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University of Pennsylvania

1. Kalla, Simo J. ESSAYS IN FAVOR-TRADING.

Degree: 2010, University of Pennsylvania

URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/124

We investigate two previously little studied aspects of favor-trading. First, we study whether and how individuals who stand to gain from favor-trading can best form cooperative relationships in an environment with private information about each agent’s ability and willingness to do favors. For agents with a low discount factor (low types) cooperation is not incentive compatible, for agents with a high discount factor (high types) it is. Both types receive privately observed opportunities to do favors with positive probability each period. We show high types are always able to separate from low types. Separation is implementable as soon as a high type receives a favor opportunity if the opportunities are independent across agents. If they are mutually exclusive, high types continue to separate with probability one if one of the agents is designated to do the first favor and that agent is a high type. Equilibria that designate an agent to act first implement separation approximately twice as slowly as symmetric equilibria that task the first high type with opportunity to separate first. Therefore the latter type of symmetric equilibria may dominate the former type of non-symmetric equilibria. Second, we study two-player games of favor-trading in a complete information environment standard to the literature, but in contrast to prominent models of favor-trading to date, we assume agents have concave utility functions of the form u(x)=x^a; 0

Subjects/Keywords: favor-trading; games of cooperation; incomplete information; insurance; game theory; convex preferences; Economics; Economic Theory

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APA (6^{th} Edition):

Kalla, S. J. (2010). ESSAYS IN FAVOR-TRADING. (Thesis). University of Pennsylvania. Retrieved from https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/124

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:

Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^{th} Edition):

Kalla, Simo J. “ESSAYS IN FAVOR-TRADING.” 2010. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania. Accessed December 07, 2019. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/124.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:

Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^{th} Edition):

Kalla, Simo J. “ESSAYS IN FAVOR-TRADING.” 2010. Web. 07 Dec 2019.

Vancouver:

Kalla SJ. ESSAYS IN FAVOR-TRADING. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Pennsylvania; 2010. [cited 2019 Dec 07]. Available from: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/124.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:

Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Kalla SJ. ESSAYS IN FAVOR-TRADING. [Thesis]. University of Pennsylvania; 2010. Available from: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/124

Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Rice University

2. Li, Jin. Essays on Fair Division and Monopoly Pricing.

Degree: PhD, Social Sciences, 2015, Rice University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/88086

The first chapter is based on a paper with Jingyi Xue in fair division problems. In this chapter, we consider the problem of fairly dividing a finite number of divisible goods among
agents with the generalized Leontief preferences. We propose and characterize the class
of generalized egalitarian rules which satisfy efficiency, group strategy-proofness, anonymity,
resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, envy-freeness and consistency. On the
Leontief domain, our rules generalize the egalitarian-equivalent rules with reference bundles. We also extend our rules to agent-specific and endowment-specific egalitarian rules. The former is a larger class of rules satisfying all the previous properties except anonymity and
envy-freeness. The latter is a class of efficient, group strategy-proof, anonymous and individually rational rules when the resources are assumed to be privately owned.
The second chapter is about monopoly pricing with social learning. In this chapter, we consider a two-period monopolistic model in which the consumers who purchase in the first
period would reveal the unknown quality of the product through their experiences to the consumers
in the second period. Due to this effect, some consumers would strategically choose
to delay to the second period in order to take this informational free-ride. We show that there always exists a unique symmetric equilibrium of consumers for each price set by the
monopolist. Then we further investigate the seller’s optimization pricing problem. In a range
of moderate patience, the seller would be likely to induce the consumers to effectively transmit information. We also discuss the impact of information disclosure on the monopolistic
profit.
*Advisors/Committee Members: Dudey, Marc (advisor), Tang, Xun (committee member), Veech, William (committee member).*

Subjects/Keywords: Fair Division; Egalitarian Rules; Leontief Preferences; Social Choice; Exchange Economies; Industrial Organization; Monopoly; Social Learning; Incomplete Information

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^{th} Edition):

Li, J. (2015). Essays on Fair Division and Monopoly Pricing. (Doctoral Dissertation). Rice University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1911/88086

Chicago Manual of Style (16^{th} Edition):

Li, Jin. “Essays on Fair Division and Monopoly Pricing.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, Rice University. Accessed December 07, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/1911/88086.

MLA Handbook (7^{th} Edition):

Li, Jin. “Essays on Fair Division and Monopoly Pricing.” 2015. Web. 07 Dec 2019.

Vancouver:

Li J. Essays on Fair Division and Monopoly Pricing. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Rice University; 2015. [cited 2019 Dec 07]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/88086.

Council of Science Editors:

Li J. Essays on Fair Division and Monopoly Pricing. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Rice University; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1911/88086

3. Saleck Pay, Babak. Decomposition Algorithms in Stochastic Integer Programming: Applications and Computations.

Degree: PhD, Mathematical Sciences, 2017, Virginia Commonwealth University

URL: https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/5027

In this dissertation we focus on two main topics. Under the first topic, we develop a new framework for stochastic network interdiction problem to address ambiguity in the defender risk preferences. The second topic is dedicated to computational studies of two-stage stochastic integer programs. More specifically, we consider two cases. First, we develop some solution methods for two-stage stochastic integer programs with continuous recourse; second, we study some computational strategies for two-stage stochastic integer programs with integer recourse.
We study a class of stochastic network interdiction problems where the defender has incomplete (ambiguous) preferences. Specifically, we focus on the shortest path network interdiction modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the defender (leader) makes an interdiction decision first, then the attacker (follower) selects a shortest path after the observation of random arc costs and interdiction effects in the network. We take a decision-analytic perspective in addressing probabilistic risk over network parameters, assuming that the defender's risk preferences over exogenously given probabilities can be summarized by the expected utility theory. Although the exact form of the utility function is ambiguous to the defender, we assume that a set of historical data on some pairwise comparisons made by the defender is available, which can be used to restrict the shape of the utility function. We use two different approaches to tackle this problem. The first approach conducts utility estimation and optimization separately, by first finding the best fit for a piecewise linear concave utility function according to the available data, and then optimizing the expected utility. The second approach integrates utility estimation and optimization, by modeling the utility ambiguity under a robust optimization framework following and . We conduct extensive computational experiments to evaluate the performances of these approaches on the stochastic shortest path network interdiction problem.
In third chapter, we propose partition-based decomposition algorithms for solving two-stage stochastic integer program with continuous recourse. The partition-based decomposition method enhance the classical decomposition methods (such as Benders decomposition) by utilizing the inexact cuts (coarse cuts) induced by a scenario partition. Coarse cut generation can be much less expensive than the standard Benders cuts, when the partition size is relatively small compared to the total number of scenarios. We conduct an extensive computational study to illustrate the advantage of the proposed partition-based decomposition algorithms compared with the state-of-the-art approaches.
In chapter four, we concentrate on computational methods for two-stage stochastic integer program with integer recourse. We consider the partition-based relaxation framework integrated with a scenario decomposition algorithm in order to develop strategies which provide a better lower…
*Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. Yongjia Song.*

Subjects/Keywords: Stochastic Network Interdiction; Incomplete Preferences Information; Two-stage Stochastic Integer Programming; Industrial Engineering; Operational Research; Other Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering; Systems Engineering

…problems where the defender
has *incomplete* (ambiguous) *preferences*. Specifically, we… …or the defender will reveal some *information* about their risk *preferences*, but this… …stochastic network interdiction when
the defender’s *incomplete* preference *information* can be… …address
ambiguity in the defender risk *preferences*. The second topic is dedicated to… …probabilistic risk over
network parameters, assuming that the defender’s risk *preferences* over…

Record Details Similar Records

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^{th} Edition):

Saleck Pay, B. (2017). Decomposition Algorithms in Stochastic Integer Programming: Applications and Computations. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Commonwealth University. Retrieved from https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/5027

Chicago Manual of Style (16^{th} Edition):

Saleck Pay, Babak. “Decomposition Algorithms in Stochastic Integer Programming: Applications and Computations.” 2017. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Commonwealth University. Accessed December 07, 2019. https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/5027.

MLA Handbook (7^{th} Edition):

Saleck Pay, Babak. “Decomposition Algorithms in Stochastic Integer Programming: Applications and Computations.” 2017. Web. 07 Dec 2019.

Vancouver:

Saleck Pay B. Decomposition Algorithms in Stochastic Integer Programming: Applications and Computations. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Commonwealth University; 2017. [cited 2019 Dec 07]. Available from: https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/5027.

Council of Science Editors:

Saleck Pay B. Decomposition Algorithms in Stochastic Integer Programming: Applications and Computations. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Commonwealth University; 2017. Available from: https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/5027