subject:(Nash equilibrium)

1. Kampisioulis, Panagiotis. Ανταγωνισμός και συνεργασία ως παράγοντες στρατηγικής αλληλεπίδρασης στη συμπεριφορική θεωρία παιγνίων.

Degree: 2013, University of Piraeus (UNIPI); Πανεπιστήμιο Πειραιώς

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/37594

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Game theory is a logical analysis of situations of conflict and cooperation in an economic system. The entities within a financial system interact differently and… (more)

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Game theory is a logical analysis of situations of conflict and cooperation in an economic system. The entities within a financial system interact differently and having potentially conflicting interests. Through the analysis of interaction we strive to understand the tactical approach to the balance of strategic factors. The code of conduct analysis of players, through the prism of trust, and our utility ensures the map in the field of individual preferences. Consequently behavioral dimensions of data are an aid to obtaining a comprehensive picture. In the third section, we refer to strategies of conflict and negotiations techniques describing an alternative approach to Nash arbitration scheme. In the fourth section, we focus on the study of the behavior of players without information under the influence of external factors. We describe the experiment held in the context of the analysis of the adaptability of players in a system. Applied techniques in operational areas such as parliamentary alliances, the race of twenty and the electricity market will be the fifth section. In the last chapter we mention the contribution to the scientific field, as well as those areas which still show strong research interest.

Η θεωρία παιγνίων είναι μια λογική ανάλυση των καταστάσεων σύγκρουσης και συνεργασίας σε ένα οικονομικό σύστημα. Οι οντότητες, μέσα σε ένα οικονομικό σύστημα, αλληλεπιδρούν έχοντας διαφορετικά και ενδεχομένως συγκρουόμενα συμφέροντα. Μέσα από την ανάλυση της αλληλεπίδρασης προσπαθούμε να κατανοήσουμε την τακτική προσέγγισης της ισορροπίας των στρατηγικών παραγόντων.Η ανάλυση του κώδικά συμπεριφοράς των παικτών, μέσα από το πρίσμα της εμπιστοσύνης, της επιλογής και της χρησιμότητας μας εξασφαλίζει το χάρτη του πεδίου ατομικών προτιμήσεων. Ως εκ τούτου οι συμπεριφορικές διαστάσεις των δεδομένων, αποτελούν βοήθημα στην προσπάθεια για απόκτηση ολοκληρωμένης εικόνας. Στην εισαγωγή της τρίτης ενότητας, αναφερόμαστε στις στρατηγικές των συγκρούσεων και στις τεχνικές των διαπραγματεύσεων. Κύριο τμήμα αποτελεί η προσέγγιση πάνω στο σχήμα διαιτησίας κατά Nash, όπου περιγράφουμε την ανάπτυξη μεθόδων προκειμένου να επιβεβαιώσουμε το σχήμα.Στην τέταρτη ενότητα εστιάζουμε στη μελέτη της συμπεριφορά των παικτών χωρίς πληροφόρηση υπό την επίδραση εξωτερικών παραγόντων. Συγκεκριμένα περιγράφουμε το πείραμα που πραγματοποιήσαμε στο πλαίσιο της ανάλυσης της προσαρμοστικότητας των παικτών σε ένα σύστημα.Εφαρμοσμένες τεχνικές σε επιχειρησιακούς τομείς όπως οι κοινοβουλευτικές συμμαχίες, η κούρσα του είκοσι και η αγορά ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας ολοκληρώνουν την πέμπτη ενότητα. Κλείνουμε τη διατριβή παρουσιάζοντας τη συνεισφορά της στο επιστημονικό πεδίο, καθώς και τις περιοχές εκείνες οι οποίες εξακολουθούν να παρουσιάζουν έντονο ερευνητικό ενδιαφέρον.

Subjects/Keywords: Ισορροπία Nash; Nash equilibrium

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APA (6^th Edition):

Kampisioulis, P. (2013). Ανταγωνισμός και συνεργασία ως παράγοντες στρατηγικής αλληλεπίδρασης στη συμπεριφορική θεωρία παιγνίων. (Thesis). University of Piraeus (UNIPI); Πανεπιστήμιο Πειραιώς. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/37594

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Kampisioulis, Panagiotis. “Ανταγωνισμός και συνεργασία ως παράγοντες στρατηγικής αλληλεπίδρασης στη συμπεριφορική θεωρία παιγνίων.” 2013. Thesis, University of Piraeus (UNIPI); Πανεπιστήμιο Πειραιώς. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/37594.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Kampisioulis, Panagiotis. “Ανταγωνισμός και συνεργασία ως παράγοντες στρατηγικής αλληλεπίδρασης στη συμπεριφορική θεωρία παιγνίων.” 2013. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Kampisioulis P. Ανταγωνισμός και συνεργασία ως παράγοντες στρατηγικής αλληλεπίδρασης στη συμπεριφορική θεωρία παιγνίων. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Piraeus (UNIPI); Πανεπιστήμιο Πειραιώς; 2013. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/37594.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Kampisioulis P. Ανταγωνισμός και συνεργασία ως παράγοντες στρατηγικής αλληλεπίδρασης στη συμπεριφορική θεωρία παιγνίων. [Thesis]. University of Piraeus (UNIPI); Πανεπιστήμιο Πειραιώς; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/37594

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Alberta

2. Waugh, Kevin. Abstraction in Large Extensive Games.

Degree: MS, Department of Computing Science, 2009, University of Alberta

URL: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/qn59q3974

► For zero-sum games, we have efficient solution techniques. Unfortunately, there are interesting games that are too large to solve. Here, a popular approach is to… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Extensive Form Games; Nash Equilibrium; Abstraction

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Waugh, K. (2009). Abstraction in Large Extensive Games. (Masters Thesis). University of Alberta. Retrieved from https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/qn59q3974

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Waugh, Kevin. “Abstraction in Large Extensive Games.” 2009. Masters Thesis, University of Alberta. Accessed February 26, 2021. https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/qn59q3974.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Waugh, Kevin. “Abstraction in Large Extensive Games.” 2009. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Waugh K. Abstraction in Large Extensive Games. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Alberta; 2009. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/qn59q3974.

Council of Science Editors:

Waugh K. Abstraction in Large Extensive Games. [Masters Thesis]. University of Alberta; 2009. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/qn59q3974

Penn State University

3. Kashaev, Nail. Collision and collusion: testing the Nash behavior in entry games of complete information.

Degree: 2016, Penn State University

URL: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/0r967372b

► The present dissertation consists of three essays on Econometrics of discrete outcome models. The first essay analyses possibility of discriminating between several solution concepts in… (more)

▼ The present dissertation consists of three essays on Econometrics of discrete outcome models. The first essay analyses possibility of discriminating between several solution concepts in a general class of semiparametric finite games with complete information based on observed data on outcomes and characteristics of agents. I find conditions under which it is possible to identify whether actual behavior of agents is consistent with a given solution concept. I propose different applications for my general methodology. For example, I can identify whether and how often firms play Nash equilibria (NE) in an entry game, which equilibria are more likely to be selected, and whether profit functions are private information or common knowledge. I also identify whether choices are sequential or simultaneous. The second essay is a logical continuation of the first one. I focus on entry games with complete information and provide a statistical tool to test for the NE solution concept. I develop a sieve likelihood ratio type procedure to test whether the NE assumption can rationalize the data on outcomes and payoff shifters in semiparametric entry games with second-order rational firms. I allow agents to play mixed strategy NE in the regions of NE multiplicity. I do not impose parametric restrictions on the way firms randomize between different equilibria. The testing procedure does not assume that the model is point identified. I apply the proposed procedure to the data on entry and exit decisions of small grocery stores in rural areas in the USA. In the third essay I address the issue of data availability in parametric binary outcome models. In particular, I consider environments where the researcher only observes the data that correspond to a particular outcome (pure choice-based data) and has some auxiliary information about the distribution of the explanatory variables. I propose a Generalized Method of Moments type procedure to estimate parametric binary models with pure choice-based data when auxiliary information on distribution of explanatory variables is available. As an empirical application of my procedure, I estimate the probability of a two-car collision based on the data on all police reported accidents in Seattle from 2002-2011. Advisors/Committee Members: Coenraad Arnout P Pinkse, Dissertation Advisor/Co-Advisor, Coenraad Arnout P Pinkse, Committee Chair/Co-Chair, Sung Jae Jun, Committee Chair/Co-Chair, Andres Aradillas-Lopez, Committee Member, Edward C Jaenicke, Outside Member, Sung Jae Jun, Dissertation Advisor/Co-Advisor.

Subjects/Keywords: Econometrics of games; Entry game; Nash equilibrium

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Kashaev, N. (2016). Collision and collusion: testing the Nash behavior in entry games of complete information. (Thesis). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/0r967372b

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Kashaev, Nail. “Collision and collusion: testing the Nash behavior in entry games of complete information.” 2016. Thesis, Penn State University. Accessed February 26, 2021. https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/0r967372b.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Kashaev, Nail. “Collision and collusion: testing the Nash behavior in entry games of complete information.” 2016. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Kashaev N. Collision and collusion: testing the Nash behavior in entry games of complete information. [Internet] [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2016. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/0r967372b.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Kashaev N. Collision and collusion: testing the Nash behavior in entry games of complete information. [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2016. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/0r967372b

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Princeton University

4. Wang, Peiqi. Finite State Mean Field Games .

Degree: PhD, 2019, Princeton University

URL: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01zw12z808g

► Mean field game is a powerful framework for studying the strategic interactions within a large population of rational agents. Although existing research has predominantly relied… (more)

▼ Mean field game is a powerful framework for studying the strategic interactions within a large population of rational agents. Although existing research has predominantly relied on diffusion models to depict agents’ states, numerous applications, such as epidemic control and botnet defense, can best be modeled by systems of particles in discrete state space. This thesis tackles finite state mean field games. In the first part of the thesis, we develop a probabilistic approach for finite state mean field games. Based on the weak formulation of optimal control, the approach accommodates the interactions through the players’ strategies and flexible information structures. The second part of the thesis is devoted to finite state mean field games involving a player possessing dominating influence. Two different mechanisms are explored. We first study a form of Stackelberg games, in which the dominating player, referred to as principal, moves first and chooses its strategy which impacts the dynamics and ob- jective functions of every remaining player, referred to as agent. Having observed the principal’s strategy, the agents reach a Nash equilibrium. We seek optimal strategies of the principal, whose objective function depends on the statistical distribution of the agents’ states in equilibrium. Using the weak formulation of finite state mean field games developed previously in the thesis, we transform the principal’s optimization problem into a McKean-Vlasov control problem, and provide a semi-explicit solution under the assumptions of linear transition rate, quadratic cost and risk-neutral utility. In the second model, we assume that all players move simultaneously and we study Nash equilibria formed jointly by major and minor players. We introduce finite player games and derive mean field game formulation in the limit of infinitely many minor players. In this limit, we characterize the best responses of major and minor players via viscosity solutions of HJB equations, and we prove existence of Nash equilibria under reasonable assumptions. We also derive approximate Nash equilibria for the finite player game from the solution of the mean field game. Advisors/Committee Members: Carmona, René (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Contract Theory; Mean Field Games; Nash Equilibrium

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Wang, P. (2019). Finite State Mean Field Games . (Doctoral Dissertation). Princeton University. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01zw12z808g

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Wang, Peiqi. “Finite State Mean Field Games .” 2019. Doctoral Dissertation, Princeton University. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01zw12z808g.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Wang, Peiqi. “Finite State Mean Field Games .” 2019. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Wang P. Finite State Mean Field Games . [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Princeton University; 2019. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01zw12z808g.

Council of Science Editors:

Wang P. Finite State Mean Field Games . [Doctoral Dissertation]. Princeton University; 2019. Available from: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01zw12z808g

University of Toronto

5. Xie, Erhao. Identification and Estimation of Empirical Games without Equilibrium Assumption.

Degree: PhD, 2018, University of Toronto

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/91972

► Empirical studies of games typically rely on Nash Equilibrium. However, such solution concept is rejected by experimental evidence in many situations. The incorrect imposition of… (more)

▼ Empirical studies of games typically rely on Nash Equilibrium. However, such solution concept is rejected by experimental evidence in many situations. The incorrect imposition of Nash Equilibrium can generate bias in both estimation and counterfactual prediction. Therefore, my thesis studies the identification and estimation of empirical games without equilibrium assumption. The first two chapters focus on discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of restricting players to have unbiased expectation as required by equilibrium, my model treats a player's belief about the behaviors of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. This belief function is estimated together with players' payoffs. The first chapter shows that the variations of players' choice sets identify the payoff and belief functions up to scale normalizations. Moreover, the hypothesis of unbiased belief is testable. I then empirically study store hours competition between McDonald's and KFC in China. The null hypothesis of KFC's unbiased beliefs is rejected. Furthermore, the estimated payoff functions indicate that the store hours decision is a type of vertical differentiation. The second chapter, co-authored with Victor Aguirregabiria, focuses on experimental games. We show that another source of identification (i.e. one variable affects one player's payoffs without affecting this player's belief) can achieve similar identification results as chapter 1. We then apply our methods to two sets of experiments. In the matching pennies game, a player can correctly predict the other player's behavior. In contrast, the hypothesis of unbiased belief is rejected in the coordination game. When players do not adopt equilibrium strategies, they can learn from their mistakes to better perform in the future. Therefore, the third chapter studies the identification of learning behaviors using experimental data. I consider a general model that nests commonly used learning procedures. More importantly, instead of assuming monetary payoff is players' actual utility as in existing literature, I treat utility as an unknown unrestricted function. Under weak conditions, I show that players' structural learning parameters and utility function are identified. The finite sample properties of MLE and consequences of misspecification of utility function are illustrated by a Monte Carlo simulation. Advisors/Committee Members: Aguirregabiria, Victor, Economics.

Subjects/Keywords: Games; Identification; Nash Equilibrium; Unbiased Beliefs; 0501

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Xie, E. (2018). Identification and Estimation of Empirical Games without Equilibrium Assumption. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Toronto. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1807/91972

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Xie, Erhao. “Identification and Estimation of Empirical Games without Equilibrium Assumption.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Toronto. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1807/91972.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Xie, Erhao. “Identification and Estimation of Empirical Games without Equilibrium Assumption.” 2018. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Xie E. Identification and Estimation of Empirical Games without Equilibrium Assumption. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Toronto; 2018. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/91972.

Council of Science Editors:

Xie E. Identification and Estimation of Empirical Games without Equilibrium Assumption. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Toronto; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/91972

Kansas State University

6. Huang, Ying. Multi-agent system for future groundwater depletion scenarios using game theory.

Degree: MS, Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2016, Kansas State University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2097/32561

► Groundwater is one of the most vital of all common pool resources throughout the world. More than half of groundwater is used to grow crops.… (more)

▼ Groundwater is one of the most vital of all common pool resources throughout the world. More than half of groundwater is used to grow crops. This research models groundwater depletion patterns within a multi-agent system framework. Irrigators are modeled as agents in the multi-agent system. The irrigation strategies adopted by the agents are investigated using game theory, under several futuristic scenarios. The consequence of unregulated groundwater extraction in each case is analyzed. A set of five irrigators, growing three crops: corn, sorghum and wheat, have been considered in this study. To allow groundwater flow, these agents are assumed to be located in adjoining farm lands. Irrigators are modeled selfish agents that strategize their irrigation patterns in order to maximize their own utilities, i.e. the difference between the total revenue obtained from crop sales and the costs incurred, including groundwater extraction costs. Due to groundwater flow, irrigators have no incentive to conserve groundwater for later use. This leads to unsustainable depletion of the resource. Using the Nikaido-Isoda relaxation algorithm, their irrigation strategies under Nash equilibrium, when no irrigator can increase its utility by unilaterally changing its strategy, are obtained. All parameters in this research are representative of Kansas. Recorded environmental and economic data of the region, along with the DSSAT software, have been used to obtain these futuristic projections. These scenarios include temperature increase, lowering of the water table, different precipitation levels, and different price increases for the crops. One of the emergent phenomena of the simulations is the adoption of crop rotation patterns by the irrigators to conserve groundwater. The irrigators grow corn, which is a more profitable yet water intensive crop in one year, and in the next, conserve water by growing sorghum instead. Another emergent outcome of this research is the viability of LEMAs. When the irrigators are subject to LEMA-level limits on groundwater use, there is a slight increase in the aggregate utility of the LEMA Advisors/Committee Members: Sanjoy Das.

Subjects/Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Groundwater; MAS model; Irrigation

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Huang, Y. (2016). Multi-agent system for future groundwater depletion scenarios using game theory. (Masters Thesis). Kansas State University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2097/32561

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Huang, Ying. “Multi-agent system for future groundwater depletion scenarios using game theory.” 2016. Masters Thesis, Kansas State University. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/2097/32561.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Huang, Ying. “Multi-agent system for future groundwater depletion scenarios using game theory.” 2016. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Huang Y. Multi-agent system for future groundwater depletion scenarios using game theory. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Kansas State University; 2016. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2097/32561.

Council of Science Editors:

Huang Y. Multi-agent system for future groundwater depletion scenarios using game theory. [Masters Thesis]. Kansas State University; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2097/32561

Georgia Tech

7. Zhang, Qifan. Learning Nash equilibria in zero-sum stochastic games via entropy-regularized policy approximation.

Degree: MS, Computer Science, 2020, Georgia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/63651

► In this thesis, we explore the use of policy approximation for reducing the computational cost of learning Nash Equilibria in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning. Existing multi-agent… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Reinforcement learning; Game theory; Nash equilibrium

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Zhang, Q. (2020). Learning Nash equilibria in zero-sum stochastic games via entropy-regularized policy approximation. (Masters Thesis). Georgia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1853/63651

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Zhang, Qifan. “Learning Nash equilibria in zero-sum stochastic games via entropy-regularized policy approximation.” 2020. Masters Thesis, Georgia Tech. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/63651.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Zhang, Qifan. “Learning Nash equilibria in zero-sum stochastic games via entropy-regularized policy approximation.” 2020. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Zhang Q. Learning Nash equilibria in zero-sum stochastic games via entropy-regularized policy approximation. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Georgia Tech; 2020. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/63651.

Council of Science Editors:

Zhang Q. Learning Nash equilibria in zero-sum stochastic games via entropy-regularized policy approximation. [Masters Thesis]. Georgia Tech; 2020. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/63651

Universiteit Utrecht

8. Pastink, A.J. Aspects of communication complexity for approximating Nash equilibria.

Degree: 2012, Universiteit Utrecht

URL: http://dspace.library.uu.nl:8080/handle/1874/253425

► Since it was shown that finding a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete [Daskalakis2006], even for 2-player normal form games [Chen2006], a lot of attention has been… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: approximate Nash equilbrium; Nash equilibrium; communication complexity; well-supported Nash equilibrium; polynomial time algorithms; small games

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Pastink, A. J. (2012). Aspects of communication complexity for approximating Nash equilibria. (Masters Thesis). Universiteit Utrecht. Retrieved from http://dspace.library.uu.nl:8080/handle/1874/253425

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Pastink, A J. “Aspects of communication complexity for approximating Nash equilibria.” 2012. Masters Thesis, Universiteit Utrecht. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://dspace.library.uu.nl:8080/handle/1874/253425.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Pastink, A J. “Aspects of communication complexity for approximating Nash equilibria.” 2012. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Pastink AJ. Aspects of communication complexity for approximating Nash equilibria. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Universiteit Utrecht; 2012. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://dspace.library.uu.nl:8080/handle/1874/253425.

Council of Science Editors:

Pastink AJ. Aspects of communication complexity for approximating Nash equilibria. [Masters Thesis]. Universiteit Utrecht; 2012. Available from: http://dspace.library.uu.nl:8080/handle/1874/253425

9. Stan, Daniel. Stratégies randomisées dans les jeux concurrents : Randomized strategies in concurrent games.

Degree: Docteur es, Informatique, 2017, Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE)

URL: http://www.theses.fr/2017SACLN011

►

Ce travail se concentre sur l'étude de jeux joués sur des graphes finis, parun nombre arbitraire de joueurs, dont les objectifs ne sont pas antagonistes.Chaque… (more)

▼

Ce travail se concentre sur l'étude de jeux joués sur des graphes finis, parun nombre arbitraire de joueurs, dont les objectifs ne sont pas antagonistes.Chaque joueur représente un agent, c'est-à-dire un programme, un processus,ou un périphérique, qui interagit avec les autres joueurs et leurenvironnement commun dans le but de satisfaire au mieux son objectifindividuel.Des concepts telsque les équilibres de Nash, permettant d'exprimer l'optimalité des stratégiesdes joueurs, ont été étudiés dans un cadre déterministe, et l'existencede tels équilibres n'est pas assurée, même lorsque les objectifs des joueurssont de simples conditions d'accessibilité ou de sûreté. En effet, lorsqueles joueurs jouent de manière déterministe, le système évolue en conservantune certaine symmétrie, ce qui nous motive à considérer un modèle stochastiqueoù les joueurs et l'environnement sont sources d'aléa. Dans le premier cas,nous montrons que les concepts classiques d'équilibres de Nash ne peuventêtre calculés, et introduisons des notions approchées d'équilibrescalculables. Dans le deuxième cas, nous nous intéressons à l'analyse desystèmes composés d'un nombre arbitraires de processus, dont l'éxécutionest déterminée par un ordonnanceur, c'est-à-dire l'environnement,probabiliste.

We study games played on graphs by an arbitrary number of players withnon-zero sum objectives. The players representagents (programs, processes or devices) that can interact to achieve their ownobjectives as much as possible. Solution concepts, as Nash Equilibrium, forsuch optimal plays,need not exist when restricting topure deterministic strategies, even with simple reachability or safetyobjectives. The symmetry induced by deterministic behavioursmotivates the studies where eitherthe players or the environment can use randomization. In the first case, weshow that classical concepts are undecidable with a fixednumber of agents and propose computable approximations.In the second case, we studyrandomization as a reasonable policy for scheduling an arbitrary number ofprocesses.

Advisors/Committee Members: Markey, Nicolas (thesis director).

Subjects/Keywords: Jeux; Automates; Concurrent; Nash; Stochastique; Equilibre; Games; Automata; Concurrent; Nash; Stochastic; Equilibrium

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Stan, D. (2017). Stratégies randomisées dans les jeux concurrents : Randomized strategies in concurrent games. (Doctoral Dissertation). Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE). Retrieved from http://www.theses.fr/2017SACLN011

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Stan, Daniel. “Stratégies randomisées dans les jeux concurrents : Randomized strategies in concurrent games.” 2017. Doctoral Dissertation, Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE). Accessed February 26, 2021. http://www.theses.fr/2017SACLN011.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Stan, Daniel. “Stratégies randomisées dans les jeux concurrents : Randomized strategies in concurrent games.” 2017. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Stan D. Stratégies randomisées dans les jeux concurrents : Randomized strategies in concurrent games. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE); 2017. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://www.theses.fr/2017SACLN011.

Council of Science Editors:

Stan D. Stratégies randomisées dans les jeux concurrents : Randomized strategies in concurrent games. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE); 2017. Available from: http://www.theses.fr/2017SACLN011

Tampere University

10. Papageorgiou, Achillefs. Spatial model analysis of party policy strategies. Insights of deterministic and probabilistic voting with biased voters: Applications to Finland .

Degree: 2011, Tampere University

URL: https://trepo.tuni.fi/handle/10024/66746

► Äänestämisen läheisyysteorian mukaan mikäli puolueet ja äänestäjät ovat edustettuina samassa poliitiikkadimensiossa, äänestäjät äänestävät puoluetta, joka on lähinnä heidän positioitaan asiakysymyksissä. Vastoin spatiaalista perinnettä Michiganin koulukunnan… (more)

▼ Äänestämisen läheisyysteorian mukaan mikäli puolueet ja äänestäjät ovat edustettuina samassa poliitiikkadimensiossa, äänestäjät äänestävät puoluetta, joka on lähinnä heidän positioitaan asiakysymyksissä. Vastoin spatiaalista perinnettä Michiganin koulukunnan mukaan äänestäjät eivät äänestä rationaalisesti poliittisiin asiakysymyksiin perustuen, vaan antavat äänensä puolueelle, jota kokevat olevansa psykologisesti lähinnä, eli puoluetta, johon he samastuvat. Adams, Merrill ja Grofman (2005) yhteensovittavat yllämainitut äänestysperinteet teoksessaan, johon tukeutuen tämä väitöskirja osoittaa vaikutuksen, joka puoluesamastumisen kaltaisella psykologisella ominaisuudella on rationaalisiin strategioihin, joilla puolueet hakevat optimaalisia paikkojaan politiikkadimensiossa. Analyysi on jaettu kahteen osaan. Ensimmäisessä osassa oletetaan, että äänestäjät äänestävät valitsemaansa puoluetta varmuudella tai deterministisesti läheisyyden ja puoluesamastumisen perusteella. Toisessa osassa oletetaan, että äänestäjien päätökset ovat probabilistisia, sillä heidän päätöksiinsä vaikuttavat määrittelemättömät tekijät, jotka tekevät heidän päätöksistään epävarmoja puolueiden näkökulmasta. Deterministisen äänestämisen kohdalla käytetään simulaatioanalyysiä, jonka avulla osoitetaan, että puolueilla on kannustimena hakea erilaisia optimaalisia positioita silloin kun puoluesamastuminen vaikuttaa äänestämiseen kuin silloin, kun se ei vaikuta. Probabilistisen äänestämisen kohdalla osoitetaan, että puoluesamastumisella on kurvilineaarinen vaikutus suomalaisten puolueiden Nashin tasapainotiloihin: vähäinen puoluesamastumisen aste johtaa vahvaan keskihakuiseen kilpailuun, keskivahva puoluesamastuminen johtaa vähemmän vahvaan keskihakuiseen kilpailuun ja korkea puoluesamastuminen vie kilpailun takaisin vahvasti keskihakuisiin tuloksiin. Edellämainittu puoluesamastumisen kurvilineaarinen vaikutus pitää myös paikkansa kun tarkastellaan Ruotsin vaaliaineistoa, ja vastaa tuloksia, jotka Adams, Merrill ja Grofman (2005) ilmoittivat sovellettaessa samaa äänestysalgoritmia Ranskan politiikkaan. Soveltamalla spatiaalisen mallin tekniikoita eduskuntavaalitutkimusten aineistoihin tutkimus osoittaa myös missä määrin suomalaisten äänestäjien päätökset perustuvat psykologisiin komponentteihin kuten puoluesamastumiseen sen sijaan, että ne perustuisivat poliittiseen suuntautumiseen akselilla vasemmisto-oikeisto. Tutkimus osoittaa Nashin tasapainon Suomen ja Ruotsin tapauksissa ja miten nämä tasapainotilat vertautuvat aikaisempiin empiirisiin tutkimuksiin. Se osoittaa missä määrin puoluesamastuminen ja poliittinen suuntautuminen vasemmisto-oikeisto -akselilla vaikuttavat puolueiden odotettuun äänisaaliiseen ja miksi suuren puolueeseen samastuneen äänestäjäkunnan omaavilla suomalaisilla puolueilla on kannustin keskihakuisuuteen politiikkadimensiossa, sekä osoittaa onko suomalaisten puolueiden asiakysymyksissä ottamissa positioissa vuonna 2007 samankaltaisuuksia niiden Nashin tasapainotilojen kanssa. Lisäksi tutkimus osoittaa onko psykologinen käsite,…

Subjects/Keywords: suomalaiset poliittiset puolueet ; puoluesamastuminen ; simulaatiot ; Nash-tasapaino ; Finnish political parties ; party identification ; simulations ; Nash equilibrium.

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Papageorgiou, A. (2011). Spatial model analysis of party policy strategies. Insights of deterministic and probabilistic voting with biased voters: Applications to Finland . (Doctoral Dissertation). Tampere University. Retrieved from https://trepo.tuni.fi/handle/10024/66746

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Papageorgiou, Achillefs. “Spatial model analysis of party policy strategies. Insights of deterministic and probabilistic voting with biased voters: Applications to Finland .” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, Tampere University. Accessed February 26, 2021. https://trepo.tuni.fi/handle/10024/66746.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Papageorgiou, Achillefs. “Spatial model analysis of party policy strategies. Insights of deterministic and probabilistic voting with biased voters: Applications to Finland .” 2011. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Papageorgiou A. Spatial model analysis of party policy strategies. Insights of deterministic and probabilistic voting with biased voters: Applications to Finland . [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Tampere University; 2011. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: https://trepo.tuni.fi/handle/10024/66746.

Council of Science Editors:

Papageorgiou A. Spatial model analysis of party policy strategies. Insights of deterministic and probabilistic voting with biased voters: Applications to Finland . [Doctoral Dissertation]. Tampere University; 2011. Available from: https://trepo.tuni.fi/handle/10024/66746

11. Könönen, Ville. Multiagent Reinforcement Learning in Markov Games: Asymmetric and Symmetric Approaches.

Degree: 2004, Helsinki University of Technology

URL: http://lib.tkk.fi/Diss/2004/isbn9512273594/

►

Modern computing systems are distributed, large, and heterogeneous. Computers, other information processing devices and humans are very tightly connected with each other and therefore it… (more)

▼

Modern computing systems are distributed, large, and heterogeneous. Computers, other information processing devices and humans are very tightly connected with each other and therefore it would be preferable to handle these entities more as agents than stand-alone systems. One of the goals of artificial intelligence is to understand interactions between entities, whether they are artificial or natural, and to suggest how to make good decisions while taking other decision makers into account. In this thesis, these interactions between intelligent and rational agents are modeled with Markov games and the emphasis is on adaptation and learning in multiagent systems. Markov games are a general mathematical tool for modeling interactions between multiple agents. The model is very general, for example common board games are special instances of Markov games, and particularly interesting because it forms an intersection of two distinct research disciplines: machine learning and game theory. Markov games extend Markov decision processes, a well-known tool for modeling single-agent problems, to multiagent domains. On the other hand, Markov games can be seen as a dynamic extension to strategic form games, which are standard models in traditional game theory. From the computer science perspective, Markov games provide a flexible and efficient way to describe different social interactions between intelligent agents. This thesis studies different aspects of learning in Markov games. From the machine learning perspective, the focus is on a very general learning model, i.e. reinforcement learning, in which the goal is to maximize the long-time performance of the learning agent. The thesis introduces an asymmetric learning model that is computationally efficient in multiagent systems and enables the construction of different agent hierarchies. In multiagent reinforcement learning systems based on Markov games, the space and computational requirements grow very quickly with the number of learning agents and the size of the problem instance. Therefore, it is necessary to use function approximators, such as neural networks, to model agents in many real-world applications. In this thesis, various numeric learning methods are proposed for multiagent learning problems. The proposed methods are tested with small but non-trivial example problems from different research areas including artificial robot navigation, simplified soccer game, and automated pricing models for intelligent agents. The thesis also contains an extensive literature survey on multiagent reinforcement learning and various methods based on Markov games. Additionally, game-theoretic methods and methods originated from computer science for multiagent learning and decision making are compared.

Dissertations in computer and information science. Report D, ISSN 1459-7020; 8

Advisors/Committee Members: Helsinki University of Technology, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Laboratory of Computer and Information Science.

Subjects/Keywords: Markov games; reinforcement learning; Nash equilibrium; Stackelberg equilibrium; value function approximation; policy gradient

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APA (6^th Edition):

Könönen, V. (2004). Multiagent Reinforcement Learning in Markov Games: Asymmetric and Symmetric Approaches. (Thesis). Helsinki University of Technology. Retrieved from http://lib.tkk.fi/Diss/2004/isbn9512273594/

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Könönen, Ville. “Multiagent Reinforcement Learning in Markov Games: Asymmetric and Symmetric Approaches.” 2004. Thesis, Helsinki University of Technology. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://lib.tkk.fi/Diss/2004/isbn9512273594/.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Könönen, Ville. “Multiagent Reinforcement Learning in Markov Games: Asymmetric and Symmetric Approaches.” 2004. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Könönen V. Multiagent Reinforcement Learning in Markov Games: Asymmetric and Symmetric Approaches. [Internet] [Thesis]. Helsinki University of Technology; 2004. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://lib.tkk.fi/Diss/2004/isbn9512273594/.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Könönen V. Multiagent Reinforcement Learning in Markov Games: Asymmetric and Symmetric Approaches. [Thesis]. Helsinki University of Technology; 2004. Available from: http://lib.tkk.fi/Diss/2004/isbn9512273594/

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Temple University

12. Delgado, Lisa A. Matching Market for Skills.

Degree: PhD, 2009, Temple University

URL: http://digital.library.temple.edu/u?/p245801coll10,41030

►

Economics

This dissertation builds a model of information exchange, where the information is skills. A two-sided matching market for skills is employed that includes two… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Economics, Theory; algorithmic game; correlated equilibrium; game theory; matching market; Nash equilibrium; skills market

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APA (6^th Edition):

Delgado, L. A. (2009). Matching Market for Skills. (Doctoral Dissertation). Temple University. Retrieved from http://digital.library.temple.edu/u?/p245801coll10,41030

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Delgado, Lisa A. “Matching Market for Skills.” 2009. Doctoral Dissertation, Temple University. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://digital.library.temple.edu/u?/p245801coll10,41030.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Delgado, Lisa A. “Matching Market for Skills.” 2009. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Delgado LA. Matching Market for Skills. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Temple University; 2009. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://digital.library.temple.edu/u?/p245801coll10,41030.

Council of Science Editors:

Delgado LA. Matching Market for Skills. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Temple University; 2009. Available from: http://digital.library.temple.edu/u?/p245801coll10,41030

Penn State University

13. Liao, Mouhua. Models of Strategic and Pairwise Trade.

Degree: 2012, Penn State University

URL: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/15119

► This dissertation consists of three chapters. In Chapter 1, a new type of market game is formulated: the strategy space generalizes the usual Cournot quantities… (more)

▼ This dissertation consists of three chapters. In Chapter 1, a new type of market game is formulated: the strategy space generalizes the usual Cournot quantities with limit prices. Under mild market-thickness conditions, symmetric Nash equilibria coincide with price-taking equilibria. In the case of two goods, a price-taking equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium. In the case of multiple goods, a price-taking equilibrium is competitive, but subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. Chapter 2 considers periodic, complete-participation trade in the Lagos-Rocheteau (Econometrica, 2009) Mode. Lagos-Rocheteau is part of the literature that applies a search model to asset trade in the over-the-counter market. The only friction in their model is a cost of agents getting into contact with other agents. Therefore, as an alternative to their investor-dealer random meetings, a centralized competitive market which occurs periodically is studied. This arrangement preserves the main tension in their paper: a tradeoff between a portfolio that maximizes current utility and one that is good on average. For calibrated versions of the model, it is shown that this market must occur only infrequently in order for investors to be as well off as they in the Lagos-Rocheteau setup. In Chapter 3, employment agents (called as em-agents) are introduced as a third type of agent in world of a labor market with search frictions. Each type of agent matches pairwise with the other two types through two independent matching processes. Each process depends on the ratio of the agent's own type to the other type in the match ( market tightness). Job matches can be formed directly between a worker and a firm, or indirectly through an em-agent. It is shown that there is a unique steady-state equilibrium in which em-agents are active. The presence of em-agents enhances the welfare of workers. More generally, the welfare of workers decreases as the outside option of em-agents or firms increases. When job matches are heterogeneous in productivity, jobs filled through em-agents have higher average productivity than ones done directly. Advisors/Committee Members: Neil Wallace, Dissertation Advisor/Co-Advisor, Neil Wallace, Committee Chair/Co-Chair, Edward James Green, Committee Member, James Schuyler Jordan, Committee Member, Anthony Mark Kwasnica, Committee Member.

Subjects/Keywords: Market game; Limit orders; Nash equilibrium; Walras equilibrium; OTC market; Periodic market; Random search; Middlemen

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Liao, M. (2012). Models of Strategic and Pairwise Trade. (Thesis). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/15119

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Liao, Mouhua. “Models of Strategic and Pairwise Trade.” 2012. Thesis, Penn State University. Accessed February 26, 2021. https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/15119.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Liao, Mouhua. “Models of Strategic and Pairwise Trade.” 2012. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Liao M. Models of Strategic and Pairwise Trade. [Internet] [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2012. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/15119.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Liao M. Models of Strategic and Pairwise Trade. [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2012. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/15119

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of New Mexico

14. Saad, George. Selfishness and Malice in Distributed Systems.

Degree: Department of Computer Science, 2015, University of New Mexico

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1928/27896

► Large-scale distributed systems are increasingly prevalent. Two issues can impact the performance of such systems: selfishness and malice. Selfish players can reduce social welfare of… (more)

▼ Large-scale distributed systems are increasingly prevalent. Two issues can impact the performance of such systems: selfishness and malice. Selfish players can reduce social welfare of games, and malicious nodes can disrupt networks. In this dissertation, we provide algorithms to address both of these issues. One approach to ameliorating selfishness in large networks is the idea of a mediator. A mediator implements a correlated equilibrium when it proposes a strategy to each player privately such that the mediators proposal is the best interest for every player to follow. In this dissertation, we present a mediator that implements the best correlated equilibrium for an extended El Farol game. The extended El Farol game we consider has both positive and negative network effects. We study the degree to which this type of mediator can decrease the social cost. In particular, we give an exact characterization of Mediation Value (MV) and Enforcement Value (EV) for this game. MV measures the efficiency of our mediator compared to the best Nash equilibrium, and EV measures the efficiency of our mediator compared to the optimal social cost. This sort of exact characterization is uncommon for games with both kinds of network effects. An interesting outcome of our results is that both the MV and EV values can be unbounded for our game. Recent years have seen significant interest in designing networks that are self-healing in the sense that they can automatically recover from adversarial attacks. Previous work shows that it is possible for a network to automatically recover, even when an adversary repeatedly deletes nodes in the network. However, there have not yet been any algorithms that self-heal in the case where an adversary takes over nodes in the network. In this dissertation, we address this gap. In particular, we describe a communication network over n nodes that ensures the following properties, even when an adversary controls up to t ≤ (1/4 − ε)n nodes, for any constant ε > 0. First, the network provides point-to-point communication with message cost and latency that are asymptotically optimal in an amortized sense. Second, the expected total number of message corruptions is O(t(log* n)²), after which the adversarially controlled nodes are effectively quarantined so that they cause no more corruptions. In the problem of reliable multiparty computation (RMC), there are n parties, each with an individual input, and the parties want to jointly and reliably compute a function f over n inputs, assuming that it is not necessary to maintain the privacy of the inputs. The problem is complicated by the fact that an omniscient adversary controls a hidden fraction of the parties. We describe a self-healing algorithm for this problem. In particular, for a fixed function f, with n parties and m gates, we describe how to perform RMC repeatedly as the inputs to f change. Our algorithm maintains the following properties, even when an adversary controls up to t ≤ (1/4 − ε)n parties, for any… Advisors/Committee Members: Saia, Jared, Saia, Jared, Young, Maxwell, Hayes, Thomas, Arnold, Dorian.

Subjects/Keywords: Selfishness; Malice; Self-Healing; Byzantine Faults; Nash Equilibrium; Correlated Equilibrium; Mediators; Byzantine Adversary

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Saad, G. (2015). Selfishness and Malice in Distributed Systems. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of New Mexico. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1928/27896

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Saad, George. “Selfishness and Malice in Distributed Systems.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, University of New Mexico. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1928/27896.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Saad, George. “Selfishness and Malice in Distributed Systems.” 2015. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Saad G. Selfishness and Malice in Distributed Systems. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of New Mexico; 2015. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1928/27896.

Council of Science Editors:

Saad G. Selfishness and Malice in Distributed Systems. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of New Mexico; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1928/27896

University of New South Wales

15. Arbis, David. Modelling the Strategic Interactions of Driver Manoeuvres.

Degree: Civil & Environmental Engineering, 2017, University of New South Wales

URL: http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/58329 ; https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:45813/SOURCE02?view=true

► Driving is naturally an interactive task where individual drivers are continuously manoeuvring based on expectations and beliefs regarding actions of other drivers. However mathematical models… (more)

▼ Driving is naturally an interactive task where individual drivers are continuously manoeuvring based on expectations and beliefs regarding actions of other drivers. However mathematical models of interaction are seldom used for modelling driver manoeuvres. The dominant modelling methods rather assume there is a one-dimensional interaction between the stimuli provided by a driver, and the response of any conflicting drivers. This oversight of the inter-relation between conflicting drivers’ actions fails to scientifically evaluate key aspects of the safety and efficiency of driver interactions: behavioural norms of interaction, and moral hazards of interaction.Improving modelling of driver conflicts is important to evaluate the safety of existing road infrastructure and proposed technology measures that aim to improve driver safety. Thus Game Theory which is a framework for mathematical models of interaction has been emerging as a research area within traffic analysis. Given this, game theoretic literature for driver manoeuvres still poses a lacuna in the investigation of modelling sub-processes that are critical for accurate game theoretic predictions against reality. These modelling aspects are the specification of payoff functions for decisions, and methods to mathematically calculate interaction game solutions.The research project within this thesis accordingly develops game theoretic models that investigate the importance of risk attitude and risk perception parameters in payoff functions for interactive driver manoeuvres, and efficacy of a Quantal Response Equilibrium game solution.An empirical approach is used to calibrate and verify the significance of the proposed game theoretic models and frameworks against observed driver interactions. In particular, field data of an experiment conducted in an experimental economics laboratory is used, as well as GPS trajectory of vehicles merging at an on-ramp along Interstate 80 in Emeryville, California. The studies find that the introduction of risk-related parameters in payoff functions for interactive decisions is important to explain observed driver interactions and a Quantal Response Equilibrium game solution is able to provide good fit to observations.The key contributions of the research project are novel approaches for improved modelling of interaction in driver manoeuvres. The modelling approaches help to more accurately evaluate existing and proposed measures towards traffic safety and efficiency. Advisors/Committee Members: Dixit, Vinayak, Civil & Environmental Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, UNSW, Rashidi, Taha, Civil & Environmental Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, UNSW.

Subjects/Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Game Theory; Quantal Response Equilibrium; Risk Perception; Risk Attitudes; Driver Safety

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APA (6^th Edition):

Arbis, D. (2017). Modelling the Strategic Interactions of Driver Manoeuvres. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of New South Wales. Retrieved from http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/58329 ; https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:45813/SOURCE02?view=true

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Arbis, David. “Modelling the Strategic Interactions of Driver Manoeuvres.” 2017. Doctoral Dissertation, University of New South Wales. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/58329 ; https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:45813/SOURCE02?view=true.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Arbis, David. “Modelling the Strategic Interactions of Driver Manoeuvres.” 2017. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Arbis D. Modelling the Strategic Interactions of Driver Manoeuvres. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of New South Wales; 2017. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/58329 ; https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:45813/SOURCE02?view=true.

Council of Science Editors:

Arbis D. Modelling the Strategic Interactions of Driver Manoeuvres. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of New South Wales; 2017. Available from: http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/58329 ; https://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:45813/SOURCE02?view=true

NSYSU

16. Lin, Ting-An. The optimal gang structures in a shadow economy.

Degree: Master, Economics, 2013, NSYSU

URL: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0610113-214031

► This article will discuss which form the gang structures will take when the government tries to reach the maximum potential for social welfare through either… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: organized crime; confiscation; counterfeit; Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium

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APA (6^th Edition):

Lin, T. (2013). The optimal gang structures in a shadow economy. (Thesis). NSYSU. Retrieved from http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0610113-214031

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Lin, Ting-An. “The optimal gang structures in a shadow economy.” 2013. Thesis, NSYSU. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0610113-214031.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Lin, Ting-An. “The optimal gang structures in a shadow economy.” 2013. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Lin T. The optimal gang structures in a shadow economy. [Internet] [Thesis]. NSYSU; 2013. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0610113-214031.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Lin T. The optimal gang structures in a shadow economy. [Thesis]. NSYSU; 2013. Available from: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0610113-214031

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

NSYSU

17. Yen, Ling-Ju. The Optimal Strategy for Patent Competition-The Game Theory Approach.

Degree: Master, Economics, 2013, NSYSU

URL: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0620113-104451

► This study investigated the optimal strategy for patent competition from two firms on the similar marketing based on the game theory. The model was set… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: game theory; patent competition; Nash equilibrium; patent litigation; infringement act

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APA (6^th Edition):

Yen, L. (2013). The Optimal Strategy for Patent Competition-The Game Theory Approach. (Thesis). NSYSU. Retrieved from http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0620113-104451

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Yen, Ling-Ju. “The Optimal Strategy for Patent Competition-The Game Theory Approach.” 2013. Thesis, NSYSU. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0620113-104451.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Yen, Ling-Ju. “The Optimal Strategy for Patent Competition-The Game Theory Approach.” 2013. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Yen L. The Optimal Strategy for Patent Competition-The Game Theory Approach. [Internet] [Thesis]. NSYSU; 2013. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0620113-104451.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Yen L. The Optimal Strategy for Patent Competition-The Game Theory Approach. [Thesis]. NSYSU; 2013. Available from: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0620113-104451

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

McMaster University

18. Meskar, Erfan. Energy Efficient Offloading for Competing Users on a Shared Communication Channel.

Degree: MASc, 2016, McMaster University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/18692

►

In this thesis we consider a set of mobile users that employ cloud-based computation offloading. In computation offloading, user energy consumption can be decreased by… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Mobile cloud computing; Computation offloading; Game theory; Nash equilibrium

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APA (6^th Edition):

Meskar, E. (2016). Energy Efficient Offloading for Competing Users on a Shared Communication Channel. (Masters Thesis). McMaster University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11375/18692

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Meskar, Erfan. “Energy Efficient Offloading for Competing Users on a Shared Communication Channel.” 2016. Masters Thesis, McMaster University. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/18692.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Meskar, Erfan. “Energy Efficient Offloading for Competing Users on a Shared Communication Channel.” 2016. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Meskar E. Energy Efficient Offloading for Competing Users on a Shared Communication Channel. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. McMaster University; 2016. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/18692.

Council of Science Editors:

Meskar E. Energy Efficient Offloading for Competing Users on a Shared Communication Channel. [Masters Thesis]. McMaster University; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/18692

Penn State University

19. Xu, Haiqing. Discrete Choice Models with Endogeneity .

Degree: 2011, Penn State University

URL: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/12170

► CHAPTER 1: Discrete Choice Models With Local Interactions: A Game Theoretical Approach Consider observations from a single equilibrium of a local interaction game in which… (more)

▼ CHAPTER 1: Discrete Choice Models With Local Interactions: A Game Theoretical Approach Consider observations from a single equilibrium of a local interaction game in which each player, a firm, has a finite number of actions (discrete choice) and is subject to interactions that are local–for example, the two surrounding neighbors in a ‘linear’ Hotelling model. Asymptotics in this setting is studied by assuming that all the players are located in a single market and that the number of them grows. All observations are potentially dependent on each other because they are interpreted as arising from a single equilibrium of settings where players interact directly or indirectly. Simple assumptions about the structure are made that ensure that the game with a fixed number of players has a unique equilibrium and the equilibrium has a stability property. The formulation of this stability property is new and is the basis for consistency. I introduce an estimation procedure called (sieve) maximum approximated likelihood. This estimator has the same asymptotic properties as the corresponding maximum likelihood estimator, but is easier to compute. CHAPTER 2: Estimation of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in Static Discrete Games with Correlated Private Signals This paper studies a two by two static game of incomplete information. I allow players' private signals to be correlated, which adds complexity to Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) solutions of the game. Further, the econometric structure of this model is ‘incomplete’ due to the existence of multiple equilibria (Tamer (2003)). I therefore focus on a nontrivial subset of the support of public information variables (regressors), where a unique Monotone Strategy Bayesian Equilibrium (MSBE) exists. I propose a four–step procedure to estimate the payoff structure. In the first step I estimate a set of parameters containing the underlying parameter of interest. I then obtain a point estimator in the second step and prove its consistency. The third and fourth step estimators are square n-consistent; the fourth step estimation is more efficient. CHAPTER 3: Semiparametric estimation of binary decision games of incomplete information with correlated private signals (with Yuanyuan Wan) This paper studies the identification and estimation of a semiparametric binary decision game of incomplete information. We make no parametric assumptions on the joint distribution of private signals and allow them to be correlated. Focusing on Monotone Strategy Bayesian Equilibrium, we show that the equilibrium strategies can be represented by a binary choice model with an unobserved regressor, of which we find (estimable) upper and lower bounds. We show that the parameters of interest can be point–identified subject to a scale normalization under mild support requirements for the regressors (publicly observed states) and errors (private signals). Following Manski and Tamer (2002), we use the modified maximum score estimator with estimated bounds and show its consistency. CHAPTER 4: Tighter Bounds in… Advisors/Committee Members: Joirs Pinkse And Sung Jae Jun, Dissertation Advisor/Co-Advisor, Coenraad Arnout P Pinkse, Committee Chair/Co-Chair, Sung Jae Jun, Committee Chair/Co-Chair, Herman J Bierens, Committee Member, Runze Li, Committee Member, Barry William Ickes, Committee Member.

Subjects/Keywords: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; Endogeneity; Discrete Choice Model; Monotone Strategy; Triangular System

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Xu, H. (2011). Discrete Choice Models with Endogeneity . (Thesis). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/12170

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Xu, Haiqing. “Discrete Choice Models with Endogeneity .” 2011. Thesis, Penn State University. Accessed February 26, 2021. https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/12170.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Xu, Haiqing. “Discrete Choice Models with Endogeneity .” 2011. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Xu H. Discrete Choice Models with Endogeneity . [Internet] [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2011. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/12170.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Xu H. Discrete Choice Models with Endogeneity . [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2011. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/12170

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Toronto

20. Wang, Yatao. A Modified Q-Learning Algorithm in Games.

Degree: 2014, University of Toronto

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/68563

►

This thesis presents a modified Q-learning algorithm and provides conditions for convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium in potential games. In general Q-learning schemes, convergence… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Potential Games; Pure Nash Equilibrium; Q-learning; Stochastic Process; 0544

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APA (6^th Edition):

Wang, Y. (2014). A Modified Q-Learning Algorithm in Games. (Masters Thesis). University of Toronto. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1807/68563

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Wang, Yatao. “A Modified Q-Learning Algorithm in Games.” 2014. Masters Thesis, University of Toronto. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1807/68563.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Wang, Yatao. “A Modified Q-Learning Algorithm in Games.” 2014. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Wang Y. A Modified Q-Learning Algorithm in Games. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Toronto; 2014. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/68563.

Council of Science Editors:

Wang Y. A Modified Q-Learning Algorithm in Games. [Masters Thesis]. University of Toronto; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/68563

21. Oskarsson, Christian. Taktikröstning i kommunala val : En studie om strategiskt väljarbeteende utifrån rational choice-teorin.

Degree: Political Science, 2016, Umeå University

URL: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-116862

► Denna kandidatuppsats bemöter frågan om väljarbeteende i allmänna val; huruvida strategiskt röstande (taktikröstning) är ett förekommande fenomen i val till svenska kommunfullmäktige eller ej… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Strategiröstning Väljarbeteende Rational choice Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Regnbågskoalitioner Valteknisk samverkan

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APA (6^th Edition):

Oskarsson, C. (2016). Taktikröstning i kommunala val : En studie om strategiskt väljarbeteende utifrån rational choice-teorin. (Thesis). Umeå University. Retrieved from http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-116862

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Oskarsson, Christian. “Taktikröstning i kommunala val : En studie om strategiskt väljarbeteende utifrån rational choice-teorin.” 2016. Thesis, Umeå University. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-116862.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Oskarsson, Christian. “Taktikröstning i kommunala val : En studie om strategiskt väljarbeteende utifrån rational choice-teorin.” 2016. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Oskarsson C. Taktikröstning i kommunala val : En studie om strategiskt väljarbeteende utifrån rational choice-teorin. [Internet] [Thesis]. Umeå University; 2016. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-116862.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Oskarsson C. Taktikröstning i kommunala val : En studie om strategiskt väljarbeteende utifrån rational choice-teorin. [Thesis]. Umeå University; 2016. Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-116862

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Iowa State University

22. Hao, Yiping. Computation and analysis of evolutionary game dynamics.

Degree: 2013, Iowa State University

URL: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/13356

► Biological processes are usually defined based on the principles of replication, mutation, competition, adaption, and evolution. In evolutionary game theory, such a process is modeled… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: complementarity method; evolutionary game theory; evolutionary stability; Nash equilibrium; Applied Mathematics

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APA (6^th Edition):

Hao, Y. (2013). Computation and analysis of evolutionary game dynamics. (Thesis). Iowa State University. Retrieved from https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/13356

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Hao, Yiping. “Computation and analysis of evolutionary game dynamics.” 2013. Thesis, Iowa State University. Accessed February 26, 2021. https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/13356.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Hao, Yiping. “Computation and analysis of evolutionary game dynamics.” 2013. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Hao Y. Computation and analysis of evolutionary game dynamics. [Internet] [Thesis]. Iowa State University; 2013. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/13356.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Hao Y. Computation and analysis of evolutionary game dynamics. [Thesis]. Iowa State University; 2013. Available from: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/13356

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Louisiana State University

23. He, Quqiong. Strategic interaction and social networks.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2013, Louisiana State University

URL: etd-06262013-095701 ; https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/2372

► This dissertation consists of three essays which investigate individuals’ interaction in different contexts using social network analysis. The first essay generalizes the models of link… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Friendship network; Chinese lineage; Social network; Nash equilibrium

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APA (6^th Edition):

He, Q. (2013). Strategic interaction and social networks. (Doctoral Dissertation). Louisiana State University. Retrieved from etd-06262013-095701 ; https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/2372

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

He, Quqiong. “Strategic interaction and social networks.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, Louisiana State University. Accessed February 26, 2021. etd-06262013-095701 ; https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/2372.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

He, Quqiong. “Strategic interaction and social networks.” 2013. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

He Q. Strategic interaction and social networks. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Louisiana State University; 2013. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: etd-06262013-095701 ; https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/2372.

Council of Science Editors:

He Q. Strategic interaction and social networks. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Louisiana State University; 2013. Available from: etd-06262013-095701 ; https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/2372

24. Wolfley, Jared Lynn. Machinery sharing by agribusiness firms: methodology, application, and simulation.

Degree: PhD, Agricultural Economics, 2009, Texas A&M University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2314

► Machinery investments represent a substantial portion of agribusiness firms’ costs. Because of high machinery costs, variable profit margins, and increasing competition, agribusiness managers continually seek… (more)

▼ Machinery investments represent a substantial portion of agribusiness firms’ costs. Because of high machinery costs, variable profit margins, and increasing competition, agribusiness managers continually seek methods to maintain profitability and manage risk. One relatively new method is jointly owning and sharing machinery. Contract design issues to enhance horizontal linkages between firms through machinery sharing are addressed. Specifically, costs and depreciation sharing between two firms entering into a joint machinery ownership contract are examined. Two, two-player models, a Nash equilibrium game theoretical model and an applied two-farm simulation model are used to determine impacts of machinery sharing on firms engaged in machinery sharing. The Nash equilibrium model determines theoretical optimal sharing rules for two generic firms. Using the Nash equilibrium model as the basis, the two-farm simulation model provides more specific insights into joint harvest machinery sharing. Both models include contractual components that are uniquely associated with machinery sharing. Contractual components include penalty payment structure for untimely machinery delivery and the percentages of shared costs paid and depreciation claimed paid by each firm. Harvesting windows for each farm and yield reductions associated with untimely machinery delivery are accounted for within the models. Machinery sharing can increase the NPV of after tax cash flows and potentially reduce risk. Sharing will, however, not occur if own marginal transaction costs and/or marginal penalty costs associated with untimely machinery delivery are too large. Further, if the marginal costs of sharing are small relative to own marginal net benefits, sharing will not occur. There are potential tradeoffs between the percentage of shared costs paid and the percentage of shared depreciation claimed depending on each farms’ specific tax deductions. Harvesting window overlaps help determine the viability of machinery sharing. Farms may be better off sharing larger, more efficient machinery than using smaller machinery even when harvest must be delayed. Percentages of shared costs, depreciation, and tax deductions have important tax implications that impact the after tax cash flows and should be considered when negotiating machinery sharing contracts. Advisors/Committee Members: Mjelde, James W. (advisor), Jin, Yanhong (committee member), Klinefelter, Danny A. (committee member), Rosenthal, Wesley (committee member), Salin, Victoria S. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Simulation

…models are developed, a Nash equilibrium theoretical and an applied two-farm simulation model… …The single period Nash equilibrium model for two firms sharing machinery is developed to… …the economics of machinery sharing, the Nash equilibrium model is one advancement in… …associated with untimely machinery delivery are considered. The Nash equilibrium model is general… …sharing machinery. Because the functional forms used in the Nash equilibrium model are general…

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Wolfley, J. L. (2009). Machinery sharing by agribusiness firms: methodology, application, and simulation. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2314

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Wolfley, Jared Lynn. “Machinery sharing by agribusiness firms: methodology, application, and simulation.” 2009. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2314.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Wolfley, Jared Lynn. “Machinery sharing by agribusiness firms: methodology, application, and simulation.” 2009. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Wolfley JL. Machinery sharing by agribusiness firms: methodology, application, and simulation. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2009. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2314.

Council of Science Editors:

Wolfley JL. Machinery sharing by agribusiness firms: methodology, application, and simulation. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2009. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2314

25. kotra, Anuraag. A Game Theoretic Approach Applied in k- Anonymization for Preserving Privacy in Shared Data.

Degree: 2020, University of Nevada – Reno

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11714/7415

► Privacy preservation is one of the greatest concerns when data is shared between different organizations. On the one hand, releasing data for research purposes is… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Contract Theory; game theory; k-anonymization; Nash Equilibrium; Repeated Game

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APA (6^th Edition):

kotra, A. (2020). A Game Theoretic Approach Applied in k- Anonymization for Preserving Privacy in Shared Data. (Thesis). University of Nevada – Reno. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11714/7415

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

kotra, Anuraag. “A Game Theoretic Approach Applied in k- Anonymization for Preserving Privacy in Shared Data.” 2020. Thesis, University of Nevada – Reno. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11714/7415.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

kotra, Anuraag. “A Game Theoretic Approach Applied in k- Anonymization for Preserving Privacy in Shared Data.” 2020. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

kotra A. A Game Theoretic Approach Applied in k- Anonymization for Preserving Privacy in Shared Data. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Nevada – Reno; 2020. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11714/7415.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

kotra A. A Game Theoretic Approach Applied in k- Anonymization for Preserving Privacy in Shared Data. [Thesis]. University of Nevada – Reno; 2020. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11714/7415

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

26. Ye, Zhineng. Solving Eight Treasures Of Game Theory Problems Using Bi-criteria Method.

Degree: MSs, EECS - System and Control Engineering, 2016, Case Western Reserve University School of Graduate Studies

URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=case1454062652

► Game theory is a strategic mathematics model of how we make decisions. It is widely applied in fields like economics and psychology to make our… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Engineering; Economic Theory; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Bi-criteria

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APA (6^th Edition):

Ye, Z. (2016). Solving Eight Treasures Of Game Theory Problems Using Bi-criteria Method. (Masters Thesis). Case Western Reserve University School of Graduate Studies. Retrieved from http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=case1454062652

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Ye, Zhineng. “Solving Eight Treasures Of Game Theory Problems Using Bi-criteria Method.” 2016. Masters Thesis, Case Western Reserve University School of Graduate Studies. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=case1454062652.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Ye, Zhineng. “Solving Eight Treasures Of Game Theory Problems Using Bi-criteria Method.” 2016. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Ye Z. Solving Eight Treasures Of Game Theory Problems Using Bi-criteria Method. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Case Western Reserve University School of Graduate Studies; 2016. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=case1454062652.

Council of Science Editors:

Ye Z. Solving Eight Treasures Of Game Theory Problems Using Bi-criteria Method. [Masters Thesis]. Case Western Reserve University School of Graduate Studies; 2016. Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=case1454062652

27. Palmieri, Anthony. Constraint games revisited : Νοuvelles techniques pοur les cοnstraint games.

Degree: Docteur es, Informatique, 2019, Normandie

URL: http://www.theses.fr/2019NORMC207

►

Cette thèse présente de nouvelles techniques pour les Constraint Games.La manière de résoudre un Constraint Game est repensée en terme de propagation de contraintes.Les préférences… (more)

▼

Cette thèse présente de nouvelles techniques pour les Constraint Games.La manière de résoudre un Constraint Game est repensée en terme de propagation de contraintes.Les préférences des joueurs sont maintenant considérées comme des contraintes globales permettant une intégration transparente dans les solveurs de contraintes ainsi que d'améliorer l'efficacité du framework.Notre nouveau solveur ConGA est diffusé en open source.Celui-ci est plus rapide que les travaux connexes et est capable de trouver tous les équilibres de Nash, et cela même dans des jeux avec 200 joueurs voir 2000 pour certains jeux graphiques.Grâce à cette perspective, le framework a pu être utilisé pour résoudre un problème de routage dans le domaine des télécommunications. Les aspects centralisé et décentralisé ont été étudiés.La comparaison de ces derniers est très importante pour évaluer la qualité de service dans les applications multi-utilisateurs. L'évaluation de cette dernière peut être très coûteuse, c'est pourquoi nous proposons plusieurs techniques permettant d'améliorer la résolution de ce problème et ainsi d'améliorer la résolution du problème.

This thesis revisits the Constraint games framework by rethinking their solving technique in terms of constraint propagation.Players preferences are considered as global constraints making transparently the integration in constraints solvers.It yields not only a more elegant but also a more efficient framework.We release our new solver ConGA in open source.Our new complete solver is faster than previous state-of-the-art and is able to find all pure Nash equilibrium for some problems with 200 players or even with 2000 players in graphical games.This new perspective enables us to tackle real-worlds Telecommunication problems.This problem is solved with a centralized perspective and a decentralized one.The comparison of the two last approaches is really important to evaluate the quality of service in multi-users application, but computationally consuming.That is why, we propose new techniques in order to improve the resolution process.

Advisors/Committee Members: Boizumault, Patrice (thesis director).

Subjects/Keywords: Informatique et applications; Constraint Programming; Game theory; Nash Equilibrium; Search strategy

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Palmieri, A. (2019). Constraint games revisited : Νοuvelles techniques pοur les cοnstraint games. (Doctoral Dissertation). Normandie. Retrieved from http://www.theses.fr/2019NORMC207

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Palmieri, Anthony. “Constraint games revisited : Νοuvelles techniques pοur les cοnstraint games.” 2019. Doctoral Dissertation, Normandie. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://www.theses.fr/2019NORMC207.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Palmieri, Anthony. “Constraint games revisited : Νοuvelles techniques pοur les cοnstraint games.” 2019. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Palmieri A. Constraint games revisited : Νοuvelles techniques pοur les cοnstraint games. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Normandie; 2019. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://www.theses.fr/2019NORMC207.

Council of Science Editors:

Palmieri A. Constraint games revisited : Νοuvelles techniques pοur les cοnstraint games. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Normandie; 2019. Available from: http://www.theses.fr/2019NORMC207

28. Pedro Ribeiro de Andrade Neto. Game theory and agent-based modelling for the simulation of spatial phenomena.

Degree: 2010, Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais

URL: http://urlib.net/sid.inpe.br/mtc-m19/2010/11.21.17.15

►

A modelagem baseada em agentes (\TEXTIT{Agent-Based Modelling} - ABM) fornece uma metodologia it{bottom-up} para a construção sistemas complexos. Ela tem obtido uma crescente aceitação em… (more)

▼

A modelagem baseada em agentes (\TEXTIT{Agent-Based Modelling} - ABM) fornece uma metodologia it{bottom-up} para a construção sistemas complexos. Ela tem obtido uma crescente aceitação em vários campos da ciência, tais como economia, sociologia e antropologia, por causa de sua capacidade de expressar como ações coletivas podem emergir a partir de um comportamento social individual. Um dos desafios importantes na modelagem baseada em agentes diz respeito a como representar as ações humanas em um ambiente espacialmente explícito. Agentes têm de ser conectados a uma representação do mundo, que pode ser observada e sobre a qual eles podem tomar decisões. Para estes estudos, ferramentas para modelagem baseada em agentes precisam ser capazes de manipular os diferentes tipos de dados geoespaciais. Entretanto, as demandas e os formalismos para se tratar estes problemas ainda não estão bem estabelecidos na literatura. Este trabalho apresenta avanços em metodologias para se representar e desenvolver modelos baseados em agentes de fenômenos geoespaciais. Primeiro, é apresentada uma arquitetura para estudar fenômenos geográficos usando a abordagem baseada em agentes. Segundo, é apresentado um conjunto de modelos que usam a teoria de jogos como base para o comportamento dos agentes. Nestes modelos, os agentes competem por espaço, e a interação entre eles é expressa através de jogos não-cooperativos. Uma definição de mobilidade é apresentada e seus efeitos sobre o desenvolvimento dos modelos são investigados.

Agent-based modelling (ABM) provides a bottom-up method for building complex systems. It has been gaining growing acceptance in various fields of science, such as economics, sociology, and anthropology, because of its capacity to show how collective social actions emerge from individual behaviour. One of the important research challenges for ABM concerns how to represent human actions in a landscape. The agents have to be grounded to a representation of the world, on which they can sense and act. In these studies, ABM toolkits need to support different types of geospatial data. However, the demands and formalisms for creating agent-based models for geospatial problems are not well established in the literature. This work presents advances on methodologies to represent and develop agent-based models of geospatial phenomena. First, it describes an architecture for studying geospatial phenomena using an agent-based approach. Second, it presents a couple of models that uses game theory as basis for the behaviour of agents. Agents compete for space, and their interactions are expressed as non-cooperative games. A definition of mobility is presented, and the effect of this and other parameters on the development of the models are investigated.

Advisors/Committee Members: Lamartine Nogueira Frutuoso Guimarães, Antonio Miguel Vieira Monteiro, Gilberto Câmara, Lúbia Vinhas, Jaime Simão Sichman, Antonio Carlos da Rocha Costa, Tiago Garcia de Senna Carneiro.

Subjects/Keywords: spatial games; mobility; Nash equilibrium; Elutionary Stable Strategy (ESS); toolkits; jogos espaciais; mobilidade; equilíbrio de Nash; Estratégia Evolutivamente Estável (ESS); ferramentas

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Neto, P. R. d. A. (2010). Game theory and agent-based modelling for the simulation of spatial phenomena. (Thesis). Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais. Retrieved from http://urlib.net/sid.inpe.br/mtc-m19/2010/11.21.17.15

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Neto, Pedro Ribeiro de Andrade. “Game theory and agent-based modelling for the simulation of spatial phenomena.” 2010. Thesis, Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://urlib.net/sid.inpe.br/mtc-m19/2010/11.21.17.15.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Neto, Pedro Ribeiro de Andrade. “Game theory and agent-based modelling for the simulation of spatial phenomena.” 2010. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Neto PRdA. Game theory and agent-based modelling for the simulation of spatial phenomena. [Internet] [Thesis]. Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais; 2010. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://urlib.net/sid.inpe.br/mtc-m19/2010/11.21.17.15.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Neto PRdA. Game theory and agent-based modelling for the simulation of spatial phenomena. [Thesis]. Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais; 2010. Available from: http://urlib.net/sid.inpe.br/mtc-m19/2010/11.21.17.15

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

29. Monis, Thais Fernanda Mendes. Sobre teoremas de equilíbrio de Nash.

Degree: PhD, Matemática, 2010, University of São Paulo

URL: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/55/55135/tde-22092010-114021/ ;

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Nesse trabalho, aplicando métodos da Topologia Algébrica, nós obtivemos novas versões do teorema de equilíbrio de Nash. Nós definimos um conceito de equilíbrio local para… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Coincidence point; Equilíbrio de Nash; Lefschetz number; Nash equilibrium; Número de Lefschetz; Pareto optimum point; Ponto de coincidência; Ponto ótimo Pareto

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Monis, T. F. M. (2010). Sobre teoremas de equilíbrio de Nash. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of São Paulo. Retrieved from http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/55/55135/tde-22092010-114021/ ;

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Monis, Thais Fernanda Mendes. “Sobre teoremas de equilíbrio de Nash.” 2010. Doctoral Dissertation, University of São Paulo. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/55/55135/tde-22092010-114021/ ;.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Monis, Thais Fernanda Mendes. “Sobre teoremas de equilíbrio de Nash.” 2010. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

Monis TFM. Sobre teoremas de equilíbrio de Nash. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of São Paulo; 2010. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/55/55135/tde-22092010-114021/ ;.

Council of Science Editors:

Monis TFM. Sobre teoremas de equilíbrio de Nash. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of São Paulo; 2010. Available from: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/55/55135/tde-22092010-114021/ ;

30. JOÃO ALMEIDA SANTOS. Applicationof the Theory of games in People management: an analysis of variable salary.

Degree: 2012, Universidade Metodista de São Paulo

URL: http://ibict.metodista.br/tedeSimplificado/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=3226

► This paper presents the main aspects of Game Theory, showing its application as an analytical tool in People Management with respect to the variable salary.… (more)

▼ This paper presents the main aspects of Game Theory, showing its application as an analytical tool in People Management with respect to the variable salary. It considers the organization and worker as general concepts, without identifying the sector, business field, legal classification according to their revenue, total employees or market share of the organization. Likewise the concept worker receives no identification on the business field where they work, function, salary or professional training. The organization is any structure that generates goods and services for society and the worker is every element that employs its workforce in the production of goods and services. The objectives set for this study are: to identify the possibilities of application of Game Theory in People Management considering the variable salary as an element of conflict between the organization and the worker; to show whether the extensive form representation is more appropriate or not to analyze the clash scenario in the decision to hire or not the worker or pay more or pay less and the existence of Nash Equilibrium. The qualitative methodology with bibliographic and documentary support features this qualitative research according to the research methodology. Qualitative methods help to interpret the everyday phenomena, which may be composed of symbolic data located in a particular context. The documentary research is an important contribution to the study of the proposed topic, since qualitative research is not a rigidly structured proposal and this allows the researcher to use imagination and creativity to achieve the goal. The results obtained by the research point out that it is possible the application of Game Theory in People Management considering the clash between the players (the worker and the organization) about the salary, as can be seen in chapter 4 in the matrix representations of payoff of a strategic game and pictures 9, 10, 11, and 16. The representation in extensive form, is another goal, indicating the payoffs between two central decisions represented by X = flexibility with waiver of rights by workers and Y = flexibility / adaptation / negotiation, as shown in picture 16. By analyzing the picture, the personnel manager realizes existing strategies for organization and worker for decision making, while assessing the present situation and doing simulations for new proposals. Finally the Nash Equilibrium for application in People Management is discussed in section 4.1.3, making it possible to verify that both the worker and the organization can reach a favorable decision for both and keep their originally intended purposes. In picture 17, this balance is shown after the decision is made by the worker in face of the proposal made by the organization in the wake O2 and the worker got the sequence branch T2 with the value of 20 coins. The potentiality of Game Theory in People Management arises from the fact that those who work in an organization share good or bad results obtained by the choices of others, individual… Advisors/Committee Members: Wanderlei de Lima Paulo, Diógenes de Souza Bido, Luiz Jurandir Simões de Araujo.

Subjects/Keywords: organização; trabalhador; ADMINISTRACAO; People Management; worker; Nash Equilibrium; Teoria dos Jogos; Gestão de Pessoas; Equilíbrio de Nash; Game Theory; organization

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

SANTOS, J. A. (2012). Applicationof the Theory of games in People management: an analysis of variable salary. (Thesis). Universidade Metodista de São Paulo. Retrieved from http://ibict.metodista.br/tedeSimplificado/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=3226

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

SANTOS, JOÃO ALMEIDA. “Applicationof the Theory of games in People management: an analysis of variable salary.” 2012. Thesis, Universidade Metodista de São Paulo. Accessed February 26, 2021. http://ibict.metodista.br/tedeSimplificado/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=3226.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

SANTOS, JOÃO ALMEIDA. “Applicationof the Theory of games in People management: an analysis of variable salary.” 2012. Web. 26 Feb 2021.

Vancouver:

SANTOS JA. Applicationof the Theory of games in People management: an analysis of variable salary. [Internet] [Thesis]. Universidade Metodista de São Paulo; 2012. [cited 2021 Feb 26]. Available from: http://ibict.metodista.br/tedeSimplificado/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=3226.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

SANTOS JA. Applicationof the Theory of games in People management: an analysis of variable salary. [Thesis]. Universidade Metodista de São Paulo; 2012. Available from: http://ibict.metodista.br/tedeSimplificado/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=3226

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Open Access Theses and Dissertations