subject:(Game theory)

1. Ramaswamy Pillai, Vinod. Applications of Game Theory to Multi-Agent Coordination Problems in Communication Networks.

Degree: 2013, Texas Digital Library

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969; http://hdl.handle.net/2249.1/66549

► Recent years there has been a growing interest in the study of distributed control mechanisms for use in communication networks. A fundamental assumption in these… (more)

▼ Recent years there has been a growing interest in the study of distributed control mechanisms for use in communication networks. A fundamental assumption in these models is that the participants in the network are willing to cooperate with the system. However, there are many instances where the incentives to cooperate is missing. Then, the agents may seek to achieve their own private interests by behaving strategically. Often, such selfish choices lead to inefficient equilibrium state of the system, commonly known as the tragedy of commons in Economics terminology. Now, one may ask the following question: how can the system be led to the socially optimal state in spite of selfish behaviors of its participants? The traditional control design framework fails to provide an answer as it does not take into account of selfish and strategic behavior of the agents. The use of game theoretical methods to achieve coordination in such network systems is appealing, as it naturally captures the idea of rational agents taking locally optimal decisions. In this thesis, we explore several instances of coordination problems in communication networks that can be analyzed using game theoretical methods. We study one coordination problem each, from each layer of TCP/IP reference model - the network model used in the current Internet architecture. First, we consider societal agents taking decisions on whether to obtain content legally or illegally, and tie their behavior to questions of performance of content distribution networks. We show that revenue sharing with peers promote performance and revenue extraction from content distribution networks. Next, we consider a transport layer problem where applications compete against each other to meet their performance objectives by selfishly picking congestion controllers. We establish that tolling schemes that incentivize applications to choose one of several different virtual networks catering to particular needs yields higher system value. Hence, we propose the adoption of such virtual networks. We address a network layer question in third problem. How do the sources in a wireless network split their traffic over the available set of paths to attain the lowest possible number of transmissions per unit time? We develop a two level distributed controller that attains the optimal traffic split. Finally, we study mobile applications competing for channel access in a cellular network. We show that the mechanism where base station conducting sequence of second price auctions and providing channel access to the winner achieves the benefits of the state of art solution, Largest Queue First policy. Advisors/Committee Members: Shakkottai, Srinivas (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Game theory

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Ramaswamy Pillai, V. (2013). Applications of Game Theory to Multi-Agent Coordination Problems in Communication Networks. (Thesis). Texas Digital Library. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969; http://hdl.handle.net/2249.1/66549

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Ramaswamy Pillai, Vinod. “Applications of Game Theory to Multi-Agent Coordination Problems in Communication Networks.” 2013. Thesis, Texas Digital Library. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/1969; http://hdl.handle.net/2249.1/66549.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Ramaswamy Pillai, Vinod. “Applications of Game Theory to Multi-Agent Coordination Problems in Communication Networks.” 2013. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Ramaswamy Pillai V. Applications of Game Theory to Multi-Agent Coordination Problems in Communication Networks. [Internet] [Thesis]. Texas Digital Library; 2013. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969; http://hdl.handle.net/2249.1/66549.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Ramaswamy Pillai V. Applications of Game Theory to Multi-Agent Coordination Problems in Communication Networks. [Thesis]. Texas Digital Library; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969; http://hdl.handle.net/2249.1/66549

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Rutgers University

2. Alabdel Abass, Ahmed A., 1980-. Evolutionary games: applications to security and resource allocation in networks.

Degree: PhD, Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2018, Rutgers University

URL: https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/58878/

► Modern life is getting more complicated and people rely more on the intelligence embedded in their electronic gadgets. It is expected these gadgets will take… (more)

▼ Modern life is getting more complicated and people rely more on the intelligence embedded in their electronic gadgets. It is expected these gadgets will take larger roles in making, at least some simple, decisions instead of us. It is not difficult to see how many gadgets will be needed in an Internet of Things environment, or smart home settings, or any sort of connected devices. Interaction among these devices can be addressed using game theoretical models. However for a large number of devices interacting/playing with each other, the classical game models can be complicated. One way to approach this problem is by using evolutionary game theory (EGT). Evolutionary games deal with large number of players by making assumptions such as some common similarities in the players' interests, payoffs, and bounded rationality. Both of these assumptions seem to fit in modeling the large number of players'/devices' interaction. On the other hand, evolutionary games can model the user behavior in taking decisions when repeatedly played. Meaning that, each time a player does a move, the player observes the payoff and can compare it with the average payoff, and in the next play the player can choose a different move if it gives higher payoff and so on so forth. By using the concept of replicator dynamics, evolutionary games make it possible to observe how the choice dynamics is made. It can be looked at as learning until reaching to a very stable choice which is an evolutionary stable choice. This thesis first presents the problem of communications under a denial of service attack through a jamming threat. We consider the problem where the players try to communicate with a base station under the threat of jammers who, possible cooperatively, try to block their communications. The users have the option to work cooperatively too. The second problem this thesis deals with a generalized network model known as ephemeral network under the threat of a malicious attack with the absence of any central authority. The only control to the network is a set of rules which are agreed upon before setting a connection. Thirdly, we study the problem of advanced persistent threats (APTs), which is the problem of a powerful and stealthy attacker who wants to infiltrate the system. Evolutionary game theory is used by giving the players, the APT attacker and the system defender, the opportunity to adapt their decisions according to the replicator dynamics to reach to the robust decision,i.e, to choose the defend/attack strategy. The final part of this work uses evolutionary game theory to model the coexistence between WiFi and LTE-U technologies. We consider a scenario where there are two heterogeneous populations, one population represents the set of LET-U APs and the other one represents the set of WiFi AP. Furthermore, we assume that AP's belong to the same population do not interfere with each other. We study, under a given set of transmission strategies, the stability of the strategies that can appear in such a conflict. We specify the… Advisors/Committee Members: Mandayam, Narayan B. (chair), School of Graduate Studies.

Subjects/Keywords: Game theory

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Alabdel Abass, Ahmed A., 1. (2018). Evolutionary games: applications to security and resource allocation in networks. (Doctoral Dissertation). Rutgers University. Retrieved from https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/58878/

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Alabdel Abass, Ahmed A., 1980-. “Evolutionary games: applications to security and resource allocation in networks.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, Rutgers University. Accessed February 26, 2020. https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/58878/.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Alabdel Abass, Ahmed A., 1980-. “Evolutionary games: applications to security and resource allocation in networks.” 2018. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Alabdel Abass, Ahmed A. 1. Evolutionary games: applications to security and resource allocation in networks. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Rutgers University; 2018. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/58878/.

Council of Science Editors:

Alabdel Abass, Ahmed A. 1. Evolutionary games: applications to security and resource allocation in networks. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Rutgers University; 2018. Available from: https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/58878/

Penn State University

3. Isogai, Shigeki. Essays on Dynamic Games and Forward Induction.

Degree: 2017, Penn State University

URL: https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/14187sxi122

► In this essay, I study how forward-induction reasoning affect plausibility/stability of agreements in which players in a dynamic interaction enforces cooperation with the threat of… (more)

▼ In this essay, I study how forward-induction reasoning affect plausibility/stability of agreements in which players in a dynamic interaction enforces cooperation with the threat of mutually destructive punishment. While the traditional theory using equilibrium concept shows that such strategy profile is self-enforcing, under a modification of the model, such strategy profile fails to be consistent with players' rationality.In the first chapter I provide the simplest setting under which this non-rationalizability result of deterrence can be shown. The game is a two-player three-stage game: in the first stage, the players choose whether to enter the strategic interaction by paying some cost; in the second stage, the players play a prisoners' dilemma game; and in the third stage, the players play a coordination game. Each move is simultaneous and the players' past actions are perfectly monitored. While there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which players can cooperate with the threat of punishment provided the punishment is strong enough, I show that the strategy profile does not consists of rationalizable strategies under a certain parameter values. This occurs because choosing to enter, unilaterally defect, and then punish the opponent is strictly dominated by a mixture of the two strategies ``do not enter'' and ``enter, defect, but do not punish.'' This result shows that a simple modification of the game and forward-induction consideration encoded in rationalizability might cast doubt on the idea of deterring defection by the threat of mutual punishment.The other two chapters study to what extent the result in the fist chapter does or does not apply in different settings. The second chapter considers the infinite-horizon extension of the model in the first chapter. In the first period (denoted as period 0), the players choose whether to enter the game. After the players choose to enter, the continuation game is the infinite repetition of the stage game which consists of two phases: in the first phase players play prisoners' dilemma game, after which players simultaneously choose to continue the game, exit from the game without punishing the opponent, or punish the opponent and exit from the game. I show that with a similar condition as in the result in the first chapter, strategy which entails defection and punishment in the first stage is not rationalizable. Moreover, since the exit-without-punishment option works as an outside option in later stages of the game, we also obtain a result which provides conditions under which punishment after defection is excluded by rationalizability.The third chapter extends the model in the first chapter toward an incomplete-information model in that it considers a model of random number of players, who are sequentially matched and play the game as in the first chapter. I assume that while the past actions in the stage games are not observable, occurrences of punishment is publicly observable to all the players (the typical example is the formation of cartels and the… Advisors/Committee Members: Edward Green, Dissertation Advisor.

Subjects/Keywords: game theory; collusion

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Isogai, S. (2017). Essays on Dynamic Games and Forward Induction. (Thesis). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/14187sxi122

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Isogai, Shigeki. “Essays on Dynamic Games and Forward Induction.” 2017. Thesis, Penn State University. Accessed February 26, 2020. https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/14187sxi122.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Isogai, Shigeki. “Essays on Dynamic Games and Forward Induction.” 2017. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Isogai S. Essays on Dynamic Games and Forward Induction. [Internet] [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2017. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/14187sxi122.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Isogai S. Essays on Dynamic Games and Forward Induction. [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2017. Available from: https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/14187sxi122

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Penn State University

4. Karavaev, Andrei. THREE ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2008, Penn State University

URL: https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/8790

► This dissertation consists of three essays in economics. The first essay studies information trading in fixed networks of economic agents who can only observe and… (more)

▼ This dissertation consists of three essays in economics. The first essay studies information trading in fixed networks of economic agents who can only observe and trade with other agents with whom they are directly connected. We study the nature of price competition for information in this environment. The linear network, when the agents are located at the integer points of the real line, is a specific example I completely characterize. For the linear network there always exists a stationary equilibrium, where the strategies do not depend on time. I show that there is an equilibrium where any agent has a nonzero probability of staying uninformed forever. Under certain initial conditions this equilibrium is a limit of equilibria of finite-horizon games. The role of a transversality condition is emphasized, namely that the price in the transaction should not exceed the expected utility of all the agents who get the information due to the transaction. I show that the price offered does not converge to zero with time. The second essay focuses on the problem of using idiosyncratic shocks and random matchings. Many economic models use a continuum of negligible agents to avoid considering one person's effect on aggregate characteristics of the economy. Along with a continuum of agents, these models often incorporate a sequence of independent shocks and random matchings. Despite frequent use of such models, there are still unsolved questions about their mathematical justification. In this paper we construct a discrete time framework, in which major desirable properties of idiosyncratic shocks and random matchings hold. In this framework the agent space constitutes a probability space, and the probability distribution for each agent is replaced by the population distribution. Unlike previous authors, we question the assumption of known identity - the location on the agent space. We assume that the agents only know their previous history - what had happened to them before, - but not their identity. The construction justifies the use of numerous dynamic models of idiosyncratic shocks and random matchings. The third essay examines inefficient equilibria in Games Played Through Agents. Games Played through Agents is a class of complete information games with multiple principles and multiple agents. Previous studies found conditions for the existence of the efficient equilibria, in which the sum of all the payoffs is maximized. In this paper, we prove that for a game with two principals and one agent only, any inefficient equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by an efficient one. A counterexample shows that this result does not hold for more than two principals. We also demonstrate that any efficient equilibrium is weakly dominated by the Truthful Nash Equilibrium.

Subjects/Keywords: game theory; Microeconomics

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Karavaev, A. (2008). THREE ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS. (Doctoral Dissertation). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/8790

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Karavaev, Andrei. “THREE ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS.” 2008. Doctoral Dissertation, Penn State University. Accessed February 26, 2020. https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/8790.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Karavaev, Andrei. “THREE ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS.” 2008. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Karavaev A. THREE ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Penn State University; 2008. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/8790.

Council of Science Editors:

Karavaev A. THREE ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Penn State University; 2008. Available from: https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/8790

University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign

5. Xu, Wenxin. Strategic management of operational resources under uncertainty.

Degree: PhD, Business Administration, 2016, University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/95444

► This dissertation addresses and answers two questions: (1) What are the impacts of market uncertainty and technological uncertainty? (2) What is the best way for… (more)

▼ This dissertation addresses and answers two questions: (1) What are the impacts of market uncertainty and technological uncertainty? (2) What is the best way for a firm to manage demand information and technological knowledge in the face of competition? The first essay (Chapter 2) investigates a problem of competitive investment with payoff externalities and uncertain but partially observable profitability. This essay examines a duopoly game, which, under appropriate conditions, reduces to a war of attrition game in the sense that both firms have incentives to be the follower. We find that due to the strategic interactions, payoff externalities and learning opportunities have counterintuitive effects on investment strategies and on the time to the first investment. In particular, we find that an increase in the rate of learning, which usually benefits the follower, may hasten or delay the first investment depending on the rate of learning and the prior probability that the investment is profitable. Overall, the results of this chapter suggest that firms facing entry into an unproven market need to consider the strategic effects arising from learning and externalities. The second essay (Chapter 3) investigates the strategy of investment in R&D projects when completion time of R&D is uncertain. By examining a game theoretic model of two firms competitively engaged in R&D projects, we find that the more innovative firm may or may not have an incentive to unilaterally share technological knowledge with its opponent; the result de- pends on the more innovative firm's tradeoff between reduction of competitive pressure and reduction of the competitor’s imitation. A direct implication of this result is that a firm may achieve superior performance by strategically managing its technological knowledge without incurring cost. The third essay (Chapter 4) investigates a problem of competitive investment in R&D projects to examine (1) the impacts of uncertainties and (2) the strategies of managing demand information and technological knowledge. We find that market uncertainty can improve or diminish a firm's payoff due to strategic interactions between firms and the interplay of learning effects and externalities. Our results also indicate that technological uncertainty can alter the relationship between the time to completion and the fierceness of competition. More specifically, we find that an increase in the time to completion may or may not increase the fierceness of the competition. Lastly, this essay compares the impact of disclosing demand information and that of disclosing technological knowledge. The results show that disclosing technological knowledge can only improve a firm's ex-ante payoff, whereas disclosing demand information can improve both the ex-ante and ex-post payoffs. Hence, our results indicate that the disclosed contents and the time to disclose are important when firms consider voluntary disclosure to reduce competition. Advisors/Committee Members: Kwon, H. Dharma (advisor), Kwon, H. Dharma (Committee Chair), Petruzzi, Nicholas C (committee member), Mahoney, Joseph T (committee member), Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard (committee member), Agrawal, Anupam (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Uncertainty Game Theory

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Xu, W. (2016). Strategic management of operational resources under uncertainty. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2142/95444

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Xu, Wenxin. “Strategic management of operational resources under uncertainty.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/95444.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Xu, Wenxin. “Strategic management of operational resources under uncertainty.” 2016. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Xu W. Strategic management of operational resources under uncertainty. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign; 2016. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/95444.

Council of Science Editors:

Xu W. Strategic management of operational resources under uncertainty. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/95444

University of Minnesota

6. Canann, Taylor. Essays in Applied and Computational Game Theory.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2019, University of Minnesota

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/206318

► This dissertation considers computational and applied aspects of cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. The first chapter discusses a novel applied game theory approach within the… (more)

▼ This dissertation considers computational and applied aspects of cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. The first chapter discusses a novel applied game theory approach within the field of vulnerability disclosure policy. I introduce a three-player game between software vendors, software users, and a hacker in which software vendors attempt to protect software users by releasing updates, i.e. disclosing a vulnerability, and the hacker is attempting to exploit vulnerabilities in the software package to attack the software users. The software users must determine whether the protection offered by the update outweighs the cost of installing the update. Following the model set up, I describe why low-type software users, software users that do not get much value out of the software and are thus not very damaged by an attack, prefer Non-Disclosure, and Disclosure can only be an optimal policy in cases when the cost to the hacker of searching for a zero-day vulnerability is small. Many economic problems are inherently non-linear, so in the second chapter we introduce the MGBA, the Modular Groebner Basis Approach, which is a solution technique from Algebraic Geometry that can be used to ``triangularize'' polynomial systems. The MGBA is a computational tool that overcomes the typical computational problems of intermediate coefficient swell and solving for lucky primes that can limit the ability to compute Groebner bases. The Groebner basis is an all-solution computational technique that can be applied to many fields in economics. This chapter focuses on applying the MGBA to Bertrand games with multiple equilibria and a manifold approach to solving dynamic programming problems. Advances in computational power and techniques have greatly benefited both economic theory, in allowing economists to solve more realistic models, and data analysis, such as machine learning. However, the field of cooperative game theory has fallen behind. Therefore, in the final chapter, I introduce the compression value, a computationally efficient approximation technique for the non-transferable utility (NTU) Shapley value. This algorithm gives a reasonable approximation of the NTU Shapley value if the initial guess of Pareto weights is near the actual solution.

Subjects/Keywords: Cybersecurity; Game Theory

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Canann, T. (2019). Essays in Applied and Computational Game Theory. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Minnesota. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11299/206318

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Canann, Taylor. “Essays in Applied and Computational Game Theory.” 2019. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Minnesota. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/11299/206318.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Canann, Taylor. “Essays in Applied and Computational Game Theory.” 2019. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Canann T. Essays in Applied and Computational Game Theory. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Minnesota; 2019. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/206318.

Council of Science Editors:

Canann T. Essays in Applied and Computational Game Theory. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Minnesota; 2019. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/206318

University of Alberta

7. Lanctot, Marc. Monte Carlo Sampling and Regret Minimization for Equilibrium Computation and Decision-Making in Large Extensive Form Games.

Degree: PhD, Department of Computing Science, 2013, University of Alberta

URL: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/wp988k138

► In this thesis, we investigate the problem of decision-making in large two-player zero-sum games using Monte Carlo sampling and regret minimization methods. We demonstrate four… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: regret minimization; extensive form game; game theory

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Lanctot, M. (2013). Monte Carlo Sampling and Regret Minimization for Equilibrium Computation and Decision-Making in Large Extensive Form Games. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Alberta. Retrieved from https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/wp988k138

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Lanctot, Marc. “Monte Carlo Sampling and Regret Minimization for Equilibrium Computation and Decision-Making in Large Extensive Form Games.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Alberta. Accessed February 26, 2020. https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/wp988k138.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Lanctot, Marc. “Monte Carlo Sampling and Regret Minimization for Equilibrium Computation and Decision-Making in Large Extensive Form Games.” 2013. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Lanctot M. Monte Carlo Sampling and Regret Minimization for Equilibrium Computation and Decision-Making in Large Extensive Form Games. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Alberta; 2013. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/wp988k138.

Council of Science Editors:

Lanctot M. Monte Carlo Sampling and Regret Minimization for Equilibrium Computation and Decision-Making in Large Extensive Form Games. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Alberta; 2013. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/wp988k138

University of Oregon

8. Merriner, Ashley. Aural Abjections and Dancing Dystopias: Sonic Signifiers in Video Game Horror.

Degree: 2017, University of Oregon

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1794/22733

► For centuries, the horror genre has ensnared audiences across generations and genre lines: ballet, opera, literature, poetry, film, and, most recently, video games have all… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Game theory; Gender theory; Horror; Ludomusicology; Musicology; Video game theory

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Merriner, A. (2017). Aural Abjections and Dancing Dystopias: Sonic Signifiers in Video Game Horror. (Thesis). University of Oregon. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1794/22733

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Merriner, Ashley. “Aural Abjections and Dancing Dystopias: Sonic Signifiers in Video Game Horror.” 2017. Thesis, University of Oregon. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/22733.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Merriner, Ashley. “Aural Abjections and Dancing Dystopias: Sonic Signifiers in Video Game Horror.” 2017. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Merriner A. Aural Abjections and Dancing Dystopias: Sonic Signifiers in Video Game Horror. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Oregon; 2017. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1794/22733.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Merriner A. Aural Abjections and Dancing Dystopias: Sonic Signifiers in Video Game Horror. [Thesis]. University of Oregon; 2017. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1794/22733

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Missouri – Columbia

9. Sperry-Taylor, Ashton T. Bounded rationality in games of strategy.

Degree: 2011, University of Missouri – Columbia

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/14271

► [ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT REQUEST OF AUTHOR.] Traditional game theory predicts behavior contrary to how real people actually behave. And what… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: game theory; bounded rationality; decision theory; behavioral game theory; backward induction

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Sperry-Taylor, A. T. (2011). Bounded rationality in games of strategy. (Thesis). University of Missouri – Columbia. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10355/14271

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Sperry-Taylor, Ashton T. “Bounded rationality in games of strategy.” 2011. Thesis, University of Missouri – Columbia. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10355/14271.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Sperry-Taylor, Ashton T. “Bounded rationality in games of strategy.” 2011. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Sperry-Taylor AT. Bounded rationality in games of strategy. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Missouri – Columbia; 2011. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/14271.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Sperry-Taylor AT. Bounded rationality in games of strategy. [Thesis]. University of Missouri – Columbia; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/14271

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Illinois – Chicago

10. Hardwick, John. Graphical Algorithms for Finding the Nucleolus of Binary-Valued Matching Games.

Degree: 2017, University of Illinois – Chicago

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10027/21740

► In cooperative game theory, the class of assignment games models a hypothetical market with two groups of people (for instance, buyers and sellers, or men… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: game theory; cooperative game theory; nucleolus; assignment game; matching; graph theory; directed graph; algorithms

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Hardwick, J. (2017). Graphical Algorithms for Finding the Nucleolus of Binary-Valued Matching Games. (Thesis). University of Illinois – Chicago. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10027/21740

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Hardwick, John. “Graphical Algorithms for Finding the Nucleolus of Binary-Valued Matching Games.” 2017. Thesis, University of Illinois – Chicago. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10027/21740.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Hardwick, John. “Graphical Algorithms for Finding the Nucleolus of Binary-Valued Matching Games.” 2017. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Hardwick J. Graphical Algorithms for Finding the Nucleolus of Binary-Valued Matching Games. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Illinois – Chicago; 2017. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10027/21740.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Hardwick J. Graphical Algorithms for Finding the Nucleolus of Binary-Valued Matching Games. [Thesis]. University of Illinois – Chicago; 2017. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10027/21740

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Dalhousie University

11. Milley, Rebecca. Restricted Universes of Partizan Misere Games.

Degree: PhD, Department of Mathematics & Statistics - Math Division, 2013, Dalhousie University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10222/21441

► This thesis considers three restricted universes of partizan combinatorial games and finds new results for misere play using the recently-introduced theory of indistinguishability quotients. The… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Combinatorial game theory; misere; partizan

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Milley, R. (2013). Restricted Universes of Partizan Misere Games. (Doctoral Dissertation). Dalhousie University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10222/21441

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Milley, Rebecca. “Restricted Universes of Partizan Misere Games.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, Dalhousie University. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10222/21441.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Milley, Rebecca. “Restricted Universes of Partizan Misere Games.” 2013. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Milley R. Restricted Universes of Partizan Misere Games. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Dalhousie University; 2013. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10222/21441.

Council of Science Editors:

Milley R. Restricted Universes of Partizan Misere Games. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Dalhousie University; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10222/21441

University of Alberta

12. Schnizlein, David. State translation in no-limit poker.

Degree: MS, Department of Computing Science, 2009, University of Alberta

URL: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/hq37vp736

► One way to create a champion level poker agent is to compute a Nash Equilibrium in an abstract version of the poker game. The resulting… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: poker; translation; game theory

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Schnizlein, D. (2009). State translation in no-limit poker. (Masters Thesis). University of Alberta. Retrieved from https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/hq37vp736

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Schnizlein, David. “State translation in no-limit poker.” 2009. Masters Thesis, University of Alberta. Accessed February 26, 2020. https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/hq37vp736.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Schnizlein, David. “State translation in no-limit poker.” 2009. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Schnizlein D. State translation in no-limit poker. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Alberta; 2009. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/hq37vp736.

Council of Science Editors:

Schnizlein D. State translation in no-limit poker. [Masters Thesis]. University of Alberta; 2009. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/hq37vp736

Texas A&M University

13. Rai, Birendra Kumar. Essays in game theory and institutions.

Degree: 2009, Texas A&M University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1772

► This dissertation is a compilation of essays highlighting the usefulness of game theory in understanding socio-economic phenomena. The second chapter tries to provide a reason… (more)

▼ This dissertation is a compilation of essays highlighting the usefulness of game theory in understanding socio-economic phenomena. The second chapter tries to provide a reason for the strict codes of conduct that have been imposed on unmarried girls in almost every society at some point of time in its history using tools from classical game theory. If men prefer to marry submissive women, then parents of girls will have an incentive to signal the submissiveness of their daughters in various ways in order to attract better matches. At the same time, parents will find it costlier to signal the submissiveness of girls who are not really submissive. This line of reasoning thus helps us interpret phenomena such as veiling, footbinding, and sequestration of women in general as signals of submissiveness. The third chapter attempts to rationalize some of the ad hoc rules proposed for dividing a bankrupt estate using tools from evolutionary game theory. The ad hoc rules differ from each other because of the axioms that are imposed in addition to efficiency and claims boundedness. Efficiency requires that the estate be completely divided between the claimants, and claims boundedness requires that no claimant be awarded more than her initial contribution. This dissertation tries to show that an ad hoc rule can be rationalized as the unique self-enforcing long run outcome of Young's [46] evolutionary bargaining model by using certain intuitive rules for the Nash demand game. In the fourth chapter I present a simple model of conflict over inputs in an economy with ill-defined property rights. Agents produce output from the land they hold, which in turn can be allocated to consumption or the production of guns. There is no agency to enforce rights over the initial land holdings, and the future holdings of land are determined using a contest success function that depends on the guns produced by both agents. I characterize the equilibria in which only one, both, and none of the agents produce guns, as a function of the total land and the inequality of initial land holdings for general forms of utility, production, cost, and contest success functions. Advisors/Committee Members: Sarin, Rajiv (advisor), DeBlassie, Dante (committee member), Gronberg, Timothy J. (committee member), Ureta, Manuelita (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: game theory; equilibrium selection

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Rai, B. K. (2009). Essays in game theory and institutions. (Thesis). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1772

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Rai, Birendra Kumar. “Essays in game theory and institutions.” 2009. Thesis, Texas A&M University. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1772.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Rai, Birendra Kumar. “Essays in game theory and institutions.” 2009. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Rai BK. Essays in game theory and institutions. [Internet] [Thesis]. Texas A&M University; 2009. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1772.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Rai BK. Essays in game theory and institutions. [Thesis]. Texas A&M University; 2009. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1772

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Texas A&M University

14. Li, Jiaxing. Reverse Auction Bidding Further Elements to the Game Theory.

Degree: 2014, Texas A&M University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/153236

► Reverse Auction Bidding systems are increasingly used by some large corporations for the supply of buildings, an example is the major firm Target. The belief… (more)

▼ Reverse Auction Bidding systems are increasingly used by some large corporations for the supply of buildings, an example is the major firm Target. The belief is that the Reverse Auction Bidding system improves the efficiency of the bidding system and leads to cost savings during the construction process. Neither statement has been shown to be correct at this time. A game theory was developed for the Reverse Auction Bidding system; this theory postulated that two sub-games exist within the overall Reverse Auction Bidding game. The first sub-game is between the purchaser and the set of bidders. The purchaser is presented with a group of lowest prices that under the rules of the game must be accepted. This group of prices has been shown to have a non-normal distribution in prior research at TAMU. If economic efficiency was to be maintained by the bidding system, one would expect a normal distribution with a tight range on the standard deviation, which does not occur. The second sub-game is between the bidders, who make use of the non-normal aspects of price group to maximize individual returns. All things being equal and given the intent of the game, the purchaser would expect the bidders return to be normally distributed with a small standard deviation representing a tight control on price, which has never been observed in game play. Three types of bidders have been postulated for the set, the first is an economically efficient bidder, an economically inefficient bidder, and a middle of the road bidder. This study aims to compare statistically the difference between economically efficient bidders, Type ? bidder, and economically inefficient bidders, Type ? bidder, in terms of the statistical properties of the return data. The central hypothesis is that a statistically evident bias exists between the average return generated by the Type ? bidder and the Type ? bidder. The addition of the two distributions along with the average return generated by a Type ? bidder results in the observed distribution for the group, L. The secondary hypothesis is that Type ? bidders minimize the price reduction for each bid. The first hypothesis is true, the Type ? bidder earn on average twice the returns of the Type ? bidder. The second hypothesis is not true, the Type ? bidder as a set do not attempt to minimize the bid differentials. Further research is suggested on the statistical properties of the bid differentials as more games are played at TAMU. Advisors/Committee Members: Nichols, John M (advisor), Feigenbaum, Leslie (committee member), Shepley, Mardelle (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Reverse Auction Bidding; Game Theory

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Li, J. (2014). Reverse Auction Bidding Further Elements to the Game Theory. (Thesis). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/153236

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Li, Jiaxing. “Reverse Auction Bidding Further Elements to the Game Theory.” 2014. Thesis, Texas A&M University. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/153236.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Li, Jiaxing. “Reverse Auction Bidding Further Elements to the Game Theory.” 2014. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Li J. Reverse Auction Bidding Further Elements to the Game Theory. [Internet] [Thesis]. Texas A&M University; 2014. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/153236.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Li J. Reverse Auction Bidding Further Elements to the Game Theory. [Thesis]. Texas A&M University; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/153236

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

15. Αθανασόπουλος, Αλέξανδρος. Θεωρία παιγνίων και εφαρμογές της στο χώρο των επιχειρήσεων και την πολιτική.

Degree: 2011, University of Patras

URL: http://nemertes.lis.upatras.gr/jspui/handle/10889/4792

►

Η εργασία χωρίζεται σε δυο βασικά μέρη. Στο πρώτο μέρος αναφερόμαστε στα παίγνια γενικού αθροίσματος δυο παιχτών, όπου μετά την αναφορά της βασικής θεωρίας και… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Θεωρία παιγνίων; 519.3; Game theory

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Αθανασόπουλος, �. (2011). Θεωρία παιγνίων και εφαρμογές της στο χώρο των επιχειρήσεων και την πολιτική. (Masters Thesis). University of Patras. Retrieved from http://nemertes.lis.upatras.gr/jspui/handle/10889/4792

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Αθανασόπουλος, Αλέξανδρος. “Θεωρία παιγνίων και εφαρμογές της στο χώρο των επιχειρήσεων και την πολιτική.” 2011. Masters Thesis, University of Patras. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://nemertes.lis.upatras.gr/jspui/handle/10889/4792.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Αθανασόπουλος, Αλέξανδρος. “Θεωρία παιγνίων και εφαρμογές της στο χώρο των επιχειρήσεων και την πολιτική.” 2011. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Αθανασόπουλος �. Θεωρία παιγνίων και εφαρμογές της στο χώρο των επιχειρήσεων και την πολιτική. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Patras; 2011. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://nemertes.lis.upatras.gr/jspui/handle/10889/4792.

Council of Science Editors:

Αθανασόπουλος �. Θεωρία παιγνίων και εφαρμογές της στο χώρο των επιχειρήσεων και την πολιτική. [Masters Thesis]. University of Patras; 2011. Available from: http://nemertes.lis.upatras.gr/jspui/handle/10889/4792

University of Edinburgh

16. Alves, Vasco Filipe Figueiredo. Essays on strategic queueing.

Degree: PhD, 2016, University of Edinburgh

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/26015

► This thesis includes three essays exploring some economic implications of queueing. A preliminary chapter introducing useful results from the literature which help contextualize the original… (more)

▼ This thesis includes three essays exploring some economic implications of queueing. A preliminary chapter introducing useful results from the literature which help contextualize the original research in the thesis is presented first. This introductory chapter starts by surveying queueing results from probability theory and operations research. Then it covers a few seminal papers on strategic queueing, mostly but not exclusively from the economics literature. These cover issues of individual and social welfare in the context of First Come First Served (FCFS) and Equitable Processor Sharing (EPS) queues, with one or multiple servers, as well as a discussion of strategic interactions surrounding queue cutting. Then an overview of some important papers on the impact of queueing on competitive behaviour, mostly Industrial Organization economists, is presented. The first original chapter presents a model for the endogenous determination of the number of queues in an M/M/2 system. Customers arriving at a system where two customers are being served play a game, choosing between two parallel queues or one single queue. Subgame perfect equilibria are obtained, varying with customer characteristics and game specifications. With risk neutrality and when jockeying is not permitted, a single queue is an equilibrium, as is two queues. With risk neutrality and jockeying allowed, there is a unique two queue equilibrium. With risk aversion and no jockeying, there is a unique single queue equilibrium, and with risk aversion and jockeying, the equilibrium depends on the magnitude of risk aversion. The second chapter analyses the individual decisions taken by consumers when deciding whether to join an M/M/1 queue where a subset of customers who interact repeatedly can both cut the queue and be overtaken once they join, by-passing occasional users. This is shown to be an equilibrium in repeated games for sufficiently patient customers. The expected sojourn time for customers under this discipline is described as a solution of a system of difference equations, and this is then used to obtain a threshold joining strategy for arrivals, which is independent of the number of regular customers in the queue, as regulars form a sub-queue under the LCFS discipline. Numerical methods are then employed to contrast sojourn times and thresholds with the equilibrium for a strict First Come First Served queueing discipline, and with the socially optimal joining rule. Finally, the third chapter describes a duopoly market for healthcare where one of the two providers is publicly owned and charges a price of zero, while the other sets a price so as to maximize its profit. Both providers are subject to congestion in the form of an M/M/1 queue, and they serve patient-customers with randomly distributed unit costs of time. Consumer demand (as market share) for both providers is obtained and described with its full complement of comparative statics. The private provider’s pricing decision is explored, and equilibrium existence is proven. Social welfare…

Subjects/Keywords: economics; microeconomics; game theory; queueing

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Alves, V. F. F. (2016). Essays on strategic queueing. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Edinburgh. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1842/26015

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Alves, Vasco Filipe Figueiredo. “Essays on strategic queueing.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Edinburgh. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/26015.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Alves, Vasco Filipe Figueiredo. “Essays on strategic queueing.” 2016. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Alves VFF. Essays on strategic queueing. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Edinburgh; 2016. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/26015.

Council of Science Editors:

Alves VFF. Essays on strategic queueing. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Edinburgh; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/26015

University of Hong Kong

17. 夏侯皓凌.; Xiahou, Haoling. Auction-based WLAN resource allocation in game theory perspective.

Degree: M. Phil., 2011, University of Hong Kong

URL: Xiahou, H. [夏侯皓凌]. (2011). Auction-based WLAN resource allocation in game theory perspective. (Thesis). University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b4786981 ; http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b4786981 ; http://hdl.handle.net/10722/161541

►

Surge in WLAN development leads to urgent demand for more efficient bandwidth allocation methods. The bandwidth resource becomes more and more scarce. As a… (more)

▼

Surge in WLAN development leads to urgent demand for more efficient bandwidth allocation methods. The bandwidth resource becomes more and more scarce. As a consequence, it demands both revenue maximizing and cost efficient allocation methods. To develop this sort of allocation methods, a dilemma between the target of maximizing service quality (in terms of user revenue) and the target of cost efficient allocation must be resolved. In this thesis, two novel auction-based time-slotted WLAN bandwidth allocation models are established, namely the Combination of Single-slot Second-Price Sealed Auction (CSSA) and the Multi-slot Vickrey Auction versus Homogeneous Objects (MVAH). The two models propose a new approach to the solution of the dilemma: user revenue is formulated by not only its revenue gain or loss related to the access to the bandwidth resource, but also by a series of WLAN transmission factors, including Packet Collision Rate and Minimal Packet Transmission error rate. In the two models, wireless bandwidth is time-slotted and bandwidth users compete for the access to these time slots. Initially, each bandwidth user joins a bidding group which is represented by its bidder. There is only one bandwidth provider in the coverage area of the WLAN. After being assigned virtual credit budget, every bidder bids for arbitrary slot combination in each bidding trial or all slots in one bidding trial, according to the bidding rule of adopted allocation model. Non-cooperative game formulation is thereafter introduced to analyze the revenue of each bidder, revenue of the provider, and revenue of the whole allocation system. Specifically, each bidder’s revenue function is differentiated by its bid; the extreme points of this partial differential equation, i.e., the best bids for the bidder, are computed. The bidding strategy formula for each single bidder is derived from the game formulation under the bidder’s budget limit. Each bidder adjusts its bids to attain the optimal revenue obtained from the bidding strategy formula. The allocation pattern is therefore formed. By means of calculation of the all-bidder revenue to whole system revenue ratio, the system efficiency values for both allocation models are analyzed. Conclusions can be derived from the formula of system efficiency: 1) CSSA benefits about 1 percent higher system efficiency unit than MVAH when only average throughputs of user groups differ. And both models iii- gain optimal system efficiencies when bidder’s average throughput differs 65 times pairwise. 2) The larger the number of users connecting to each bidder, the lower the system efficiency. And CSSA model attains higher system efficiency than MVAH when user numbers of user groups differ more than 3.2 times pairwise. In accordance with the pursuit of maximum system efficiency, new WLANs satisfying both revenue maximizing and cost efficient allocation demands can be established.

published_or_final_version

Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Master

Master of Philosophy

Subjects/Keywords: Wireless LANs.; Game theory.

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

夏侯皓凌.; Xiahou, H. (2011). Auction-based WLAN resource allocation in game theory perspective. (Masters Thesis). University of Hong Kong. Retrieved from Xiahou, H. [夏侯皓凌]. (2011). Auction-based WLAN resource allocation in game theory perspective. (Thesis). University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b4786981 ; http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b4786981 ; http://hdl.handle.net/10722/161541

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

夏侯皓凌.; Xiahou, Haoling. “Auction-based WLAN resource allocation in game theory perspective.” 2011. Masters Thesis, University of Hong Kong. Accessed February 26, 2020. Xiahou, H. [夏侯皓凌]. (2011). Auction-based WLAN resource allocation in game theory perspective. (Thesis). University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b4786981 ; http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b4786981 ; http://hdl.handle.net/10722/161541.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

夏侯皓凌.; Xiahou, Haoling. “Auction-based WLAN resource allocation in game theory perspective.” 2011. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

夏侯皓凌.; Xiahou H. Auction-based WLAN resource allocation in game theory perspective. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Hong Kong; 2011. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: Xiahou, H. [夏侯皓凌]. (2011). Auction-based WLAN resource allocation in game theory perspective. (Thesis). University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b4786981 ; http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b4786981 ; http://hdl.handle.net/10722/161541.

Council of Science Editors:

夏侯皓凌.; Xiahou H. Auction-based WLAN resource allocation in game theory perspective. [Masters Thesis]. University of Hong Kong; 2011. Available from: Xiahou, H. [夏侯皓凌]. (2011). Auction-based WLAN resource allocation in game theory perspective. (Thesis). University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b4786981 ; http://dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b4786981 ; http://hdl.handle.net/10722/161541

University of Edinburgh

18. Balduzzi, Paolo. Game theoretic models of public choice and political economy.

Degree: 2006, University of Edinburgh

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/869

► This thesis is composed of three chapters, which can be read independently. In the first one, we present and solve some bargaining games a la… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: 320.01; Game theory; economics

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Balduzzi, P. (2006). Game theoretic models of public choice and political economy. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Edinburgh. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1842/869

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Balduzzi, Paolo. “Game theoretic models of public choice and political economy.” 2006. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Edinburgh. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/869.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Balduzzi, Paolo. “Game theoretic models of public choice and political economy.” 2006. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Balduzzi P. Game theoretic models of public choice and political economy. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Edinburgh; 2006. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/869.

Council of Science Editors:

Balduzzi P. Game theoretic models of public choice and political economy. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Edinburgh; 2006. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/869

University of Missouri – Columbia

19. Mesta Iscan, Ozlem. Entry biases in Cournot markets with free entry.

Degree: 2009, University of Missouri – Columbia

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/6150

► Entry biases determine whether free entry is desirable. This study examines entry biases in a Cournot market by comparing the number of free entry equilibrium… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Oligopolies – Mathematical models; Game theory

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Mesta Iscan, O. (2009). Entry biases in Cournot markets with free entry. (Thesis). University of Missouri – Columbia. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10355/6150

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Mesta Iscan, Ozlem. “Entry biases in Cournot markets with free entry.” 2009. Thesis, University of Missouri – Columbia. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10355/6150.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Mesta Iscan, Ozlem. “Entry biases in Cournot markets with free entry.” 2009. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Mesta Iscan O. Entry biases in Cournot markets with free entry. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Missouri – Columbia; 2009. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/6150.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Mesta Iscan O. Entry biases in Cournot markets with free entry. [Thesis]. University of Missouri – Columbia; 2009. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/6150

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign

20. Moon, Jun. Control and estimation with limited information: a game-theoretic approach.

Degree: PhD, Electrical & Computer Engineering, 2015, University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/88941

► Modern control systems can be viewed as interconnections of spatially distributed multiple subsystems, where the individual subsystems share their information with each other through an… (more)

▼ Modern control systems can be viewed as interconnections of spatially distributed multiple subsystems, where the individual subsystems share their information with each other through an underlying network that inherently introduces limitations on information flow. Inherent limitations on the flow of information among individual subsystems may stem from structural constraints of the network and/or communication constraints of the network. Hence, in order to design optimal control and estimation mechanisms for modern control systems, we must answer the following two practical but important questions: (1) What are the fundamental communication limits to achieve a desired control performance and stability? (2) What are the approaches one has to adopt to design a decentralized controller for a complex system to deal with structural constraints? In this thesis, we consider four different problems within a game-theoretic framework to address the above questions. The first part of the thesis considers problems of control and estimation with limited communication, which correspond to question (1) above. We first consider the minimax estimation problem with intermittent observations. In this setting, the disturbance in the dynamical system as well as the sensor noise are controlled by adversaries, and the estimator receives the sensor measurements only sporadically, with availability governed by an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Bernoulli process. This problem is cast in the thesis within the framework of stochastic zero-sum dynamic games. First, a corresponding stochastic minimax state estimator (SMSE) is obtained, along with an associated generalized stochastic Riccati equation (GSRE). Then, the asymptotic behavior of the estimation error in terms of the GSRE is analyzed. We obtain threshold-type conditions on the rate of intermittent observations and the disturbance attenuation parameter, above which 1) the expected value of the GSRE is bounded from below and above by deterministic quantities, and 2) the norm of the sequence generated by the GSRE converges weakly to a unique stationary distribution. We then study the minimax control problem over unreliable communication channels. The transmission of packets from the plant output sensors to the controller, and from the controller to the plant, are over sporadically failing channels governed by two independent i.i.d. Bernoulli processes. Two different scenarios for unreliable communication channels are considered. The first one is when the communication channel provides perfect acknowledgments of successful transmissions of control packets through a clean reverse channel, which is the TCP (Transmission Control Protocol), and the second one is when there is no acknowledgment, which is the UDP (User Datagram Protocol). Under both scenarios, the thesis obtains output feedback minimax controllers; it also identifies a set of explicit existence conditions in terms of the disturbance attenuation parameter and the communication channel loss… Advisors/Committee Members: Basar, Tamer (advisor), Basar, Tamer (Committee Chair), Belabbas, Mohamed Ali (committee member), Dullerud, Geir (committee member), Hajek, Bruce (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Game Theory; Limited Information

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Moon, J. (2015). Control and estimation with limited information: a game-theoretic approach. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2142/88941

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Moon, Jun. “Control and estimation with limited information: a game-theoretic approach.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/88941.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Moon, Jun. “Control and estimation with limited information: a game-theoretic approach.” 2015. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Moon J. Control and estimation with limited information: a game-theoretic approach. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign; 2015. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/88941.

Council of Science Editors:

Moon J. Control and estimation with limited information: a game-theoretic approach. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/88941

University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign

21. Chung, Key-whan. Game theory with learning for cyber security monitoring.

Degree: MS, Electrical & Computer Engineering, 2015, University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/89157

► Carefully crafted computer worms such as Stuxnet and recent data breaches on retail organizations (e.g., Target, Home Depot) are very sophisticated security attacks on critical… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Computer security; Game theory

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Chung, K. (2015). Game theory with learning for cyber security monitoring. (Thesis). University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2142/89157

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Chung, Key-whan. “Game theory with learning for cyber security monitoring.” 2015. Thesis, University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/89157.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Chung, Key-whan. “Game theory with learning for cyber security monitoring.” 2015. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Chung K. Game theory with learning for cyber security monitoring. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign; 2015. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/89157.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Chung K. Game theory with learning for cyber security monitoring. [Thesis]. University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/89157

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Florida

22. Moon, Ji Hwan. Pricing as Communication and Strategic Response.

Degree: PhD, Business Administration - Marketing, 2017, University of Florida

URL: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0051524

► Sellers use pricing for different purposes. Chapter 1 shows that sellers can use bundling to signal the product popularity. Many sellers bundle add-ons (e.g., in-flight… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: bundling – game-theory – signaling

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Moon, J. H. (2017). Pricing as Communication and Strategic Response. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Florida. Retrieved from http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0051524

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Moon, Ji Hwan. “Pricing as Communication and Strategic Response.” 2017. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Florida. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0051524.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Moon, Ji Hwan. “Pricing as Communication and Strategic Response.” 2017. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Moon JH. Pricing as Communication and Strategic Response. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Florida; 2017. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0051524.

Council of Science Editors:

Moon JH. Pricing as Communication and Strategic Response. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Florida; 2017. Available from: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0051524

University of Southern California

23. Tsai, Jason. Protecting networks against diffusive attacks: game-theoretic resource allocation for contagion mitigation.

Degree: PhD, Computer Science, 2013, University of Southern California

URL: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/283292/rec/5290

► Many real-world situations involve attempts to spread influence through a social network. For example, viral marketing is when a marketer selects a few people to… (more)

▼ Many real-world situations involve attempts to spread influence through a social network. For example, viral marketing is when a marketer selects a few people to receive some initial advertisement in the hopes that these `seeds' will spread the news. Even peacekeeping operations in one area have been shown to have a contagious effect on the neighboring vicinity. Each of these domains also features multiple parties seeking to maximize or mitigate a contagious effect by spreading its own influence among a select few seeds, naturally yielding an adversarial resource allocation problem. My work models the interconnected network of people as a graph and develops algorithms to optimize resource allocation in these networked competitive contagion scenarios. ❧ Game-theoretic resource allocation in the past has not considered domains with both a networked structure and contagion effects, rendering them unusable in critical domains such as rumor control, counterinsurgency, and crowd management. Networked domains without contagion effects already present computational challenges due to the large scale of the action space. To address this issue, my first contribution proposed efficient game-theoretic allocation algorithms for the graph-based urban road network domain. This work still provides the only polynomial-time algorithm for allocating vehicle checkpoints through a city, giving law enforcement officers an efficient tool to combat terrorists making their way to potential points of attack. Second, I have provided the first game-theoretic treatment for contagion mitigation in social networks and given practitioners the first principled techniques for such vital concerns as rumor control and counterinsurgency. Finally, I extended my work on game-theoretic contagion mitigation to address uncertainty about the network structure to find that, contrary to what evidence and intuition suggest, heuristic sampling approaches provide near-optimal solutions across a wide range of generative graph models and uncertainty models. Thus, despite extreme practical challenges in attaining accurate social network information, my techniques remain near-optimal across numerous forms of uncertainty in multiple synthetic and real-world graph structures. ❧ Beyond optimization of resource allocation, I have further studied contagion effects to understand the effectiveness of such resources. First, I created an evacuation simulation, ESCAPES, to explore the interaction of pedestrian fear contagion and authority fear mitigation during an evacuation. Second, using this simulator, I have advanced the frontier in contagion modeling by developing empirical evaluation methods for comparing and calibrating computational contagion models that are critical in crowd simulations and evacuation modeling. Finally, I have also conducted an examination of agent-human emotional contagion to inform the rising use of simulations for personnel training in emotionally-charged situations. Advisors/Committee Members: Tambe, Milind (Committee Chair), Marsella, Stacy C. (Committee Member), Yang, Sha (Committee Member), McCubbins, Mathew D. (Committee Member), Krishnamachari, Bhaskar (Committee Member), Bowring, Emma (Committee Member).

Subjects/Keywords: game theory; security; contagion; networks

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Tsai, J. (2013). Protecting networks against diffusive attacks: game-theoretic resource allocation for contagion mitigation. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/283292/rec/5290

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Tsai, Jason. “Protecting networks against diffusive attacks: game-theoretic resource allocation for contagion mitigation.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/283292/rec/5290.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Tsai, Jason. “Protecting networks against diffusive attacks: game-theoretic resource allocation for contagion mitigation.” 2013. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Tsai J. Protecting networks against diffusive attacks: game-theoretic resource allocation for contagion mitigation. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2013. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/283292/rec/5290.

Council of Science Editors:

Tsai J. Protecting networks against diffusive attacks: game-theoretic resource allocation for contagion mitigation. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2013. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/283292/rec/5290

University of Southern California

24. Ertas, Yusuf. Essays on bargaining games.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2012, University of Southern California

URL: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/121947/rec/2437

► This dissertation is centered around bargaining games. I study both the cooperative and the non-cooperative approaches to the bargaining games. The two chapters of my… (more)

▼ This dissertation is centered around bargaining games. I study both the cooperative and the non-cooperative approaches to the bargaining games. The two chapters of my dissertation deal with each of these approaches. ❧ Coming back to the bargaining problem; in the first chapter of this dissertation, I study two related but separate questions on a cooperative bargaining problem. I will give a brief historical background to explain the first question I tackle. Nash (1950) characterized a solution for bargaining problems in terms of four simple axioms. Later research showed that when the disagreement point in the analysis is replaced with an infeasible ideal point, there is no solution that can be characterized with the axioms that are counterparts to the ones used in Nash's approach. One way to deal with this problem is suggested by Conley, McLean, and Wilkie (forthcoming). Instead of using independence from affine transformations, their characterization of the Nash solution employs a property that guarantees proportional gains from an endogenous disagreement point. Then, the same property is used to characterize another solution when the endogenous disagreement point is replaced by an infeasible ideal point. That is, the corresponding property guarantees proportional losses from this ideal point. I extend their characterization to weighted bargaining games by a simple modification of their proportional loss property. ❧ In the second part of the paper, I tweak Nash's original proof to characterize solutions that are independent under common scale transformations. This weakening of the independence from affine transformations is required since we know that there is no solution that satisfies it along with other nice properties under the ideal point approach. Then, instead of showing that the Nash solution can be obtained in the entire domain from the solution of a symmetric set, I show that any solution that satisfies independence under common scale transformations can be obtained from the solutions of a certain class of hyperplanes. ❧ In the second chapter of this dissertation, I look at the bargaining problem from the non-cooperative side. I provide results that extend and complement Yildiz (2003). Yildiz studies bargaining games without a common prior; that is, games where players have subjective beliefs about their probabilities of getting selected at each period. This departs from the original alternating offers games where such selection procedures are strict. Assuming no learning and transferable utility, he shows that as long as both players are optimistic for long enough, they will reach an agreement immediately. Intuitively, players will reach an agreement immediately if both of them are highly optimistic, since their expectations about rents in future periods are so low that they settle immediately. Another key result from his work is that players will also reach an immediate agreement if the drop in optimism from one period to the next is within certain bounds. This second result does not require high… Advisors/Committee Members: Wilkie, Simon J. (Committee Chair), Cheng, Harrison (Committee Member), Border, Kim C. (Committee Member).

Subjects/Keywords: game theory; bargaining games

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Ertas, Y. (2012). Essays on bargaining games. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/121947/rec/2437

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Ertas, Yusuf. “Essays on bargaining games.” 2012. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/121947/rec/2437.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Ertas, Yusuf. “Essays on bargaining games.” 2012. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Ertas Y. Essays on bargaining games. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2012. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/121947/rec/2437.

Council of Science Editors:

Ertas Y. Essays on bargaining games. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2012. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/121947/rec/2437

University of Southern California

25. Zhu, Yi. Essays on commercial media and advertising.

Degree: PhD, Business Administration, 2013, University of Southern California

URL: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/238277/rec/2443

► My dissertation aims to advance our understanding of marketing processes in light of the emerging new media and technology. ❧ My dissertation first provides guidance… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: advertising; commercial media; game theory

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Zhu, Y. (2013). Essays on commercial media and advertising. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/238277/rec/2443

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Zhu, Yi. “Essays on commercial media and advertising.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. Accessed February 26, 2020. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/238277/rec/2443.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Zhu, Yi. “Essays on commercial media and advertising.” 2013. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Zhu Y. Essays on commercial media and advertising. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2013. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/238277/rec/2443.

Council of Science Editors:

Zhu Y. Essays on commercial media and advertising. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2013. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/238277/rec/2443

University of Alberta

26. Niu, Binglai. Cooperative wireless multicast: cooperation strategy and incentive mechanism.

Degree: MS, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2010, University of Alberta

URL: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/000000638

► Multicast is a bandwidth efficient mechanism to provide wireless services for a group of nodes. Providing reliable wireless multicast is challenging due to channel fading.… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: cooperation; game theory; multicast

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Niu, B. (2010). Cooperative wireless multicast: cooperation strategy and incentive mechanism. (Masters Thesis). University of Alberta. Retrieved from https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/000000638

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Niu, Binglai. “Cooperative wireless multicast: cooperation strategy and incentive mechanism.” 2010. Masters Thesis, University of Alberta. Accessed February 26, 2020. https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/000000638.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Niu, Binglai. “Cooperative wireless multicast: cooperation strategy and incentive mechanism.” 2010. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Niu B. Cooperative wireless multicast: cooperation strategy and incentive mechanism. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Alberta; 2010. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/000000638.

Council of Science Editors:

Niu B. Cooperative wireless multicast: cooperation strategy and incentive mechanism. [Masters Thesis]. University of Alberta; 2010. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/000000638

Penn State University

27. Chowdhury, Avantika. Essays in Network Formation.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2008, Penn State University

URL: https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/8503

► This thesis contains three essays on the formation of social networks. The first essay focuses on citation networks while the second one proposes a general… (more)

▼ This thesis contains three essays on the formation of social networks. The first essay focuses on citation networks while the second one proposes a general model of network formation. The third essay is an empirical investigation of a person's kinship network. Chapter 1: Citations and the Diffusion of Knowledge: An Economic Analysis (with Kalyan Chatterjee) Citation patterns in many academic disciplines have displayed a pattern of connections similar to those observed in many other different real-world contexts, such as links on the world-wide web. The various models that have been proposed to generate such networks, generically called "preferential attachment models", rely solely on random link formation and copying and do not take into account rational choice among authors in an academic community, which would consider the competition for citations and ensuing professional success. In this paper we construct such a model with rational agents to understand some aspects of citation patterns and knowledge diffusion in a specific academic field .. We show that rivalry or competition in citations might be an obstacle to diffusion, depending on behavioral rules specific to the field. Increased heterogeneity in the quality of papers reduces this effect. After considering models with complete information, we analyse models with private information about quality of one's own paper and use the framework to consider the interaction of this process with acquaintance networks and strategic entry. Superimposing the citation process on an acquaintance network yields patterns different from preferential attachment. Strategic entry leads to cascades of papers. Though we might have ex-ante efficiency in some equilibria, ex-post efficiency is not guaranteed. Ex post efficiency cannot be guaranteed since it is always possible in equilibrium that a good paper "dies" and a worse one survives, but ex ante efficiency is sometimes attainable. Chapter 2: Competing to be a `Star': A model of sequential network formation This paper studies a sequential-move game of network formation with capacity constrained agents. The sequential nature of the game allows us to focus on the the role played by foresight in the formation of particular network configurations. We find that the equilibrium network structure depends crucially on the rate of decreasing returns (decay) in the payoffs. With homogeneous agents and a capacity of one link, the equilibrium network is a fully connected graph for extreme levels of decay. The architectures for very low and very high levels of decay are a complete star and a graph similar to the hub-and-spoke architecture, respectively. For intermediate levels of decay, however, the network configuration might have more than one component. This occurs because agents have the incentive to reject a link in some subgame in order to become central in the network at some future date. With heterogeneous agents, the equilibrium network for both very high and very low levels of decay is a star with a high ability agent as the…

Subjects/Keywords: microeconomics; game theory; networks

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Chowdhury, A. (2008). Essays in Network Formation. (Doctoral Dissertation). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/8503

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Chowdhury, Avantika. “Essays in Network Formation.” 2008. Doctoral Dissertation, Penn State University. Accessed February 26, 2020. https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/8503.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Chowdhury, Avantika. “Essays in Network Formation.” 2008. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Chowdhury A. Essays in Network Formation. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Penn State University; 2008. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/8503.

Council of Science Editors:

Chowdhury A. Essays in Network Formation. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Penn State University; 2008. Available from: https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/8503

Louisiana State University

28. Wiser, Matthew. On contests with complementarities.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2013, Louisiana State University

URL: etd-06062013-225727 ; https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/4066

► In this dissertation, we consider the role of complementarities in contests. In most contests, there is either a single prize available, or multiple prizes whose… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Multi-Battle Contests; Game Theory

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Wiser, M. (2013). On contests with complementarities. (Doctoral Dissertation). Louisiana State University. Retrieved from etd-06062013-225727 ; https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/4066

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Wiser, Matthew. “On contests with complementarities.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, Louisiana State University. Accessed February 26, 2020. etd-06062013-225727 ; https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/4066.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Wiser, Matthew. “On contests with complementarities.” 2013. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Wiser M. On contests with complementarities. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Louisiana State University; 2013. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: etd-06062013-225727 ; https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/4066.

Council of Science Editors:

Wiser M. On contests with complementarities. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Louisiana State University; 2013. Available from: etd-06062013-225727 ; https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/4066

Ryerson University

29. Mc Inerney, Fionn. Wall cops and robbers.

Degree: 2015, Ryerson University

URL: https://digital.library.ryerson.ca/islandora/object/RULA%3A4406

► Wall Cops and Robbers is a new turn-based game played on graphs. It is inspired by the games of Cops and Robbers and the Angel… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Game theory; Computer Science – Mathematics

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Mc Inerney, F. (2015). Wall cops and robbers. (Thesis). Ryerson University. Retrieved from https://digital.library.ryerson.ca/islandora/object/RULA%3A4406

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Mc Inerney, Fionn. “Wall cops and robbers.” 2015. Thesis, Ryerson University. Accessed February 26, 2020. https://digital.library.ryerson.ca/islandora/object/RULA%3A4406.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Mc Inerney, Fionn. “Wall cops and robbers.” 2015. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Mc Inerney F. Wall cops and robbers. [Internet] [Thesis]. Ryerson University; 2015. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: https://digital.library.ryerson.ca/islandora/object/RULA%3A4406.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Mc Inerney F. Wall cops and robbers. [Thesis]. Ryerson University; 2015. Available from: https://digital.library.ryerson.ca/islandora/object/RULA%3A4406

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Montana State University

30. Natarajan, Thiagarajan. Selection of parameters in differential games.

Degree: College of Engineering, 1971, Montana State University

URL: https://scholarworks.montana.edu/xmlui/handle/1/4478

Subjects/Keywords: Game theory.

Record Details Similar Records Cite « Share

❌

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Natarajan, T. (1971). Selection of parameters in differential games. (Thesis). Montana State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.montana.edu/xmlui/handle/1/4478

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Natarajan, Thiagarajan. “Selection of parameters in differential games.” 1971. Thesis, Montana State University. Accessed February 26, 2020. https://scholarworks.montana.edu/xmlui/handle/1/4478.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Natarajan, Thiagarajan. “Selection of parameters in differential games.” 1971. Web. 26 Feb 2020.

Vancouver:

Natarajan T. Selection of parameters in differential games. [Internet] [Thesis]. Montana State University; 1971. [cited 2020 Feb 26]. Available from: https://scholarworks.montana.edu/xmlui/handle/1/4478.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Natarajan T. Selection of parameters in differential games. [Thesis]. Montana State University; 1971. Available from: https://scholarworks.montana.edu/xmlui/handle/1/4478

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Open Access Theses and Dissertations