informed by these criteria. This
account retains all of the attractive features of internalism while
avoiding its pitfalls.
Advisors/Committee Members: Robert Audi, Research Director, Ted Warfield, Research Director.
Subjects/Keywords: Normativity; Practical Rationality; Philosophy; Ethics; Metaethics; Practical Reason
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Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Rossi, B. C. (2017). Internalism about Practical Reasons</h1>. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Notre Dame. Retrieved from https://curate.nd.edu/show/r494vh5710c
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Rossi, Benjamin Cohen. “Internalism about Practical Reasons</h1>.” 2017. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Notre Dame. Accessed December 05, 2019.
https://curate.nd.edu/show/r494vh5710c.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Rossi, Benjamin Cohen. “Internalism about Practical Reasons</h1>.” 2017. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Rossi BC. Internalism about Practical Reasons</h1>. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Notre Dame; 2017. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: https://curate.nd.edu/show/r494vh5710c.
Council of Science Editors:
Rossi BC. Internalism about Practical Reasons</h1>. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Notre Dame; 2017. Available from: https://curate.nd.edu/show/r494vh5710c
UCLA
13.
Johnson, Rachel Ann.
What are practical reasons? Explaining the counting in favor of relation.
Degree: Philosophy, 2013, UCLA
URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/62655272
► It is commonly claimed, in normative ethics, that a reason for action is a consideration that counts in favor of performing an action. There is,…
(more)
▼ It is commonly claimed, in normative ethics, that a reason for action is a consideration that counts in favor of performing an action. There is, however, considerable debate about whether and how this counting in favor of relation is to be explained. That is, there is considerable debate about in virtue of what a consideration counts in favor of performing an action. In this dissertation, I defend the idea that a consideration counts in favor of performing an action in virtue of picking out something about that action that would have value. Chapter 1 examines a prominent strategy for defending this explanation of the counting in favor of relation. This strategy attempts to understand the relation by looking at the role that reasons for action play in distinguishing intentional actions from non-intentional actions. I argue that this distinction is not helpful for understanding the counting in favor of relation, and I suggest that an investigation into this relation should focus instead on a different distinction – that between actions that agents perform because they regard those actions as "called for" by something about them and actions that agents are merely moved to perform. Chapters 2-4 then examine accounts of the counting in favor of relation that attempt to capture this distinction without appealing to value. They appeal instead to non-normative desires and formal principles of reasoning. I argue that each of these accounts fails to capture the distinction. Furthermore, the ways in which each account fails to capture this distinction make clearer what the distinction is and why, in order to capture it, we need to appeal to value. In the final chapter, I discuss what the arguments presented in Chapters 2-4 show about what taking a consideration to "call for" an action amounts to. I also explain why we need the idea that a reason counts in favor of an action in virtue of picking out something about that action that would have value in order to account for this sense in which, when an action acts for a reason, she takes that reason to call for her action.
Subjects/Keywords: Ethics; Philosophy; counting in favor of relation; practical reason; reason for action
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APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
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CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Johnson, R. A. (2013). What are practical reasons? Explaining the counting in favor of relation. (Thesis). UCLA. Retrieved from http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/62655272
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Johnson, Rachel Ann. “What are practical reasons? Explaining the counting in favor of relation.” 2013. Thesis, UCLA. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/62655272.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Johnson, Rachel Ann. “What are practical reasons? Explaining the counting in favor of relation.” 2013. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Johnson RA. What are practical reasons? Explaining the counting in favor of relation. [Internet] [Thesis]. UCLA; 2013. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/62655272.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Johnson RA. What are practical reasons? Explaining the counting in favor of relation. [Thesis]. UCLA; 2013. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/62655272
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
University of Guelph
14.
Zheng, Tiger.
Human Form, Phronesis, and Euboulia
.
Degree: 2018, University of Guelph
URL: https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/14312
► In this thesis I answer the question of how claims about human form can play a role in the deliberation of agents within the framework…
(more)
▼ In this thesis I answer the question of how claims about human form can play a role in the deliberation of agents within the framework of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. As raised by both Jennifer Frey and Matthias Haase, the central tension that I address is one between the first personal nature of deliberation and the third personal nature of claims about human form. In response, I develop and advance the view that moral development entails the acquisition of experience with which agents come to understand the third personal claims about human form in the first person, and that, ultimately, the development of the intellectual virtue of good deliberation (euboulia), on this view, entails a component of interpretation.
Advisors/Committee Members: Hacker-Wright, John (advisor).
Subjects/Keywords: Aristotle;
Virtue ethics;
Practical reason;
Practical Wisdom;
Intellectual Virtue;
Euboulia;
Deliberation;
Foot;
Naturalism
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APA ·
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MLA ·
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Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Zheng, T. (2018). Human Form, Phronesis, and Euboulia
. (Thesis). University of Guelph. Retrieved from https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/14312
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Zheng, Tiger. “Human Form, Phronesis, and Euboulia
.” 2018. Thesis, University of Guelph. Accessed December 05, 2019.
https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/14312.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Zheng, Tiger. “Human Form, Phronesis, and Euboulia
.” 2018. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Zheng T. Human Form, Phronesis, and Euboulia
. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Guelph; 2018. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/14312.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Zheng T. Human Form, Phronesis, and Euboulia
. [Thesis]. University of Guelph; 2018. Available from: https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/14312
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
University of Canterbury
15.
Mason, Carolyn Ellen.
Practical reasons.
Degree: School of Social and Political Sciences, 2012, University of Canterbury
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10092/7534
► Normal human limitations mean that when people decide how to act, they often have to base their decisions on flawed information or reasoning. Even when…
(more)
▼ Normal human limitations mean that when people decide how to act, they often have to base their decisions on flawed information or reasoning. Even when agents reason to the best of their ability, and form intentions consistent with that reasoning, they sometimes get things wrong. Dominant theories about reasons for action argue that all good, or ‘normative’, reasons for acting are objective normative reasons. But objective normative reasons for action are derived from facts about the world that ignore certain facts about human agents. On these accounts of reasons, real human agents can be unable to learn what they have normative reason to do. A common response to this problem is to say that in such situations people act in a praiseworthy way, but their actions are based on false beliefs, and false beliefs cannot be good reasons. I argue that when agents reason to the best of their ability and form intentions consistent with that reasoning, agents act appropriately in response to states of the world that are normative reasons for action. To support my claim, I develop an account of what I call ‘justifiable reasons’, normative reasons for action that human agents can always use as a basis for action, and the form of reason that underpins rationality.
I discuss the similarities and differences between my account of justifiable reasons and several approaches to reasons that resemble my account. I show that, in spite of objections, justifiable reasons are normative reasons, not motivating reasons. Accounts of subjective normative reasons are based on examples that look similar to mine. So, I explain why justifiable reasons are not subjective normative reasons. Some features of internal reasons also resemble features of justifiable reasons. But, I show that there is nothing about justifiable reasons that entails that they must be internal or external reasons. I take it that justifiable and objective normative reasons serve different purposes, so I explain these different purposes. Finally, I argue in support of my claim that to be rational, agents must act appropriately in response to justifiable reasons.
Subjects/Keywords: normative reasons; rationality; objective normative reasons; subjective reasons; practical reason
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APA ·
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MLA ·
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Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
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APA (6th Edition):
Mason, C. E. (2012). Practical reasons. (Thesis). University of Canterbury. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10092/7534
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Mason, Carolyn Ellen. “Practical reasons.” 2012. Thesis, University of Canterbury. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/10092/7534.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Mason, Carolyn Ellen. “Practical reasons.” 2012. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Mason CE. Practical reasons. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Canterbury; 2012. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10092/7534.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Mason CE. Practical reasons. [Thesis]. University of Canterbury; 2012. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10092/7534
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
UCLA
16.
Jennings, Justin.
Right Action and Integrity.
Degree: Philosophy, 2015, UCLA
URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/80b2s4f4
► If there exists a right thing to do, why should the internal consistency of persons’ attitudes matter, at all? Acting on one’s best judgment or…
(more)
▼ If there exists a right thing to do, why should the internal consistency of persons’ attitudes matter, at all? Acting on one’s best judgment or to taking the means one believes necessary to one’s ends could lead one into incorrect action. Perhaps acting against one’s best judgment or with inconsistent intentions could lead one into right behaviors or away from wrong ones. So why be consistent? Why not just be correct? Why should akrasia matter? Why not just right action? Why should rationality matter? Why not just reasons? I try in my dissertation to answer these questions through an account of the structure of right action as such. I do not suggest one has reason in every case sufficient to make consistent action always right action. I argue instead acting on one’s best judgment about what is right partially constitutes any instance of right action, at all. Right action, I argue, must be done because it is right, which suggests it must be done out of the attempt to do what is right. Yet one who tries to do what is right forms her best judgment about what is right and tries to act on it. She may fail to do the right thing with consistency. Yet she cannot succeed in doing the right thing without it. Chapter 1 formulates this account as a response to Niko Kolodny’s critique of theories justifying internal consistency. Kolodny argues all the going theories either (1) entail one should act on one’s beliefs merely because one has them, (2) give implausible reasons as to why one should be consistent, (3) require one to act for the sake of consistency rather than correctness, or else (4) do not explain why one’s beliefs should guide one’s actions, at all. An accurate theory must avoid all these unacceptable results. This account of right action avoids them by suggesting not the sufficiency but the necessity of consistent action to right action. One must form and act on one’s best judgment as a constitutive part of carrying out any particular right action as such. Chapter 2 argues for the sufficiency of the above account of right action to ordinary uses of the concept by responding to an objection Nomy Arpaly raises against accounts of right action as entailing action on best judgment. She argues no such view can account for the actions of the titular character from Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Huck, being from the antebellum American South, believes he should report his friend Jim to the authorities because Jim recently escaped enslavement. But after their journey down the Mississippi River together, Huck finds he cannot go through with it and instead helps Jim escape. Arpaly claims Huck acts against his best judgment and yet still acts rightly. I argue Huck does act rightly but acts on a non-deliberative form of judgment on which persons appear to act over the vast majority of their lives. Huck sees Jim’s humanity and inchoately knows he cannot turn him in. Persons who “act against their best judgment” as Huck does seem to act rightly where those merely causally overpowered by emotion or…
Subjects/Keywords: Philosophy; Ethics; Ethics; Moral Psychology; Practical Reason; Rationality
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APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
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Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Jennings, J. (2015). Right Action and Integrity. (Thesis). UCLA. Retrieved from http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/80b2s4f4
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Jennings, Justin. “Right Action and Integrity.” 2015. Thesis, UCLA. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/80b2s4f4.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Jennings, Justin. “Right Action and Integrity.” 2015. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Jennings J. Right Action and Integrity. [Internet] [Thesis]. UCLA; 2015. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/80b2s4f4.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Jennings J. Right Action and Integrity. [Thesis]. UCLA; 2015. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/80b2s4f4
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Georgia State University
17.
Mac, Linh.
Rawls’s Political Liberalism: Historicist Or Kantian?.
Degree: MA, Philosophy, 2018, Georgia State University
URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/239
► Rainer Forst views Rawls’s Political Liberalism (PL) as “a non-comprehensive Kantian moral-political theory,” arguing that the political conception of justice is justified using practical…
(more)
▼ Rainer Forst views Rawls’s
Political Liberalism (
PL)
as “a non-comprehensive Kantian moral-political theory,” arguing that the political conception of justice is justified using
practical reason alone. In contrast, Burton Dreben holds that “Kant’s talk about
practical reason is useless for understanding Rawls.” This thesis argues that Dreben’s reading fits better with the project of
PL. Forst mistakenly treats political conceptions of justice
as if they were categorical imperatives that independently determine the reasonableness of comprehensive doctrines, resulting in his overlooking an important feature of Rawls’s political constructivism that distinguishes it from Kant’s moral constructivism—the public justification of political conceptions of justice, given reasonable pluralism. Forst does not adequately take into account the ways in which fundamental ideas implicit in the public political culture of constitutional liberal democracies
justify the political conception of justice.
Advisors/Committee Members: Andrew Altman, William Edmundson.
Subjects/Keywords: Rawls; Political Liberalism; Historicist interpretation; Kantian interpretation; Practical reason; Forst; Dreben
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APA ·
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MLA ·
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CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Mac, L. (2018). Rawls’s Political Liberalism: Historicist Or Kantian?. (Thesis). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/239
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Mac, Linh. “Rawls’s Political Liberalism: Historicist Or Kantian?.” 2018. Thesis, Georgia State University. Accessed December 05, 2019.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/239.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Mac, Linh. “Rawls’s Political Liberalism: Historicist Or Kantian?.” 2018. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Mac L. Rawls’s Political Liberalism: Historicist Or Kantian?. [Internet] [Thesis]. Georgia State University; 2018. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/239.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Mac L. Rawls’s Political Liberalism: Historicist Or Kantian?. [Thesis]. Georgia State University; 2018. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/239
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Stellenbosch University
18.
Baughan, Hugh Simpson.
Practical reason and technology : a philosophical study.
Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2015, Stellenbosch University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/96705
► ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Practical reason can help make sense of the decisions that face humankind in a complex planetary age, and notably so regarding the development…
(more)
▼ ENGLISH ABSTRACT:
Practical reason can help make sense of the decisions that face humankind in a complex planetary age, and notably so regarding the development and use of technology. Human agency and functioning as a self-understanding person, as well as certain ideas related to complexity and co-evolution are crucial aspects of this side of
practical reason. Exploring these aspects from different perspectives can help uncover some constructive insights into the special nature of the moral goals, and the uniquely human significance of some of our intentions and actions that inform our decision-making on the development and use of technology. The insights gained here can furthermore serve to expand certain mainstream conceptions in Western intellectual culture on the character of
reason as such, which proceed from a classical, or naturalistic stance. In the latter case
reason typically calls for the use of explicit criteria, and is foundational and procedural in nature. This view is important and useful. However, the model of
practical argument that accompanies it paints a characteristically sceptical picture of rational choice in the moral sphere. Yet such scepticism is not always warranted. Instead, an expanded model of
practical reason is called for, notably if human agency and self-understanding, as well as ideas related to complexity and co-evolution are taken seriously. In this thesis it is demonstrated that such an approach can serve to express in richer, less sceptical terms the sense of significance we find in our societal choices, and particularly so in those decisions for technology that confront humanity in an inclusive, interdependent age.
In light of the above, the thesis discussion attempts to review some central naturalistic beliefs in Western intellectual culture on the nature of
reason and related patterns of
practical argument. The thesis aim is to point out some of their ontological and epistemological assumptions, note their particular strengths and weaknesses and relate them to models of
reason employed in the natural and human sciences – especially those that concern the nature of explanation and understanding. Furthermore, these beliefs are linked to a generally sceptical, but at times unwarranted attitude towards the sphere of
practical moral argument. Such matters are treated in the first two chapters of the thesis discussion.
Other ways of picturing this attitude of doubt towards the moral sphere can be found in alternative notions about human agency and self-understanding, as well as from complexity and co-evolution. The concepts behind these perspectives point to certain ontological and epistemological insights which arguably take thinking beyond the normal range of naturalistic abstractions. As a result, different characterizations, or patterns, of
practical reason become possible, the nature of which can help to rework the usual warrants for scepticism when it comes to judging the significance of our intentions and actions.
Thinking in terms of human agency, self-understanding,…
Advisors/Committee Members: Hattingh, Johan P., Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy..
Subjects/Keywords: Practical reason – Philosophy; Technology – Philosophy; Naturalistic standpoint; Self-understanding; UCTD
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APA (6th Edition):
Baughan, H. S. (2015). Practical reason and technology : a philosophical study. (Doctoral Dissertation). Stellenbosch University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/96705
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Baughan, Hugh Simpson. “Practical reason and technology : a philosophical study.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, Stellenbosch University. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/96705.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Baughan, Hugh Simpson. “Practical reason and technology : a philosophical study.” 2015. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Baughan HS. Practical reason and technology : a philosophical study. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Stellenbosch University; 2015. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/96705.
Council of Science Editors:
Baughan HS. Practical reason and technology : a philosophical study. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Stellenbosch University; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/96705
Columbia University
19.
MacInnis, Luke.
The Unity of Political Principle.
Degree: 2014, Columbia University
URL: https://doi.org/10.7916/D80863GK
► The aim of this project is to argue that practical reason governs our normative responsibilities in one voice. There are no genuine conflicts within law,…
(more)
▼ The aim of this project is to argue that practical reason governs our normative responsibilities in one voice. There are no genuine conflicts within law, none within morality, and none between law and morality. On the contrary, there are single right answers to questions about what law and morality, considered separately or together, demand. I try to show that this claim, which I refer to as the "Unity Thesis", is both ordinary and deeply valuable. It concerns the correct way to understand, judge, and reason about the normative principles our political, legal, and moral practices establish. The Unity Thesis holds that we ought to, and that we already tacitly do, regard these principles as constituting an integrated, mutually supportive practical system – a unity of principle.
Subjects/Keywords: Practical reason; Concord; Principle (Philosophy); Philosophy; Political science
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APA (6th Edition):
MacInnis, L. (2014). The Unity of Political Principle. (Doctoral Dissertation). Columbia University. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.7916/D80863GK
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
MacInnis, Luke. “The Unity of Political Principle.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, Columbia University. Accessed December 05, 2019.
https://doi.org/10.7916/D80863GK.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
MacInnis, Luke. “The Unity of Political Principle.” 2014. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
MacInnis L. The Unity of Political Principle. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Columbia University; 2014. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: https://doi.org/10.7916/D80863GK.
Council of Science Editors:
MacInnis L. The Unity of Political Principle. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Columbia University; 2014. Available from: https://doi.org/10.7916/D80863GK
20.
Strandler, Ola.
Performativa lärarpraktiker.
Degree: 2017, University of Gothenburg / Göteborgs Universitet
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/52325
► The preconditions for teachers’ practices in Sweden have dramatically changed during the last few decades. Since the 1990s, processes of decentralisation, marketisation and privatisation have…
(more)
▼ The preconditions for teachers’ practices in Sweden have dramatically changed during the last few decades. Since the 1990s, processes of decentralisation, marketisation and privatisation have rapidly transformed the educational system from being one of the most regulated to one of the most deregulated in the western world. Recent changes have included a greater focus on performativity, which includes various forms of outcome controls, state-funded career services, inspections and evaluations. This thesis addresses this increased focus on performativity and how it gives rise to fields of tensions in teachers’ practices. The main part of the data was collected through interviews and observations with teachers who implemented new standardised tests and grading in their practices. The main focus in the dissertation’s four papers is on how performativity affects teaching practices. Article 1 set out the thesis methodological framework, which aims at contributing to an understanding of how performativity can be studied in teachers’ practices. It is argued that Ricœur’s discussion of the concept of practical reason can be used to depict teaching as existing in a field of tension. Further, it is argued that critical hermeneutics can frame a study of teaching, understood as practical reasoning. Article 2 studies the standardising influence of performativity on teaching practices in relation to different contextual preconditions. The article problematises the assumption that reforms such as grades and national tests in lower years can function as an impetus for educational equity. Article 3 studies a similar standardising influence of performativity in relation to social studies teaching, which, at its core, has highly diverse and sometimes conflicting aims and purposes. It is shown how teaching practices shifted from social studies’ extrinsic dimensions (emphasising an open and individual understanding of social issues) toward social studies’ intrinsic dimensions (emphasising knowledge about a predetermined content) as a result of policy changes, teachers’ meaning-making of the reforms, and in relation to external constraints. Article 4 takes a broader perspective on teachers’ practices and uses the concept of fairness as a lens for illuminating changes in social relations, changes in the organisation of teachers’ practices, and teachers’ struggles with these changes. The results show that there is an increased focus on individuality in the everyday working lives of teachers, where result-centred practices, relations and professional identities have replaced notions of equality and compensatory interventions.
Subjects/Keywords: performativity; teachers' practices; grades; national testing; critical hermeneutics; practical reason; Ricœur
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APA (6th Edition):
Strandler, O. (2017). Performativa lärarpraktiker. (Thesis). University of Gothenburg / Göteborgs Universitet. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2077/52325
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Strandler, Ola. “Performativa lärarpraktiker.” 2017. Thesis, University of Gothenburg / Göteborgs Universitet. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/2077/52325.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Strandler, Ola. “Performativa lärarpraktiker.” 2017. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Strandler O. Performativa lärarpraktiker. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Gothenburg / Göteborgs Universitet; 2017. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/52325.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Strandler O. Performativa lärarpraktiker. [Thesis]. University of Gothenburg / Göteborgs Universitet; 2017. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/52325
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Georgia State University
21.
Helder, Russell.
The Limits of Rationality: Aristotle on the Possibility of Practical Reason.
Degree: MA, Philosophy, 2019, Georgia State University
URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/258
► I argue that Aristotle thinks desire is what motivates all animal movement and human action. Reason never motivates us directly, but it can exert…
(more)
▼ I argue that Aristotle thinks desire is what motivates all animal movement and human action.
Reason never motivates us directly, but it can exert an influence on what we desire. I argue that whether
reason successfully does so depends on our character states, and that this is one
reason why Aristotle is correct to say that virtue makes the end (i.e., the object of desire) right. The object of rational desire is the good, and it is because we have character states of a certain kind that we find the ends that
reason proposes to be good. So it is because we are virtuous or vicious that we desire what
reason proposes. Since
reason cannot motivate us directly,
reason can only be
practical by affecting our desires. Since
reason only affects our desires insofar as we are virtuous or vicious, it is virtue and vice that make
practical reason possible.
Advisors/Committee Members: Tim O'Keefe, Eric Wilson.
Subjects/Keywords: Aristotle; Practical reason; Virtue; Desire; Ethics; Moral psychology
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APA (6th Edition):
Helder, R. (2019). The Limits of Rationality: Aristotle on the Possibility of Practical Reason. (Thesis). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/258
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Helder, Russell. “The Limits of Rationality: Aristotle on the Possibility of Practical Reason.” 2019. Thesis, Georgia State University. Accessed December 05, 2019.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/258.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Helder, Russell. “The Limits of Rationality: Aristotle on the Possibility of Practical Reason.” 2019. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Helder R. The Limits of Rationality: Aristotle on the Possibility of Practical Reason. [Internet] [Thesis]. Georgia State University; 2019. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/258.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Helder R. The Limits of Rationality: Aristotle on the Possibility of Practical Reason. [Thesis]. Georgia State University; 2019. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/258
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
University of Edinburgh
22.
Barandalla Ajona, Ana Isabel.
Metaethical constructivism and treating others as ends.
Degree: PhD, 2013, University of Edinburgh
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/7937
► Metaethical constructivism approaches metaethical questions from the perspective of the nature of normativity; and it approaches questions about the nature of normativity from the perspective…
(more)
▼ Metaethical constructivism approaches metaethical questions from the perspective of the nature of normativity; and it approaches questions about the nature of normativity from the perspective of agency. According to constructivism, normativity originates in the agent. The agent gives herself laws, and these laws are normative because the agent has given them to herself. Placing the agent as the source of normativity enables constructivism to answer metaphysical and epistemological questions about morality with ease. It also allows it to account for the relation between moral judgements and action. But placing the agent as the source of normativity raises two questions. First, if the laws that the agent issues to herself are normative because she issues them to herself, what are the standards of correctness of those laws? Second, if the agent is her own source of normativity, how can she accommodate the normative status of others? In this thesis I
explore whether constructivism can answer those questions. In Chapter 1 I argue that the constructivist account of normativity is rich enough to answer the first question. From Chapter 2 onwards I argue that constructivism cannot answer the second question. I argue that its account of normativity requires that the agent does not accommodate the normative status of others.
Subjects/Keywords: 170; constructivism; practical reason; morality; Korsgaard; Christine M.
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APA (6th Edition):
Barandalla Ajona, A. I. (2013). Metaethical constructivism and treating others as ends. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Edinburgh. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1842/7937
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Barandalla Ajona, Ana Isabel. “Metaethical constructivism and treating others as ends.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Edinburgh. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/1842/7937.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Barandalla Ajona, Ana Isabel. “Metaethical constructivism and treating others as ends.” 2013. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Barandalla Ajona AI. Metaethical constructivism and treating others as ends. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Edinburgh; 2013. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/7937.
Council of Science Editors:
Barandalla Ajona AI. Metaethical constructivism and treating others as ends. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Edinburgh; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/7937
23.
Hulshof, Monique.
A coisa em si entre teoria e prática: uma exigência crítica.
Degree: PhD, Filosofia, 2011, University of São Paulo
URL: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-24042013-101746/
;
► A presente tese tem como intuito inicial investigar as asserções aparentemente conflituosas que Kant faz sobre as coisas em si mesmas, ora em sentido estritamente…
(more)
▼ A presente tese tem como intuito inicial investigar as asserções aparentemente conflituosas que Kant faz sobre as coisas em si mesmas, ora em sentido estritamente negativo, como a representação problemática de algo completamente indeterminado, ora em sentido positivo como fundamento ou causa dos fenômenos. Partindo de interpretações que compreendem esse conflito entre asserções sobre as coisas em si mesmas como tendo sua origem nos dois problemas que a filosofia crítica procura solucionar a possibilidade do conhecimento especulativo e a fundamentação da moral , procura-se reconstruir, num primeiro momento, o vínculo entre a crítica da razão e os diferentes modos de representação das coisas em si mesmas. Argumentamos que a diferenciação da faculdade racional em duas atividades ou espontaneidades, entendimento e razão, que são expostas pela crítica como produtoras de conceitos e legislações distintas, exige duas maneiras de formular, criticamente, o conceito de númeno. A primeira formulação é feita pelo entendimento mediante a abstração das condições sensíveis de aplicação das categorias, dada sua originariedade em relação à sensibilidade. Este conceito tem de permanecer, contudo, em um sentido estritamente negativo e problemático, visto as categorias consistirem apenas em funções de síntese de representações sensíveis e estarem limitadas, por isso, a um uso empírico. A segunda formulação é feita, em contrapartida, pelas idéias da razão, que pressupõem um prolongamento da síntese pensada nas categorias até o incondicionado. Ainda que envolva uma aparência transcendental essas idéias se fazem necessárias, principalmente, em vista do uso prático da razão. Num segundo momento, porém, voltando nossa atenção ao esforço de Kant em articular sistematicamente esses diferentes modos de representação das coisas em si mesmas no interior da filosofia crítica, procuramos mostrar como a elaboração do conceito de autonomia na passagem para o uso prático, possibilita uma maneira de operar com a aparência transcendental presente nas ideias, sem violar a limitação das categorias ao uso empírico. Nesse sentido, explicitamos como a crítica da razão em seu uso prático desvela um novo caminho para a faculdade de julgar, em que lhe é permitido aplicar legitimamente a categoria de causalidade com referência aos númenos.
The initial aim of this thesis is to investigate the apparently conflicting claims that Kant makes about the things in themselves, sometimes in a strictly negative sense, as a problematic representation of something completely undetermined, sometimes in a positive sense as the ground or the cause of the appearances. Starting with interpretations that understand this conflict between the claims about things in themselves as having its origin in two problems that the critical philosophy aims to solve the possibility of speculative knowledge and the moral foundation our first task is to reconstruct the link between the critique of reason and the different ways of representing things in themselves. We argue that the…
Advisors/Committee Members: Cacciola, Maria Lucia Mello de Oliveira.
Subjects/Keywords: Coisa em si mesma; Crítica; Critique; Kant; Kant; Practical reason; Razão prática; Razão teórica; Theoretical reason; Thing-in-itself
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APA (6th Edition):
Hulshof, M. (2011). A coisa em si entre teoria e prática: uma exigência crítica. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of São Paulo. Retrieved from http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-24042013-101746/ ;
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Hulshof, Monique. “A coisa em si entre teoria e prática: uma exigência crítica.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, University of São Paulo. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-24042013-101746/ ;.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Hulshof, Monique. “A coisa em si entre teoria e prática: uma exigência crítica.” 2011. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Hulshof M. A coisa em si entre teoria e prática: uma exigência crítica. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of São Paulo; 2011. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-24042013-101746/ ;.
Council of Science Editors:
Hulshof M. A coisa em si entre teoria e prática: uma exigência crítica. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of São Paulo; 2011. Available from: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-24042013-101746/ ;
University of Notre Dame
24.
Raymond F. Hain IV.
Practically Virtuous: Instrumental Practical Reason and the
Virtues</h1>.
Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2009, University of Notre Dame
URL: https://curate.nd.edu/show/bg257d29c08
► Instrumental accounts of practical reason are usually thought to have few or no implications for the moral virtues. I argue, on the contrary, that…
(more)
▼ Instrumental accounts of
practical reason are
usually thought to have few or no implications for the moral
virtues. I argue, on the contrary, that the social characteristics
of instrumental
practical reasoning give us very good reasons to be
virtuous. I work to show this by first confronting with one another
four recent accounts of
practical reason (those of Simon Blackburn,
Candace Vogler, David Gauthier, and Philippa Foot) in order to
develop a powerful account of instrumental
practical reasoning as
an irreducibly social practice. I then connect this to a much older
account of
practical reasoning drawn from St. Thomas Aquinas which
is both instrumental and deeply connected to the moral virtues.
After showing how this Thomistic account of instrumental
practical
reasoning both accommodates the insights gained from the
contemporary accounts and includes a clear and persuasive grounding
for
practical deliberation as a social activity, I argue that the
resulting picture of
practical reason gives us very good
reason to
be virtuous. In short, we are always in need of others’ good
counsel, since our knowledge of the means to and parts of our final
end is both always open to revision and essentially limited
(because of the infinite number of potentially relevant
particulars, our propensity for making mistakes, and the necessary
role played by those who participate with us in the pursuit of a
common good). In turn, successful deliberation with others
regarding the means to and parts of one’s final end requires aiming
at the final ends of those with whom one is deliberating. And to
aim at the final end of another is to treat that person
virtuously.
Advisors/Committee Members: Lynn Joy, Committee Member, Karl Ameriks, Committee Member, Ralph McInerny, Committee Co-Chair, David Solomon, Committee Co-Chair, John O'Callaghan, Committee Member.
Subjects/Keywords: David Gauthier; Simon Blackburn; Philippa Foot; virtue ethics; St. Thomas Aquinas; practical reason; practical reasoning; Candace Vogler
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APA (6th Edition):
IV, R. F. H. (2009). Practically Virtuous: Instrumental Practical Reason and the
Virtues</h1>. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Notre Dame. Retrieved from https://curate.nd.edu/show/bg257d29c08
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
IV, Raymond F. Hain. “Practically Virtuous: Instrumental Practical Reason and the
Virtues</h1>.” 2009. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Notre Dame. Accessed December 05, 2019.
https://curate.nd.edu/show/bg257d29c08.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
IV, Raymond F. Hain. “Practically Virtuous: Instrumental Practical Reason and the
Virtues</h1>.” 2009. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
IV RFH. Practically Virtuous: Instrumental Practical Reason and the
Virtues</h1>. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Notre Dame; 2009. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: https://curate.nd.edu/show/bg257d29c08.
Council of Science Editors:
IV RFH. Practically Virtuous: Instrumental Practical Reason and the
Virtues</h1>. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Notre Dame; 2009. Available from: https://curate.nd.edu/show/bg257d29c08
Penn State University
25.
Grady, Kyle R.
The Discipline of Genius: Nature, Freedom and the Emergence
of the Idea of System in Kant's Critical Philosophy.
Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2008, Penn State University
URL: https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/8436
► The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an account of the movement toward systematic unity in Kant’s three Critiques by reading the discussion of…
(more)
▼ The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an
account of the movement toward systematic unity in Kant’s three
Critiques by reading the discussion of artistic genius in the
Critique of Judgment as a figure for the mediating power of the
transcendental imagination. Though the Critique of Pure Reason and
the Critique of Practical Reason manage to secure the domains of
theoretical and practical knowledge, respectively, they do so at
the expense of the coherence of Kant’s transcendental philosophy
and of the consciousness whose possibility it is likewise meant to
establish. The “immense gulf” that is fixed between nature and
freedom can be overcome only by liberating the imagination from its
subordination to the understanding in the synthesis of objective
cognition, granting it access to a higher order of synthetic
activity embodied by the talents belonging to the genius. Once the
talents of the genius are distanced from the context of the
beautiful artworks with which they are ordinarily associated, their
full impact upon the concepts of experience and of morality can be
appreciated, and the artist can be understood as model for the
essential human task of uniting nature and freedom.
Subjects/Keywords: practical philosophy; theoretical philosophy; taste;
beauty; art; genius; Darstellung; imagination; judgment; system;
freedom; nature; critical philosophy; Kant; Critique of Judgment;
Critique of Pure Reason; Critique of Practical Reason
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Export
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APA (6th Edition):
Grady, K. R. (2008). The Discipline of Genius: Nature, Freedom and the Emergence
of the Idea of System in Kant's Critical Philosophy. (Doctoral Dissertation). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/8436
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Grady, Kyle R. “The Discipline of Genius: Nature, Freedom and the Emergence
of the Idea of System in Kant's Critical Philosophy.” 2008. Doctoral Dissertation, Penn State University. Accessed December 05, 2019.
https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/8436.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Grady, Kyle R. “The Discipline of Genius: Nature, Freedom and the Emergence
of the Idea of System in Kant's Critical Philosophy.” 2008. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Grady KR. The Discipline of Genius: Nature, Freedom and the Emergence
of the Idea of System in Kant's Critical Philosophy. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Penn State University; 2008. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/8436.
Council of Science Editors:
Grady KR. The Discipline of Genius: Nature, Freedom and the Emergence
of the Idea of System in Kant's Critical Philosophy. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Penn State University; 2008. Available from: https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/8436
University of Colorado
26.
Gronholz, Shane Matthew.
Three Kinds of Practical Reason.
Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2016, University of Colorado
URL: http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/53
► This dissertation is about the nature and variety of practical reasons. A practical reason is a fact that counts in favor of an agent performing…
(more)
▼ This dissertation is about the nature and variety of
practical reasons. A
practical reason is a fact that counts in favor of an agent performing some action, having some emotion, or having some other non-cognitive attitude. I provide a classification of different kinds of reasons and offer an account of how they determine different kinds of oughts. Many philosophers recognize that there is something distinctive about moral reasons and the moral point of view, but just what distinguishes the moral from other normative standpoints is not well understood. On my view, what makes a
reason a moral
reason is that it is essentially other-regarding: it is a
reason to treat other individuals in certain ways, for their own sakes. My account of the nature of the moral competes with some of the most prominent normative theories currently on offer, i.e., utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, and virtue ethics. Moral reasons can be further divided into two distinct kinds: general other-regarding reasons and relational reasons. The former are reasons regarding one’s treatment of all moral patients. The latter are reasons regarding one’s treatment of only certain individuals, namely, those with whom one stands in a special relation, particularly those with whom one has a personal relationship. Non-moral reasons, by contrast, are essentially self-regarding: they are reasons to treat oneself in certain ways, for one’s own sake. Both relational reasons and self-regarding reasons are often stronger than general other-regarding reasons, therefore, my view is partial in the sense that an agent is often justified in prioritizing the interests of both herself, and those who are near and dear to her. That there are genuinely normative non-moral reasons may be seen as a threat to the authority many take morality to enjoy. In the final chapter, I explain how and in what sense morality is still authoritative on my view. I do this, in part, by offering a novel account of a moral requirement.
Advisors/Committee Members: Chris Heathwood, Graham Oddie, Benjamin Hale, Michael Huemer, Alastair Norcross.
Subjects/Keywords: ethics; morality; moral obligation; partiality; practical reason; rationality; Philosophy; Theory and Philosophy
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APA (6th Edition):
Gronholz, S. M. (2016). Three Kinds of Practical Reason. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Colorado. Retrieved from http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/53
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Gronholz, Shane Matthew. “Three Kinds of Practical Reason.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Colorado. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/53.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Gronholz, Shane Matthew. “Three Kinds of Practical Reason.” 2016. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Gronholz SM. Three Kinds of Practical Reason. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Colorado; 2016. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/53.
Council of Science Editors:
Gronholz SM. Three Kinds of Practical Reason. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Colorado; 2016. Available from: http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/53
University of KwaZulu-Natal
27.
[No author].
Can we be particularists about environmental ethics? : assessing the theory of moral particularism and its practical application in applied environmental ethics.
Degree: Philosophy, 2008, University of KwaZulu-Natal
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10413/303
► Moral judgments have tended to be made through the application of certain moral principles and it seems we think we need principles in order to…
(more)
▼ Moral judgments have tended to be made through the application of certain moral principles and it seems we think we need principles in order to make sound moral judgments. However, the theory of moral particularism, as put forward by Jonathan Dancy (2004), calls this into question and challenges the traditional principled approaches to moral reasoning. This challenge naturally began a debate between those who adhere to principled accounts of moral rationality, and those who advocate a particularist approach. The aim of this thesis is thus to assess the theory of moral particularism as recently put forward by Jonathan Dancy. In pursuing this project I initially set up a survey of the field of environmental ethics within which to explore traditional approaches to applied ethics. This survey suggests that applied ethical problems have traditionally been solved using various principled approaches and if we are inclined to take the particularist challenge seriously, this suggests a philosophical conundrum. On the one hand, increasingly important and pressing applied environmental ethical concerns suggest there is a
practical need for ethical principles, whilst on the other hand, the particularist claim is that we do not need principles in order to make sound moral judgments. The survey of environmental ethics then establishes the first side of the philosophical conundrum. I then move to explore the second side of the conundrum; the theory of moral particularism, looking at why the challenge it presents to traditional principled approaches needs to be taken seriously. I then move to explore theoretical challenges to moral particularism; this is done to establish the current state of the theoretical debate between the particularist and the generalist. I conclude from this that the theoretical debate between the two has currently reached a stalemate; it is, at present, simply not clear which account is correct. As the main goal of this study is to evaluate particularism, this apparent stalemate led me to explore certain
practical challenges to particularist theory as a means of advancing the debate. As particularism is a theory that challenges our traditional conception of how to make moral judgments, there will be important implications for applied ethics if particularism turns out to be correct, and 1 thus finally apply particularism to a
practical environmental problem in order to assess the validity of
practical challenges to particularism. In order to do this, a particularist ethic is applied to the question of whether or not to allow mining in Kakadu National Park in Australia. This provides a means of seeing what an applied particularist ethic could look like, as well as providing something of an answer to the
practical challenge to particularism and achieving the goal of evaluating it within the applied context of environmental ethics.
Advisors/Committee Members: Roberts, Debbie (advisor), Farland, Douglas (advisor).
Subjects/Keywords: Environmental ethics.;
Ecology – Philosophy.;
Normativity (Ethics);
Principle (Philosophy);
Ethics.;
Values.;
Individuation (Philosophy);
Practical reason.;
Philosophy.
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
author], [. (2008). Can we be particularists about environmental ethics? : assessing the theory of moral particularism and its practical application in applied environmental ethics.
(Thesis). University of KwaZulu-Natal. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10413/303
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
author], [No. “Can we be particularists about environmental ethics? : assessing the theory of moral particularism and its practical application in applied environmental ethics.
” 2008. Thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/10413/303.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
author], [No. “Can we be particularists about environmental ethics? : assessing the theory of moral particularism and its practical application in applied environmental ethics.
” 2008. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
author] [. Can we be particularists about environmental ethics? : assessing the theory of moral particularism and its practical application in applied environmental ethics.
[Internet] [Thesis]. University of KwaZulu-Natal; 2008. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10413/303.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
author] [. Can we be particularists about environmental ethics? : assessing the theory of moral particularism and its practical application in applied environmental ethics.
[Thesis]. University of KwaZulu-Natal; 2008. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10413/303
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
28.
McGuire, Steven Francis.
Freedom and the Moral Condition in F.W.J. Schelling's Freiheitsschrift.
Degree: PhD, Politics, 2010, The Catholic University of America
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1961/9213
► Degree awarded: Ph.D. Politics. The Catholic University of America
This dissertation is a study of F.W.J. Schelling's Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom.…
(more)
▼ Degree awarded: Ph.D. Politics. The Catholic University of America
This dissertation is a study of F.W.J. Schelling's Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. It focuses in particular on the Kantian themes of autonomy and the primacy of the practical as they are developed by Schelling. It is argued that Schelling, following Kant, gives primacy to the practical and thereby attempts to demonstrate that human existence unfolds within a metaphysical order of the whole. He does this by means of an analysis of human freedom (the ability to choose between good and evil by Schelling's definition), which he sees as the conduit through which we gain awareness of our moral and ontological role within the process of reality. In other words, Schelling recognizes that, through our practical existence as free beings, human beings are self-consciously aware of participating in (if not fully grasping) an overarching reality that precedes any individual's existence. Schelling thus develops Kant's argument for the primacy of practical reason into an argument for the primacy of existence, or freedom, and, from that perspective, he shows that human freedom, or autonomy, articulates our awareness of our participation with full personal responsibility in a universal moral order that transcends the self and demands our assent as moral agents. In other words, Schelling offers a new and profound analysis of what it means to be free that captures a balance between the modern emphasis on individual freedom and the need to recognize that we are always already subject to inescapable moral obligations.
Made available in DSpace on 2011-02-24T20:48:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
McGuire_cua_0043A_10124display.pdf: 1193090 bytes, checksum: c53a1e565b73ecf80f7f89b3c32b16fc (MD5)
Advisors/Committee Members: Walsh, David J (Advisor), Schneck, Stephen F (Other), Zaborowski, Holger (Other).
Subjects/Keywords: Political Science, General; Philosophy; Autonomy; Freedom; Kant; Primacy of Practical Reason; Schelling
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
McGuire, S. F. (2010). Freedom and the Moral Condition in F.W.J. Schelling's Freiheitsschrift. (Doctoral Dissertation). The Catholic University of America. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1961/9213
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
McGuire, Steven Francis. “Freedom and the Moral Condition in F.W.J. Schelling's Freiheitsschrift.” 2010. Doctoral Dissertation, The Catholic University of America. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/1961/9213.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
McGuire, Steven Francis. “Freedom and the Moral Condition in F.W.J. Schelling's Freiheitsschrift.” 2010. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
McGuire SF. Freedom and the Moral Condition in F.W.J. Schelling's Freiheitsschrift. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. The Catholic University of America; 2010. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1961/9213.
Council of Science Editors:
McGuire SF. Freedom and the Moral Condition in F.W.J. Schelling's Freiheitsschrift. [Doctoral Dissertation]. The Catholic University of America; 2010. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1961/9213
Queens University
29.
Ritcey, Nolan S.
Relationships and the Limits of Reasonable Partiality
.
Degree: Philosophy, 2015, Queens University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1974/12689
► The problems associated with an overly impartial moral psychology are well discussed in the literature on utilitarianism, consequentialism, and rational decision moral theory. Criticisms of…
(more)
▼ The problems associated with an overly impartial moral psychology are well discussed
in the literature on utilitarianism, consequentialism, and rational decision moral theory.
Criticisms of these approaches to morality center on how they invite us to think
in terms which alienate us from those things which matter to us most, our friends
and family, our special projects, and our personal integrity. To the extent that these
criticisms are successful, they recommend viewing morality and moral reasoning in
the context of personal concerns. This inquiry is an investigation into how to understand
the reasons of partiality as genuine reasons, and to determine, broadly, how to
understand reasonable partiality.
The account presented here has descriptive and normative elements. It is descriptive
of the grounds of special responsibilities and the restrictions on what relationships
are capable to support special responsibilities. It is normative insofar as it answers
questions regarding what relationships should support special responsibilities and
what significance they should have in comparison to other important considerations.
The primary focus is on how relationships do, and should, modify a moral agent’s
practical outlook. The practical relevance of relationships is modeled on a theory of
joint action, which sets out how joint actions modify an individual’s practical outlook
by making certain considerations necessarily salient.
The resulting position is primarily deflationary with regard to the conflict between
morality, on the one hand, and partiality on the other. The joint action presentation
reveals that relationships do not need to conflict with morality, but can, and should,
incorporate moral principles into the central aims and action sequences which are their
mainstays. Reasonable partiality is simply the form of reasoning that adequately recognizes the joint enterprises that compose a person’s relationship. Accordingly,
controversial acts of reasonable partiality, such as transfers of wealth, are categorized
as substantive positions within a theory of what counts as adequate recognition, not
necessary to all partiality
Subjects/Keywords: action theory;
ethics;
non-reductionism;
special obligations;
moral philosophy;
partiality;
practical reason;
relationships
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APA ·
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MLA ·
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CSE |
Export
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APA (6th Edition):
Ritcey, N. S. (2015). Relationships and the Limits of Reasonable Partiality
. (Thesis). Queens University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1974/12689
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Ritcey, Nolan S. “Relationships and the Limits of Reasonable Partiality
.” 2015. Thesis, Queens University. Accessed December 05, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/1974/12689.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Ritcey, Nolan S. “Relationships and the Limits of Reasonable Partiality
.” 2015. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Ritcey NS. Relationships and the Limits of Reasonable Partiality
. [Internet] [Thesis]. Queens University; 2015. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1974/12689.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Ritcey NS. Relationships and the Limits of Reasonable Partiality
. [Thesis]. Queens University; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1974/12689
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee
30.
Doche Linhares, Danilo.
Humean Constructivism and Deliberative Coherence.
Degree: MA, Philosophy, 2019, University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee
URL: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/2177
► According to Humean constructivism in metaethics, there is no incoherence in holding that different agents should act on aims that are not co-possible. I…
(more)
▼ According to Humean constructivism in metaethics, there is no incoherence in holding that different agents should act on aims that are not co-possible. I will show that this commitment undermines Humean constructivists’ own treatment of normative judgments, where these judgments are meant to function both as prescriptions and assertions of fact. When ideally coherent Humeans engage others in conversation, their claims about others’ reasons to act function as imperatives rather than as assertions; conversely, when Humean reasoners think of those claims while deliberating on their own, they carry no prescriptive weight at all. In light of these issues, I propose that coherence in normative judgment should take into account the joint realizability of agents’ aims. To act on reasons involves acting on aims the agent thinks are worth pursuing. And actions whose aims are in conflict cannot be successfully performed together. I argue that where aims conflict, so do the prescriptions for acting on them.
Advisors/Committee Members: Nataliya Palatnik.
Subjects/Keywords: Coherence; Humean constructivism; Metaethics; Practical reason; Pragmatics; Sharon Street; Ethics and Political Philosophy; Philosophy
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APA ·
Chicago ·
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Export
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Doche Linhares, D. (2019). Humean Constructivism and Deliberative Coherence. (Thesis). University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee. Retrieved from https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/2177
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Doche Linhares, Danilo. “Humean Constructivism and Deliberative Coherence.” 2019. Thesis, University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee. Accessed December 05, 2019.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/2177.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Doche Linhares, Danilo. “Humean Constructivism and Deliberative Coherence.” 2019. Web. 05 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Doche Linhares D. Humean Constructivism and Deliberative Coherence. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee; 2019. [cited 2019 Dec 05].
Available from: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/2177.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Doche Linhares D. Humean Constructivism and Deliberative Coherence. [Thesis]. University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee; 2019. Available from: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/2177
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
◁ [1] [2] [3] ▶
. 
Open Access Theses and Dissertations
