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Indian Institute of Science

1. Prakash, Gujar Sujit. Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings.

Degree: PhD, Faculty of Engineering, 2012, Indian Institute of Science

Allocation of objects or resources to competing agents is a ubiquitous problem in the real world. For example, a federal government may wish to allocate different types of spectrum licenses to telecom service providers; a search engine has to assign different sponsored slots to the ads of advertisers; etc. The agents involved in such situations have private preferences over the allocations. The agents, being strategic, may manipulate the allocation procedure to get a favourable allocation. If the objects to be allocated are heterogeneous (rather than homogeneous), the problem becomes quite complex. The allocation problem becomes even more formidable in the presence of a dynamic supply and/or demand. This doctoral work is motivated by such problems involving strategic agents, heterogeneous objects, and dynamic supply and/or demand. In this thesis, we model such problems in a standard game theoretic setting and use mechanism design to propose novel solutions to the problems. We extend the current state-of-the-art in a non-trivial way by solving the following problems: Optimal combinatorial auctions with single minded bidders, generalizing the existing methods to take into account multiple units of heterogeneous objects Multi-armed bandit mechanisms for sponsored search auctions with multiple slots, generalizing the current methods that only consider a single slot. Strategyproof redistribution mechanisms for heterogeneous objects, expanding the scope of the current state of practice beyond homogeneous objects Online allocation mechanisms without money for one-sided and two-sided matching markets, extending the existing methods for static settings. Advisors/Committee Members: Narahari, Y (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Investments (Economics)- Allocation; Mechanism Design Theory; Heterogeneous Objects; Dynamic House Allocation; Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions; Optimal Combinatorial Auctions; Dynamic Matching; Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms; Two-Sided Markets; Financial Economics

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Prakash, G. S. (2012). Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings. (Doctoral Dissertation). Indian Institute of Science. Retrieved from http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/1654

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Prakash, Gujar Sujit. “Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings.” 2012. Doctoral Dissertation, Indian Institute of Science. Accessed October 26, 2020. http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/1654.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Prakash, Gujar Sujit. “Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings.” 2012. Web. 26 Oct 2020.

Vancouver:

Prakash GS. Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Indian Institute of Science; 2012. [cited 2020 Oct 26]. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/1654.

Council of Science Editors:

Prakash GS. Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Indian Institute of Science; 2012. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/1654

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