You searched for subject:(Moral Hazard).
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Iowa State University
1.
Yang, Youzhi.
Essays on Repated Moral Hazard.
Degree: 2009, Iowa State University
URL: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/10728 
► In Chapter 1, I study an infinitely repeated moral hazard problem in which the principal privately observes and publicly reports the agent's output, as in…
(more)
▼ In Chapter 1, I study an infinitely repeated moral hazard problem in which the principal privately observes and publicly reports the agent's output, as in Fuchs (2007). The role of the agent's private strategies, which depend on the history of his private efforts, is examined in providing incentives for the principal to be truthful. I show that in order for his effort history to work as an incentive device, the agent has to use a mixed strategy, since otherwise his efforts are predictable by the principal and thus, in effect, public information. However, hiding the agent's efforts from the principal incurs a non-negligible efficiency loss, which may, or may not be justified by the efficiency gain from the use of the agent's private strategies. Moreover, the agent's optimal strategy is shown to be consistent with empirical studies on how employees respond to subjective performance evaluations.
In Chapter 2, we studies an equilibrium model of the labor market with moral hazard in which jobs are dynamic contracts, job separations are terminations of optimal dynamic contracts, and terminations are used as an incentive device. Transitions from unemployment to new jobs are modeled as a process of matching and bargaining. Non-employed workers make consumption and saving decisions as in a typical growth model, but they must also decide whether or not to participate in the labor market. The equilibrium of the model is characterized. We then calibrate the model to the U.S. labor market to study quantitatively worker turnover, compensation dynamics and distribution. We show that the model can generate equilibrium wage dispersions similar to that in the data. Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2006) argue that standard search matching models can generate only a very small differential between the average wage and the lowest wage paid in the labor market.
Subjects/Keywords: Repeated Moral Hazard; Economics
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Yang, Y. (2009). Essays on Repated Moral Hazard. (Thesis). Iowa State University. Retrieved from https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/10728
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Yang, Youzhi. “Essays on Repated Moral Hazard.” 2009. Thesis, Iowa State University. Accessed December 07, 2019.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/10728.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Yang, Youzhi. “Essays on Repated Moral Hazard.” 2009. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Yang Y. Essays on Repated Moral Hazard. [Internet] [Thesis]. Iowa State University; 2009. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/10728.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Yang Y. Essays on Repated Moral Hazard. [Thesis]. Iowa State University; 2009. Available from: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/10728
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign
2.
Park, Hye Jin.
Three essays on economics of rehypothecation.
Degree: PhD, Economics, 2017, University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/98238
► In the first chapter of my thesis, I develop a theoretical model of rehypothecation,a practice in which financial institutions re-use or re-pledge collateral pledged by…
(more)
▼ In the first chapter of my thesis, I develop a theoretical model of rehypothecation,a practice in which financial institutions re-use or re-pledge collateral pledged by their clients for their own purposes. I show that rehypothecation has trade-off effects; it enhances provision of funding liquidity to the economy so that additional productive investments can be undertaken, but incurs deadweight cost by misallocating the asset among the agents when it fails.
Next, I show that the intermediary's choices of rehypothecation may not achieve a socially optimal outcome. The direction of the conflict between the objectives of the intermediary and social efficiency depends on haircuts of the contract between the intermediary and the borrower; if the contract involves over-collateralization, there tends to be an excessive use of rehypothecation by the intermediary, and if the contract involves under-collateralization, there tends to be an insufficient use of rehypothecation.
In the second chapter, I extend the previous model into a dynamic economy with aggregate uncertainty that financial intermediaries might default having repledged their clients' collateral. I discuss how individual reuse decisions, allocation of collateral, and aggregate output vary across (i) different temporary shocks and (ii) different persistent shocks. I show that when negative temporary shocks reduce the borrower's willingness to allow rehypothecation, the economy drops further, but it recovers faster. In addition, I show that a more protracted period of good shocks can lead to a greater fall in output in the future.
In the third chapter, I consider the competition between direct financing and rehypothecation. A borrower faces two alternative ways of financing: one option is to borrow funding directly from a cash holder (direct financing), another option is to borrow funding through an intermediary (indirect financing). With direct financing, the borrower delivers collateral directly to the cash holder with some transaction costs. With indirect financing, the borrower delivers collateral to the intermediary who then lends (rehypothecates) it to the cash holder, and this exposes the borrower with the risk of losing collateral in case that the intermediary defaults. I investigate how the severity of the borrower's
moral hazard problem affects the borrower's choice between these two alternative ways of financing. If the intermediary's default risk is exogenous, as the
moral hazard problem gets more severe, the borrower is less concerned about the default risk of the intermediary, resulting in indirect financing being chosen more frequently. However, if the intermediary's default risk is endogenous, as the
moral hazard problem gets more severe, the cost of indirect financing also increases, resulting in indirect financing not being chosen in both cases that the severity of the
moral hazard problem is too small or too large.
Advisors/Committee Members: Kahn, Charles M (advisor), Kahn, Charles M (Committee Chair), Bernhardt, Daniel M (committee member), Lemus, Jorge (committee member), Marshall, Guillermo (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Collateral; Rehypothecation; Moral hazard
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Park, H. J. (2017). Three essays on economics of rehypothecation. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2142/98238
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Park, Hye Jin. “Three essays on economics of rehypothecation.” 2017. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/2142/98238.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Park, Hye Jin. “Three essays on economics of rehypothecation.” 2017. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Park HJ. Three essays on economics of rehypothecation. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign; 2017. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/98238.
Council of Science Editors:
Park HJ. Three essays on economics of rehypothecation. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign; 2017. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/98238
Penn State University
3.
Durceylan Kaygusuz, Esra.
INDUSTRY DYNAMICS AND AGENCY.
Degree: PhD, Economics, 2008, Penn State University
URL: https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/9273
► This thesis empirically investigates the effects of agency problems on endogenous managerial effort, firm performance, corporate structure and industry-wide productivity. In the second chapter, I…
(more)
▼ This thesis empirically investigates the effects of
agency problems on endogenous managerial effort, firm performance,
corporate structure and industry-wide productivity. In the second
chapter, I develop an industrial evolution model with endogenous
managerial effort and endogenous organizational form. The model has
heterogeneous firms competing in a monopolistically competitive
market, endogenous entry and exit and aggregate uncertainty. It
also characterizes the relationship between a manager and an owner
by a long term dynamic contract. The structural model allows me to
quantify the changes in managerial behavior and distribution of
firms' organizational form and, as a result, the change in
aggregate productivity in response to heightened competitive
pressure. In chapter three, I estimate the model with exogenous
corporate structure. Two versions of the model are considered to be
able to demonstrate the differences in managerial responses when
the organizational forms are different. The first one is the model
where ownership is separated from management, the second is the one
in which managers own their firms. The model is estimated using
panel data on the Colombian Malt industry. With the estimated
parameters, counterfactual experiments are conducted to quantify
the importance of agency on endogenous effort and firm performance
The final chapter considers the model described in the first essay
with endogenous set of corporate structure. The model is simulated
with a plausible set of parameters that generate both corporations
and family owned firms in steady state equilibrium. The simulated
model is used to show that competitive pressures significantly
affects the organizational choice of owners. Heightened competitive
pressure induce firms to choose proprietorships over
corporations.
Subjects/Keywords: industry dynamics; moral hazard; productivity; efficiency;
agency
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Durceylan Kaygusuz, E. (2008). INDUSTRY DYNAMICS AND AGENCY. (Doctoral Dissertation). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/9273
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Durceylan Kaygusuz, Esra. “INDUSTRY DYNAMICS AND AGENCY.” 2008. Doctoral Dissertation, Penn State University. Accessed December 07, 2019.
https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/9273.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Durceylan Kaygusuz, Esra. “INDUSTRY DYNAMICS AND AGENCY.” 2008. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Durceylan Kaygusuz E. INDUSTRY DYNAMICS AND AGENCY. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Penn State University; 2008. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/9273.
Council of Science Editors:
Durceylan Kaygusuz E. INDUSTRY DYNAMICS AND AGENCY. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Penn State University; 2008. Available from: https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/9273
Universidade Nova
4.
Gonçalves, Jorge Diogo Barreiros.
Bank capital and stock performance around the subprime lending risis.
Degree: 2013, Universidade Nova
URL: http://www.rcaap.pt/detail.jsp?id=oai:run.unl.pt:10362/11598
► A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business…
(more)
▼ A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics
This empirical study observes the relationship between bank capital and stock performance when an unexpected negative shock materializes to bank value. The analysis covers the three months after the collapse of Lehman Brothers on the 15th September 2008, using the holding period stock return as the dependent variable. With data from the US largest commercial banking and saving and loans institutions, we constructed a multiple regression model and performed several estimations using different definitions of bank capital. Our conclusions are consistent with the premise that better capitalized banks are in a better position to withstand the negative impacts of a disruptive financial event, such as the Lehman collapse, and therefore are susceptible to smaller stock price declines. We also find evidence that simpler and more conservative capital ratios are perceived by equity market participants as more accurate measures of bank health relative to regulatory risk based ratios. Therefore, our results provide support to the inclusion of simpler capital ratios that rely on balance sheet information to bank regulatory frameworks.
Advisors/Committee Members: Ferreira, Miguel.
Subjects/Keywords: Bank capital; Subprime lending crisis; moral hazard
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APA (6th Edition):
Gonçalves, J. D. B. (2013). Bank capital and stock performance around the subprime lending risis. (Thesis). Universidade Nova. Retrieved from http://www.rcaap.pt/detail.jsp?id=oai:run.unl.pt:10362/11598
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Gonçalves, Jorge Diogo Barreiros. “Bank capital and stock performance around the subprime lending risis.” 2013. Thesis, Universidade Nova. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://www.rcaap.pt/detail.jsp?id=oai:run.unl.pt:10362/11598.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Gonçalves, Jorge Diogo Barreiros. “Bank capital and stock performance around the subprime lending risis.” 2013. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Gonçalves JDB. Bank capital and stock performance around the subprime lending risis. [Internet] [Thesis]. Universidade Nova; 2013. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://www.rcaap.pt/detail.jsp?id=oai:run.unl.pt:10362/11598.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Gonçalves JDB. Bank capital and stock performance around the subprime lending risis. [Thesis]. Universidade Nova; 2013. Available from: http://www.rcaap.pt/detail.jsp?id=oai:run.unl.pt:10362/11598
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Rice University
5.
Atanasov, Iliya.
Delegation, Agency and Competitive Representation.
Degree: PhD, Social Sciences, 2015, Rice University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/87702
► Traditional agency models focus on the conceptual line of delegation running from principal to agent. The more information about agents’ preferences and actions, the better…
(more)
▼ Traditional agency models focus on the conceptual line of delegation running from principal to agent. The more information about agents’ preferences and actions, the better able the principals to use selection and sanctioning to achieve desirable outcomes. Following this conventional wisdom, institutional transparency is viewed as an unequivocal good and representative democracy as built on delegation and control. However, this is an incomplete picture at best.
Game-theoretic and case analysis shows that the elevation of the elected European Parliament as a legislative chamber coequal to the intergovernmental Council of the European Union may be a ruse to undermine lobbyist influence by diluting formal responsibility. Less transparency in decision-making may help align EU policy closer to broader societal objectives. The Commission, perhaps most heavily influenced by special interests, and not Council has lost clout in the legislative process as a result of the changes.
In several generalized noncooperative formal settings with information asymmetries, delegation can work for principals only if the set of potential agents is diverse. Not only does selection dominate sanctioning as a control mechanism, but the very existence of compliance equilibria is contingent upon the a priori arrangement of candidate agents’ policy preferences relative to one another and to the principals’. The principal–agent relationship is dependent on and may be only secondary to between-agent competition. This insight has far-reaching implications for a number of research programs within political science.
Schumpeter viewed modern democracy as a system where elites compete for the support of the masses. This conceptualization suggests a new path towards sustainable democratization. Building elite capacity in undemocratic conditions through institutionalized, if unfair, competition may be a more effective approach than parachuting fully democratic institutions in an unreceptive environment. Empirical analysis of over two hundred years of data shows that states with competitive political institutions, regardless of whether those are democratic, are most likely to develop and sustain full-fledged democracy.
Advisors/Committee Members: Stevenson, Randolph T. (advisor), Hamm, Keith E. (committee member), Dobelman, John (committee member), Martin, Lanny (committee member), Tang, Xun (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: moral hazard; adverse selection; political capital
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Atanasov, I. (2015). Delegation, Agency and Competitive Representation. (Doctoral Dissertation). Rice University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1911/87702
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Atanasov, Iliya. “Delegation, Agency and Competitive Representation.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, Rice University. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/1911/87702.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Atanasov, Iliya. “Delegation, Agency and Competitive Representation.” 2015. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Atanasov I. Delegation, Agency and Competitive Representation. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Rice University; 2015. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/87702.
Council of Science Editors:
Atanasov I. Delegation, Agency and Competitive Representation. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Rice University; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/87702
University of Rochester
6.
Kim, Yunjeen.
Bank bailouts and moral hazard? : evidence from banks'
investment and financing decisions.
Degree: PhD, 2014, University of Rochester
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/28468
► The goal of this paper is to estimate a dynamic model of a bank to explain how bank bailouts exacerbate moral hazard. In the model,…
(more)
▼ The goal of this paper is to estimate a dynamic
model of a bank to explain how bank bailouts exacerbate moral
hazard. In the model, a bank makes an endogenous choice of the
risks of its investments and can finance these investments by
deposits and risky debt. I estimate nine model parameters that
characterize a bank's behavior. For the full sample of U.S. banks,
I estimate the expected bailout probability, conditional on
bankruptcy, to be 52%. The estimated conditional bailout
probabilities for small and large banks are 36% and 76%,
respectively. The model predicts that rescue funding constitutes
4.2% of total assets, which is very close to the actual capital
injection, 4.4% of total assets, made by the U.S. government under
the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The simulation
results show that a bank with a higher bailout belief takes more
risks, especially when it is very close to
bankruptcy.
Subjects/Keywords: Bailouts; Banks; Moral Hazard; Risk-taking
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APA ·
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Kim, Y. (2014). Bank bailouts and moral hazard? : evidence from banks'
investment and financing decisions. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Rochester. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1802/28468
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Kim, Yunjeen. “Bank bailouts and moral hazard? : evidence from banks'
investment and financing decisions.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Rochester. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/1802/28468.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Kim, Yunjeen. “Bank bailouts and moral hazard? : evidence from banks'
investment and financing decisions.” 2014. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Kim Y. Bank bailouts and moral hazard? : evidence from banks'
investment and financing decisions. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2014. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/28468.
Council of Science Editors:
Kim Y. Bank bailouts and moral hazard? : evidence from banks'
investment and financing decisions. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/28468
University of Helsinki
7.
Ahtonen, Tommi.
Moral-hazard-ongelman ratkaiseminen franchisingsopimuksissa.
Degree: Department of Political Science; Helsingfors universitet, Allmän statslära, Institutionen för, 2002, University of Helsinki
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/10713
► Tutkielmassa tarkastellaan franchisingsopimuksiin liittyvää moral-hazard-ongelmaa. Lisäksi analysoidaan franchisingtoimintamallin esiintymiseen liittyviä tekijöitä. Tutkielman teoreettinen viitekehys rakentuu kaksipuolisen moral-hazard-mallin sekä empiiristen tutkimusten pohjalta. Franchising on yksi yrittäjyyden…
(more)
▼ Tutkielmassa tarkastellaan franchisingsopimuksiin liittyvää moral-hazard-ongelmaa. Lisäksi analysoidaan franchisingtoimintamallin esiintymiseen liittyviä tekijöitä. Tutkielman teoreettinen viitekehys rakentuu kaksipuolisen moral-hazard-mallin sekä empiiristen tutkimusten pohjalta. Franchising on yksi yrittäjyyden muoto, joka perustuu kahden itsenäisen yrityksen väliseen yhteistyöhön. Franchisingtoimintamallissa päämies (franchisingantaja) luovuttaa agentille (franchisingyrittäjä) oikeuden käyttää omistamaansa liikeideaa tai tuotemerkkiä. Vastikkeena tästä agentti maksaa päämiehelle korvauksen sekä sitoutuu noudattamaan liiketoiminnassaan franchisingketjun laatuvaatimuksia. Franchisingsopimuksen vallitseva teoreettinen tutkimussuunta muodostuu moral-hazard-ongelman ratkaisemisesta. Kahdensuuntaisen moral-hazard-mallin ydin on siinä, että päämies ja agentti eivät voi havaita toistensa panoksia, jotka vaikuttavat lopputuotteen kysyntään. Päämiehen panos tuotemerkkiin ja agentin lisäämä arvo lopputuotteeseen (mm. palvelu) ovat tekijöitä, joita ei voi havaita. Tällöin oman edun tavoittelu yhteisen edun sijaan johtaa kummankin osapuolen houkutukseen laistaa sopimuksen velvoitteista. Agentille tulee houkutus vapaamatkustaa vertikaalisesti päämiehen tuotemerkillä tai horisontaalisesti muiden agenttien kustannuksella. Päämiehelle puolestaan tulee houkutus laistaa investoinneista tuotemerkkiin. Franchisingsopimuksen pitää antaa riittävät kannusteet molemmille osapuolille toimia tehokkaasti ja välttää velvoitteiden laiminlyöntiä. Moral-hazard-ongelma voidaan ratkaista pääsääntöisesti voitonjakosopimuksella. Osapuolet jakavat tällöin toimipisteen tuotot. Sopimuksen ytimenä on ensisijaisesti sopimuksentekohetkellä maksettava aloitusmaksu agentilta päämiehelle sekä jatkuvat maksut eli rojaltit. Päämies voi lisäksi monitoroida agenttia, mikäli voitonjakosopimus yksinään ei riittävästi kannusta agenttia toimimaan tehokkaasti. Pääosiltaan empiiriset työt tukevat kaksipuolista moral-hazard-mallia. Empiiriset tutkimukset tuovat myös esiin toimialan luonteen sekä taloudellisen ympäristön vaikutuksen franchisingtoimintamallin esiintymiseen. Empiirinen aineisto osoittaa lisäksi, että organisaatiomuodon valintaan vaikuttavat toimipisteiden maantieteellinen hajanaisuus sekä korkeat monitorointikustannukset. Päämiehet, joilla on vahva tuotemerkki ja jotka toimivat työvoimavaltaisella alalla, suosivat tutkitusti franchisingia organisaatiomuotona. Franchisingtoimintamallin esiintymiseen ja sopimuksen ehtoihin vaikuttaa ennen kaikkea päämiehen ja agentin panosten välinen suhteellinen painoarvo. Mitä vahvempi panos osapuolella on, sitä paremmat ehdot hän saa franchisingsopimukseen. Tutkielman tärkeimmät lähteet ovat Mathewsonin ja Winterin, Bhattachryyaan ja Lafontainen sekä Lalin teoreettiset artikkelit. Lisäksi tutkielmassa käytetään useita aiheeseen liittyviä empiirisiä tutkimuksia.
Endast sammandrag. Inbundna avhandlingar kan sökas i Helka-databasen (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Elektroniska kopior av…
Subjects/Keywords: franchising; moral hazard; agenttiteoria; franchising; moral hazard; agenttiteoria
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Ahtonen, T. (2002). Moral-hazard-ongelman ratkaiseminen franchisingsopimuksissa. (Masters Thesis). University of Helsinki. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10138/10713
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Ahtonen, Tommi. “Moral-hazard-ongelman ratkaiseminen franchisingsopimuksissa.” 2002. Masters Thesis, University of Helsinki. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/10138/10713.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Ahtonen, Tommi. “Moral-hazard-ongelman ratkaiseminen franchisingsopimuksissa.” 2002. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Ahtonen T. Moral-hazard-ongelman ratkaiseminen franchisingsopimuksissa. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Helsinki; 2002. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/10713.
Council of Science Editors:
Ahtonen T. Moral-hazard-ongelman ratkaiseminen franchisingsopimuksissa. [Masters Thesis]. University of Helsinki; 2002. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/10713
8.
Svensson, Elin.
Minimering av informationsasymmetri mellan investerare och entreprenör : En fallstudie av tre svenska Venture Kapitalister.
Degree: Business Studies, 2016, Södertörn University
URL: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-32186
► Studiens syfte: Denna studie har som syfte att undersöka hur svenska venture capital aktörer minimerar asymmetrisk information i samarbetsprocessen med entreprenören. Metod: Studien är av fallstudiedesign…
(more)
▼ Studiens syfte: Denna studie har som syfte att undersöka hur svenska venture capital aktörer minimerar asymmetrisk information i samarbetsprocessen med entreprenören. Metod: Studien är av fallstudiedesign med kvalitativ ansats där semistrukturerade intervjuer samt enkät med slutna frågor har använts för att samla in data. Empiri: Det empiriska materialet visar hur tre svenska venture capital aktörer noggrant och effektivt väljer investeringsobjekt och sedan arbetar aktivt för att dessa bolag ska bli så bra som möjligt. Slutsats: Studien visar att svenska venture capital aktörer använder sig av en kombination av olika verktyg och att bygga förtroende mellan de olika parterna för att minimera risken med asymmetrisk information.
Purpose: The aim of this study is to examine how the Swedish venture capital operators minimize the asymmetric information that may occur during an investment process. Method: This study has a case study design using a qualitative approach in which semi- structured interviews and a questionnaire with closed-end questions were used to collect data. Research: The empirical data shows how Swedish Venture Capital operators accurately and efficiently selects investment targets and then actively work for the companies they invest in. Conclusion: The main result of this investigation is that Swedish venture capital operators use a combination of different tools and trust to minimize the risk of asymmetric information.
Subjects/Keywords: Private Equity; venture capital; asymmetric information; Moral Hazard; Agency Theory; Private equity; venture capital; asymmetrisk information; Moral Hazard; Agency theory
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Svensson, E. (2016). Minimering av informationsasymmetri mellan investerare och entreprenör : En fallstudie av tre svenska Venture Kapitalister. (Thesis). Södertörn University. Retrieved from http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-32186
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Svensson, Elin. “Minimering av informationsasymmetri mellan investerare och entreprenör : En fallstudie av tre svenska Venture Kapitalister.” 2016. Thesis, Södertörn University. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-32186.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Svensson, Elin. “Minimering av informationsasymmetri mellan investerare och entreprenör : En fallstudie av tre svenska Venture Kapitalister.” 2016. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Svensson E. Minimering av informationsasymmetri mellan investerare och entreprenör : En fallstudie av tre svenska Venture Kapitalister. [Internet] [Thesis]. Södertörn University; 2016. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-32186.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Svensson E. Minimering av informationsasymmetri mellan investerare och entreprenör : En fallstudie av tre svenska Venture Kapitalister. [Thesis]. Södertörn University; 2016. Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-32186
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
9.
Carin Maribel Koetz Diniz da Costa.
A influêcnia do incentivo no comportamento oportunista de risco moral: uma análise experimental.
Degree: 2009, Universidade do Vale do Itajaí
URL: http://www6.univali.br/tede/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=747
► Os conflitos advindos das divergências de interesses entre a empresa e os seus administradores têm sido objeto de estudo no contexto organizacional. Um dos problemas…
(more)
▼ Os conflitos advindos das divergências de interesses entre a empresa e os seus administradores têm sido objeto de estudo no contexto organizacional. Um dos problemas relacionado a estes conflitos é o risco moral, o qual caracteriza-se por um comportamento oportunista da parte do administrador após o contrato ter sido firmado. A fim de minimizar este problema, os proprietários da empresa podem utilizar-se de incentivos, os quais têm a importante função de alinhar os interesses do administrador aos seus próprios, minimizando o risco moral e estabelecendo uma posição de vantagem competitiva para a empresa. O objetivo deste trabalho consiste em analisar a influência do tipo de incentivo (pecuniário, não pecuniário e misto) no comportamento de risco moral do administrador. O método utilizado foi um quase-experimento, o qual foi aplicado em duplas e em três rodadas, contemplando os três tipos distintos de incentivos. Os resultados demonstraram que o tipo de incentivo não influenciou, de forma significativa, nas respostas dos pesquisados. Porém, um efeito interativo, advindo do não conhecimento prévio do parceiro, foi detectado na relação entre o tipo de incentivo e a intenção de risco moral, provocando um aumento significativo quando o incentivo pecuniário foi utilizado.
Conflicts arising from differences in interests between the company and its directors have been the object of study in the organizational context. One of the problems related to these conflicts is moral hazard, which is characterized as an opportunistic behavior on the part of the manager, after the contract has been signed. In order to minimize this problem, the companys owner may use incentives, which have the important function of aligning the managers interests with his or her own, reducing the moral hazard and establishing a position of competitive advantage for the company. The objective of this paper is to analyze the influence of type of incentive (monetary, non-monetary, or mixed) on the managers moral hazard behavior. The method used was a quasi-experiment, which was applied in pairs and in three rounds, which included three different types of incentive. The results show that the type of incentive does not significantly influence the respondents answers. However, an interactive effect, arising from a lack of prior knowledge of the partner, was detected in the relationship between type of incentive and intention of moral hazard, leading to a significant increase when a monetary incentive was used
Advisors/Committee Members: Anete Alberton, Rosilene Marcon.
Subjects/Keywords: risco moral; incentivos; teoria da agência; ADMINISTRACAO; moral hazard; incent ives; agency theory
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Costa, C. M. K. D. d. (2009). A influêcnia do incentivo no comportamento oportunista de risco moral: uma análise experimental. (Thesis). Universidade do Vale do Itajaí. Retrieved from http://www6.univali.br/tede/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=747
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Costa, Carin Maribel Koetz Diniz da. “A influêcnia do incentivo no comportamento oportunista de risco moral: uma análise experimental.” 2009. Thesis, Universidade do Vale do Itajaí. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://www6.univali.br/tede/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=747.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Costa, Carin Maribel Koetz Diniz da. “A influêcnia do incentivo no comportamento oportunista de risco moral: uma análise experimental.” 2009. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Costa CMKDd. A influêcnia do incentivo no comportamento oportunista de risco moral: uma análise experimental. [Internet] [Thesis]. Universidade do Vale do Itajaí; 2009. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://www6.univali.br/tede/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=747.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Costa CMKDd. A influêcnia do incentivo no comportamento oportunista de risco moral: uma análise experimental. [Thesis]. Universidade do Vale do Itajaí; 2009. Available from: http://www6.univali.br/tede/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=747
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Uppsala University
10.
Piehl, Helena.
Västvärldens hantering av utvecklingsländernas skulder – att hjälpa eller att stjälpa.
Degree: Economics, 2008, Uppsala University
URL: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-9251
► Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att klargöra hur omvärlden hanterar det skuldproblem som blir allt mer omfattande i många utvecklingsländer. Många afrikanska länder…
(more)
▼ Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att klargöra hur omvärlden hanterar det skuldproblem som blir allt mer omfattande i många utvecklingsländer. Många afrikanska länder söder om Sahara har fastnat i en fattigdomsfälla och är i desperat behov av förändring. Det globala finansiella systemet, med IMF i spetsen, har uppmärksammat detta problem och genom omstruktureringar och avskrivningar av skulderna vill de ge länderna en möjlighet att komma på fötter igen. Många svårigheter uppkommer när externa parter kommer in och ska lösa skuldproblemen åt länderna. Hänsyn måste tas till de som har givit lånen, såväl som till de skuldsatta ländernas ekonomiska struktur. Min frågeställning i denna uppsats rör hur det finansiella systemet hanterar skuldkrisen och om det skulle kunna finnas bättre alternativ till de processer som används idag. Genom min avhandling kom jag fram till att det kommer att krävas att en extern part är närvarande i förhandlingarna mellan långivare och låntagare för att undvika obalans och orättvisa. Det som framförallt måste ändras är dock att göra de huvudsakliga aktörerna, långivarna och låntagarna, mer delaktiga i processerna för att bättre resultat ska uppnås.
Subjects/Keywords: Skuldhantering; IMF; moral hazard; internationella bailouts; långivar- och låntagaransvar; Economics; Nationalekonomi
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APA ·
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Piehl, H. (2008). Västvärldens hantering av utvecklingsländernas skulder – att hjälpa eller att stjälpa. (Thesis). Uppsala University. Retrieved from http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-9251
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Piehl, Helena. “Västvärldens hantering av utvecklingsländernas skulder – att hjälpa eller att stjälpa.” 2008. Thesis, Uppsala University. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-9251.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Piehl, Helena. “Västvärldens hantering av utvecklingsländernas skulder – att hjälpa eller att stjälpa.” 2008. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Piehl H. Västvärldens hantering av utvecklingsländernas skulder – att hjälpa eller att stjälpa. [Internet] [Thesis]. Uppsala University; 2008. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-9251.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Piehl H. Västvärldens hantering av utvecklingsländernas skulder – att hjälpa eller att stjälpa. [Thesis]. Uppsala University; 2008. Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-9251
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Uppsala University
11.
Sunnanängs, Johan.
Bonusar och finanskrisen : kan ett bonusstopp minska risken för finansiella kriser?.
Degree: Economics, 2010, Uppsala University
URL: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-113344
► Denna litteraturstudie avser reda ut den eventuella kopplingen mellan bonus och dagens finanskris samt undersöka om ett bonusstopp för bankanställda kan minska risken för…
(more)
▼ Denna litteraturstudie avser reda ut den eventuella kopplingen mellan bonus och dagens finanskris samt undersöka om ett bonusstopp för bankanställda kan minska risken för en framtida finansiell kris. Uppsatsen inleds med en förklaring av bankväsendets särart och vikten av ett statligt skyddsnät. Senare avhandlas relevant bonusteori och moral hazard, därefter en redogörelse för bonusens betydelse i finanskrisen. Vidare utreds bonusprogrammens inverkan i svenska bankers expansion i Baltikum. Vi har kommit fram till att belöningsstrukturen inom finansbranschen har varit felaktigt utformad då dessa belönat kortsiktiga vinster på riskfyllda affärer. Detta har varit en av orsakerna till subprimekrisen. Ett bonusstopp minskar därför risken för liknande finansiella kriser men kan däremot inte helt eliminera risken för finanskriser.
Subjects/Keywords: bonus; finanskris; subprime; risk; moral hazard; Economics; Nationalekonomi
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Sunnanängs, J. (2010). Bonusar och finanskrisen : kan ett bonusstopp minska risken för finansiella kriser?. (Thesis). Uppsala University. Retrieved from http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-113344
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Sunnanängs, Johan. “Bonusar och finanskrisen : kan ett bonusstopp minska risken för finansiella kriser?.” 2010. Thesis, Uppsala University. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-113344.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Sunnanängs, Johan. “Bonusar och finanskrisen : kan ett bonusstopp minska risken för finansiella kriser?.” 2010. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Sunnanängs J. Bonusar och finanskrisen : kan ett bonusstopp minska risken för finansiella kriser?. [Internet] [Thesis]. Uppsala University; 2010. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-113344.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Sunnanängs J. Bonusar och finanskrisen : kan ett bonusstopp minska risken för finansiella kriser?. [Thesis]. Uppsala University; 2010. Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-113344
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
University of Utah
12.
Cai, Huan.
Collateral, two-dimensional moral hazard, and competition.
Degree: PhD, Business Administration, 2012, University of Utah
URL: http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd3/id/1917/rec/481
► This dissertation develops a theory on the use of costly collateral in a credit contract.Existing theories advocate the function of collateral as an incentive device…
(more)
▼ This dissertation develops a theory on the use of costly collateral in a credit contract.Existing theories advocate the function of collateral as an incentive device to reduce moralhazard. However, they do not distinguish between the effects of collateral on moral hazardregarding \risk-taking" from those on moral hazard regarding \shirking". I study amodel with two-dimensional moral hazard under two extreme market structures: perfectcompetition and monopoly.In the section \Risk-taking Moral Hazard" (Section 5), I isolate the effects of risk-takingfrom those of shirking. I also study adverse selection in which consumer has one of two types(good types and bad types). In the model, banks choose not to use collateral to mitigaterisk-taking moral hazard. In a perfectly competitive market, there is a unique separatingequilibrium with zero collateral for the bad-type borrower and positive collateral for thegood-type. I show that the latter is caused by adverse selection. In the pure monopolycase, zero collateral is optimal for both types.In the section \Shirking Moral Hazard" (Section 6), I consider shirking moral hazardwith a continuum of eort levels, but no adverse selection. In this case, the second-besteffort level depends on the trade-off between the marginal benefit of effort (in terms ofincreasing expected return of the agent's project) and the marginal cost (in terms of reducinglimited-liability rents). When collateral is not very costly, it is possible that the good-typeborrower exerts effort at a level that is higher than the rst-best, regardless of the marketstructure. In addition, a lower cost of collateral and/or more competition can improvePareto efficiency of social welfare.In the section \Two-Dimensional Moral Hazard" (Section 7), I extend my results tothe case in which both types of moral hazard exist. Regardless of the market structure, Ishow that collateral is not used to mitigate risk-taking but to encourage a more efficienteffort level. But when the optimal collateral to induce eort happens to be higher than theinterest rate, collateral also reduces risk-taking as a side effect.
Subjects/Keywords: Adverse Selection; Collateral; Competition; Debt Contract; Moral Hazard
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APA ·
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Cai, H. (2012). Collateral, two-dimensional moral hazard, and competition. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Utah. Retrieved from http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd3/id/1917/rec/481
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Cai, Huan. “Collateral, two-dimensional moral hazard, and competition.” 2012. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Utah. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd3/id/1917/rec/481.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Cai, Huan. “Collateral, two-dimensional moral hazard, and competition.” 2012. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Cai H. Collateral, two-dimensional moral hazard, and competition. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Utah; 2012. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd3/id/1917/rec/481.
Council of Science Editors:
Cai H. Collateral, two-dimensional moral hazard, and competition. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Utah; 2012. Available from: http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd3/id/1917/rec/481
University of Utah
13.
Reyes, Gustavo Adolfo.
The use of brokered deposits and its relation to bank failure: the case of industrial banks.
Degree: MS, Economics, 2013, University of Utah
URL: http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd3/id/2358/rec/2711
► As a result of the Great Recession of 2007-2009, the financial services industry came under intense government scrutiny that resulted in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street…
(more)
▼ As a result of the Great Recession of 2007-2009, the financial services industry came under intense government scrutiny that resulted in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank). As part of Dodd-Frank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was required to conduct a study on the use of brokered deposits and its effect on insurance premiums to be completed by July 2011. Across the banking sector, industrial banks are the primary users of brokered deposits and yet no industrial banks failed during the Great Recession. This thesis reviews the literature on industrial banks to help explain how this group of banks endured the effects of the Great Recession. A select data set from FDIC Call Reports will show how the existing regulation of brokered deposits provided the correct incentives to deter moral hazard issues that cause bank failures.
Subjects/Keywords: Bank Failure; Brokered Deposits; Call Reports; FDIC; Industrial Banks; Moral Hazard
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Reyes, G. A. (2013). The use of brokered deposits and its relation to bank failure: the case of industrial banks. (Masters Thesis). University of Utah. Retrieved from http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd3/id/2358/rec/2711
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Reyes, Gustavo Adolfo. “The use of brokered deposits and its relation to bank failure: the case of industrial banks.” 2013. Masters Thesis, University of Utah. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd3/id/2358/rec/2711.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Reyes, Gustavo Adolfo. “The use of brokered deposits and its relation to bank failure: the case of industrial banks.” 2013. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Reyes GA. The use of brokered deposits and its relation to bank failure: the case of industrial banks. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Utah; 2013. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd3/id/2358/rec/2711.
Council of Science Editors:
Reyes GA. The use of brokered deposits and its relation to bank failure: the case of industrial banks. [Masters Thesis]. University of Utah; 2013. Available from: http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/etd3/id/2358/rec/2711
Texas A&M University
14.
Wang, Wen-Yao.
Essays on Banking Crises and Deposit Insurance.
Degree: 2009, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2932
► My research focuses on the reasons for banking crises and the corresponding policy rules that could help prevent such crises. This abstract briefly reviews the…
(more)
▼ My research focuses on the reasons for banking crises and the corresponding policy rules
that could help prevent such crises. This abstract briefly reviews the two essays in my
dissertation. The first essay focuses on the optimal mechanism design of the deposit
insurance system while the second essay studies the impact of international illiquidity on
domestic banking crises.
The Recent Deposit Insurance Reform in the U.S. raised the coverage limit for
certain types of deposits. In chapter II, I study the optimal coverage limit in a model of
deposit insurance in the banking system. Because of the coverage limit, depositors have
incentives to monitor the bank?s risk-taking behavior, threatening banks with the
withdrawal of deposits if necessary. The model includes risk-taking banks,
heterogeneous depositors, and a benevolent insurance company providing deposit
insurance. I find that partial coverage combined with risk-sensitive premia in the
presence of capital requirements can improve social welfare and manage banks? risktaking
behavior. Moreover, when a partial coverage limit is in place, banks are better off
by finding a balance between the higher premia and the depositors? monitoring and
withdrawals.
Unlike chapter II, chapter III focuses on the role played by international
illiquidity. I build a dynamic general equilibrium model (DGEM) of a small, open
economy. The features I include in the model are nontrivial demands for fiat currencies,
unanticipated sunspots, and financial/banking crises originated by sudden stops of foreign capital inflows are. This chapter gives us a better understanding of the
performance of alternative exchange rate regimes and associated monetary policies
under a simple setup. I show the existence of multiple equilibria that may be ranked
based on the presence of binding information constraints and on welfare. Moreover, I
show that a strong connection of the scope for existence and for indeterminacy of
equilibria with the underlying policy regime. I also find that the presence of binding
multiple reserve requirements help in reducing the scope for financial fragility and panic
equilibria.
Advisors/Committee Members: Gan, Li (advisor), Bessler, David (committee member), Hernandez, Paula (committee member), Jansen, Dennis W. (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Moral hazard; Partial deposit insurance; Bank runs; Multiple reserve requirements
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Wang, W. (2009). Essays on Banking Crises and Deposit Insurance. (Thesis). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2932
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Wang, Wen-Yao. “Essays on Banking Crises and Deposit Insurance.” 2009. Thesis, Texas A&M University. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2932.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Wang, Wen-Yao. “Essays on Banking Crises and Deposit Insurance.” 2009. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Wang W. Essays on Banking Crises and Deposit Insurance. [Internet] [Thesis]. Texas A&M University; 2009. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2932.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Wang W. Essays on Banking Crises and Deposit Insurance. [Thesis]. Texas A&M University; 2009. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2932
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
NSYSU
15.
Hung, Chi-Yu.
The Issue of Incentive Contract Designs under Existential Experience: Taking Fund Manager as an Example.
Degree: Master, Economics, 2013, NSYSU
URL: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0616113-204850
► Abstract Based on the principal-agent theory, this study was undertaken to investigate the influence of incentive contracts while principal or agent under the different risk…
(more)
▼ Abstract
Based on the principal-agent theory, this study was undertaken to investigate the influence of incentive contracts while principal or agent under the different risk preferences. It further explored, the impact from cumulative effect of existential experience on cross-implications for incentive contracts under two periods. The results indicated that principal should consider risk appetite from themselves or their agent in the process of designing the incentive contracts, so as to achieve the purpose of effective incentive. In addition, in the intertemporal circumstance, the correlation between experience effect in single-period contract and its output is positive while the experience effect and its effort is negative. The result indicated that under the condition of guaranteed contract, fund manager meet
moral risk. For two- period fluctuated-incentive contract, the correlation between the experience effect and output is positive. The same level of efforts appeared that in cumulative effect of existential experience, the intertemporal incentive effect for two-period fluctuated-incentive contract is better than single fixed-terms incentive contract. However, the feature of two-period fluctuated-incentive contract cannot offer the guarantee to well-performing fund manager. Single fluctuated-incentive contract is a compromise way for the above two kinds of contracts. The model was derived to prove that single fluctuated- incentive contract can enhance the effect of intertemporal incentives for fund managers, as well as providing a stable intertemporal contract.
Advisors/Committee Members: Hai-tao Tsao (chair), Shan-non Tseng (chair), Tru-Gin Liu (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: risk averse; intertemporal incentive; Principal-Agent; incentive contract; moral hazard
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Hung, C. (2013). The Issue of Incentive Contract Designs under Existential Experience: Taking Fund Manager as an Example. (Thesis). NSYSU. Retrieved from http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0616113-204850
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Hung, Chi-Yu. “The Issue of Incentive Contract Designs under Existential Experience: Taking Fund Manager as an Example.” 2013. Thesis, NSYSU. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0616113-204850.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Hung, Chi-Yu. “The Issue of Incentive Contract Designs under Existential Experience: Taking Fund Manager as an Example.” 2013. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Hung C. The Issue of Incentive Contract Designs under Existential Experience: Taking Fund Manager as an Example. [Internet] [Thesis]. NSYSU; 2013. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0616113-204850.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Hung C. The Issue of Incentive Contract Designs under Existential Experience: Taking Fund Manager as an Example. [Thesis]. NSYSU; 2013. Available from: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0616113-204850
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
NSYSU
16.
Chen, Hou-geng.
Venture Capital Contracts with Moral Hazard.
Degree: Master, Economics, 2005, NSYSU
URL: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0811105-151610
► Abstract With a focus on the three contractsâranging from the common stock contract to the more sophisticated contracts of convertible debt and staged financing stock,…
(more)
▼ Abstract
With a focus on the three contractsâranging from the common stock contract to the more sophisticated contracts of convertible debt and staged financing stock, this study aims at studying the
moral hazard concerning a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur in their venture financing.
The two objectives of the present study are: to compare the optimal levels for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur when they are fully informed or when they are under
moral hazard, given that the two parties are in the same type of contract; to compare the optimal levels for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur of the three contracts.
This study intends to construct a utility maximum model for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur in the three contracts and to work out the optimal levels for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur when they are fully informed or when they are under
moral hazard.
The conclusion is as follows:
1. Of the three contracts, the optimal effort levels for a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur under full information are all larger than those under
moral hazard.
2. Of the three contracts, a venture capitalist and an entrepreneurâs optimal effort levels are: The optimal effort levels for convertible debt are larger than those for common stock, and the optimal effort levels for common stock are larger than those for staged financing stock.
Advisors/Committee Members: Jeun-sheng Lin (chair), Tru-gin Lau (chair), Shan-non Chin (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: moral hazard; venture capital
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APA (6th Edition):
Chen, H. (2005). Venture Capital Contracts with Moral Hazard. (Thesis). NSYSU. Retrieved from http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0811105-151610
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Chen, Hou-geng. “Venture Capital Contracts with Moral Hazard.” 2005. Thesis, NSYSU. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0811105-151610.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Chen, Hou-geng. “Venture Capital Contracts with Moral Hazard.” 2005. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Chen H. Venture Capital Contracts with Moral Hazard. [Internet] [Thesis]. NSYSU; 2005. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0811105-151610.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Chen H. Venture Capital Contracts with Moral Hazard. [Thesis]. NSYSU; 2005. Available from: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0811105-151610
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
NSYSU
17.
CHEN, GUANG.
Hold-up Problem and the Optimal Allocation of Control Right: From the Perspective of the Investor.
Degree: Master, Economics, 2016, NSYSU
URL: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0609116-135729
► The thesis analyzes the design of incomplete contract from the perspective of control right allocation to improve the efficiency of enterprise financing. It considers hold-up…
(more)
▼ The thesis analyzes the design of incomplete contract from the perspective of control right allocation to improve the efficiency of enterprise financing. It considers hold-up problems between manager and investor in enterprise financing from the standpoint of investor, analyzes the payoff rules of equilibrium with control right and chooses the optimal contract. In the equilibrium of a given control right, the thesis discovers that only two control allocations are optimal in equilibrium: either exclusive investor control or a contingent control allocation, which is the same as Yerramilli (2011). However, Yerramilli must make strict assumptions to analyze hold-up or renegotiation problems from the standpoint of manager. This thesis not only has no such disadvantages, but also makes the conditions of optimal contract more accurate and general. It is sufficient to improve and supplement Yerramilliâs model and fix some errors.
Advisors/Committee Members: Yuan-ho Hsu (chair), Shul-John Li (committee member), Chi-Chia, Hong (chair).
Subjects/Keywords: hold-up problem; moral hazard; Incomplete contract; control right; contingent control
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
CHEN, G. (2016). Hold-up Problem and the Optimal Allocation of Control Right: From the Perspective of the Investor. (Thesis). NSYSU. Retrieved from http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0609116-135729
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
CHEN, GUANG. “Hold-up Problem and the Optimal Allocation of Control Right: From the Perspective of the Investor.” 2016. Thesis, NSYSU. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0609116-135729.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
CHEN, GUANG. “Hold-up Problem and the Optimal Allocation of Control Right: From the Perspective of the Investor.” 2016. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
CHEN G. Hold-up Problem and the Optimal Allocation of Control Right: From the Perspective of the Investor. [Internet] [Thesis]. NSYSU; 2016. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0609116-135729.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
CHEN G. Hold-up Problem and the Optimal Allocation of Control Right: From the Perspective of the Investor. [Thesis]. NSYSU; 2016. Available from: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0609116-135729
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Universidade do Rio Grande do Sul
18.
Teixeira, Gibran da Silva.
Ensaios sobre o seguro desemprego no Brasil : teorias e evidências.
Degree: 2013, Universidade do Rio Grande do Sul
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10183/79110
► A presente tese de doutorado estuda duas questões referentes ao programa brasileiro de Seguro Desemprego: o impacto do benefício sobre o salário de reinserção dos…
(more)
▼ A presente tese de doutorado estuda duas questões referentes ao programa brasileiro de Seguro Desemprego: o impacto do benefício sobre o salário de reinserção dos trabalhadores beneficiados, bem como sobre o tempo de procura por emprego. No primeiro ensaio são apresentados alguns fatos estilizados referente ao problema de pesquisa, entre os quais destacam-se: i) Descrição Jurídica e os principais objetivos do Programa brasileiro de Seguro Desemprego; ii) O Status Quo do Programa Seguro Desemprego; iii) O Perfil do Trabalhador Beneficiado pelo Programa; iv) Salário de reinserção de trabalhadores contemplados e não contemplados pelo programa (2006-2009) com tempo de permanência no trabalho anterior entre um mês e onze meses; e v) Procura por emprego de trabalhadores contemplados e não contemplados pelo programa (2006-2010) com tempo de permanência no trabalho anterior entre um mês e onze meses. No segundo ensaio, avalia-se o impacto do benefício Seguro Desemprego sobre o salário de reinserção de seu público alvo, utilizando-se as Teorias de Job Search e do Capital Humano. Na estratégia empírica, utilizaram-se informações da Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílio - PNAD no período de 2006 a 2009, bem como o método de regressão com descontinuidade. Os resultados indicaram que para o período avaliado, o programa de Seguro Desemprego vai de encontro com as teorias, visto que não se mostrou estatisticamente significativo para influenciar o salário de reinserção dos beneficiados. No terceiro ensaio, destaca-se o impacto do benefício sobre o tempo de procura por trabalho, utilizando-se como referenciais teóricos os modelos de assimetria de informação, mais especificamente o modelo de Moral Hazard. Para análise empírica da presença do risco moral no programa, foram utilizadas informações da Pesquisa de Emprego e Desemprego - PED, no período de 2006 a 2010, e as estimativas baseadas no método de regressão com descontinuidade. Os resultados indicaram que o programa Seguro Desemprego influenciou a procura por emprego dos trabalhadores chefes de família e também dos considerados filhos. Portanto, no período avaliado, constata-se que a procura por trabalho foi realizada de modo menos intensivo pelos chefes de família e jovens que receberam o benefício, e pela inexistência de instrumentos de controle da procura por emprego por parte do Governo, a presença do risco moral acabou configurando-se no grupo de trabalhadores avaliados.
This doctoral thesis studies two issues of the Brazilian Unemployment Insurance program: the impact of the benefit on the reemployment wage of beneficiaries, as well as, job search time for reemployment. In the first test, some stylized facts regarding the research problem are presented, among which we highlight: i) Legal description and key objectives of the Brazilian Unemployment Insurance program; ii) The Status Quo of the Unemployment Insurance program; iii) Profile of the workers who benefit through the program; iv) Reemployment wage of workers, covered and not covered by the (2006-2009)…
Advisors/Committee Members: Balbinotto Neto, Giacomo.
Subjects/Keywords: Unemployment insurance; Seguro-desemprego; Brasil; Reemployment wage; Moral hazard; Discontinuity regression
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APA (6th Edition):
Teixeira, G. d. S. (2013). Ensaios sobre o seguro desemprego no Brasil : teorias e evidências. (Thesis). Universidade do Rio Grande do Sul. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10183/79110
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Teixeira, Gibran da Silva. “Ensaios sobre o seguro desemprego no Brasil : teorias e evidências.” 2013. Thesis, Universidade do Rio Grande do Sul. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/10183/79110.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Teixeira, Gibran da Silva. “Ensaios sobre o seguro desemprego no Brasil : teorias e evidências.” 2013. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Teixeira GdS. Ensaios sobre o seguro desemprego no Brasil : teorias e evidências. [Internet] [Thesis]. Universidade do Rio Grande do Sul; 2013. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10183/79110.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Teixeira GdS. Ensaios sobre o seguro desemprego no Brasil : teorias e evidências. [Thesis]. Universidade do Rio Grande do Sul; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10183/79110
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
19.
Olin, Brian.
Corporate Fraud And The Impact Of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Degree: Economics, 2005, University of Puget-Sound
URL: http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics_theses/23
;
http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics_theses/23
Subjects/Keywords: moral hazard; Enron; WorldCom; Economics
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APA (6th Edition):
Olin, B. (2005). Corporate Fraud And The Impact Of Sarbanes-Oxley. (Thesis). University of Puget-Sound. Retrieved from http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics_theses/23 ; http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics_theses/23
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Olin, Brian. “Corporate Fraud And The Impact Of Sarbanes-Oxley.” 2005. Thesis, University of Puget-Sound. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics_theses/23 ; http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics_theses/23.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Olin, Brian. “Corporate Fraud And The Impact Of Sarbanes-Oxley.” 2005. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Olin B. Corporate Fraud And The Impact Of Sarbanes-Oxley. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Puget-Sound; 2005. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics_theses/23 ; http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics_theses/23.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Olin B. Corporate Fraud And The Impact Of Sarbanes-Oxley. [Thesis]. University of Puget-Sound; 2005. Available from: http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics_theses/23 ; http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics_theses/23
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Georgia State University
20.
Yan, Zhiqiang.
Reinsurance Contracting with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: Theory and Evidence.
Degree: PhD, Risk Management and Insurance, 2009, Georgia State University
URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/rmi_diss/23
► This dissertation includes two essays on adverse selection and moral hazard problems in reinsurance markets. The first essay builds a competitive principal-agent model that considers…
(more)
▼ This dissertation includes two essays on adverse selection and
moral hazard problems in reinsurance markets. The first essay builds a competitive principal-agent model that considers adverse selection and
moral hazard jointly, and characterizes graphically various forms of separating Nash equilibria. In the second essay, we use panel data on U.S. property liability reinsurance for the period 1995-2000 to test for the existence of adverse selection and
moral hazard. We find that (1) adverse selection is present in private passenger auto liability reinsurance market and homeowners reinsurance market, but not in product liability reinsurance market; (2) residual
moral hazard does not exist in all the three largest lines of reinsurance, but is present in overall reinsurance markets; and (3)
moral hazard is present in the product liability reinsurance market, but not in the other two lines of reinsurance.
Advisors/Committee Members: Ajay Subramanian - Chair, Susan Laury, George Zanjani, Richard Phillips, Martin Grace.
Subjects/Keywords: contract theory; reinsurance market; adverse selection; moral hazard; asymmetric information; Insurance
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Yan, Z. (2009). Reinsurance Contracting with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: Theory and Evidence. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/rmi_diss/23
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Yan, Zhiqiang. “Reinsurance Contracting with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: Theory and Evidence.” 2009. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed December 07, 2019.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/rmi_diss/23.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Yan, Zhiqiang. “Reinsurance Contracting with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: Theory and Evidence.” 2009. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Yan Z. Reinsurance Contracting with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: Theory and Evidence. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2009. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/rmi_diss/23.
Council of Science Editors:
Yan Z. Reinsurance Contracting with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: Theory and Evidence. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2009. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/rmi_diss/23
Georgia State University
21.
Wen, Jian.
Essays on Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance Market.
Degree: PhD, Risk Management and Insurance, 2010, Georgia State University
URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/rmi_diss/25
► Essay One examines the asymmetric information problem between primary insurers and reinsurers in the reinsurance industry and contributes uniquely to the separation of adverse selection…
(more)
▼ Essay One examines the asymmetric information problem between primary insurers and reinsurers in the reinsurance industry and contributes uniquely to the separation of adverse selection from
moral hazard, if both are present. A two-period principal-agent model is set up to identify the signals of adverse selection and
moral hazard generated by the actions of the primary insurer and to provide a basis for corresponding hypotheses for empirical testing. Using data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and A.M. Best Company, the empirical tests show that the problem of adverse selection exists in the reinsurance market between the affiliated insurers and non-affiliated reinsurers, and even between closely related affiliated insurers and reinsurers. There is no evidence indicating the presence of
moral hazard in the reinsurance market.
To address the issue of soaring property insurance premiums and coverage availability in states that are
subject to hurricane risks, state and federal governments have not only regulated the private insurance market but have also intervened directly into markets by establishing government-funded insurance programs. With coexisting public and private insurance mechanisms and price regulation, the risk of cross subsidization and a subsequent
moral hazard problem may arise. By using data from the Florida Citizens Insurance Corporation, the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, the Flood Insurance and the private homeowner insurance market in Florida from 1998 to 2007, the second essay examines the
moral hazard problems arising from government regulation and involvement in the private insurance sector. In sum, the provision of national flood insurance is found to be positively related to the population growth in the state of Florida, which shows that state immigrants can take advantage of the lower cost of flood insurance when relocating in higher-risk areas. Further, we find that national flood insurance and the catastrophe fund complement the development of the private insurance sector, while the residual market hinders the development of private property insurance market.
Advisors/Committee Members: Martin F. Grace, Robert W. Klein, Mary Beth Walker, Zhiyong Liu.
Subjects/Keywords: adverse selection; moral hazard; reinsurance; catastrophe; insurance regulation; Insurance
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Wen, J. (2010). Essays on Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance Market. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/rmi_diss/25
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Wen, Jian. “Essays on Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance Market.” 2010. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed December 07, 2019.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/rmi_diss/25.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Wen, Jian. “Essays on Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance Market.” 2010. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Wen J. Essays on Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance Market. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2010. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/rmi_diss/25.
Council of Science Editors:
Wen J. Essays on Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance Market. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2010. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/rmi_diss/25
University of Victoria
22.
Liu, Bibo.
The mathematics of principal-agent problems.
Degree: Dept. of Mathematics and Statistics, 2010, University of Victoria
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1828/2518
► The principal-agent problem is an important model in the field of Economics of Information. In this thesis we study only a particular type of principal-agent…
(more)
▼ The principal-agent problem is an important model in the field of Economics of Information. In this thesis we study only a particular type of principal-agent problem which is called
moral hazard model and by the principal-agent problem we mean it is
moral hazard model. The
moral hazard model actually belongs to the class of bilevel programming problems in Mathematics. In Economics. the first order approach is used to reduce the principal-agent problem to a single level optimization problem. However, this approach is only valid under some strong conditions. Moreover the approach can only be used under the assumption that the optimal action of the principal-agent problem and its relaxed problem appears only at an interior point. In this thesis, we consider a new relaxed problem. Under more general assumptions. we can solve the principal-agent problem without restricting the optimal action of the agent to be in the interior.
Advisors/Committee Members: Ye, Juan Juan (supervisor).
Subjects/Keywords: Principal agent; Moral hazard; UVic Subject Index::Sciences and Engineering::Mathematics
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Liu, B. (2010). The mathematics of principal-agent problems. (Masters Thesis). University of Victoria. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1828/2518
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Liu, Bibo. “The mathematics of principal-agent problems.” 2010. Masters Thesis, University of Victoria. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/1828/2518.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Liu, Bibo. “The mathematics of principal-agent problems.” 2010. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Liu B. The mathematics of principal-agent problems. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Victoria; 2010. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1828/2518.
Council of Science Editors:
Liu B. The mathematics of principal-agent problems. [Masters Thesis]. University of Victoria; 2010. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1828/2518
Harvard University
23.
Andersen, Martin.
Consequences of Government Provision and Regulation of Health Insurance.
Degree: PhD, Health Policy, 2012, Harvard University
URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9876088
► The first two chapters of this dissertation concern the effect of public catastrophic insurance programs. In the first chapter, I show how these programs, which…
(more)
▼ The first two chapters of this dissertation concern the effect of public catastrophic insurance programs. In the first chapter, I show how these programs, which only protect against large health shocks, induce advantageous selection in private insurance. I use data on older Americans with Medicare insurance from the Health and Retirement Study to test if individuals with supplemental private health insurance are systematically lower-risk in states with public catastrophic insurance programs. I find that these programs decrease the average health risk for the privately insured by $700 and that a one standard deviation increase in an individual’s health risk decreases her probability of having private insurance by 4 percentage points. In the second chapter, I show that these programs reduce the incentive to invest in risk-reducing activities. I find large decreases in self-protection after a program is introduced and that individuals for whom the program is less generous are more likely to engage in self-protection. These effects are stronger for women than for men and apply to a variety of investments in health, including decisions about smoking, obesity, and cancer screening. The third chapter considers a different form of government intervention in insurance markets. In this chapter, I study laws mandating that employer-sponsored health insurance provide coverage for mental illness. I show that industries for which mental health coverage became more generous had larger increases in the average mental distress of their insured workforce. Part of the increase in generosity was due to regulations mandating coverage of mental health benefits. I then show that these regulations affected the behavior of individuals in the labor market—individuals who value more generous mental health benefits and switch jobs work longer hours after these regulations take effect, but individuals who do not value mental health benefits decrease their labor supply. These results are consistent with firms cutting back on their demand for labor due to the cost of the mandate, which leads to lower wages and a decrease in labor supply by individuals who do not value mental health benefits, but an increase in labor supply by individuals who do value mental
health benefits highly.
Advisors/Committee Members: McGuire, Thomas G. (advisor), Chandra, Amitabh (committee member), Newhouse, Joseph (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: mental health; moral hazard; prevention; economics; public policy; insurance; selection
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Andersen, M. (2012). Consequences of Government Provision and Regulation of Health Insurance. (Doctoral Dissertation). Harvard University. Retrieved from http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9876088
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Andersen, Martin. “Consequences of Government Provision and Regulation of Health Insurance.” 2012. Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9876088.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Andersen, Martin. “Consequences of Government Provision and Regulation of Health Insurance.” 2012. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Andersen M. Consequences of Government Provision and Regulation of Health Insurance. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Harvard University; 2012. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9876088.
Council of Science Editors:
Andersen M. Consequences of Government Provision and Regulation of Health Insurance. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Harvard University; 2012. Available from: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9876088
Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology
24.
Kukah, Augustine Senanu Komla.
“Investigating the causal relationships and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection on public-private-partnership construction projects”.
Degree: 2017, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology
URL: http://dspace.knust.edu.gh:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/10009
► Globally, failures of Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) contracts are more often than not ascribed to moral hazard and adverse selection problems, which arise under conditions of inadequate…
(more)
▼ Globally, failures of Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) contracts are more often than not ascribed to moral hazard and adverse selection problems, which arise under conditions of inadequate and asymmetric information when an agent is hired by a principal. Currently in Ghana, there is no law on PPP but rather a draft bill. This fact makes the tendency of moral hazard and adverse very high in PPP construction projects. The aim of this research was to investigate the causal relationship and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection on Public-Private-Partnership projects. Literature review was carried out and it explored the motivating factors for entering into Public-Private-Partnership construction projects; causes of moral hazard and adverse selection of PPP construction projects; effects of moral hazard and adverse selection on PPP construction projects and the causal relationships of moral hazard and adverse selection of PPP construction projects. Questionnaires were used to collect data from respondents in the Accra and Kumasi metropolis. Two hundred and ten (210) questionnaires were retrieved out of two hundred and eighty (280) distributed representing a response rate of seventy five percent. SPSS, STATA and AMOS softwares aided in the analysis of data. Analytical tools used were descriptive statistics, mean score ranking, ANOVA, one sample t-test and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). Reduction of public expenditures, faster delivery time of construction projects, achieving improved value for money (VFM), use of innovative materials and technologies and increased certainty of projects were the most significant motivations for the public sector entering into PPP construction projects. Furthermore, increase in accessible capital, gaining of profits, creation of goodwill for private partner, improvement in private sector’s international image and sharing of risks were the most significant motivations for the private sector entering into PPP construction projects. One way ANOVA was used to test the significance of perception among respondents in ranking these motivating factors for the public and private sectors. Effort dimensions which are not verifiable, low transfer of risk, lack of accurate information about project conditions, wrong party chosen to execute project and renegotiation of contracts were the most important causes of moral hazard and adverse selection problems in PPP construction projects. In addition, reduction of competition, high transaction costs, consequences on profitability of project, siphoning of funds and negative implications on enforceability of contract were the most important effects of moral hazard and adverse selection problems in PPP construction projects. One sample t-test was conducted on the causes and effects to establish the relative significance of these variables. SEM was used to explore the causal relationships between the causes and effects with causes being the independent variables (IV) and effects the dependent variables (DV). A model culminated out of these…
Subjects/Keywords: effects; projects; Moral hazard; Adverse selection; PPP; construction; Causal relationships
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APA (6th Edition):
Kukah, A. S. K. (2017). “Investigating the causal relationships and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection on public-private-partnership construction projects”. (Thesis). Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology. Retrieved from http://dspace.knust.edu.gh:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/10009
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Kukah, Augustine Senanu Komla. ““Investigating the causal relationships and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection on public-private-partnership construction projects”.” 2017. Thesis, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://dspace.knust.edu.gh:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/10009.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Kukah, Augustine Senanu Komla. ““Investigating the causal relationships and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection on public-private-partnership construction projects”.” 2017. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Kukah ASK. “Investigating the causal relationships and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection on public-private-partnership construction projects”. [Internet] [Thesis]. Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology; 2017. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://dspace.knust.edu.gh:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/10009.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Kukah ASK. “Investigating the causal relationships and effects of moral hazard and adverse selection on public-private-partnership construction projects”. [Thesis]. Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology; 2017. Available from: http://dspace.knust.edu.gh:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/10009
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Boston University
25.
Sen, Arup.
Incentives in the labor market: theory and evidence from the NBA.
Degree: PhD, Economics, 2013, Boston University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2144/15253
► This dissertation uses the institutional setup in the market for NBA players to test important hypotheses about how the labor market functions. Sports markets provide…
(more)
▼ This dissertation uses the institutional setup in the market for NBA players to test important hypotheses about how the labor market functions. Sports markets provide an ideal setting to study economic phenomena because of the wealth of publicly available information on productivity and compensation.
In Chapter one, I analyze the effort incentives created by the existence of long-term contracts that guarantee players a wage irrespective of performance. I use a panel of all NBA players from 1999 to 2007 to show that player performance improves as the expiration date of the current contract draws nearer. Players perform ten percent better in the last year of their contract than in the penultimate one, an effect attributable to their interest in gaining a new contract. Despite the adverse effort incentives, teams may still prefer to sign players to multi-period contracts because risk-averse players are willing to accept lower salaries in return for greater security.
In Chapter two, I use the fact that the NBA draft provides us with a quasi-natural experiment to analyze the impact of peers on player productivity and earnings. Using information for first round draft picks for a fourteen-year span I find that better teammates have a negative but statistically insignificant effect, on player performance. Teammate quality has a statistically and economically significant adverse impact on player wages. Thus the market appears to penalize players for having better teammates.
I focus on the NBA's push to raise the minimum age of entry into the league in Chapter three. This phenomenon seems surprising since one naturally expects employers to encourage and entrenched workers to discourage entry of new workers into the labor market, as this should push wages down. I construct a three-period theoretical model in which the surplus accruing to teams can be higher when entry is restricted, even if the average productivity of NBA players declines. In our setting this outcome is driven by the existence of a fixed wage for rookies, which implies that the rents extracted from new entrants increase when entry is restricted.
Subjects/Keywords: Economics; Contracts; NBA; Unraveling; Moral hazard; Peer effects
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Sen, A. (2013). Incentives in the labor market: theory and evidence from the NBA. (Doctoral Dissertation). Boston University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2144/15253
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Sen, Arup. “Incentives in the labor market: theory and evidence from the NBA.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, Boston University. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/2144/15253.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Sen, Arup. “Incentives in the labor market: theory and evidence from the NBA.” 2013. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Sen A. Incentives in the labor market: theory and evidence from the NBA. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Boston University; 2013. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2144/15253.
Council of Science Editors:
Sen A. Incentives in the labor market: theory and evidence from the NBA. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Boston University; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2144/15253
Uppsala University
26.
Tedeblad, Ida.
P-pilleranvändning och moral hazard : En paneldatastudie om unga kvinnors sexuella riskbeteende.
Degree: Economics, 2016, Uppsala University
URL: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-316188
► I denna studie analyseras hur en försäkring påverkar riskbeteende i en tidigare outforskad situation, med kvinnors sexuella riskbeteende i fokus. Hypotesen som undersöks i…
(more)
▼ I denna studie analyseras hur en försäkring påverkar riskbeteende i en tidigare outforskad situation, med kvinnors sexuella riskbeteende i fokus. Hypotesen som undersöks i studien är att ökad p-pilleranvändning leder till ökat riskbeteende. En sådan moral hazard-effekt förväntas när marginalkostnaden för oskyddat sex minskar vid p-pilleranvändning, eftersom risken för graviditet minskar. Klamydia används som mått för sexuellt riskbeteende eftersom könssjukdomen och oskyddat sex har ett direkt samband. För att urskilja sambandet används paneldata för p-pilleranvändning och klamydia på länsnivå för kvinnor 20-29 år under åren 2000-2014. Först används en modell med fixa effekter för att utnyttja variationen inom län, mellan län och över tid. Slutligen används en instrumentvariabel-modell där p- pilleranvändningen instrumenteras med p-pillersubventionen. Resultatet visar att ökad p- pilleranvändning leder till att ett ökat antal kvinnor smittas av klamydia. Studien bevisar att riskbeteendet ökar när marginalkostnaden för oskyddat sex minskar.
Subjects/Keywords: Riskbeteende. Moral hazard. P-piller. Preventivmedel. Subvention. Försäkring.; Social Sciences; Samhällsvetenskap
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APA (6th Edition):
Tedeblad, I. (2016). P-pilleranvändning och moral hazard : En paneldatastudie om unga kvinnors sexuella riskbeteende. (Thesis). Uppsala University. Retrieved from http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-316188
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Tedeblad, Ida. “P-pilleranvändning och moral hazard : En paneldatastudie om unga kvinnors sexuella riskbeteende.” 2016. Thesis, Uppsala University. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-316188.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Tedeblad, Ida. “P-pilleranvändning och moral hazard : En paneldatastudie om unga kvinnors sexuella riskbeteende.” 2016. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Tedeblad I. P-pilleranvändning och moral hazard : En paneldatastudie om unga kvinnors sexuella riskbeteende. [Internet] [Thesis]. Uppsala University; 2016. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-316188.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Tedeblad I. P-pilleranvändning och moral hazard : En paneldatastudie om unga kvinnors sexuella riskbeteende. [Thesis]. Uppsala University; 2016. Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-316188
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Delft University of Technology
27.
Van der Valk, R.J.A.
Why My Payment Got Rejected: A Method to Mine Payment Refusal Clues:.
Degree: 2015, Delft University of Technology
URL: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:9768c196-e490-4ad7-b9e1-0912c5ebf6a4
► A significant amount of payments fail for seemingly ‘mysterious’ reasons when refused by an issuer (i.e. cardholder’s bank). The technical and social complexities, such as…
(more)
▼ A significant amount of payments fail for seemingly ‘mysterious’ reasons when refused by an issuer (i.e. cardholder’s bank). The technical and social complexities, such as a principal-agent problem, hinder the development of policies or information architectures, which impose an issuer to share its ‘honest’ reason. In this thesis we propose a method to induce the authorisation decision rules which an issuer uses to refuse certain payments. We evaluate the method on a large database with payment transactions. Experts confirm the correctness and the completeness of the found rules. We experiment with strategies to act on the rules, which shows there is significant business value in the results. The results signal that there is a large potential which justifies further research to improve the method.
Advisors/Committee Members: Van den Berg, J., Janssen, M.F.W.H.A., Van der Voort, H.G., Hadžiosmanović, D., Tajalizadehkhoob, S., Oostdam, M.P.C., Lobbezoo, L.W.M..
Subjects/Keywords: payments; data mining; association rule mining; moral hazard; principal-agent problem
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Van der Valk, R. J. A. (2015). Why My Payment Got Rejected: A Method to Mine Payment Refusal Clues:. (Masters Thesis). Delft University of Technology. Retrieved from http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:9768c196-e490-4ad7-b9e1-0912c5ebf6a4
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Van der Valk, R J A. “Why My Payment Got Rejected: A Method to Mine Payment Refusal Clues:.” 2015. Masters Thesis, Delft University of Technology. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:9768c196-e490-4ad7-b9e1-0912c5ebf6a4.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Van der Valk, R J A. “Why My Payment Got Rejected: A Method to Mine Payment Refusal Clues:.” 2015. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Van der Valk RJA. Why My Payment Got Rejected: A Method to Mine Payment Refusal Clues:. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2015. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:9768c196-e490-4ad7-b9e1-0912c5ebf6a4.
Council of Science Editors:
Van der Valk RJA. Why My Payment Got Rejected: A Method to Mine Payment Refusal Clues:. [Masters Thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2015. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:9768c196-e490-4ad7-b9e1-0912c5ebf6a4
Delft University of Technology
28.
Eikelboom, C.T.C.
Peer monitoring in managing moral hazard: An exploratory study on the functioning of peer monitoring arrangements on the management of moral hazard in the Dutch social housing sector:.
Degree: 2013, Delft University of Technology
URL: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:facb9799-ae51-4aef-8d2e-70fdb590c44c
► Risk taking in the Dutch social housing sector is characterized by moral hazard. This exploratory research studies the potential of peer monitoring in managing moral…
(more)
▼ Risk taking in the Dutch social housing sector is characterized by
moral hazard. This exploratory research studies the potential of peer monitoring in managing
moral hazard. In scholarly literature, peer monitoring is argued to have potential in managing
moral hazard as peers, in comparison to vertical regulators, are less hampered by information asymmetry which characterizes
moral hazard. However, based on an institutional analysis and case study of the Dutch social housing sector, this research argues the potential of peer monitoring to be limited as peers lack both the willingness and ability to monitor one another. This research also suggests improvements on the functioning of peer monitoring in the Dutch social housing sector to bring forward its real potential to manage
moral hazard.
Advisors/Committee Members: Van der Voort, H.G., De Bruijn, J.A., Correljé, V., Paardekooper, V..
Subjects/Keywords: moral hazard; peer monitoring; Dutch social housing sector; information asymmetry
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
Eikelboom, C. T. C. (2013). Peer monitoring in managing moral hazard: An exploratory study on the functioning of peer monitoring arrangements on the management of moral hazard in the Dutch social housing sector:. (Masters Thesis). Delft University of Technology. Retrieved from http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:facb9799-ae51-4aef-8d2e-70fdb590c44c
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Eikelboom, C T C. “Peer monitoring in managing moral hazard: An exploratory study on the functioning of peer monitoring arrangements on the management of moral hazard in the Dutch social housing sector:.” 2013. Masters Thesis, Delft University of Technology. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:facb9799-ae51-4aef-8d2e-70fdb590c44c.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Eikelboom, C T C. “Peer monitoring in managing moral hazard: An exploratory study on the functioning of peer monitoring arrangements on the management of moral hazard in the Dutch social housing sector:.” 2013. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Eikelboom CTC. Peer monitoring in managing moral hazard: An exploratory study on the functioning of peer monitoring arrangements on the management of moral hazard in the Dutch social housing sector:. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2013. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:facb9799-ae51-4aef-8d2e-70fdb590c44c.
Council of Science Editors:
Eikelboom CTC. Peer monitoring in managing moral hazard: An exploratory study on the functioning of peer monitoring arrangements on the management of moral hazard in the Dutch social housing sector:. [Masters Thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2013. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:facb9799-ae51-4aef-8d2e-70fdb590c44c
Wayne State University
29.
Liu, Yang.
Selection Effect In Medigap Insurance Market With Multi-Dimensional Private Information.
Degree: PhD, Economics, 2016, Wayne State University
URL: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations/1651
► Theoretical models of insurance suggest that when individuals have private information about their risk type alone, insurance coverage will be adversely selected by those…
(more)
▼ Theoretical models of insurance suggest that when individuals have private information about their risk type alone, insurance coverage will be adversely selected by those riskier individuals due to asymmetric information. In this study we investigate whether individuals have private information of their risk type and riskier individuals are indeed more likely to choose health insurance in the context of Medigap insurance market in the United States where government intervention reinforces information asymmetry. Medigap is supplemental private insurance that optional to those who have Medicare Part A and Part B and it is used to cover some of the cost sharing required by Medicare
We find out that conditional on risk classification assessed by insurance companies, self-rated health status is positively correlated with total health expenditure and negative correlated with Medigap coverage. It demonstrates that people have private information about their risk type; however, those with worse self-rated health status less likely to choose Medigap coverage. This finding provides evidence that on average there is advantageous selection rather than adverse selection in Medigap insurance market. Meanwhile, we find out coexistence of
moral hazard.
The only factor that could be potentially identified as source of advantageous selection in this study is cognitive limitation. Cognitive limitation is positively and significantly correlated with logarithm of total health expenditure in 2009, 2010 and 2011; at the same time, it is negatively and significantly correlated with Medigap purchase regardless of controlling only premium variables or premium variables plus risk aversion, education and poverty categories in Seemingly Unrelated Regression model in 2009 and 2010.
The factors that have been investigated in several previous articles such as education, risk aversion, poverty categories which reflect economic status seem to have little effect if there is any in our study.
Advisors/Committee Members: Allen Goodman.
Subjects/Keywords: Information Asymmetric; Medigap; Moral Hazard; Selection Effect; Economics
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APA (6th Edition):
Liu, Y. (2016). Selection Effect In Medigap Insurance Market With Multi-Dimensional Private Information. (Doctoral Dissertation). Wayne State University. Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations/1651
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Liu, Yang. “Selection Effect In Medigap Insurance Market With Multi-Dimensional Private Information.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, Wayne State University. Accessed December 07, 2019.
https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations/1651.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Liu, Yang. “Selection Effect In Medigap Insurance Market With Multi-Dimensional Private Information.” 2016. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Liu Y. Selection Effect In Medigap Insurance Market With Multi-Dimensional Private Information. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Wayne State University; 2016. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations/1651.
Council of Science Editors:
Liu Y. Selection Effect In Medigap Insurance Market With Multi-Dimensional Private Information. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Wayne State University; 2016. Available from: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations/1651
University of Minnesota
30.
Marsh, Christina L.
Essays in health care economics: structural approaches to measuring moral hazard and adverse selection.
Degree: PhD, Economics, 2010, University of Minnesota
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95197
► The classic issues of moral hazard and adverse selection as they appear in health care are addressed in this dissertation using new tools of analysis.…
(more)
▼ The classic issues of moral hazard and adverse selection as they appear in health care are addressed in this dissertation using new tools of analysis.
In the first essay, I construct a new estimator and estimates to measure the price response of patients in health insurance. These estimates allow us to measure the magnitude of moral hazard. Recent health care initiatives attempt to stem rising costs by increasing patients' cost sharing. These initiatives include high deductible plans, the Medicare Drug Plan \doughnut hole," and Health Savings Accounts (HSAs). The success of such initiatives depends on how health expenditures change as patients' reimbursement decreases. Estimating this elasticity is complicated by selection bias, as high expenditure patients can self-select into high reimbursement plans. Additionally, nonlinear reimbursement is prevalent in U.S. insurance contracts and the aforementioned initiatives. Nonlinearities introduce bias when using previous estimation methods by simultaneously determining expenditure and reimbursement rate. This paper develops an elasticity estimation method that controls for selection bias by taking advantage of nonlinear reimbursement rates. Discontinuous reimbursement rates induced by a nonlinearity are used to isolate patients' expenditure choices. Using detailed claims-level data of employer-sponsored health insurance, I nd a tight range of elasticities between -0.25 and -0.33 in the range of average U.S. spending. I then use these estimates in a policy experiment measuring moral hazard and calculate the resulting welfare eects. This paper's estimation method may be used on many policies with nonlinear reimbursement which previous tools could not address.
In the second essay, I present joint work with Patrick Bajari, Han Hong, and Ahmed Khwaja wherein we construct an estimator that can address both moral hazard and adverse selection simultaneously. Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it dicult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care. We empirically study this question by a using unique data set with condential information from a large self-insured employer to estimate a structural model of the demand for health insurance and medical care. We propose a two-step semiparametric estimation strategy that builds on the work on identification and estimation of auction models. We find significant evidence of moral hazard and adverse selection.
Subjects/Keywords: Adverse selection; Elasticity; Moral hazard; Nonlinear reimbursement; Structural estimation; Economics
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Marsh, C. L. (2010). Essays in health care economics: structural approaches to measuring moral hazard and adverse selection. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Minnesota. Retrieved from http://purl.umn.edu/95197
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Marsh, Christina L. “Essays in health care economics: structural approaches to measuring moral hazard and adverse selection.” 2010. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Minnesota. Accessed December 07, 2019.
http://purl.umn.edu/95197.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Marsh, Christina L. “Essays in health care economics: structural approaches to measuring moral hazard and adverse selection.” 2010. Web. 07 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Marsh CL. Essays in health care economics: structural approaches to measuring moral hazard and adverse selection. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Minnesota; 2010. [cited 2019 Dec 07].
Available from: http://purl.umn.edu/95197.
Council of Science Editors:
Marsh CL. Essays in health care economics: structural approaches to measuring moral hazard and adverse selection. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Minnesota; 2010. Available from: http://purl.umn.edu/95197
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Open Access Theses and Dissertations