subject:(Game theory)

1. Ramaswamy Pillai, Vinod. Applications of Game Theory to Multi-Agent Coordination Problems in Communication Networks.

Degree: 2013, Texas Digital Library

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969; http://hdl.handle.net/2249.1/66549

► Recent years there has been a growing interest in the study of distributed control mechanisms for use in communication networks. A fundamental assumption in these… (more)

▼ Recent years there has been a growing interest in the study of distributed control mechanisms for use in communication networks. A fundamental assumption in these models is that the participants in the network are willing to cooperate with the system. However, there are many instances where the incentives to cooperate is missing. Then, the agents may seek to achieve their own private interests by behaving strategically. Often, such selfish choices lead to inefficient equilibrium state of the system, commonly known as the tragedy of commons in Economics terminology. Now, one may ask the following question: how can the system be led to the socially optimal state in spite of selfish behaviors of its participants? The traditional control design framework fails to provide an answer as it does not take into account of selfish and strategic behavior of the agents. The use of game theoretical methods to achieve coordination in such network systems is appealing, as it naturally captures the idea of rational agents taking locally optimal decisions. In this thesis, we explore several instances of coordination problems in communication networks that can be analyzed using game theoretical methods. We study one coordination problem each, from each layer of TCP/IP reference model - the network model used in the current Internet architecture. First, we consider societal agents taking decisions on whether to obtain content legally or illegally, and tie their behavior to questions of performance of content distribution networks. We show that revenue sharing with peers promote performance and revenue extraction from content distribution networks. Next, we consider a transport layer problem where applications compete against each other to meet their performance objectives by selfishly picking congestion controllers. We establish that tolling schemes that incentivize applications to choose one of several different virtual networks catering to particular needs yields higher system value. Hence, we propose the adoption of such virtual networks. We address a network layer question in third problem. How do the sources in a wireless network split their traffic over the available set of paths to attain the lowest possible number of transmissions per unit time? We develop a two level distributed controller that attains the optimal traffic split. Finally, we study mobile applications competing for channel access in a cellular network. We show that the mechanism where base station conducting sequence of second price auctions and providing channel access to the winner achieves the benefits of the state of art solution, Largest Queue First policy. Advisors/Committee Members: Shakkottai, Srinivas (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Game theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Ramaswamy Pillai, V. (2013). Applications of Game Theory to Multi-Agent Coordination Problems in Communication Networks. (Thesis). Texas Digital Library. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969; http://hdl.handle.net/2249.1/66549

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Ramaswamy Pillai, Vinod. “Applications of Game Theory to Multi-Agent Coordination Problems in Communication Networks.” 2013. Thesis, Texas Digital Library. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1969; http://hdl.handle.net/2249.1/66549.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Ramaswamy Pillai, Vinod. “Applications of Game Theory to Multi-Agent Coordination Problems in Communication Networks.” 2013. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Ramaswamy Pillai V. Applications of Game Theory to Multi-Agent Coordination Problems in Communication Networks. [Internet] [Thesis]. Texas Digital Library; 2013. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969; http://hdl.handle.net/2249.1/66549.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Ramaswamy Pillai V. Applications of Game Theory to Multi-Agent Coordination Problems in Communication Networks. [Thesis]. Texas Digital Library; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969; http://hdl.handle.net/2249.1/66549

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Rutgers University

2. Alabdel Abass, Ahmed A., 1980-. Evolutionary games: applications to security and resource allocation in networks.

Degree: PhD, Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2018, Rutgers University

URL: https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/58878/

► Modern life is getting more complicated and people rely more on the intelligence embedded in their electronic gadgets. It is expected these gadgets will take… (more)

▼ Modern life is getting more complicated and people rely more on the intelligence embedded in their electronic gadgets. It is expected these gadgets will take larger roles in making, at least some simple, decisions instead of us. It is not difficult to see how many gadgets will be needed in an Internet of Things environment, or smart home settings, or any sort of connected devices. Interaction among these devices can be addressed using game theoretical models. However for a large number of devices interacting/playing with each other, the classical game models can be complicated. One way to approach this problem is by using evolutionary game theory (EGT). Evolutionary games deal with large number of players by making assumptions such as some common similarities in the players' interests, payoffs, and bounded rationality. Both of these assumptions seem to fit in modeling the large number of players'/devices' interaction. On the other hand, evolutionary games can model the user behavior in taking decisions when repeatedly played. Meaning that, each time a player does a move, the player observes the payoff and can compare it with the average payoff, and in the next play the player can choose a different move if it gives higher payoff and so on so forth. By using the concept of replicator dynamics, evolutionary games make it possible to observe how the choice dynamics is made. It can be looked at as learning until reaching to a very stable choice which is an evolutionary stable choice. This thesis first presents the problem of communications under a denial of service attack through a jamming threat. We consider the problem where the players try to communicate with a base station under the threat of jammers who, possible cooperatively, try to block their communications. The users have the option to work cooperatively too. The second problem this thesis deals with a generalized network model known as ephemeral network under the threat of a malicious attack with the absence of any central authority. The only control to the network is a set of rules which are agreed upon before setting a connection. Thirdly, we study the problem of advanced persistent threats (APTs), which is the problem of a powerful and stealthy attacker who wants to infiltrate the system. Evolutionary game theory is used by giving the players, the APT attacker and the system defender, the opportunity to adapt their decisions according to the replicator dynamics to reach to the robust decision,i.e, to choose the defend/attack strategy. The final part of this work uses evolutionary game theory to model the coexistence between WiFi and LTE-U technologies. We consider a scenario where there are two heterogeneous populations, one population represents the set of LET-U APs and the other one represents the set of WiFi AP. Furthermore, we assume that AP's belong to the same population do not interfere with each other. We study, under a given set of transmission strategies, the stability of the strategies that can appear in such a conflict. We specify the… Advisors/Committee Members: Mandayam, Narayan B. (chair), School of Graduate Studies.

Subjects/Keywords: Game theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Alabdel Abass, Ahmed A., 1. (2018). Evolutionary games: applications to security and resource allocation in networks. (Doctoral Dissertation). Rutgers University. Retrieved from https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/58878/

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Alabdel Abass, Ahmed A., 1980-. “Evolutionary games: applications to security and resource allocation in networks.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, Rutgers University. Accessed March 02, 2021. https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/58878/.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Alabdel Abass, Ahmed A., 1980-. “Evolutionary games: applications to security and resource allocation in networks.” 2018. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Alabdel Abass, Ahmed A. 1. Evolutionary games: applications to security and resource allocation in networks. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Rutgers University; 2018. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/58878/.

Council of Science Editors:

Alabdel Abass, Ahmed A. 1. Evolutionary games: applications to security and resource allocation in networks. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Rutgers University; 2018. Available from: https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/58878/

3. Bailey, Leilani. An Analysis of a Strategic Market Game Using Gold as Money and Ornament.

Degree: 2012, University of Nevada – Reno

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11714/3776

► In Quint-Shubik (2012), the authors present and solve several models of a simple economy, the idea being to show how to game theoretically model the… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Game Theory; Strategic Market Game

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APA (6^th Edition):

Bailey, L. (2012). An Analysis of a Strategic Market Game Using Gold as Money and Ornament. (Thesis). University of Nevada – Reno. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11714/3776

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Bailey, Leilani. “An Analysis of a Strategic Market Game Using Gold as Money and Ornament.” 2012. Thesis, University of Nevada – Reno. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11714/3776.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Bailey, Leilani. “An Analysis of a Strategic Market Game Using Gold as Money and Ornament.” 2012. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Bailey L. An Analysis of a Strategic Market Game Using Gold as Money and Ornament. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Nevada – Reno; 2012. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11714/3776.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Bailey L. An Analysis of a Strategic Market Game Using Gold as Money and Ornament. [Thesis]. University of Nevada – Reno; 2012. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11714/3776

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Penn State University

4. Isogai, Shigeki. Essays on Dynamic Games and Forward Induction.

Degree: 2017, Penn State University

URL: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/14187sxi122

► In this essay, I study how forward-induction reasoning affect plausibility/stability of agreements in which players in a dynamic interaction enforces cooperation with the threat of… (more)

▼ In this essay, I study how forward-induction reasoning affect plausibility/stability of agreements in which players in a dynamic interaction enforces cooperation with the threat of mutually destructive punishment. While the traditional theory using equilibrium concept shows that such strategy profile is self-enforcing, under a modification of the model, such strategy profile fails to be consistent with players' rationality. In the first chapter I provide the simplest setting under which this non-rationalizability result of deterrence can be shown. The game is a two-player three-stage game: in the first stage, the players choose whether to enter the strategic interaction by paying some cost; in the second stage, the players play a prisoners' dilemma game; and in the third stage, the players play a coordination game. Each move is simultaneous and the players' past actions are perfectly monitored. While there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which players can cooperate with the threat of punishment provided the punishment is strong enough, I show that the strategy profile does not consists of rationalizable strategies under a certain parameter values. This occurs because choosing to enter, unilaterally defect, and then punish the opponent is strictly dominated by a mixture of the two strategies ``do not enter'' and ``enter, defect, but do not punish.'' This result shows that a simple modification of the game and forward-induction consideration encoded in rationalizability might cast doubt on the idea of deterring defection by the threat of mutual punishment. The other two chapters study to what extent the result in the fist chapter does or does not apply in different settings. The second chapter considers the infinite-horizon extension of the model in the first chapter. In the first period (denoted as period 0), the players choose whether to enter the game. After the players choose to enter, the continuation game is the infinite repetition of the stage game which consists of two phases: in the first phase players play prisoners' dilemma game, after which players simultaneously choose to continue the game, exit from the game without punishing the opponent, or punish the opponent and exit from the game. I show that with a similar condition as in the result in the first chapter, strategy which entails defection and punishment in the first stage is not rationalizable. Moreover, since the exit-without-punishment option works as an outside option in later stages of the game, we also obtain a result which provides conditions under which punishment after defection is excluded by rationalizability. The third chapter extends the model in the first chapter toward an incomplete-information model in that it considers a model of random number of players, who are sequentially matched and play the game as in the first chapter. I assume that while the past actions in the stage games are not observable, occurrences of punishment is publicly observable to all the players (the typical example is the formation of cartels and the… Advisors/Committee Members: Edward Green, Dissertation Advisor/Co-Advisor, Edward Green, Committee Chair/Co-Chair, Robert Clifford Marshall, Committee Member, Vijay Krishna, Committee Member, Lisa Lipowski Posey, Outside Member.

Subjects/Keywords: game theory; collusion

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APA (6^th Edition):

Isogai, S. (2017). Essays on Dynamic Games and Forward Induction. (Thesis). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/14187sxi122

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Isogai, Shigeki. “Essays on Dynamic Games and Forward Induction.” 2017. Thesis, Penn State University. Accessed March 02, 2021. https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/14187sxi122.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Isogai, Shigeki. “Essays on Dynamic Games and Forward Induction.” 2017. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Isogai S. Essays on Dynamic Games and Forward Induction. [Internet] [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2017. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/14187sxi122.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Isogai S. Essays on Dynamic Games and Forward Induction. [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2017. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/14187sxi122

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign

5. Xu, Wenxin. Strategic management of operational resources under uncertainty.

Degree: PhD, Business Administration, 2016, University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/95444

► This dissertation addresses and answers two questions: (1) What are the impacts of market uncertainty and technological uncertainty? (2) What is the best way for… (more)

▼ This dissertation addresses and answers two questions: (1) What are the impacts of market uncertainty and technological uncertainty? (2) What is the best way for a firm to manage demand information and technological knowledge in the face of competition? The first essay (Chapter 2) investigates a problem of competitive investment with payoff externalities and uncertain but partially observable profitability. This essay examines a duopoly game, which, under appropriate conditions, reduces to a war of attrition game in the sense that both firms have incentives to be the follower. We find that due to the strategic interactions, payoff externalities and learning opportunities have counterintuitive effects on investment strategies and on the time to the first investment. In particular, we find that an increase in the rate of learning, which usually benefits the follower, may hasten or delay the first investment depending on the rate of learning and the prior probability that the investment is profitable. Overall, the results of this chapter suggest that firms facing entry into an unproven market need to consider the strategic effects arising from learning and externalities. The second essay (Chapter 3) investigates the strategy of investment in R&D projects when completion time of R&D is uncertain. By examining a game theoretic model of two firms competitively engaged in R&D projects, we find that the more innovative firm may or may not have an incentive to unilaterally share technological knowledge with its opponent; the result de- pends on the more innovative firm's tradeoff between reduction of competitive pressure and reduction of the competitor’s imitation. A direct implication of this result is that a firm may achieve superior performance by strategically managing its technological knowledge without incurring cost. The third essay (Chapter 4) investigates a problem of competitive investment in R&D projects to examine (1) the impacts of uncertainties and (2) the strategies of managing demand information and technological knowledge. We find that market uncertainty can improve or diminish a firm's payoff due to strategic interactions between firms and the interplay of learning effects and externalities. Our results also indicate that technological uncertainty can alter the relationship between the time to completion and the fierceness of competition. More specifically, we find that an increase in the time to completion may or may not increase the fierceness of the competition. Lastly, this essay compares the impact of disclosing demand information and that of disclosing technological knowledge. The results show that disclosing technological knowledge can only improve a firm's ex-ante payoff, whereas disclosing demand information can improve both the ex-ante and ex-post payoffs. Hence, our results indicate that the disclosed contents and the time to disclose are important when firms consider voluntary disclosure to reduce competition. Advisors/Committee Members: Kwon, H. Dharma (advisor), Kwon, H. Dharma (Committee Chair), Petruzzi, Nicholas C (committee member), Mahoney, Joseph T (committee member), Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard (committee member), Agrawal, Anupam (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Uncertainty Game Theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Xu, W. (2016). Strategic management of operational resources under uncertainty. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2142/95444

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Xu, Wenxin. “Strategic management of operational resources under uncertainty.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/95444.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Xu, Wenxin. “Strategic management of operational resources under uncertainty.” 2016. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Xu W. Strategic management of operational resources under uncertainty. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign; 2016. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/95444.

Council of Science Editors:

Xu W. Strategic management of operational resources under uncertainty. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Illinois – Urbana-Champaign; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/95444

University of Minnesota

6. Canann, Taylor. Essays in Applied and Computational Game Theory.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2019, University of Minnesota

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/206318

► This dissertation considers computational and applied aspects of cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. The first chapter discusses a novel applied game theory approach within the… (more)

▼ This dissertation considers computational and applied aspects of cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. The first chapter discusses a novel applied game theory approach within the field of vulnerability disclosure policy. I introduce a three-player game between software vendors, software users, and a hacker in which software vendors attempt to protect software users by releasing updates, i.e. disclosing a vulnerability, and the hacker is attempting to exploit vulnerabilities in the software package to attack the software users. The software users must determine whether the protection offered by the update outweighs the cost of installing the update. Following the model set up, I describe why low-type software users, software users that do not get much value out of the software and are thus not very damaged by an attack, prefer Non-Disclosure, and Disclosure can only be an optimal policy in cases when the cost to the hacker of searching for a zero-day vulnerability is small. Many economic problems are inherently non-linear, so in the second chapter we introduce the MGBA, the Modular Groebner Basis Approach, which is a solution technique from Algebraic Geometry that can be used to ``triangularize'' polynomial systems. The MGBA is a computational tool that overcomes the typical computational problems of intermediate coefficient swell and solving for lucky primes that can limit the ability to compute Groebner bases. The Groebner basis is an all-solution computational technique that can be applied to many fields in economics. This chapter focuses on applying the MGBA to Bertrand games with multiple equilibria and a manifold approach to solving dynamic programming problems. Advances in computational power and techniques have greatly benefited both economic theory, in allowing economists to solve more realistic models, and data analysis, such as machine learning. However, the field of cooperative game theory has fallen behind. Therefore, in the final chapter, I introduce the compression value, a computationally efficient approximation technique for the non-transferable utility (NTU) Shapley value. This algorithm gives a reasonable approximation of the NTU Shapley value if the initial guess of Pareto weights is near the actual solution.

Subjects/Keywords: Cybersecurity; Game Theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Canann, T. (2019). Essays in Applied and Computational Game Theory. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Minnesota. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11299/206318

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Canann, Taylor. “Essays in Applied and Computational Game Theory.” 2019. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Minnesota. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11299/206318.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Canann, Taylor. “Essays in Applied and Computational Game Theory.” 2019. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Canann T. Essays in Applied and Computational Game Theory. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Minnesota; 2019. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/206318.

Council of Science Editors:

Canann T. Essays in Applied and Computational Game Theory. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Minnesota; 2019. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/206318

University of Alberta

7. Lanctot, Marc. Monte Carlo Sampling and Regret Minimization for Equilibrium Computation and Decision-Making in Large Extensive Form Games.

Degree: PhD, Department of Computing Science, 2013, University of Alberta

URL: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/wp988k138

► In this thesis, we investigate the problem of decision-making in large two-player zero-sum games using Monte Carlo sampling and regret minimization methods. We demonstrate four… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: regret minimization; extensive form game; game theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Lanctot, M. (2013). Monte Carlo Sampling and Regret Minimization for Equilibrium Computation and Decision-Making in Large Extensive Form Games. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Alberta. Retrieved from https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/wp988k138

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Lanctot, Marc. “Monte Carlo Sampling and Regret Minimization for Equilibrium Computation and Decision-Making in Large Extensive Form Games.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Alberta. Accessed March 02, 2021. https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/wp988k138.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Lanctot, Marc. “Monte Carlo Sampling and Regret Minimization for Equilibrium Computation and Decision-Making in Large Extensive Form Games.” 2013. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Lanctot M. Monte Carlo Sampling and Regret Minimization for Equilibrium Computation and Decision-Making in Large Extensive Form Games. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Alberta; 2013. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/wp988k138.

Council of Science Editors:

Lanctot M. Monte Carlo Sampling and Regret Minimization for Equilibrium Computation and Decision-Making in Large Extensive Form Games. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Alberta; 2013. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/wp988k138

University of Oregon

8. Merriner, Ashley. Aural Abjections and Dancing Dystopias: Sonic Signifiers in Video Game Horror.

Degree: MA, School of Music and Dance, 2017, University of Oregon

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1794/22733

► For centuries, the horror genre has ensnared audiences across generations and genre lines: ballet, opera, literature, poetry, film, and, most recently, video games have all… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Game theory; Gender theory; Horror; Ludomusicology; Musicology; Video game theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Merriner, A. (2017). Aural Abjections and Dancing Dystopias: Sonic Signifiers in Video Game Horror. (Masters Thesis). University of Oregon. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1794/22733

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Merriner, Ashley. “Aural Abjections and Dancing Dystopias: Sonic Signifiers in Video Game Horror.” 2017. Masters Thesis, University of Oregon. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/22733.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Merriner, Ashley. “Aural Abjections and Dancing Dystopias: Sonic Signifiers in Video Game Horror.” 2017. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Merriner A. Aural Abjections and Dancing Dystopias: Sonic Signifiers in Video Game Horror. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Oregon; 2017. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1794/22733.

Council of Science Editors:

Merriner A. Aural Abjections and Dancing Dystopias: Sonic Signifiers in Video Game Horror. [Masters Thesis]. University of Oregon; 2017. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1794/22733

University of Missouri – Columbia

9. Sperry-Taylor, Ashton T. Bounded rationality in games of strategy.

Degree: 2011, University of Missouri – Columbia

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/14271

► [ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT REQUEST OF AUTHOR.] Traditional game theory predicts behavior contrary to how real people actually behave. And what… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: game theory; bounded rationality; decision theory; behavioral game theory; backward induction

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APA (6^th Edition):

Sperry-Taylor, A. T. (2011). Bounded rationality in games of strategy. (Thesis). University of Missouri – Columbia. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10355/14271

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Sperry-Taylor, Ashton T. “Bounded rationality in games of strategy.” 2011. Thesis, University of Missouri – Columbia. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10355/14271.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Sperry-Taylor, Ashton T. “Bounded rationality in games of strategy.” 2011. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Sperry-Taylor AT. Bounded rationality in games of strategy. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Missouri – Columbia; 2011. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/14271.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Sperry-Taylor AT. Bounded rationality in games of strategy. [Thesis]. University of Missouri – Columbia; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/14271

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Illinois – Chicago

10. Hardwick, John. Graphical Algorithms for Finding the Nucleolus of Binary-Valued Matching Games.

Degree: 2017, University of Illinois – Chicago

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10027/21740

► In cooperative game theory, the class of assignment games models a hypothetical market with two groups of people (for instance, buyers and sellers, or men… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: game theory; cooperative game theory; nucleolus; assignment game; matching; graph theory; directed graph; algorithms

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APA (6^th Edition):

Hardwick, J. (2017). Graphical Algorithms for Finding the Nucleolus of Binary-Valued Matching Games. (Thesis). University of Illinois – Chicago. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10027/21740

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Hardwick, John. “Graphical Algorithms for Finding the Nucleolus of Binary-Valued Matching Games.” 2017. Thesis, University of Illinois – Chicago. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10027/21740.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Hardwick, John. “Graphical Algorithms for Finding the Nucleolus of Binary-Valued Matching Games.” 2017. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Hardwick J. Graphical Algorithms for Finding the Nucleolus of Binary-Valued Matching Games. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Illinois – Chicago; 2017. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10027/21740.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Hardwick J. Graphical Algorithms for Finding the Nucleolus of Binary-Valued Matching Games. [Thesis]. University of Illinois – Chicago; 2017. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10027/21740

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Alberta

11. Niu, Binglai. Cooperative wireless multicast: cooperation strategy and incentive mechanism.

Degree: MS, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2010, University of Alberta

URL: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/000000638

► Multicast is a bandwidth efficient mechanism to provide wireless services for a group of nodes. Providing reliable wireless multicast is challenging due to channel fading.… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: cooperation; game theory; multicast

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APA (6^th Edition):

Niu, B. (2010). Cooperative wireless multicast: cooperation strategy and incentive mechanism. (Masters Thesis). University of Alberta. Retrieved from https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/000000638

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Niu, Binglai. “Cooperative wireless multicast: cooperation strategy and incentive mechanism.” 2010. Masters Thesis, University of Alberta. Accessed March 02, 2021. https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/000000638.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Niu, Binglai. “Cooperative wireless multicast: cooperation strategy and incentive mechanism.” 2010. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Niu B. Cooperative wireless multicast: cooperation strategy and incentive mechanism. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Alberta; 2010. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/000000638.

Council of Science Editors:

Niu B. Cooperative wireless multicast: cooperation strategy and incentive mechanism. [Masters Thesis]. University of Alberta; 2010. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/000000638

Dalhousie University

12. Milley, Rebecca. Restricted Universes of Partizan Misere Games.

Degree: PhD, Department of Mathematics & Statistics - Math Division, 2013, Dalhousie University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10222/21441

► This thesis considers three restricted universes of partizan combinatorial games and finds new results for misere play using the recently-introduced theory of indistinguishability quotients. The… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Combinatorial game theory; misere; partizan

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APA (6^th Edition):

Milley, R. (2013). Restricted Universes of Partizan Misere Games. (Doctoral Dissertation). Dalhousie University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10222/21441

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Milley, Rebecca. “Restricted Universes of Partizan Misere Games.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, Dalhousie University. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10222/21441.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Milley, Rebecca. “Restricted Universes of Partizan Misere Games.” 2013. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Milley R. Restricted Universes of Partizan Misere Games. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Dalhousie University; 2013. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10222/21441.

Council of Science Editors:

Milley R. Restricted Universes of Partizan Misere Games. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Dalhousie University; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10222/21441

Ryerson University

13. Mc Inerney, Fionn. Wall cops and robbers.

Degree: 2015, Ryerson University

URL: https://digital.library.ryerson.ca/islandora/object/RULA%3A4406

► Wall Cops and Robbers is a new turn-based game played on graphs. It is inspired by the games of Cops and Robbers and the Angel… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Game theory; Computer Science – Mathematics

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APA (6^th Edition):

Mc Inerney, F. (2015). Wall cops and robbers. (Thesis). Ryerson University. Retrieved from https://digital.library.ryerson.ca/islandora/object/RULA%3A4406

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Mc Inerney, Fionn. “Wall cops and robbers.” 2015. Thesis, Ryerson University. Accessed March 02, 2021. https://digital.library.ryerson.ca/islandora/object/RULA%3A4406.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Mc Inerney, Fionn. “Wall cops and robbers.” 2015. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Mc Inerney F. Wall cops and robbers. [Internet] [Thesis]. Ryerson University; 2015. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: https://digital.library.ryerson.ca/islandora/object/RULA%3A4406.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Mc Inerney F. Wall cops and robbers. [Thesis]. Ryerson University; 2015. Available from: https://digital.library.ryerson.ca/islandora/object/RULA%3A4406

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Rochester Institute of Technology

14. McClain, George A. An Examination of Equilibria in the Multi-Site Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.

Degree: MS, School of Mathematical Sciences (COS), 2013, Rochester Institute of Technology

URL: https://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses/9082

► Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple model for the interaction between two self-interested agents who can choose whether or not to cooperate with one… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Game theory; Prisoner's Dilemma

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APA (6^th Edition):

McClain, G. A. (2013). An Examination of Equilibria in the Multi-Site Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. (Masters Thesis). Rochester Institute of Technology. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses/9082

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

McClain, George A. “An Examination of Equilibria in the Multi-Site Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.” 2013. Masters Thesis, Rochester Institute of Technology. Accessed March 02, 2021. https://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses/9082.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

McClain, George A. “An Examination of Equilibria in the Multi-Site Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.” 2013. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

McClain GA. An Examination of Equilibria in the Multi-Site Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Rochester Institute of Technology; 2013. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: https://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses/9082.

Council of Science Editors:

McClain GA. An Examination of Equilibria in the Multi-Site Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. [Masters Thesis]. Rochester Institute of Technology; 2013. Available from: https://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses/9082

University of Alberta

15. Schnizlein, David. State translation in no-limit poker.

Degree: MS, Department of Computing Science, 2009, University of Alberta

URL: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/hq37vp736

► One way to create a champion level poker agent is to compute a Nash Equilibrium in an abstract version of the poker game. The resulting… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: poker; translation; game theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Schnizlein, D. (2009). State translation in no-limit poker. (Masters Thesis). University of Alberta. Retrieved from https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/hq37vp736

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Schnizlein, David. “State translation in no-limit poker.” 2009. Masters Thesis, University of Alberta. Accessed March 02, 2021. https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/hq37vp736.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Schnizlein, David. “State translation in no-limit poker.” 2009. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Schnizlein D. State translation in no-limit poker. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Alberta; 2009. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/hq37vp736.

Council of Science Editors:

Schnizlein D. State translation in no-limit poker. [Masters Thesis]. University of Alberta; 2009. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/hq37vp736

16. Αθανασόπουλος, Αλέξανδρος. Θεωρία παιγνίων και εφαρμογές της στο χώρο των επιχειρήσεων και την πολιτική.

Degree: 2011, University of Patras

URL: http://nemertes.lis.upatras.gr/jspui/handle/10889/4792

►

Η εργασία χωρίζεται σε δυο βασικά μέρη. Στο πρώτο μέρος αναφερόμαστε στα παίγνια γενικού αθροίσματος δυο παιχτών, όπου μετά την αναφορά της βασικής θεωρίας και… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Θεωρία παιγνίων; 519.3; Game theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Αθανασόπουλος, �. (2011). Θεωρία παιγνίων και εφαρμογές της στο χώρο των επιχειρήσεων και την πολιτική. (Masters Thesis). University of Patras. Retrieved from http://nemertes.lis.upatras.gr/jspui/handle/10889/4792

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Αθανασόπουλος, Αλέξανδρος. “Θεωρία παιγνίων και εφαρμογές της στο χώρο των επιχειρήσεων και την πολιτική.” 2011. Masters Thesis, University of Patras. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://nemertes.lis.upatras.gr/jspui/handle/10889/4792.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Αθανασόπουλος, Αλέξανδρος. “Θεωρία παιγνίων και εφαρμογές της στο χώρο των επιχειρήσεων και την πολιτική.” 2011. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Αθανασόπουλος �. Θεωρία παιγνίων και εφαρμογές της στο χώρο των επιχειρήσεων και την πολιτική. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Patras; 2011. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://nemertes.lis.upatras.gr/jspui/handle/10889/4792.

Council of Science Editors:

Αθανασόπουλος �. Θεωρία παιγνίων και εφαρμογές της στο χώρο των επιχειρήσεων και την πολιτική. [Masters Thesis]. University of Patras; 2011. Available from: http://nemertes.lis.upatras.gr/jspui/handle/10889/4792

Cornell University

17. Oren, Sigal. An Algorithmic Approach To Analyzing Social Phenomena.

Degree: PhD, Computer Science, 2013, Cornell University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/34358

► Online information and interaction is becoming more and more prominent in our lives. This development is made possible by the growth of large-scale userbased applications… (more)

▼ Online information and interaction is becoming more and more prominent in our lives. This development is made possible by the growth of large-scale userbased applications on the Web (including sites such as Wikipedia and Facebook). As the number of people using these applications increases, the number of social interactions increases and we start to witness social phenomena which originally appeared in the offline world, as well as new ones. Our main goal in this thesis is to obtain a better understanding of some of these phenomena both in the online and the offline world. We will concentrate on phenomena from two main domains. First, motivated by the increasing interest in polarization and the implications that social interactions in the online world has on it, we study how people form their opinion. We present and analyze two models of opinion formation and a more general model of culture dynamics describing the process by which people form opinions on a set of issues simultaneously. Second, we consider how to allocate credit to incentivize effort. We explore this question in the realm of scientific communities by studying a simple game theoretic model illustrating the process by which researchers choose a research project. Our results are not restricted to the academic domain alone, as crowd sourcing sites like Wikipedia are already implementing number of credit-allocation conventions familiar from the scientific community. We also take a special interest in studying the effects long range reasoning has on individuals' choices in other academic domains. We will take the algorithmic approach in which we first try to construct a model of the phenomena in question. For the most part of this thesis we choose to model individuals as strategic agents maximizing some utility function. Then we analyze the model using tools from various fields such as game theory, computer science and statistical physics. Finally, we use our analysis to derive lessons for designing new systems. Advisors/Committee Members: Kleinberg, Jon M (chair), Macy, Michael Walton (committee member), Halpern, Joseph Yehuda (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Algorithmic game theory; social networks

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APA (6^th Edition):

Oren, S. (2013). An Algorithmic Approach To Analyzing Social Phenomena. (Doctoral Dissertation). Cornell University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1813/34358

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Oren, Sigal. “An Algorithmic Approach To Analyzing Social Phenomena.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1813/34358.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Oren, Sigal. “An Algorithmic Approach To Analyzing Social Phenomena.” 2013. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Oren S. An Algorithmic Approach To Analyzing Social Phenomena. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Cornell University; 2013. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/34358.

Council of Science Editors:

Oren S. An Algorithmic Approach To Analyzing Social Phenomena. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Cornell University; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/34358

Cornell University

18. Bjorndahl, Adam. Language-Based Games.

Degree: PhD, Mathematics, 2014, Cornell University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/38745

► We introduce language-based games, in which utility is defined over descriptions in a given language. By choosing the right language, we can capture psychological games… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: game theory; modal logic

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APA (6^th Edition):

Bjorndahl, A. (2014). Language-Based Games. (Doctoral Dissertation). Cornell University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1813/38745

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Bjorndahl, Adam. “Language-Based Games.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1813/38745.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Bjorndahl, Adam. “Language-Based Games.” 2014. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Bjorndahl A. Language-Based Games. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Cornell University; 2014. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/38745.

Council of Science Editors:

Bjorndahl A. Language-Based Games. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Cornell University; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/38745

Cornell University

19. Reilly, Allison. Game Theory Based Identification Of Facility Use Prohibitions For The Movement Of Hazardous Materials Under Terrorist Threat.

Degree: PhD, Civil and Environmental Engineering, 2011, Cornell University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/29193

► The modeling tools that have been developed over the last 25 years for the identification of routes for hazmat shipments emphasize the tradeoffs between cost… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: hazardous materials; routing; game theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Reilly, A. (2011). Game Theory Based Identification Of Facility Use Prohibitions For The Movement Of Hazardous Materials Under Terrorist Threat. (Doctoral Dissertation). Cornell University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1813/29193

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Reilly, Allison. “Game Theory Based Identification Of Facility Use Prohibitions For The Movement Of Hazardous Materials Under Terrorist Threat.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1813/29193.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Reilly, Allison. “Game Theory Based Identification Of Facility Use Prohibitions For The Movement Of Hazardous Materials Under Terrorist Threat.” 2011. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Reilly A. Game Theory Based Identification Of Facility Use Prohibitions For The Movement Of Hazardous Materials Under Terrorist Threat. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Cornell University; 2011. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/29193.

Council of Science Editors:

Reilly A. Game Theory Based Identification Of Facility Use Prohibitions For The Movement Of Hazardous Materials Under Terrorist Threat. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Cornell University; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/29193

Vanderbilt University

20. Noreiga, Quentin Carlyle. Game Theoretic Multidisciplinary Optimization Methods for System-of-Systems Analysis.

Degree: PhD, Interdisciplinary Studies: Systems Engineering and Operations Research, 2012, Vanderbilt University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/13326

► High-speed rail (HSR) planning models have not considered the response of airline operations to introducing high-speed rail to their commercial transportation networks. While considering the… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: game theory; optimization; systems analysis

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APA (6^th Edition):

Noreiga, Q. C. (2012). Game Theoretic Multidisciplinary Optimization Methods for System-of-Systems Analysis. (Doctoral Dissertation). Vanderbilt University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1803/13326

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Noreiga, Quentin Carlyle. “Game Theoretic Multidisciplinary Optimization Methods for System-of-Systems Analysis.” 2012. Doctoral Dissertation, Vanderbilt University. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1803/13326.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Noreiga, Quentin Carlyle. “Game Theoretic Multidisciplinary Optimization Methods for System-of-Systems Analysis.” 2012. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Noreiga QC. Game Theoretic Multidisciplinary Optimization Methods for System-of-Systems Analysis. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Vanderbilt University; 2012. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/13326.

Council of Science Editors:

Noreiga QC. Game Theoretic Multidisciplinary Optimization Methods for System-of-Systems Analysis. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Vanderbilt University; 2012. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/13326

Texas A&M University

21. Li, Jiaxing. Reverse Auction Bidding Further Elements to the Game Theory.

Degree: MS, Construction Management, 2014, Texas A&M University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/153236

► Reverse Auction Bidding systems are increasingly used by some large corporations for the supply of buildings, an example is the major firm Target. The belief… (more)

▼ Reverse Auction Bidding systems are increasingly used by some large corporations for the supply of buildings, an example is the major firm Target. The belief is that the Reverse Auction Bidding system improves the efficiency of the bidding system and leads to cost savings during the construction process. Neither statement has been shown to be correct at this time. A game theory was developed for the Reverse Auction Bidding system; this theory postulated that two sub-games exist within the overall Reverse Auction Bidding game. The first sub-game is between the purchaser and the set of bidders. The purchaser is presented with a group of lowest prices that under the rules of the game must be accepted. This group of prices has been shown to have a non-normal distribution in prior research at TAMU. If economic efficiency was to be maintained by the bidding system, one would expect a normal distribution with a tight range on the standard deviation, which does not occur. The second sub-game is between the bidders, who make use of the non-normal aspects of price group to maximize individual returns. All things being equal and given the intent of the game, the purchaser would expect the bidders return to be normally distributed with a small standard deviation representing a tight control on price, which has never been observed in game play. Three types of bidders have been postulated for the set, the first is an economically efficient bidder, an economically inefficient bidder, and a middle of the road bidder. This study aims to compare statistically the difference between economically efficient bidders, Type ξ bidder, and economically inefficient bidders, Type Ϛ bidder, in terms of the statistical properties of the return data. The central hypothesis is that a statistically evident bias exists between the average return generated by the Type ξ bidder and the Type Ϛ bidder. The addition of the two distributions along with the average return generated by a Type ϕ bidder results in the observed distribution for the group, L. The secondary hypothesis is that Type ξ bidders minimize the price reduction for each bid. The first hypothesis is true, the Type ξ bidder earn on average twice the returns of the Type Ϛ bidder. The second hypothesis is not true, the Type ξ bidder as a set do not attempt to minimize the bid differentials. Further research is suggested on the statistical properties of the bid differentials as more games are played at TAMU. Advisors/Committee Members: Nichols, John M (advisor), Feigenbaum, Leslie (committee member), Shepley, Mardelle (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Reverse Auction Bidding; Game Theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Li, J. (2014). Reverse Auction Bidding Further Elements to the Game Theory. (Masters Thesis). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/153236

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Li, Jiaxing. “Reverse Auction Bidding Further Elements to the Game Theory.” 2014. Masters Thesis, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/153236.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Li, Jiaxing. “Reverse Auction Bidding Further Elements to the Game Theory.” 2014. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Li J. Reverse Auction Bidding Further Elements to the Game Theory. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Texas A&M University; 2014. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/153236.

Council of Science Editors:

Li J. Reverse Auction Bidding Further Elements to the Game Theory. [Masters Thesis]. Texas A&M University; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/153236

Texas A&M University

22. Lu, Wei. Optimization and Mechanism Design for Ridesharing Services.

Degree: PhD, Civil Engineering, 2015, Texas A&M University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/156279

► Ridesharing services, whose aim is to gather travelers with similar itineraries and compatible schedules, are able to provide substantial environmental and social benefits through reducing… (more)

▼ Ridesharing services, whose aim is to gather travelers with similar itineraries and compatible schedules, are able to provide substantial environmental and social benefits through reducing the use of private vehicles. When the operations of a ridesharing system is optimized, it can also save travelers a significant amount of transportation cost. The economic benefits associated with ridesharing in turn attract more travelers to participate in ridesharing services and thereby improve the utilization of transportation infrastructure capacity. This study addresses two of the most challenging issues in designing an efficient and sustainable ridesharing service: ridesharing optimization and ridesharing market design. The first part of the dissertation formally defines the large-scale ridesharing optimization problem, characterizes its complexity and discusses its relation to classic relevant problems like the traveling salesman problem (TSP) and the vehicle routing problem (VRP). A mixed-integer program (MIP) model is developed to solve the ridesharing optimization problem. Since the ridesharing optimization problem is NP-hard, the MIP model is not able to solve larger instances within a reasonable time. An insertion-based heuristic is developed to get approximate solutions to the ridesharing optimization problem. Experiments showed that ridesharing can significantly reduce the system-wide travel cost and vehicle trips. Evaluation of the heuristic solution method showed that the heuristic approach can solve the problem very fast and provide nearly-optimal (98%) solutions, thus, confirming its efficiency and accuracy. From a societal perspective, the ridesharing optimization model proposed in this dissertation provided substantial system-wide travel cost saving (25%+) and vehicle-trip saving (50%) compared to non-ridesharing situation. However, the system-level optimal solution might not completely align with individual participant interest. The second part of this dissertation formulates this issue as a fair cost allocation problem through the lens of the cooperative game theory. A special property of the cooperative ridesharing game is that, its characteristic function values are calculated by solving an optimization problem. We characterize the game to be monotone and subadditive, but non-convex. Several concepts of fairness are investigated and special attention is paid to a solution concept named nucleolus, which aims to minimize the maximum dissatisfaction in the system. However, finding the nucleolus is very challenging because it requires solving the ridesharing optimization problem for every possible coalition, whose number grows exponentially as the number of participants increases in the system. We break the cost allocation (nucleolus finding) problem into a master-subproblem structure and two subproblems are developed to generate constraints for the master problem. We propose a coalition generation procedure to find the nucleolus and approximate nucleolus of the game. When the game has a non-empty core, in… Advisors/Committee Members: Quadrifoglio, Luca (advisor), Rathinam, Sivakumar (committee member), Wang, Xiubin Bruce (committee member), Zhang, Yunlong (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Ridesharing; Optimization; Game theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Lu, W. (2015). Optimization and Mechanism Design for Ridesharing Services. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/156279

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Lu, Wei. “Optimization and Mechanism Design for Ridesharing Services.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/156279.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Lu, Wei. “Optimization and Mechanism Design for Ridesharing Services.” 2015. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Lu W. Optimization and Mechanism Design for Ridesharing Services. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2015. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/156279.

Council of Science Editors:

Lu W. Optimization and Mechanism Design for Ridesharing Services. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/156279

University of Toronto

23. Zhu, Yuefei. Auction Design for Secondary Spectrum Markets.

Degree: 2012, University of Toronto

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/33624

►

Opportunistic wireless channel access by non-licensed users has emerged as a promising solution for addressing the bandwidth scarcity challenge. In this thesis, we first design… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Spectrum auction; Game theory; 0544

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APA (6^th Edition):

Zhu, Y. (2012). Auction Design for Secondary Spectrum Markets. (Masters Thesis). University of Toronto. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1807/33624

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Zhu, Yuefei. “Auction Design for Secondary Spectrum Markets.” 2012. Masters Thesis, University of Toronto. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1807/33624.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Zhu, Yuefei. “Auction Design for Secondary Spectrum Markets.” 2012. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Zhu Y. Auction Design for Secondary Spectrum Markets. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Toronto; 2012. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/33624.

Council of Science Editors:

Zhu Y. Auction Design for Secondary Spectrum Markets. [Masters Thesis]. University of Toronto; 2012. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/33624

University of Guelph

24. Andrews, Michael. Applications of Game Theory to Social Norm Establishment.

Degree: MS, Department of Mathematics and Statistics, 2013, University of Guelph

URL: https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/5251

► We create pure strategy versions of Robert Axelrod's well known norms and metanorms games. To analyze the evolutionary behaviour of these games, we utilize replicator… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Game Theory; Social Norms

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APA (6^th Edition):

Andrews, M. (2013). Applications of Game Theory to Social Norm Establishment. (Masters Thesis). University of Guelph. Retrieved from https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/5251

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Andrews, Michael. “Applications of Game Theory to Social Norm Establishment.” 2013. Masters Thesis, University of Guelph. Accessed March 02, 2021. https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/5251.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Andrews, Michael. “Applications of Game Theory to Social Norm Establishment.” 2013. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Andrews M. Applications of Game Theory to Social Norm Establishment. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Guelph; 2013. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/5251.

Council of Science Editors:

Andrews M. Applications of Game Theory to Social Norm Establishment. [Masters Thesis]. University of Guelph; 2013. Available from: https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/5251

Oregon State University

25. Jirka, Robert James. An iterative method for finding a solution to a zero-sum two person rectangular game.

Degree: MS, Mathematics, 1959, Oregon State University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1957/50386

Subjects/Keywords: Game theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Jirka, R. J. (1959). An iterative method for finding a solution to a zero-sum two person rectangular game. (Masters Thesis). Oregon State University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1957/50386

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Jirka, Robert James. “An iterative method for finding a solution to a zero-sum two person rectangular game.” 1959. Masters Thesis, Oregon State University. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1957/50386.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Jirka, Robert James. “An iterative method for finding a solution to a zero-sum two person rectangular game.” 1959. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Jirka RJ. An iterative method for finding a solution to a zero-sum two person rectangular game. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Oregon State University; 1959. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1957/50386.

Council of Science Editors:

Jirka RJ. An iterative method for finding a solution to a zero-sum two person rectangular game. [Masters Thesis]. Oregon State University; 1959. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1957/50386

University of Connecticut

26. Wang, Qixing. Game Theory Approach to Transportation Network Vulnerability Measurement.

Degree: MS, Civil Engineering, 2012, University of Connecticut

URL: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/gs_theses/211

► The vulnerability of a transportation network is strongly correlated with the ability of the network to withstand shocks and disruptions. A robust network with… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Game Theory; Transportation Network Vulnerability

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APA (6^th Edition):

Wang, Q. (2012). Game Theory Approach to Transportation Network Vulnerability Measurement. (Masters Thesis). University of Connecticut. Retrieved from https://opencommons.uconn.edu/gs_theses/211

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Wang, Qixing. “Game Theory Approach to Transportation Network Vulnerability Measurement.” 2012. Masters Thesis, University of Connecticut. Accessed March 02, 2021. https://opencommons.uconn.edu/gs_theses/211.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Wang, Qixing. “Game Theory Approach to Transportation Network Vulnerability Measurement.” 2012. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Wang Q. Game Theory Approach to Transportation Network Vulnerability Measurement. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Connecticut; 2012. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/gs_theses/211.

Council of Science Editors:

Wang Q. Game Theory Approach to Transportation Network Vulnerability Measurement. [Masters Thesis]. University of Connecticut; 2012. Available from: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/gs_theses/211

27. Allbee, Matthew. An approximation algorithm with additive error for extensive-form, pure Stackelberg games with a chance player.

Degree: 2018, University of Wisconsin – Whitewater

URL: http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/78968

►

This file was last viewed in Microsoft Edge.

Substantial work has gone into ﬁnding techniques for solving real-world sized Nash games. Stackelberg Equilibria is another… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Game theory; Approximation algorithms

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APA (6^th Edition):

Allbee, M. (2018). An approximation algorithm with additive error for extensive-form, pure Stackelberg games with a chance player. (Thesis). University of Wisconsin – Whitewater. Retrieved from http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/78968

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Allbee, Matthew. “An approximation algorithm with additive error for extensive-form, pure Stackelberg games with a chance player.” 2018. Thesis, University of Wisconsin – Whitewater. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/78968.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Allbee, Matthew. “An approximation algorithm with additive error for extensive-form, pure Stackelberg games with a chance player.” 2018. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Allbee M. An approximation algorithm with additive error for extensive-form, pure Stackelberg games with a chance player. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Wisconsin – Whitewater; 2018. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/78968.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Allbee M. An approximation algorithm with additive error for extensive-form, pure Stackelberg games with a chance player. [Thesis]. University of Wisconsin – Whitewater; 2018. Available from: http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1793/78968

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Delaware

28. Keffer, Jeremy. Constructing strategies for games with simultaneous movement.

Degree: PhD, University of Delaware, Department of Computer and Information Sciences, 2015, University of Delaware

URL: http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/17474

► From the early days of AI, computers have been programmed to play games against human players. Most of the AI work has sought to build… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Game theory.; Algorithms.; Strategy.

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Keffer, J. (2015). Constructing strategies for games with simultaneous movement. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Delaware. Retrieved from http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/17474

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Keffer, Jeremy. “Constructing strategies for games with simultaneous movement.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Delaware. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/17474.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Keffer, Jeremy. “Constructing strategies for games with simultaneous movement.” 2015. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Keffer J. Constructing strategies for games with simultaneous movement. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Delaware; 2015. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/17474.

Council of Science Editors:

Keffer J. Constructing strategies for games with simultaneous movement. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Delaware; 2015. Available from: http://udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/17474

University of Guelph

29. Morsky, Bryce. Homophily, payoff distributions, and truncation selection in replicator dynamics.

Degree: PhD, Department of Mathematics and Statistics, 2016, University of Guelph

URL: https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/9758

► This dissertation explores the field of replicator dynamics by examining extensions to and relaxations of the classical replicator equation and complimentary agent-based models. We extend… (more)

▼ This dissertation explores the field of replicator dynamics by examining extensions to and relaxations of the classical replicator equation and complimentary agent-based models. We extend the replicator equation by the incorporation of homophilic imitation, a form of tag-based selection. We show that though the equilibria are not affected by this modification, the population's diversity may increase or decrease depending on two invasion scenarios we detail, and there is significant impact on the rates of convergence to equilibria. Two important assumptions of the replicator equation that we relaxed are: mean payoffs, where all replicators earn the mean payoff of the underlying game; and proportional selection, where the probabilities for survival and reproduction are proportional to the difference between the fitness of a replicator and the mean fitness of the population. Our models thus comprise payoff distributions and two types of truncation selection: independent, where replicator above a threshold, φ, survive; and dependent, where the top τ of replicators survive. The reproduction rates are equal for all survivors. We show that the classical replicator equation is a special case of our independent truncation equation. Further, for any boundary fixed point, we may choose a φ such that that point is stable (or unstable). We observed complex and transient dynamics in both truncation methods. We applied this framework to evolutionary graphs that included diffusion, and show where cooperation is facilitated by these models in comparison to spatial and non-spatial proportional selection. Alfred Russel Wallace reasoned that the relatively unfit could coexist with the fit, and it has been argued that this would result in a genotypically diverse population resistant to extinction. This is because natural selection, rather than Spencer's ``survival of the fittest,'' may be better encapsulated by the phrases: ``survival of the fit,'' or ``non-survival of the non-fit.'' We argue that truncation selection, here explored, can model this phenomenon, and thus is an important addition to the theoretical biology literature. Advisors/Committee Members: Bauch, Chris T (advisor), Ashlock, Daniel (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Replicator dynamics; Evolutionary game theory

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Morsky, B. (2016). Homophily, payoff distributions, and truncation selection in replicator dynamics. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Guelph. Retrieved from https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/9758

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Morsky, Bryce. “Homophily, payoff distributions, and truncation selection in replicator dynamics.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Guelph. Accessed March 02, 2021. https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/9758.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Morsky, Bryce. “Homophily, payoff distributions, and truncation selection in replicator dynamics.” 2016. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Morsky B. Homophily, payoff distributions, and truncation selection in replicator dynamics. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Guelph; 2016. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/9758.

Council of Science Editors:

Morsky B. Homophily, payoff distributions, and truncation selection in replicator dynamics. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Guelph; 2016. Available from: https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/9758

30. Su, Tong. Three Chapters in Information Economics : Trois essais à l'économie de l'information.

Degree: Docteur es, Economie, 2016, Université Toulouse I – Capitole

URL: http://www.theses.fr/2016TOU10065

►

Ma thèse étudie le mécanisme de l’acquisition et de l’approvisionnement des informations. Il est appliqué à trois situations. Le premier chapitre (travaillé avec Georgy Lukyanov)… (more)

▼

Ma thèse étudie le mécanisme de l’acquisition et de l’approvisionnement des informations. Il est appliqué à trois situations. Le premier chapitre (travaillé avec Georgy Lukyanov) développe un modèle dans lequel l’émetteur communique stratégiquement avec un groupe de récepteurs. Les gains des récepteurs dépendent des informations de l’émetteur. Ceci indique que, en dépit de la bienveillance de l’émetteur, le conflit des intérêts entre l’émetteur et les récepteurs apparaît de façon endogène à la présence de friction de la coordination. Par conséquent, l’équilibre de communication est imparfait : les nouvelles extrêmes, bonnes ou mauvaises, sont relevées mais les nouvelles relativement neutres ne sont pas prises en compte. Donc, un biais exogène dans les préférences de l’émetteur peut améliorer la communication et augmenter le bien-être. Le second chapitre (travaillé avec Takuro Yamashita) parle du problème de la divulgation optimale des informations dans le mécanisme désigné où le principal peut s’engager dans sa divulgation et aussi dans son mécanisme. Au début, on offre un résultat caractéristique pour optimiser la politique de révélation complète. Pour appliquer le résultat, on montre que le principal (vendeur) préfère toujours révéler toutes les informations relatives aux récepteurs de la vente aux enchères générale. Dans le cas du commerce bilatéral où son but est le surplus avec une légère condition sur l’environnement, il ne trouve pas optimal de révéler toutes les informations. Pour une procédure de vote, les votants peuvent choisir entre le statu quo et la réforme. On démontre que le principal doit révéler toutes les informations sur le bénéfice global mais qu’il ne doit révéler aucune information sur le bénéfice individuel de chaque agent. Dans le troisième chapitre on montre que, contrairement à l’idée conventionnelle selon laquelle les agents qui ont des convictions hétérogènes vont s’entendre à long terme (suite aux nouvelles informations), leurs convictions peuvent diverger s’ils sont rationnellement inattentifs. Quand l’attention a un coût, le choix optimal des agents est d’accepter les nouvelles informations qui leur paraissent plus vraisemblables. Cela va conduire à un apprentissage conformiste. Ainsi, les agents qui ont des croyances éloignées de la vérité réagiront moins que les agents qui ont des croyances proches de la vérité. Ceci va mener à une divergence de leurs anticipations. Je caractérise la condition de la divergence de croyance et je montre que ça a plus de chance d’arriver quand la vérité est plus extrême et que le coût de l’attention est moins important.

My thesis studies the mechanism of endogenous information acquisition and provision, and applies it into three applications. The first chapter (joint with Georgy Lukyanov) develops a model in which the sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender’s information. It is shown that, in the presence of coordination frictions, conflict of interests between the sender and the receivers arises…

Advisors/Committee Members: Hellwig, Christian (thesis director).

Subjects/Keywords: Théorie des jeux; Game theory

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Su, T. (2016). Three Chapters in Information Economics : Trois essais à l'économie de l'information. (Doctoral Dissertation). Université Toulouse I – Capitole. Retrieved from http://www.theses.fr/2016TOU10065

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Su, Tong. “Three Chapters in Information Economics : Trois essais à l'économie de l'information.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, Université Toulouse I – Capitole. Accessed March 02, 2021. http://www.theses.fr/2016TOU10065.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Su, Tong. “Three Chapters in Information Economics : Trois essais à l'économie de l'information.” 2016. Web. 02 Mar 2021.

Vancouver:

Su T. Three Chapters in Information Economics : Trois essais à l'économie de l'information. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Université Toulouse I – Capitole; 2016. [cited 2021 Mar 02]. Available from: http://www.theses.fr/2016TOU10065.

Council of Science Editors:

Su T. Three Chapters in Information Economics : Trois essais à l'économie de l'information. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Université Toulouse I – Capitole; 2016. Available from: http://www.theses.fr/2016TOU10065

Open Access Theses and Dissertations