subject:(Mechanism design)

1. Naroditskiy, Victor. Select Problems at the Intersection of Computer Science and Economics.

Degree: PhD, Computer Science, 2009, Brown University

URL: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:202/

► We apply computer science techniques to try to solve a selection of problems that arise in economics and electronic commerce. The problems we address and… (more)

▼ We apply computer science techniques to try to solve a selection of problems that arise in economics and electronic commerce. The problems we address and our results are summarized below. The first problem is from the field of Mechanism Design. The goal is to find a procedure for allocating identical items among agents with private values in the manner that maximizes the total utility of the agents. We approach this problem computationally: solutions are found algorithmically rather than through mathematical derivations. Our computational approach yields a nearly optimal solution greatly improving prior results. In the case with 3 agents and 2 items, we were able to find a provably optimal solution. Next, we address a game-theoretic problem of finding Nash Equilibria in auctions. We investigate when a computational procedure finds an equilibrium in first and second price auctions with discrete bids and values. The rest of the thesis is devoted to automated decision making in electronic commerce domains. Three domains are considered: sponsored search, supply chain management, and simultaneous auctions. The last two domains are studied in the context of the SCM and Travel divisions of the Trading Agent Competition (TAC). Our contributions to automated decision making are both practical and theoretical. On the practical side, the bidding strategy we designed for sponsored search auctions is currently being used by a large advertiser. Our work on TAC Travel culminated in winning the competition in 2006. In the TAC SCM competition, the agent we built was among the top 5 out of over 20 agents almost every year of the competition. For theoretical contributions, we characterized optimal strategies for bidding in simultaneous auctions when prices are known and complemented this analysis with an empirical comparison of different strategies. We identified that bidding decisions in TAC SCM can be modeled as a non-linear knapsack problem and proved the asymptotic optimality of a greedy algorithm for solving a class of non-linear knapsack problems. Advisors/Committee Members: Greenwald, Amy (director), de Clippel, Geoffroy (reader), Pennock, David (reader), Ramshaw, Lyle (reader), Van Hentenryck, Pascal (reader).

Subjects/Keywords: mechanism design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Naroditskiy, V. (2009). Select Problems at the Intersection of Computer Science and Economics. (Doctoral Dissertation). Brown University. Retrieved from https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:202/

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Naroditskiy, Victor. “Select Problems at the Intersection of Computer Science and Economics.” 2009. Doctoral Dissertation, Brown University. Accessed March 04, 2021. https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:202/.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Naroditskiy, Victor. “Select Problems at the Intersection of Computer Science and Economics.” 2009. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Naroditskiy V. Select Problems at the Intersection of Computer Science and Economics. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Brown University; 2009. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:202/.

Council of Science Editors:

Naroditskiy V. Select Problems at the Intersection of Computer Science and Economics. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Brown University; 2009. Available from: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:202/

Delft University of Technology

2. Staal, I.C. (author). Evolutionary Mechanims.

Degree: 2014, Delft University of Technology

URL: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:dbe5544e-6c67-4f32-b06d-250b1c1af1f2

Automated synthesis of robotic mechanisms by an Evolutionary Algorithm.

BMD

BioMechanical Engineering

Mechanical, Maritime and Materials Engineering

Advisors/Committee Members: Wisse, M. (mentor), Wolfslag, W.J. (mentor).

Subjects/Keywords: Mechanism design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Staal, I. C. (. (2014). Evolutionary Mechanims. (Masters Thesis). Delft University of Technology. Retrieved from http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:dbe5544e-6c67-4f32-b06d-250b1c1af1f2

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Staal, I C (author). “Evolutionary Mechanims.” 2014. Masters Thesis, Delft University of Technology. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:dbe5544e-6c67-4f32-b06d-250b1c1af1f2.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Staal, I C (author). “Evolutionary Mechanims.” 2014. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Staal IC(. Evolutionary Mechanims. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2014. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:dbe5544e-6c67-4f32-b06d-250b1c1af1f2.

Council of Science Editors:

Staal IC(. Evolutionary Mechanims. [Masters Thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2014. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:dbe5544e-6c67-4f32-b06d-250b1c1af1f2

Princeton University

3. Shishkin, Denis. Essays in Information Economics .

Degree: PhD, 2020, Princeton University

URL: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01w0892d86n

► Information is crucial for making decisions under uncertainty. This dissertation explores how information is designed or elicited by a principal aiming to implement a certain… (more)

▼ Information is crucial for making decisions under uncertainty. This dissertation explores how information is designed or elicited by a principal aiming to implement a certain objective. Chapters 1 and 2 study information design in cases when there is no commitment to reveal information. In Chapter 1, I analyze optimal evidence acquisition in a game of voluntary disclosure. A sender seeks hard evidence to persuade a receiver to take a certain action, but there is uncertainty about whether evidence has been obtained. When the probability of obtaining evidence is low, I show that the optimal evidence structure is a binary certification: all it reveals is whether the state of the world is above or below a certain threshold. When binary structures are optimal, higher uncertainty leads to less pooling at the bottom because the sender uses binary certification to commit to disclose evidence more often. Chapter 2 (co-authored with Elliot Lipnowski and Doron Ravid) studies how credibility affects persuasion. A sender uses a weak institution to disseminate information to persuade a receiver. Specifically, the weaker is the institution, the higher is the probability that its report reflects the sender’s agenda rather than the officially announced protocol. We show that increasing this probability can benefit the receiver and can lead to a discontinuous drop in the sender’s payoffs. To derive our results, we geometrically characterize the sender’s highest equilibrium payoff, which is based on the concave envelope of her capped value function. Finally, Chapter 3 (co-authored with Franz Ostrizek) explores monopolistic screening with frame-dependent valuations. A principal designs an extensive-form decision problem with frames at each stage. The optimal mechanism has a simple three-stage structure and uses changes in framing (high-low-high) to induce dynamic inconsistency and thereby reduce information rents. To achieve this, the principal offers unchosen decoy contracts. Sophisticated consumers correctly anticipate that if they deviated, they would choose a decoy, which they want to avoid in the low frame. This allows the principal to eliminate some incentive constraints. With naive consumers, the principal can perfectly screen by cognitive type and extract full surplus from naifs. Advisors/Committee Members: Morris, Stephen (advisor), Ortoleva, Pietro (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: information design; mechanism design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Shishkin, D. (2020). Essays in Information Economics . (Doctoral Dissertation). Princeton University. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01w0892d86n

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Shishkin, Denis. “Essays in Information Economics .” 2020. Doctoral Dissertation, Princeton University. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01w0892d86n.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Shishkin, Denis. “Essays in Information Economics .” 2020. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Shishkin D. Essays in Information Economics . [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Princeton University; 2020. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01w0892d86n.

Council of Science Editors:

Shishkin D. Essays in Information Economics . [Doctoral Dissertation]. Princeton University; 2020. Available from: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01w0892d86n

University of Rochester

4. Dogan, Battal (1983 - ). Essays on mechanism design and implementation.

Degree: PhD, 2014, University of Rochester

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/28931

► In Chapter 1, we study affirmative action in school choice. School choice programs aim to give students the option to choose their school. At the… (more)

▼ In Chapter 1, we study affirmative action in school choice. School choice programs aim to give students the option to choose their school. At the same time, underrepresented minority students should be favored to close the opportunity gap. A common way to achieve this is to have a majority quota at each school, and to require that no school be assigned more majority students than its majority quota. An alternative way is to reserve some seats at each school for the minority students, and to require that a reserve seat at a school be assigned to a majority student only if no minority student prefers that school to her assignment. However, fair rules based on either type of affirmative action suffer from a common problem: a stronger affirmative action may hurt some minority students without benefiting another minority student. First, we show that this problem is pervasive: the problem disappears only if the minority students "mostly" have priority over the majority students. Then, we uncover the root of this problem: for some minority students, treating them as minority students does not benefit them, but possibly hurts other minority students. We propose a new assignment rule (Modified deferred acceptance with minority reserves), which treats such minority students as majority students, achieves affirmative action, and never hurts a minority student without benefiting another minority student. In Chapter 2, we consider implementing a socially optimal allocation when there are responsible agents. A set of tasks is to be allocated among agents. There is an optimal allocation of the tasks, which is not observable by the designer and which does not necessarily depend on the preferences of the agents over tasks. We allow for "responsible agents" whose preferences over allocations are responsive to the optimal allocation in the following way: given two allocations such that she is indifferent between her assignments, if all the agents who are assigned their optimal tasks at the former allocation are still assigned their optimal tasks at the latter allocation, and there is an agent who is not assigned her optimal task in the former but is assigned her optimal task in the latter allocation, then the responsible agent prefers the latter allocation to the former. In this context, we analyze eliciting the optimal allocation via game forms. We show that if the designer knows that there are at least three responsible agents, even if the identities of the responsible agents are not known, the optimal allocation can be elicited. The framework we introduce allows studying problems where some agents care about the goal of the designer besides their self interest. In Chapter 3, we consider Nash-implementation of the "no-envy" solution. Without any assumptions on the structure of the resources to be distributed, by only assuming preferences to be complete, we show that a simple game form, which resembles the "Divide-and-Choose" procedure, Nash-implements the no-envy solution. Our result extends a result by Thomson (2005), and it is…

Subjects/Keywords: Implementation; Mechanism design; School choice

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APA (6^th Edition):

Dogan, B. (. -. ). (2014). Essays on mechanism design and implementation. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Rochester. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1802/28931

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Dogan, Battal (1983 - ). “Essays on mechanism design and implementation.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Rochester. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1802/28931.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Dogan, Battal (1983 - ). “Essays on mechanism design and implementation.” 2014. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Dogan B(-). Essays on mechanism design and implementation. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2014. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/28931.

Council of Science Editors:

Dogan B(-). Essays on mechanism design and implementation. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/28931

Georgia Tech

5. Foris, Adam J. Exploiting singular configurations for controllable, low-power, friction enhancement on unmanned ground vehicles.

Degree: MS, Mechanical Engineering, 2020, Georgia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/62760

► This paper describes the design, validation, and performance of a new type of adaptive wheel morphology for unmanned ground vehicles. Our adaptive wheel morphology uses… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Mechanism design; Wheeled robots

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APA (6^th Edition):

Foris, A. J. (2020). Exploiting singular configurations for controllable, low-power, friction enhancement on unmanned ground vehicles. (Masters Thesis). Georgia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1853/62760

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Foris, Adam J. “Exploiting singular configurations for controllable, low-power, friction enhancement on unmanned ground vehicles.” 2020. Masters Thesis, Georgia Tech. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/62760.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Foris, Adam J. “Exploiting singular configurations for controllable, low-power, friction enhancement on unmanned ground vehicles.” 2020. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Foris AJ. Exploiting singular configurations for controllable, low-power, friction enhancement on unmanned ground vehicles. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Georgia Tech; 2020. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/62760.

Council of Science Editors:

Foris AJ. Exploiting singular configurations for controllable, low-power, friction enhancement on unmanned ground vehicles. [Masters Thesis]. Georgia Tech; 2020. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/62760

Vanderbilt University

6. Zheng, Ying. Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auctions.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2018, Vanderbilt University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/13216

► Chapters 1 develops a game-theoretic model to approximate bidders’ behavior in a takeover process, accounting for their valuation discount due to the dissemination of confidential… (more)

▼ Chapters 1 develops a game-theoretic model to approximate bidders’ behavior in a takeover process, accounting for their valuation discount due to the dissemination of confidential information and their uncertainty about the number of actual opponents. We derive a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium with a strictly increasing bidding strategy, and provide a sufficient condition for the monotonicity of the equilibrium bidding strategy. Finally, we construct the information cost resulting from bidders’ information disclosure discounts and show how it affects the seller’s expected revenue. Chapter 2 empirically explains why sellers in takeover auctions limit bidders' entry by considering two types of costs incurred by sellers of target companies: the information cost (developed in Chapter 1) and the operation cost. We establish the identification of the model primitives with unobserved heterogeneity, naturally arising from the confidential information. Using a sample with 287 M&A deals of U.S. public companies, we find that the unobserved heterogeneity explains 75.3% of the variation of the value and bidders lower their values by 11.9% for each rival. We further quantify the information cost and operation cost using counterfactual analysis. Chapter 3 studies the optimal auction design with voluntary entry when entry fees/subsidies are not allowed as a policy instrument, as in most of real-world auctions. In a symmetric IPV paradigm, we find that the optimal mechanism should allocate the asset to the entrant with highest non-negative virtual value with an adjustment for the entry-stage incentivization. The seller can extract additional information rent from the winner as a result of his ability to use a reserve price to induce a desired competition among entrants. Our model embeds Myerson (1981) and Levin and Smith (1994) as special cases. Advisors/Committee Members: Gregory Leo (committee member), Jingfeng Lu (committee member), Eun Jeong Heo (committee member), Tong Li (Committee Chair).

Subjects/Keywords: Auctions; Structural Econometrics; Mechanism Design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Zheng, Y. (2018). Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auctions. (Doctoral Dissertation). Vanderbilt University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1803/13216

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Zheng, Ying. “Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auctions.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, Vanderbilt University. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1803/13216.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Zheng, Ying. “Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auctions.” 2018. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Zheng Y. Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auctions. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Vanderbilt University; 2018. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/13216.

Council of Science Editors:

Zheng Y. Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auctions. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Vanderbilt University; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/13216

Queens University

7. Mirza, Afrasiab. Essays in Banking and Finance .

Degree: Economics, 2014, Queens University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1974/12280

► This dissertation examines the design of regulation for financial institutions fol- lowing the financial crisis of 2008-2009. In the aftermath of the crisis, regulators in… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Banking ; Finance ; Dynamics Mechanism Design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Mirza, A. (2014). Essays in Banking and Finance . (Thesis). Queens University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1974/12280

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Mirza, Afrasiab. “Essays in Banking and Finance .” 2014. Thesis, Queens University. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1974/12280.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Mirza, Afrasiab. “Essays in Banking and Finance .” 2014. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Mirza A. Essays in Banking and Finance . [Internet] [Thesis]. Queens University; 2014. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1974/12280.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Mirza A. Essays in Banking and Finance . [Thesis]. Queens University; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1974/12280

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

North Carolina State University

8. Korrapati, Sameer. A Simple Auction for Early Delivery of High-Demand Products.

Degree: MS, Computer Science, 2004, North Carolina State University

URL: http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/resolver/1840.16/1349

► Companies face an important challenge in deciding the allocation and pricing of high-demand products when they can supply them only in limited quantities, especially during… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Mechanism Design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Korrapati, S. (2004). A Simple Auction for Early Delivery of High-Demand Products. (Thesis). North Carolina State University. Retrieved from http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/resolver/1840.16/1349

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Korrapati, Sameer. “A Simple Auction for Early Delivery of High-Demand Products.” 2004. Thesis, North Carolina State University. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/resolver/1840.16/1349.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Korrapati, Sameer. “A Simple Auction for Early Delivery of High-Demand Products.” 2004. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Korrapati S. A Simple Auction for Early Delivery of High-Demand Products. [Internet] [Thesis]. North Carolina State University; 2004. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/resolver/1840.16/1349.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Korrapati S. A Simple Auction for Early Delivery of High-Demand Products. [Thesis]. North Carolina State University; 2004. Available from: http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/resolver/1840.16/1349

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

9. Kundu, Preeti. Inhibition and reaction mechanism of Mycobacterium tuberculosis anthranilate phosphoribosyltransferase: A potential target for novel drug design.

Degree: 2020, Victoria University of Wellington; Victoria University of Wellington

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10063/8945

► Tuberculosis (TB), which is estimated to affect 2 billion individuals worldwide, is an infection predominately caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis(M. tuberculosis). Of particular concern is the… (more)

▼ Tuberculosis (TB), which is estimated to affect 2 billion individuals worldwide, is an infection predominately caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis(M. tuberculosis). Of particular concern is the increasing prevalence of TB, which is becoming resistant to the treatments currently available. Anthranilate phosphoribosyltransferase (AnPRT) catalyses the formation of N-(5’-phosphoribosyl)anthranilate (PRA) from 5-phospho-α-ribose-1-diphosphate (PRPP) and anthranilate and plays an important role in the synthesis of an essential amino acid in M.tuberculosis. A strain with a genetic knockout of the trpD gene, which encodes for the AnPRT enzyme, was unable to cause disease, even in immune-deficient mice. Therefore, this enzyme is a potential drug target for the development of new treatments against TB and other infectious diseases. This research explores the synthesis of different substrates and potential transition state analogues in order to understand catalysis and inhibition of AnPRT enzymes to aid novel drug design. The first part of this study utilises “bianthranilate-like” phosphonate inhibitors that display effective inhibition of the AnPRT enzyme, with the lowest Ki value being 1.3 μM. It was found strong enzymatic inhibition increases with an increased length of the phosphonate linker that occupies multiple anthranilate binding sites within the anthranilate binding channel of the enzyme. Crystal studies of the enzyme in complex with the inhibitors were carried out in order to expose the binding interactions. The second part of this study investigates several new compounds that target the active site of M. tuberculosis AnPRT, based on a virtual screening approach. This approach identified a strong AnPRT inhibitor, which displays an apparent Ki value of 7.0 ± 0.4 μM with respect to both substrates. This study also exposed a conformational change at the active site of the enzyme that occurs on inhibitor binding. The observed conformational changes of the enzyme active site diminish the binding of the substrate PRPP. These pieces of information provide future inhibitor design strategies to aid the development of novel anti-TB agents that target the AnPRT enzyme. To elucidate the reaction mechanism of M. tuberculosis AnPRT, the third part of this study explores the substrate binding sites in detail. This study uses structural analysis, complemented by differential scanning fluorimetry (DSF) and isothermal titration calorimetry (ITC), to reveal detailed information of the substrate and inhibitor binding sites. The final part of this thesis presents the synthesis of various PRPP analogues and potential transition state mimics that were designed based on the likely reaction mechanism of the enzyme. This set of inhibitors includes a number of iminoribitol analogues that were developed to capture the geometry of the flattened ribose ring and include a nitrogen atom within the ring to mimic the positive charge characteristics that are expected in the oxocarbenium-ion-like transition state predicted for M. tuberculosis AnPRT.… Advisors/Committee Members: Parker, Emily, Tyler, Peter.

Subjects/Keywords: inhibition; reaction mechanism; drug design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Kundu, P. (2020). Inhibition and reaction mechanism of Mycobacterium tuberculosis anthranilate phosphoribosyltransferase: A potential target for novel drug design. (Doctoral Dissertation). Victoria University of Wellington; Victoria University of Wellington. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10063/8945

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Kundu, Preeti. “Inhibition and reaction mechanism of Mycobacterium tuberculosis anthranilate phosphoribosyltransferase: A potential target for novel drug design.” 2020. Doctoral Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington; Victoria University of Wellington. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10063/8945.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Kundu, Preeti. “Inhibition and reaction mechanism of Mycobacterium tuberculosis anthranilate phosphoribosyltransferase: A potential target for novel drug design.” 2020. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Kundu P. Inhibition and reaction mechanism of Mycobacterium tuberculosis anthranilate phosphoribosyltransferase: A potential target for novel drug design. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Victoria University of Wellington; Victoria University of Wellington; 2020. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10063/8945.

Council of Science Editors:

Kundu P. Inhibition and reaction mechanism of Mycobacterium tuberculosis anthranilate phosphoribosyltransferase: A potential target for novel drug design. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Victoria University of Wellington; Victoria University of Wellington; 2020. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10063/8945

University of Toronto

10. Wu, Young. Dynamic Mechanism Design without Transfers.

Degree: PhD, 2018, University of Toronto

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/91992

► This thesis consists of three chapters. In chapter 1, titled "Design of Committee Search," I apply a mechanism design approach to committee search problems, such… (more)

▼ This thesis consists of three chapters. In chapter 1, titled "Design of Committee Search," I apply a mechanism design approach to committee search problems, such as hiring by a department or a couple's search for a house. A special class of simple dynamic decisions rules have agents submit in each period one of three votes: veto, approve, or recommend; the current option is adopted whenever no agent vetoes and at least one agent recommends. I show that every implementable payoff can be attained by randomizing among these simple rules. This result dramatically simplifies the design problem. In chapter 2, titled "School Choice with Observable Characteristics," I study a school choice problem where students have observable characteristics that are correlated with their preferences. For example, one such characteristic may be the location of a student's home, which is correlated with preferences if students tend to prefer nearby schools. I consider mechanisms that are envy-free, efficient, and treat students with the same observable characteristics equally. I show that the welfare-maximizing mechanism in this class is a modified probabilistic serial mechanism with capacities. These capacities specify the maximum number of students with given characteristics that can be admitted into each school. In chapter 3, titled "Mechanism Design for Stopping Problems with Two Actions," I analyse a class of dynamic mechanism design problems in which a single agent privately observes a time-varying state, chooses a stopping time, and upon stopping, chooses between two actions. The principal designs transfers that depend only on the time the agent stops and on the alternative the agent chooses. The analysis provides necessary and sufficient conditions for implementability in this environment. In particular, I show that any stopping rule in which the agent stops the first time the state falls outside of an interval in the state space can be implemented if and only if a pair of monotonicity conditions is satisfied. Advisors/Committee Members: Peski, Marcin, Stewart, Colin, Economics.

Subjects/Keywords: Game Theory; Mechanism Design; 0511

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APA (6^th Edition):

Wu, Y. (2018). Dynamic Mechanism Design without Transfers. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Toronto. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1807/91992

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Wu, Young. “Dynamic Mechanism Design without Transfers.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Toronto. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1807/91992.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Wu, Young. “Dynamic Mechanism Design without Transfers.” 2018. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Wu Y. Dynamic Mechanism Design without Transfers. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Toronto; 2018. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/91992.

Council of Science Editors:

Wu Y. Dynamic Mechanism Design without Transfers. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Toronto; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/91992

Virginia Tech

11. Kamidi, Vinaykarthik Reddy. Design and Integration of a Novel Robotic Leg Mechanism for Dynamic Locomotion at High-Speeds.

Degree: MS, Mechanical Engineering, 2018, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/91932

► Existing state-of-the-art legged robots often require complex mechanisms with multi-level controllers and computationally expensive algorithms. Part of this is owed to the multiple degrees of… (more)

▼ Existing state-of-the-art legged robots often require complex mechanisms with multi-level controllers and computationally expensive algorithms. Part of this is owed to the multiple degrees of freedom (DOFs) these intricate mechanisms possess and the other is a result of the complex nature of dynamic legged locomotion. The underlying dynamics of this class of non-linear systems must be addressed in order to develop systems that perform natural human/animal-like locomotion. However, there are no stringent rules for the number of DOFs in a system; this is merely a matter of the locomotion requirements of the system. In general, most systems designed for dynamic locomotion consist of multiple actuators per leg to address the balance and locomotion tasks simultaneously. In contrast, this research hypothesizes the decoupling of locomotion and balance by omitting the DOFs whose primary purpose is dynamic disturbance rejection to enable a far simplified mechanical design for the legged system. This thesis presents a novel single DOF mechanism that is topologically arranged to execute a trajectory conducive to dynamic locomotive gaits. To simplify the problem of dynamic balancing, the mechanism is designed to be utilized in a quadrupedal platform in the future. The preliminary design, based upon heuristic link lengths, is presented and subjected to kinematic analysis to evaluate the resulting trajectory. To improve the result and to analyze the effect of key link lengths, sensitivity analysis is then performed. Further, a reference trajectory is established and a parametric optimization over the design space is performed to drive the system to an optimal configuration. The evolved design is identified as the Bio-Inspired One-DOF Leg for Trotting (BOLT). The dynamics of this closed kinematic chain mechanism is then simplified, resulting in a minimal order state space representation. A prototype of the robotic leg was integrated and mounted on a treadmill rig to perform various experiments. Finally, open loop running is implemented on the integrated prototype demonstrating the locomotive performance of BOLT. Advisors/Committee Members: Ben-Tzvi, Pinhas (committeechair), Leonessa, Alexander (committee member), Furukawa, Tomonari (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Legged Locomotion; Mechanism and Design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Kamidi, V. R. (2018). Design and Integration of a Novel Robotic Leg Mechanism for Dynamic Locomotion at High-Speeds. (Masters Thesis). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/91932

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Kamidi, Vinaykarthik Reddy. “Design and Integration of a Novel Robotic Leg Mechanism for Dynamic Locomotion at High-Speeds.” 2018. Masters Thesis, Virginia Tech. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/91932.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Kamidi, Vinaykarthik Reddy. “Design and Integration of a Novel Robotic Leg Mechanism for Dynamic Locomotion at High-Speeds.” 2018. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Kamidi VR. Design and Integration of a Novel Robotic Leg Mechanism for Dynamic Locomotion at High-Speeds. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Virginia Tech; 2018. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/91932.

Council of Science Editors:

Kamidi VR. Design and Integration of a Novel Robotic Leg Mechanism for Dynamic Locomotion at High-Speeds. [Masters Thesis]. Virginia Tech; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/91932

12. Jain, Ritesh. Essays In Mechanism Design and Implementation Theory.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2018, The Ohio State University

URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1524135020720277

► I broadly classify my research in micro-economic theory. This dissertation brings together my work in mechanism design and implementation theory. In Chapter 1 titled “Generalized… (more)

▼ I broadly classify my research in micro-economic theory. This dissertation brings together my work in mechanism design and implementation theory. In Chapter 1 titled “Generalized Groves Ledyard Mechanisms," (Jointly with Paul Healy) we study Nash implementation in public goods setting. Groves and Ledyard (1977) construct a mechanism for public goods procurement that can be viewed as a direct-revelation Groves mechanism in which agents announce a parameter of a quadratic approximation of their true preferences. The mechanism's Nash equilibrium outcomes are efficient. The budget is balanced because Groves mechanisms are balanced for the announced quadratic preferences. Tian (1996) subsequently discovered a richer set of budget-balancing preferences. We replicate the Groves-Ledyard construction using this expanded set of preferences, and uncover a new set of complex mechanisms that generalize the original Groves-Ledyard mechanism.In Chapter 2 titled "Symmetric Mechanism Design," (Jointly with Yaron Azrieli) we study the extent to which regulators can guarantee fair outcomes by a policy requiring mechanisms to treat agents symmetrically. This is an exercise in mechanism design. Our main result is a characterization of the class of social choice functions that can be implemented under this constraint. In many environments, extremely discriminatory social choice functions can be implemented by symmetric mechanisms, but there are also cases in which symmetry is binding. Our characterization is based on a `revelation principle' type of result, where we show that a social choice function can be symmetrically implemented if and only if a particular kind of (indirect) symmetric mechanism implements it. We illustrate the result in environments of voting with private values, voting with a common value, and assignment of indivisible goods.In Chapter 3 titled "Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences," I study the implementation of social choice correspondences (SCC), in a complete information setting, using rationalizability as the solution concept. I find a condition which I call r-monotonicity to be necessary for the rationalizable implementation of an SCC. r-monotonicity is strictly weaker than Maskin monotonicity, a condition introduced by Maskin (1999). If an SCC satisfies a no worst alternative condition and a condition which we call TF- distinguishability, then it is shown that r-monotonicity is also sufficient for rationalizable implementation. We discuss the strength of these additional conditions. In particular, I find that, whenever there are more than 3 agents a social choice correspondence, which always selects at least two alternatives is rationalizably implementable if and only if it satisfies r-monotonicity. This paper, therefore, extends Bergemann et al. (2011) to the case of social choice correspondences. Advisors/Committee Members: Healy, Paul (Advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Economics; Mechanism Design, Implementation Theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Jain, R. (2018). Essays In Mechanism Design and Implementation Theory. (Doctoral Dissertation). The Ohio State University. Retrieved from http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1524135020720277

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Jain, Ritesh. “Essays In Mechanism Design and Implementation Theory.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, The Ohio State University. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1524135020720277.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Jain, Ritesh. “Essays In Mechanism Design and Implementation Theory.” 2018. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Jain R. Essays In Mechanism Design and Implementation Theory. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. The Ohio State University; 2018. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1524135020720277.

Council of Science Editors:

Jain R. Essays In Mechanism Design and Implementation Theory. [Doctoral Dissertation]. The Ohio State University; 2018. Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1524135020720277

Georgia Tech

13. Kim, Raymond Sunghwan. Enhancing Payload Capacity with Dual-Arm Manipulation and Adaptable Mechanical Intelligence.

Degree: MS, Mechanical Engineering, 2020, Georgia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/64112

► Manipulating large and heavy objects is a crucial task in various robotic applications such as agriculture, search and rescue, service, and manufacturing. While modern manipulators… (more)

▼ Manipulating large and heavy objects is a crucial task in various robotic applications such as agriculture, search and rescue, service, and manufacturing. While modern manipulators have advanced considerably, they are limited by their net load capacity. This places a fundamental limit on the weight of loads that a single manipulator can move. For a case where a large load exceeds the capacity of a single manipulator, there are two potential solutions. First, the manipulator can be replaced with a larger one to increase the maximum payload. This can be time-consuming and expensive. Alternatively, two manipulators can be used collaboratively to share the load. This enables use of existing manipulators. Cooperative manipulation with two arms has the potential to increase the net load capacity of the system. However, it is critical that proper load sharing takes place between the two arms. If this is not maintained, the load limits of one of the arms can be exceeded and lead to catastrophic failure. Ensuring load sharing can be a challenging controls and coordination problem. In this work, a method that utilizes mechanical intelligence in the form of a whiffletree is outlined. A whiffletree is a mechanical device that allows distribution of load through the use of pivot points and linkages. Whiffletrees are used in a range of applications including bionic limbs, under-actuated fingers, horse-harnesses on carriages, and wind turbine tests. Typically, a whiffletree consists of a bar pivoted at or near the center, with force applied from one direction to the pivot and from the other direction to the tips. The points on the linkage act as pivot points, allowing positional displacements for any attached loads. This method is used to design, fabricate, and assemble the dual-arm whiffletree gripper system that enables load sharing amongst two manipulators. The mechanical properties of the whiffletree allows load distribution without any force sensory feedback and enables robustness to positional displacements. As a result, the system is able to integrate a simplified, position-control based strategy. To allow ease of integration to existing robotic systems, the overall design of this work is easily attachable/detachable with various types of customizable grippers using pneumatic tool changers. Physical experiments were conducted to illustrate the enhanced load capacity of a robotic system using the dual-arm whiffletree gripper. Specifically, two UR5 manipulators, each with 5kg maximum payload, are utilized to re-position a 7kg load. This load would exceed the capacity of a single arm, and the experimental results show that the forces on each arm remain below this level and are evenly distributed. Advisors/Committee Members: Mazumdar, Anirban (advisor), Balakirsky, Stephen (advisor), Young, Aaron (committee member), Lee, Kok Meng (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Mechanism Design; Grasping and Fixturing

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APA (6^th Edition):

Kim, R. S. (2020). Enhancing Payload Capacity with Dual-Arm Manipulation and Adaptable Mechanical Intelligence. (Masters Thesis). Georgia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1853/64112

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Kim, Raymond Sunghwan. “Enhancing Payload Capacity with Dual-Arm Manipulation and Adaptable Mechanical Intelligence.” 2020. Masters Thesis, Georgia Tech. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/64112.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Kim, Raymond Sunghwan. “Enhancing Payload Capacity with Dual-Arm Manipulation and Adaptable Mechanical Intelligence.” 2020. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Kim RS. Enhancing Payload Capacity with Dual-Arm Manipulation and Adaptable Mechanical Intelligence. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Georgia Tech; 2020. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/64112.

Council of Science Editors:

Kim RS. Enhancing Payload Capacity with Dual-Arm Manipulation and Adaptable Mechanical Intelligence. [Masters Thesis]. Georgia Tech; 2020. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1853/64112

Delft University of Technology

14. van der Geer, Cees (author). The design of a 2-DOF compliant mechanism for describing closed spatial surfaces, with intended application as leg in omnidirectional walking machines.

Degree: 2019, Delft University of Technology

URL: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:3c911704-8fcb-4c16-b6c6-19fba824edd1

►

This report presents the design of a 2-DOF compliant mechanism, capable of describing a closed spatial surface. The mechanism is designed with the intended application… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: walking machine; 2 DOF mechanism; 2-DOF mechanism; compliant mechanism; spatial mechanism; surface generator; walking locomotion; mechanism design; mechanism

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APA (6^th Edition):

van der Geer, C. (. (2019). The design of a 2-DOF compliant mechanism for describing closed spatial surfaces, with intended application as leg in omnidirectional walking machines. (Masters Thesis). Delft University of Technology. Retrieved from http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:3c911704-8fcb-4c16-b6c6-19fba824edd1

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

van der Geer, Cees (author). “The design of a 2-DOF compliant mechanism for describing closed spatial surfaces, with intended application as leg in omnidirectional walking machines.” 2019. Masters Thesis, Delft University of Technology. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:3c911704-8fcb-4c16-b6c6-19fba824edd1.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

van der Geer, Cees (author). “The design of a 2-DOF compliant mechanism for describing closed spatial surfaces, with intended application as leg in omnidirectional walking machines.” 2019. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

van der Geer C(. The design of a 2-DOF compliant mechanism for describing closed spatial surfaces, with intended application as leg in omnidirectional walking machines. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2019. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:3c911704-8fcb-4c16-b6c6-19fba824edd1.

Council of Science Editors:

van der Geer C(. The design of a 2-DOF compliant mechanism for describing closed spatial surfaces, with intended application as leg in omnidirectional walking machines. [Masters Thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2019. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:3c911704-8fcb-4c16-b6c6-19fba824edd1

Rice University

15. You, Jung Sook. Essays in Mechanism Design.

Degree: PhD, Social Sciences, 2011, Rice University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/70506

► This thesis addresses problems in the area of mechanism design. In many settings in winch collective decisions are made, individuals' actual preferences are not publicly… (more)

▼ This thesis addresses problems in the area of mechanism design. In many settings in winch collective decisions are made, individuals' actual preferences are not publicly observable. As a result, individuals should be relied on to reveal this information. We are interested in an important application of mechanism design, which is the construction of desirable procedures for deciding upon resource allocation or task assignment. We make two main contributions. First, we propose a new mechanism for allocating a divisible commodity between a number of buyers efficiently and fairly. Buyers are assumed to behave as price-anticipators rather than as price-takers. The proposed mechanism is as parsimonious as possible, in the sense that it requires participants to report a one-dimensional message (scalar strategy) instead of an entire utility function, as required by Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms. We show that this mechanism yields efficient allocations in Nash equilibria and moreover, that these equilibria are envy-free. Additionally, we present distinct results that this mechanism is the only simple scalar strategy mechanism that both implements efficient Nash equilibria and satisfies the no envy axiom of fairness. The mechanism's Nash equilibria are proven to satisfy the fairness properties of both Ranking and Voluntary Participation. Our second contribution is to develop optimal VCG mechanisms in order to assign identical economic "bads" (for example, costly tasks) to agents. An optimal VCG mechanism minimizes the largest ratio of budget imbalance to efficient surplus over all cost profiles. The optimal non-deficit VCG mechanism achieves asymptotic budget balance, yet the non-deficit requirement is incompatible with reasonable welfare bounds. If we omit the non-deficit requirement, individual rationality greatly changes the behavior of surplus loss and deficit loss. Allowing a slight deficit, the optimal individually rational VCG mechanism becomes asymptotically budget balanced. Such a phenomenon cannot be found in the case of assigning economic "goods." Advisors/Committee Members: Moulin, Herve (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Social sciences; Mechanism design; VCG mechanism; Budget balance; Scalar mechanism; Envy-free; Economic theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

You, J. S. (2011). Essays in Mechanism Design. (Doctoral Dissertation). Rice University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1911/70506

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

You, Jung Sook. “Essays in Mechanism Design.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, Rice University. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1911/70506.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

You, Jung Sook. “Essays in Mechanism Design.” 2011. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

You JS. Essays in Mechanism Design. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Rice University; 2011. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/70506.

Council of Science Editors:

You JS. Essays in Mechanism Design. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Rice University; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/70506

16. Díaz, Raquel Quesada. Horseshoe Bending Machine : Bending Mechanism.

Degree: Technology and Society, 2014, University of Skövde

URL: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-9432

► Horseshoes are manufactured metal plates developed in an extensive assortment of materials and shapes and their main function is to protect the horse’s hooves… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: horseshoe; bending; machine; hydraulics; power screw; design; mechanism; bending mechanism

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APA (6^th Edition):

Díaz, R. Q. (2014). Horseshoe Bending Machine : Bending Mechanism. (Thesis). University of Skövde. Retrieved from http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-9432

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Díaz, Raquel Quesada. “Horseshoe Bending Machine : Bending Mechanism.” 2014. Thesis, University of Skövde. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-9432.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Díaz, Raquel Quesada. “Horseshoe Bending Machine : Bending Mechanism.” 2014. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Díaz RQ. Horseshoe Bending Machine : Bending Mechanism. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Skövde; 2014. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-9432.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Díaz RQ. Horseshoe Bending Machine : Bending Mechanism. [Thesis]. University of Skövde; 2014. Available from: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-9432

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Virginia Tech

17. Badieyan, Somayesadat. Molecular Design and Mechanistic Characterization of Glycoside Hydrolases using Computational and Experimental Techniques.

Degree: PhD, Biological Systems Engineering, 2012, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77989

► Cellulase activity is due to the activity of multiple enzymes, including endoglucanases, cellobiohydrolases and glucosidases that work synergistically to solubilize crystalline cellulose efficiently. The dependence… (more)

▼ Cellulase activity is due to the activity of multiple enzymes, including endoglucanases, cellobiohydrolases and glucosidases that work synergistically to solubilize crystalline cellulose efficiently. The dependence of hydrolysis reaction rate on temperature predicts that large increases in performance and decreased enzyme cost would be achieved if the enzymatic degradation could be operated at elevated temperatures. However there is always a tradeoff between the activity and stability of enzymes. So obtaining cellulases with high thermostability and simultaneously enhanced activity is a great challenge in the field of bioethanol production. In the studies presented in this dissertation, different computational techniques, such as Molecular Dynamics (MD), Molecular Docking, Quantum Mechanics (QM) and hybrid Quantum Mechanics and Molecular Mechanics (QM/MM), along with several site-directed mutagenesis and in vitro assays have been applied to the study and design of the activity and stability of cellulases. Using molecular dynamics to investigate the thermal unfolding of endoglucanases of family 5 of glycoside hydrolases (GH5), a good correlation between the optimum activity temperatures of cellulases and their structural fluctuations was revealed. These data led us to hypothesize that cellulase stability could be enhanced by redesign of enzyme dynamics through altering the amino acid composition in the highly flexible regions of an endoglucanase that would increase its local or global rigidity. Cellulase C, a GH5 member, was stabilized thermally and chemically by cross linking its highly flexible subdomain. Family 1 of glycoside hydrolases were investigated by QM and hybrid QM/MM methods to analyze the role of non-catalytic polar residues at the active site of GH1 glucosidases that make hydrogen bonds to the glucose moiety at subsite -1. A tyrosine residue in simultaneous interaction with O5 of the glucose ring and the carboxylate group of the nucleophilic glutamate was found to play a significant role in the energy profile along the hydrolysis reaction coordinates. It was shown to reduce the energy barrier of the deglycosylation step by ~12 Kcal/mol. Exclusion of this tyrosine from QM calculation substantially influenced the preactivated structure of the glucose moiety in the enzyme-substrate complex and affected the structural distortion and charge distribution in transition states. Advisors/Committee Members: Zhang, Chenming Mike (committeechair), Sobrado, Pablo (committee member), Bevan, David R. (committee member), Barone, Justin R. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Glycoside Hydrolases; Protein design; Thermostability; Reaction mechanism; Molecular Dynamics; Quantum Mechanism

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APA (6^th Edition):

Badieyan, S. (2012). Molecular Design and Mechanistic Characterization of Glycoside Hydrolases using Computational and Experimental Techniques. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77989

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Badieyan, Somayesadat. “Molecular Design and Mechanistic Characterization of Glycoside Hydrolases using Computational and Experimental Techniques.” 2012. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77989.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Badieyan, Somayesadat. “Molecular Design and Mechanistic Characterization of Glycoside Hydrolases using Computational and Experimental Techniques.” 2012. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Badieyan S. Molecular Design and Mechanistic Characterization of Glycoside Hydrolases using Computational and Experimental Techniques. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2012. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77989.

Council of Science Editors:

Badieyan S. Molecular Design and Mechanistic Characterization of Glycoside Hydrolases using Computational and Experimental Techniques. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2012. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77989

NSYSU

18. Wu, Bo-Shiun. Development of a 4-DOF Underwater Manipulator.

Degree: Master, IAMPUT, 2011, NSYSU

URL: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-1019111-111506

► Underwater operation and sampling has been replaced by ROV (Remotely Operated Vehicle) and underwater manipulator gradually, which can avoid divers to face the dangers due… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Trackball; Jacobian; Underwater manipulator; Mechanism design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Wu, B. (2011). Development of a 4-DOF Underwater Manipulator. (Thesis). NSYSU. Retrieved from http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-1019111-111506

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Wu, Bo-Shiun. “Development of a 4-DOF Underwater Manipulator.” 2011. Thesis, NSYSU. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-1019111-111506.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Wu, Bo-Shiun. “Development of a 4-DOF Underwater Manipulator.” 2011. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Wu B. Development of a 4-DOF Underwater Manipulator. [Internet] [Thesis]. NSYSU; 2011. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-1019111-111506.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Wu B. Development of a 4-DOF Underwater Manipulator. [Thesis]. NSYSU; 2011. Available from: http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-1019111-111506

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Rochester

19. Yıldız, Özlem; Tezcan, Tolga. Design of reimbursement schemes and process improvement in service systems: applications in healthcare.

Degree: PhD, 2017, University of Rochester

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/33053

► We study the economics of and process improvements in service systems with a particular focus on applications in healthcare systems. Motivated by the increasingly high… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Healthcare operations; Process improvement; Mechanism design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Yıldız, Özlem; Tezcan, T. (2017). Design of reimbursement schemes and process improvement in service systems: applications in healthcare. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Rochester. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1802/33053

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Yıldız, Özlem; Tezcan, Tolga. “Design of reimbursement schemes and process improvement in service systems: applications in healthcare.” 2017. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Rochester. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1802/33053.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Yıldız, Özlem; Tezcan, Tolga. “Design of reimbursement schemes and process improvement in service systems: applications in healthcare.” 2017. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Yıldız, Özlem; Tezcan T. Design of reimbursement schemes and process improvement in service systems: applications in healthcare. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2017. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/33053.

Council of Science Editors:

Yıldız, Özlem; Tezcan T. Design of reimbursement schemes and process improvement in service systems: applications in healthcare. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2017. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/33053

Cornell University

20. Gorokh, Artur. Fairness and Efficiency in Online Allocation of Goods.

Degree: PhD, Applied Mathematics, 2020, Cornell University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/70376

► The subject of this thesis is the problem of allocating goods to people without using monetary payments. Specifically, I concentrate on the case of repeated… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: game theory; mechanism design; online allocation

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APA (6^th Edition):

Gorokh, A. (2020). Fairness and Efficiency in Online Allocation of Goods. (Doctoral Dissertation). Cornell University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1813/70376

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Gorokh, Artur. “Fairness and Efficiency in Online Allocation of Goods.” 2020. Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1813/70376.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Gorokh, Artur. “Fairness and Efficiency in Online Allocation of Goods.” 2020. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Gorokh A. Fairness and Efficiency in Online Allocation of Goods. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Cornell University; 2020. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/70376.

Council of Science Editors:

Gorokh A. Fairness and Efficiency in Online Allocation of Goods. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Cornell University; 2020. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/70376

University of Johannesburg

21. Steenekamp, Andries Petrus. Die ontwikkeling en beheer van 'n drie-dimensionele manipuleerder met terugvoerbeheerde pneumatiese silinders.

Degree: 2014, University of Johannesburg

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10210/10413

►

M.Ing. (Mechanical Engineering)

In this study a manipulator was developed by using system design methods. The main aim was to develop a robot which could… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Robotics; Manipulators (Mechanism) - Design and construction

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Steenekamp, A. P. (2014). Die ontwikkeling en beheer van 'n drie-dimensionele manipuleerder met terugvoerbeheerde pneumatiese silinders. (Thesis). University of Johannesburg. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10210/10413

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Steenekamp, Andries Petrus. “Die ontwikkeling en beheer van 'n drie-dimensionele manipuleerder met terugvoerbeheerde pneumatiese silinders.” 2014. Thesis, University of Johannesburg. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10210/10413.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Steenekamp, Andries Petrus. “Die ontwikkeling en beheer van 'n drie-dimensionele manipuleerder met terugvoerbeheerde pneumatiese silinders.” 2014. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Steenekamp AP. Die ontwikkeling en beheer van 'n drie-dimensionele manipuleerder met terugvoerbeheerde pneumatiese silinders. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Johannesburg; 2014. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10210/10413.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Steenekamp AP. Die ontwikkeling en beheer van 'n drie-dimensionele manipuleerder met terugvoerbeheerde pneumatiese silinders. [Thesis]. University of Johannesburg; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10210/10413

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

UCLA

22. Andreyanov, Pavel. Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design.

Degree: Economics, 2019, UCLA

URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0137s3dw

► My dissertation contributes to the literature on prior-free (robust) mechanism design. Prior-freeness can be interpreted differently, but a common feature is that certain mechanisms can… (more)

▼ My dissertation contributes to the literature on prior-free (robust) mechanism design. Prior-freeness can be interpreted differently, but a common feature is that certain mechanisms can be ranked above the others without the exact knowledge of distributions and/or utilities. According to the Wilson critique, the knowledge of fine details of the setting such as distributions and utilities is an unrealistic assumption and, moreover, optimal mechanisms in the classic (Bayesian) sense are often too complex to be implemented in reality. In the first chapter I study a scoring auction and the welfare implications of switching between the two leading designs of the scoring rule: linear (``weighted bid'') and log-linear (``adjusted bid''), when the designer's preferences for quality and money are unknown. Motivated by the empirical application, I formulate a new model of scoring auctions, with two key elements: exogenous quality and a reserve price, and characterize the equilibrium for a rich set of scoring rules. The data is drawn from the Russian public procurement sector in which the linear scoring rule was applied from 2011 to 2013. I estimate the underlying distribution of firms' types nonparametrically and simulate the equilibria for both scoring rules with different weights. The empirical results show that for any log-linear scoring rule, there exists a linear one, yielding a higher expected quality and rebate. Hence, at least with risk-neutral preferences, the linear design is superior to the log-linear.In the second chapter (Co-authored with Jernej Copic and Byeong-hyeon Jeong, UCLA) I study robust allocation of a divisible public good among n agents with quasi-linear utilities, when the budget is exactly balanced. Under several additional assumptions, we prove that such mechanism is equivalent to a distribution over simple posted prices. A robustly optimal mechanism minimizes expected welfare loss among robust divisible ones. For any prior belief, I show that a simple posted prices is robustly optimal. This justifies a restriction to binary allocations commonly found in the mechanism design literature. Robustness comes at a high cost. For certain beliefs, we show that the expected welfare loss of an optimal posted price is as big as 1/2 of the expected welfare in the corresponding optimal Bayesian mechanism, independently of the size of the economy. This bound is tight for the special case of two agents. In the third chapter (Co-authored with Tomasz Sadzik, UCLA) I provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex-post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus and are ex-post nearly efficient, when there are many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and I make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction, without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. I also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate…

Subjects/Keywords: Economics; auctions; mechanism design; robust; scoring

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APA (6^th Edition):

Andreyanov, P. (2019). Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design. (Thesis). UCLA. Retrieved from http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0137s3dw

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Andreyanov, Pavel. “Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design.” 2019. Thesis, UCLA. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0137s3dw.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Andreyanov, Pavel. “Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design.” 2019. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Andreyanov P. Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design. [Internet] [Thesis]. UCLA; 2019. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0137s3dw.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Andreyanov P. Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design. [Thesis]. UCLA; 2019. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0137s3dw

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Manitoba

23. Giesbrecht, Daniel. Design and optimization of a one-degree-of-freedom eight-bar leg mechanism for a walking machine.

Degree: Mechanical and Manufacturing Engineering, 2010, University of Manitoba

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1993/3922

► It has been established that legged, off-road vehicles exhibit better mobility, obtain higher energy efficiency and provide more comfortable movement than those of tracked or… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: linkage design; optimization; leg mechanism; walking machine

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APA (6^th Edition):

Giesbrecht, D. (2010). Design and optimization of a one-degree-of-freedom eight-bar leg mechanism for a walking machine. (Masters Thesis). University of Manitoba. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1993/3922

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Giesbrecht, Daniel. “Design and optimization of a one-degree-of-freedom eight-bar leg mechanism for a walking machine.” 2010. Masters Thesis, University of Manitoba. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1993/3922.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Giesbrecht, Daniel. “Design and optimization of a one-degree-of-freedom eight-bar leg mechanism for a walking machine.” 2010. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Giesbrecht D. Design and optimization of a one-degree-of-freedom eight-bar leg mechanism for a walking machine. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Manitoba; 2010. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1993/3922.

Council of Science Editors:

Giesbrecht D. Design and optimization of a one-degree-of-freedom eight-bar leg mechanism for a walking machine. [Masters Thesis]. University of Manitoba; 2010. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1993/3922

Rice University

24. Fang, Ye. computer-aided mechanism design.

Degree: MS, Engineering, 2015, Rice University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/87798

► Algorithmic mechanism design, as practised today, is a manual process; however, manual design and reasoning do not scale well with the complexity of design tasks.… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: program synthesis; economic mechanism design; game theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Fang, Y. (2015). computer-aided mechanism design. (Masters Thesis). Rice University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1911/87798

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Fang, Ye. “computer-aided mechanism design.” 2015. Masters Thesis, Rice University. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1911/87798.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Fang, Ye. “computer-aided mechanism design.” 2015. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Fang Y. computer-aided mechanism design. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Rice University; 2015. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/87798.

Council of Science Editors:

Fang Y. computer-aided mechanism design. [Masters Thesis]. Rice University; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/87798

Rice University

25. Zhu, Minyan. Essays on Game Theory and Financial-Strategy Test.

Degree: PhD, Social Sciences, 2015, Rice University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/88414

► Game theory studies strategic decision making among multiple rational players. Since 1950 Nash’s famous paper, it has wide applications to many fields: political science, financial… (more)

▼ Game theory studies strategic decision making among multiple rational players. Since 1950 Nash’s famous paper, it has wide applications to many fields: political science, financial market, cooperate finance, industrial organization and etc. Researchers are not only interested in the applications of game theory but also focus on the mechanism design that considers the structure of game forms. In this dissertation, I explore both areas: the first two chapters consider the games played by multiple players in industrial organization and the third chapter considers the mechanism design problem for the assignment problem. Continued government support of public good programs (e.g. assistance to less developed countries, or to university researchers for work on a multistage project, or to communities for environmental improvement programs) often depends on grant recipients making adequate progress toward their goals. Chapter 1 studies a prisoner’s dilemma with positive payoffs that will repeat a given known number of times or until there is evidence of cheating, whichever comes first. Our discussion focuses precisely on how much cooperation is possible (i.e., for how many periods cooperation lasts). When the termination rule is based on perfect information about the players’ behavior and players are motivated to cooperate for at least one period, early termination of the game never occurs, i.e. cooperation continues until the last possible period. Cooperation may end sooner when the termination rule is based on imperfect information about the players’ behavior. For the case of imperfect information, I show how much cooperation can occur as a function of the model parameters and under the assumption that players are able to engage in mutual monitoring. Chapter 2 investigates the motivation of mutual recommendations. It seems irrational for people to refer customers to the other stores without having any profit. But such examples are around us, for example, a mechanical shop may refer customers to another one when it cannot fix the issues. In this chapter, I consider a two-player infinitely repeated game. Players, in each period, can either choose recommendation or not-recommendation that depends on the history of a public signal. A new mechanism, k + 1 punishment scheme, is proposed in which two players stop recommending when k consecutive bag signals occur. Among all possible k + 1 punishment schemes, there exists a unique optimal k* to maximize the player’s payoff. Thus, mutual recommendations between players can increase their overall profits even if such action incurs cost. Chapter 3 investigates a typical class of assignment problems, which relaxes the assumption of the completeness of bipartite graphs but enforces balance conditions. When the domain is 2-connectivity (each agent has at most 2 available tasks), I find there exist mechanisms satisfying ordinal-efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proof. This result does not restrict the number of players in the game. Since a strong negative result exists… Advisors/Committee Members: Dudey, Marc P (advisor), Brown, Bryan W (committee member), Fang, Songying (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Game Theory; Mechanism Design; Portfolio Management

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APA (6^th Edition):

Zhu, M. (2015). Essays on Game Theory and Financial-Strategy Test. (Doctoral Dissertation). Rice University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1911/88414

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Zhu, Minyan. “Essays on Game Theory and Financial-Strategy Test.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, Rice University. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1911/88414.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Zhu, Minyan. “Essays on Game Theory and Financial-Strategy Test.” 2015. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Zhu M. Essays on Game Theory and Financial-Strategy Test. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Rice University; 2015. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/88414.

Council of Science Editors:

Zhu M. Essays on Game Theory and Financial-Strategy Test. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Rice University; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/88414

Delft University of Technology

26. Ipema, C.W. (author). Designing the perfect tender.

Degree: 2014, Delft University of Technology

URL: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:4d2cd08e-b64f-48d9-935d-d3b09b3840ef

►

This thesis studies parameters that are assumed to in?uence the outcomes of tender procedures. These parameters are learning, transaction costs, repetition, complex bids, uncertainty, continued… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: game theory; tender; games; mechanism design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Ipema, C. W. (. (2014). Designing the perfect tender. (Masters Thesis). Delft University of Technology. Retrieved from http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:4d2cd08e-b64f-48d9-935d-d3b09b3840ef

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Ipema, C W (author). “Designing the perfect tender.” 2014. Masters Thesis, Delft University of Technology. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:4d2cd08e-b64f-48d9-935d-d3b09b3840ef.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Ipema, C W (author). “Designing the perfect tender.” 2014. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Ipema CW(. Designing the perfect tender. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2014. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:4d2cd08e-b64f-48d9-935d-d3b09b3840ef.

Council of Science Editors:

Ipema CW(. Designing the perfect tender. [Masters Thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2014. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:4d2cd08e-b64f-48d9-935d-d3b09b3840ef

Victoria University of Wellington

27. Lassueur, Loïc. Identifying the Mechanism of Action of Bioactive 1,2-Cyclopropyl Carbohydrates.

Degree: 2015, Victoria University of Wellington

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10063/5138

► Cyclopropanes and carbohydrates have long been used in the field of drug development. Previous work has shown that 1,2-cyclopropyl carbohydrates display bioactivity in both HeLa… (more)

▼ Cyclopropanes and carbohydrates have long been used in the field of drug development. Previous work has shown that 1,2-cyclopropyl carbohydrates display bioactivity in both HeLa cancer cell lines¹ and in yeast² with a tentatively proposed mechanism of inhibition occurring through an enzymatic cyclopropane ring opening reaction and subsequent formation of a covalent bond with a target enzyme.² A small library of 1,2-cyclopropyl carbohydrate derivatives were synthesised based on known pharmacophores to examine further the potential mechanism of inhibition of such compounds and confirm the occurrence of enzyme-catalysed cyclopropane ring-opening reactions. Initial synthetic efforts were focused on the synthesis of the 1,2-dichlorocyclopropyl carbohydrate 23, which, through the optimisation of an essential C-6 detritylation reaction, was achieved in moderate yields of 32% over 7 steps. Following this, the ethoxycarbonyl substituted 1,2-cyclopropyl carbohydrate 54 was synthesised over 7 steps in a 22% yield through a rhodium acetate-catalysed addition of ethyl diazoacetate (49) to the glucal substrate 40. It was envisioned that if enzymatic cyclopropane ring-opening was occurring to form a C-7 carbanion, this would in turn be stabilised through the potential enolate formation of 54. Use of N,N-ditosylhydrazine in the synthesis of propargyl diazoacetate (58) followed by a rhodium acetate-catalysed cyclopropanation of 58 with substrate 40 resulted in the successful synthesis of 61 over 7 steps in a total yield of 9%. The incorporation of the propargyl substituent in 61 was introduced as a molecular probe in an attempt to isolate the target protein through an affinity purification procedure. The bioactivity of the propargyl derivative 61 was consistent with the synthesised compounds 23 and 54. It was proposed that these compounds undergo an enzymatic cyclopropane ring opening reaction accompanied with a clear diastereoselective preference for the α-stereoisomer of the cyclopropane ring, consistent with a target-based activation of the compounds. Chemical genetic analysis of the resulting bioactive compounds was undertaken using a deletion mutant array of Saccharomyces cerevisiae to elucidate a potential mechanism of action. Analysis of the results showed that, of the 4800 homozygous deletion strains tested in the high-throughput screens, a total of 122 strains were found following validation to sensitise and 68 to give resistance against 23 and 54. These sensitive and resistant mutants were subjected to a validation assay. Following validation, genes whose deletion led to sensitivity or resistance were then subjected to gene ontology term enrichment analysis which showed enrichment in the cytosolic ribosome, SNARE complex and SNAP receptor activity for resistant strains and enrichment in endoplasmic reticulum and endomembrane systems was found for the sensitive strain. Genes whose deletion sensitised to both compounds showed strong enrichment in cellular protein localisation, intra-golgi vesicale-mediated transport and the… Advisors/Committee Members: Teesdale-Spittle, Paul, Harvey, Joanne.

Subjects/Keywords: Cyclopropanes; Drug Design; Chemical Genetics; Mechanism-based

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APA (6^th Edition):

Lassueur, L. (2015). Identifying the Mechanism of Action of Bioactive 1,2-Cyclopropyl Carbohydrates. (Masters Thesis). Victoria University of Wellington. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10063/5138

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Lassueur, Loïc. “Identifying the Mechanism of Action of Bioactive 1,2-Cyclopropyl Carbohydrates.” 2015. Masters Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10063/5138.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Lassueur, Loïc. “Identifying the Mechanism of Action of Bioactive 1,2-Cyclopropyl Carbohydrates.” 2015. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Lassueur L. Identifying the Mechanism of Action of Bioactive 1,2-Cyclopropyl Carbohydrates. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Victoria University of Wellington; 2015. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10063/5138.

Council of Science Editors:

Lassueur L. Identifying the Mechanism of Action of Bioactive 1,2-Cyclopropyl Carbohydrates. [Masters Thesis]. Victoria University of Wellington; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10063/5138

Duke University

28. Xu, Xiaoming. Network Extenality and Mechanism Design .

Degree: 2015, Duke University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/9964

► \abstract {\em Mechanism design} studies optimization problems taking into accounts of the selfish agents. {\em Network externality} is the effect a consumer receives from… (more)

▼ \abstract {\em Mechanism design} studies optimization problems taking into accounts of the selfish agents. {\em Network externality} is the effect a consumer receives from other consumers of the same good. This effect can be negative or positive. We first consider several mechanism design problems under the network externality assumption. The externality model used in this dissertation is more general than the widely used cardinality based model. In particular the network we consider in this dissertation is a graph, which is not necessarily complete. Our goal is to design {\em truthful} mechanisms to maximize the seller's revenue. Our main results under the network externality utility model are several optimal or near optimal mechanisms for {\em digital goods auctions}. To do so we invent several novel approximation schemes as well as applying results from the {\em approximation algorithm} literature. In particular when the agents exhibit negative network externality, we first model the problem as a two staged {\em pricing game}. We then show that the pricing game is an exact {\em potential game} which always admits a pure {\em Nash Equilibrium}. We then study the {\em best} and {\em worst} Nash Equilibrium in this game in terms of the revenue. We show two positive results. For the best Nash Equilibrium we show a 2-approximation to the maximum revenue on bipartite graphs. For the worst Nash Equilibrium we use the notion of a {\em δ-relaxed} equilibrium. In the sense that the prices for the same type of agents are within δ factor of each other. We accompany our positive results with matching hardness results. On the other hand, when the agents exhibit positive network externality, we take the {\em Myersonian} approach. We first give a complete characterization for all the truthful mechanisms. Using this characterization we present a truthful mechanism which achieves the optimal expected revenue among all the truthful mechanisms when the prior distributions of the agents are {\em independent} and {\em regular}. We also show near optimal mechanisms when the prior distributions are possibly {\em correlated}. {\em Prior-free} auctions can approximate meaningful benchmarks for non-identical bidders only when sufficient qualitative information about the bidder asymmetry is publicly known. We consider digital goods auctions where there is a {\em total ordering} of the bidders that is known to the seller, where earlier bidders are in some sense thought to have higher valuations. We define an appropriate revenue benchmark: the maximum revenue that can be obtained from a bid vector using prices that are nonincreasing in the bidder ordering and bounded above by the second-highest bid. This {\em monotone-price benchmark} is always as large as the well-known fixed-price benchmark, so designing prior-free auctions with good approximation guarantees is only harder. By design, an auction that approximates the… Advisors/Committee Members: Munagala, Kamesh (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Computer science; auction theory; mechanism design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Xu, X. (2015). Network Extenality and Mechanism Design . (Thesis). Duke University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10161/9964

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Xu, Xiaoming. “Network Extenality and Mechanism Design .” 2015. Thesis, Duke University. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10161/9964.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Xu, Xiaoming. “Network Extenality and Mechanism Design .” 2015. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Xu X. Network Extenality and Mechanism Design . [Internet] [Thesis]. Duke University; 2015. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/9964.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Xu X. Network Extenality and Mechanism Design . [Thesis]. Duke University; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/9964

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Maryland

29. Johnson, Terence R. Essays on Matching and Auction Theory.

Degree: Economics, 2011, University of Maryland

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1903/12327

► This dissertation uses mechanism design theory to show how a matchmaker should design two-sided matching markets when agents are privately informed about their qualities or… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Economic theory; Auctions; Matching; Mechanism Design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Johnson, T. R. (2011). Essays on Matching and Auction Theory. (Thesis). University of Maryland. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1903/12327

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Johnson, Terence R. “Essays on Matching and Auction Theory.” 2011. Thesis, University of Maryland. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1903/12327.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Johnson, Terence R. “Essays on Matching and Auction Theory.” 2011. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Johnson TR. Essays on Matching and Auction Theory. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Maryland; 2011. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1903/12327.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Johnson TR. Essays on Matching and Auction Theory. [Thesis]. University of Maryland; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1903/12327

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Massey University

30. Lofroth, Matthew. Development of a compliant micro gripper : a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of Masters of Engineering in the School of Engineering and Advanced Technology, Massey University .

Degree: 2019, Massey University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10179/15437

► Manipulating micro objects simply and effectively has been a widely discussed and challenging task in recent literature for many reasons. Limitations in complex micro fabrication… (more)

▼ Manipulating micro objects simply and effectively has been a widely discussed and challenging task in recent literature for many reasons. Limitations in complex micro fabrication techniques mean creating extremely small tools at the micro scale is very difficult. Adhesion forces also dominate at this scale, causing anything and everything to stick together. This means that even when these tiny structures are created and introduced to the micro world, they quickly become polluted with contaminants and struggle to pick and place particles without said particle adhering to the tool. Indirect methods for micro manipulation exist, however these can be damaging to biological material such as cells, due to unseen forces being focused into a small point. Having the ability to safely manipulate and separate these objects from a culture is crucial to understanding their individual characteristics. Therefore a safe and reliable method for micro manipulation needs to be developed. This project focuses on investigating the current methods used for micro manipulation in order to identify any possible routes towards developing a simple and yet effective means for manipulating micro objects. A modular micro gripping mechanism is proposed in this report, capable of manipulating many different types of objects such as spherical, non spherical or other arbitrary shapes. The proposed micro gripper combines traditional machining techniques with a complex micro fabrication process to produce a modular mechanism consisting of a sturdy, compliant aluminium base in which replaceable silicon and borosilicate glass end effectors are attached. This creates an easily customisable solution for micro manipulation with an array of different micro tips for different applications. A kinematic analysis for the gripper has been provided which predicts the workspace of the gripper given an input actuation. Design parameters of the gripper have also been optimised through various techniques such as FEA (finite element analysis) simulation and the effects of altering individual flexure beam lengths. The gripper is operated by a piezo actuator with a total capable expansion of 19 mm when 150 VDC is applied. This expansion is then amplified by a factor of 8.1 to a maximum tip displacement of approximately 154 mm. Displacement amplification is achieved by incorporating bridge and lever amplifying techniques into the compliant design. The complete micro gripper is then used to demonstrate manipulation tasks on several different target object types including silica micro beads (spherical and non spherical), a human eyelash and a grain of pollen. These tests are performed to investigate the effect of adhesion forces and also to demonstrate the large size range of capable pick and place objects (6 mm to 500 mm).

Subjects/Keywords: Manipulators (Mechanism); Microelectromechanical systems; Design and construction

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APA (6^th Edition):

Lofroth, M. (2019). Development of a compliant micro gripper : a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of Masters of Engineering in the School of Engineering and Advanced Technology, Massey University . (Thesis). Massey University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10179/15437

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Lofroth, Matthew. “Development of a compliant micro gripper : a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of Masters of Engineering in the School of Engineering and Advanced Technology, Massey University .” 2019. Thesis, Massey University. Accessed March 04, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10179/15437.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Lofroth, Matthew. “Development of a compliant micro gripper : a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of Masters of Engineering in the School of Engineering and Advanced Technology, Massey University .” 2019. Web. 04 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Lofroth M. Development of a compliant micro gripper : a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of Masters of Engineering in the School of Engineering and Advanced Technology, Massey University . [Internet] [Thesis]. Massey University; 2019. [cited 2021 Mar 04]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10179/15437.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Lofroth M. Development of a compliant micro gripper : a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of Masters of Engineering in the School of Engineering and Advanced Technology, Massey University . [Thesis]. Massey University; 2019. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10179/15437

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

		in
And / Or
		in
And / Or
		in
And / Or
		in

Open Access Theses and Dissertations