subject:(Game Theoretic Approach)

1. ΚΑΠΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ. Σταθεροποιητικά προγράμματα, αξιόπιστα και πολιτικά κόμματα σε μικρές ανοικτές ευρωπαϊκές οικονομίες στη δεκαετία του '80.

Degree: 1993, Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB); Οικονομικό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/2684

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SOME SMALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE TRIED TO STABILIZE THEIR ECONOMIES IN THE LAST DECADE AND THEIR EXPERIENCES OFFER VERY USEFUL LESSONS. ALL THESE COUNTRIES ARE… (more)

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SOME SMALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE TRIED TO STABILIZE THEIR ECONOMIES IN THE LAST DECADE AND THEIR EXPERIENCES OFFER VERY USEFUL LESSONS. ALL THESE COUNTRIES ARE EXTREMELY OPEN AND SMALL IN TRADED GOODS MARKETS TO HAVE ANY IMPACT ONDEVELOPMENTS IN THE REST OF THE WORLD. TWO ISSUES HAVE BEEN STUDIED IN THIS DOCTORAL DISSERTATION. THE FIRST HAS TO DO WITH THE STABILIZATION OF OUTPUT AND PRICES. MORE PRECISELY, WE INVESTIGATE WHETHER STABILIZATION POLICIES COULD INCUR DISINFLATIONARY EFFECTS AND EXPANSIONARY EFFECTS ON REAL MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES. THE SECOND ISSUE OF THE DOCTORAL DISSERTATION DEALS WITH THEPOLICYMAKERS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEBT STABILIZATION. TWO CRUCIAL QUESTIONS ARE ADDRESSED HERE: (I) IS THE PATTERN OF DEBT SUSTAINABLE? AND (II) DOES THE FISCAL AUTHORITY DOMINATE OVER THE MONETARY AUTHORITY IN THE DEBT STABILIZATION PROCEDURE OR VICE VERSA?

ΜΕΡΙΚΕΣ ΜΙΚΡΕΣ ΕΥΡΩΠΑΙΚΕΣ ΧΩΡΕΣ ΠΡΟΣΠΑΘΗΣΑΝ ΝΑ ΣΤΑΘΕΡΟΠΟΙΗΣΟΥΝ ΤΙΣ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΕΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΙΑ ΔΕΚΑΕΤΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΟΙ ΕΜΠΕΙΡΙΕΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΜΠΟΡΟΥΝ ΝΑ ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΟΥΝΧΡΗΣΙΜΑ ΜΑΘΗΜΑΤΑ. ΟΛΕΣ ΑΥΤΕΣ ΟΙ ΧΩΡΕΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΕΞΑΙΡΕΤΙΚΑ "ΑΝΟΙΚΤΕΣ" ΚΑΙ "ΜΙΚΡΕΣ" ΣΤΙΣ ΔΙΕΘΝΕΙΣ ΑΓΟΡΕΣ ΩΣΤΕ ΝΑ ΕΧΟΥΝ ΟΠΟΙΑΔΗΠΟΤΕ ΕΠΙΔΡΑΣΗ ΣΤΗΝ ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΑ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ. ΔΥΟ ΘΕΜΑΤΑ ΜΕΛΕΤΩΝΤΑΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΑ ΔΙΔΑΚΤΟΡΙΚΗ ΔΙΑΤΡΙΒΗ. ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟ ΑΦΟΡΑ ΤΗ ΣΤΑΘΕΡΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ ΠΡΟΙΟΝΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΙΜΩΝ. ΠΙΟ ΣΥΓΚΕΚΡΙΜΕΝΑ, ΔΙΕΡΕΥΝΟΥΜΕ ΤΟ ΚΑΤΑ ΠΟΣΟ ΟΙ ΣΤΑΘΕΡΟΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΕΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΕΣ ΘΑ ΜΠΟΡΟΥΣΑΝ ΝΑ ΕΠΙΤΥΧΟΥΝ ΑΝΤΙΠΛΗΘΩΡΙΣΤΙΚΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΠΕΚΤΑΤΙΚΑ ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΜΑΤΑ ΕΠΙ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΩΝ ΜΑΚΡΟΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΩΝ ΜΕΓΕΘΩΝ. ΤΟ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟ ΘΕΜΑ ΠΟΥ ΑΠΑΣΧΟΛΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΑ ΔΙΔΑΚΤΟΡΙΚΗ ΔΙΑΤΡΙΒΗ ΑΦΟΡΑ ΤΗ ΣΤΑΣΗ ΤΩΝ ΣΧΕΔΙΑΣΤΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ ΕΝΑΝΤΙ ΤΗΣ ΣΤΑΘΕΡΟΠΟΙΗΣΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΧΡΕΟΥΣ. ΔΥΟ ΚΡΙΣΙΜΑ ΕΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΑ ΕΓΕΙΡΟΝΤΑΙ ΕΔΩ: (I) ΕΙΝΑΙ ΤΟ ΤΡΕΧΟΝ ΠΡΟΤΥΠΟ ΤΟΥ ΧΡΕΟΥΣ "ΔΙΑΤΗΡΗΣΙΜΟ" (SUSTAINABLE); ΚΑΙ (II) ΕΙΝΑΙ ΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ ΟΙ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΟΝΟΜΙΚΕΣ ΑΡΧΕΣ ΝΑ ΚΥΡΙΑΡΧΟΥΝ ΕΠΙ ΤΩΝ ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΙΚΩΝ ΑΡΧΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗ ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΑ ΣΤΑΘΕΡΟΠΟΙΗΣΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΧΡΕΟΥΣ Η ΙΣΧΥΕΙ ΤΟ ΑΝΤΙΣΤΡΟΦΟ;

Subjects/Keywords: Αξιοπιστία; ΠΡΟΣΕΓΓΙΣΗ ΘΕΩΡΙΑΣ ΠΑΙΓΝΙΩΝ; ΣΤΑΘΕΡΟΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ; ΥΠΟΔΕΙΓΜΑ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟ-ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΩΝ ΚΥΚΛΩΝ; Credibility; GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH; MODELS OF POLITICO- ECONOMIC CYCLES; STABILIZATION POLICIES

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

ΚΑΠΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, . �. (1993). Σταθεροποιητικά προγράμματα, αξιόπιστα και πολιτικά κόμματα σε μικρές ανοικτές ευρωπαϊκές οικονομίες στη δεκαετία του '80. (Thesis). Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB); Οικονομικό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/2684

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

ΚΑΠΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ. “Σταθεροποιητικά προγράμματα, αξιόπιστα και πολιτικά κόμματα σε μικρές ανοικτές ευρωπαϊκές οικονομίες στη δεκαετία του '80.” 1993. Thesis, Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB); Οικονομικό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών. Accessed January 23, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/2684.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

ΚΑΠΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗΣ. “Σταθεροποιητικά προγράμματα, αξιόπιστα και πολιτικά κόμματα σε μικρές ανοικτές ευρωπαϊκές οικονομίες στη δεκαετία του '80.” 1993. Web. 23 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

ΚΑΠΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ �. Σταθεροποιητικά προγράμματα, αξιόπιστα και πολιτικά κόμματα σε μικρές ανοικτές ευρωπαϊκές οικονομίες στη δεκαετία του '80. [Internet] [Thesis]. Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB); Οικονομικό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών; 1993. [cited 2021 Jan 23]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/2684.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

ΚΑΠΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ �. Σταθεροποιητικά προγράμματα, αξιόπιστα και πολιτικά κόμματα σε μικρές ανοικτές ευρωπαϊκές οικονομίες στη δεκαετία του '80. [Thesis]. Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB); Οικονομικό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών; 1993. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/2684

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

2. Makantasi, Evmorfia. Trade policy & imperfect competition.

Degree: 2014, Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB); Οικονομικό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/34676

► The continuing momentum in establishing Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) has triggered my interest in investigating some important theoretical aspects of both multilateralism and regionalism. In… (more)

▼ The continuing momentum in establishing Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) has triggered my interest in investigating some important theoretical aspects of both multilateralism and regionalism. In particular, this Ph.D. thesis approaches these aspects by using models which include imperfect competition in commodity markets, product differentiation and strategic behavior on the part of the economic decision makers (taken here to be governments and firms). Features, that is, which are widespread in the world we live in.The First Chapter of this thesis, “Product Differentiation and the ‘Most Favored Nation’ Clause” aims at offering a richer insight on the reasons that lie behind the adoption of the MFN tariffs by trading countries in a world where the bulk of trade is in differentiated products. Furthermore, this chapter attempts to shed light on the discussion regarding the interpretation of the term “like products”, which appears in numerous places in GATT legislation, beginning from Article I, and has yet to be interpreted by WTO panels and the Appellate Body. The remaining three chapters of the thesis are guided by the idea that a principal may benefit from passing authority or power to an agent who is different than herself. Various examples of the delegation decision process one might find specifically in managerial, labor and public economics. The mainstream of the notion of delegation in international trade literature has been addressed in preferential agreements such as customs union. One of the distinguishing characteristics of customs unions is that member-states commit themselves in setting a common external tariff (CET) or a subsidy in their trade with non-member countries. However, by explicitly recognizing the strategic aspects of trade policies, a member-state may find to its advantage to delegate authority to set the external policy to its partner. The determination of the optimal policy maker in the union that sets this common trade policy is investigated in the remaining three chapters of my thesis.The Second Chapter of the thesis, “Harmony and Disagreement in Customs Union: the Role of Demand”, examines how the level of demand can influence the choice of the policy maker as well as the cohesion of a customs union.An interesting, probably, insight of this chapter that could partially be a policy recommendation is that in periods of recession that lead to a fall in demand the strains between the union members and, particularly, between the more and the less cost efficient ones increase. In such cases, intra-union transfers from the “rich” to the “poor” might be needed in order to secure the stability and the cohesion of the union, to the benefit of all. In the Third Chapter, “Delegation in a Tripartite Customs Union”, the analysis of the previous chapter is extended to investigate how the delegation decision is affected in a customs union composed of three, rather than two, countries that differ in terms of cost efficiency. The Fourth Chapter, “International Capital Mobility and…

Subjects/Keywords: Ατελής ανταγωνισμός; Τελωνειακές ενώσεις, Θεωρία; Διαφοροποιημένα προϊόντα; Ρήτρα του "Μάλλον Ευνοούμενου Κράτους"; Προτιμησιακές Συμφωνίες Εμπορίου; Πολυμερείς Συμφωνίες Εμπορίου; Εκχώρηση Αρμοδιοτήτων; Θεωρία παιγνίων; Imperfect competition; Customs unions; "Most Favoured Nation" Clause; Product differentiation; Delegation decision; Regionalism; Multilateralism; Game Theoretic Approach

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Makantasi, E. (2014). Trade policy & imperfect competition. (Thesis). Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB); Οικονομικό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/34676

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Makantasi, Evmorfia. “Trade policy & imperfect competition.” 2014. Thesis, Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB); Οικονομικό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών. Accessed January 23, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/34676.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Makantasi, Evmorfia. “Trade policy & imperfect competition.” 2014. Web. 23 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Makantasi E. Trade policy & imperfect competition. [Internet] [Thesis]. Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB); Οικονομικό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών; 2014. [cited 2021 Jan 23]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/34676.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Makantasi E. Trade policy & imperfect competition. [Thesis]. Athens University Economics and Business (AUEB); Οικονομικό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/34676

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Indian Institute of Science

3. Shelke, Sunil Sitaram. A Novel Game Theoretic And Voting Mechanism Based Approach For Carbon Emissions Reduction.

Degree: MSc Engg, Faculty of Engineering, 2014, Indian Institute of Science

URL: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2361

► Global warming is currently a major challenge facing the world. There are widespread ongoing efforts in the form of summits, conferences, etc., to find satisfactory… (more)

▼ Global warming is currently a major challenge facing the world. There are widespread ongoing efforts in the form of summits, conferences, etc., to find satisfactory ways of surmounting this challenge. The basic objective of all such efforts can be summarized as conception and formation of protocols to reduce the pace of global carbon levels. Game theory and mechanism design provide a natural modeling tool for capturing the strategic dynamics involved in global warming related problems. This dissertation explores for the first time the use of voting mechanisms in the context of solving the central problems, namely, allocation of emission caps and reduction quotas to strategic emitting agents (countries). The contribution of this dissertation is two-fold. The first contribution is to develop an elegant game theoretic model that accurately captures the strategic interactions among different emitting agents in a global warming setting. This model facilitates a convenient way of exploring a mechanism design approach for solving important allocation problems in the global warming context. The second contribution is to propose and explore a novel approach, based on voting mechanisms, to solve two problems: (1) allocating emission caps and (2) allocating reduction quotas to strategic agents. Our work investigates the use of voting mechanisms that satisfy four desirable properties: (1) non-dictatorship, (2) strategy-proofness, (3) efficiency, and (4) anonymity. In particular, we explore the median selection, maximum order statistic selection, and general Kth order statistic selection voting mechanisms. Our results clearly show that only trivial allocations satisfy all the above properties simultaneously. We next investigate the use of voting mechanisms for the dual problem, namely, allocation of emission reductions to emitting agents. Here, we show that non-trivial allocations are possible, however an important property, individual rationality, might be compromised. The investigations in the thesis bring out certain limitations in applying voting mechanisms that satisfy all the four properties above. Nevertheless, the insights obtained provide valuable guidelines for solving emission allocation related problems in a principled and informed way. Advisors/Committee Members: Narahari, Y (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Game Theory; Carbon Emissions; Global Warming - Game Theoretic Model; Global Warming - Voting Mechanism; Carbon Emissions - Allocation and Reduction; Game Theoretic Approach; Game Theoretic Model; Computer Science

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Shelke, S. S. (2014). A Novel Game Theoretic And Voting Mechanism Based Approach For Carbon Emissions Reduction. (Masters Thesis). Indian Institute of Science. Retrieved from http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2361

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Shelke, Sunil Sitaram. “A Novel Game Theoretic And Voting Mechanism Based Approach For Carbon Emissions Reduction.” 2014. Masters Thesis, Indian Institute of Science. Accessed January 23, 2021. http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2361.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Shelke, Sunil Sitaram. “A Novel Game Theoretic And Voting Mechanism Based Approach For Carbon Emissions Reduction.” 2014. Web. 23 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Shelke SS. A Novel Game Theoretic And Voting Mechanism Based Approach For Carbon Emissions Reduction. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Indian Institute of Science; 2014. [cited 2021 Jan 23]. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2361.

Council of Science Editors:

Shelke SS. A Novel Game Theoretic And Voting Mechanism Based Approach For Carbon Emissions Reduction. [Masters Thesis]. Indian Institute of Science; 2014. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2361

4. Kalliris, Konstantinos. Οργανωμένο έγκλημα και διαφθορά.

Degree: 2018, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών (ΕΚΠΑ)

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/44353

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The relation between organized crime and corruption is widely documented. Quite often, corruption is included in the definition of organized crime as one of the… (more)

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The relation between organized crime and corruption is widely documented. Quite often, corruption is included in the definition of organized crime as one of the most common activities of organized criminal groups. This thesis offers an interpretation of the strategic choice of criminal organizations to resort to corrupting state officials and civil servants. The game-theoretic approach adopted looks at corruption as a rational choice made by two ‘players’: criminal organizations and states. Corruption emerges as the least costly option when the power balance between the two is maintained. In the context of this theory, a description of both organized crime and corruption is attempted. Organized criminality is described as a type of unlawful activity that can be distinguished from similar collective criminal activities by reference to its tendency to establish monopolies. Understanding the nature of this criminal monopoly is crucial for an accurate description of the powerful position from which criminal organizations ‘negotiate’ with the state. Corruption is described as an instance of cooperation to the end of mutually advancing each party’s interests - that is, a phenomenon that extends beyond financial transactions and the relationship between citizens and the state. Once the crucial concepts and the proposed theory of cooperation are properly analysed, they are tested empirically by means of a hybrid historic-comparative method, which combines the methods of agreement and difference. The cases examined in the context of the former method are the Sicilian Mafia, the Japanese Jakuza and Chicago’s Outfit. Gangs are employed as a ‘control case’, since they share many characteristics with criminal organizations but lack the tendency to monopolise their area of interest. The confirmation of the theoretical findings of the thesis is followed by a critical review of the current legislation and policy recommendations.

Η σχέση ανάμεσα στο οργανωμένο έγκλημα και τη διαφθορά είναι ευρύτατα καταγεγραμμένη. Συχνά, η διαφθορά συμπεριλαμβάνεται στον ορισμό του οργανωμένου εγκλήματος ως μία από τις συνηθέστατες δραστηριότητες των εγκληματικών οργανώσεων. Αυτή η διατριβή προσφέρει μία ερμηνεία της στρατηγικής επιλογής των εγκληματικών οργανώσεων να καταφεύγουν στη διαφθορά κρατικών αξιωματούχων και δημοσίων λειτουργών. Η παιγνιοθεωρητική προσέγγιση που προκρίνεται αντιμετωπίζει τη διαφθορά ως μία ορθολογική επιλογή από τους δύο εμπλεκόμενους «παίκτες»: τις εγκληματικές οργανώσεις και τα κράτη. Η διαφθορά αναδεικνύεται ως η λιγότερο επιζήμια επιλογή όταν η σχέση ισχύος ανάμεσά τους είναι σχετικά ισορροπημένη. Στο πλαίσιο της ανάπτυξης αυτής της θεωρίας επιχειρείται η περιγραφή των δύο κρίσιμων εννοιών, ήτοι του οργανωμένου εγκλήματος και της διαφθοράς. Οι εγκληματικές οργανώσεις περιγράφονται ως ένας φαινότυπος παραβατικής δράσης που διακρίνεται από παρεμφερείς ομαδικές δραστηριότητες με βασικό κριτήριο το μονοπωλιακό χαρακτήρα της. Η κατανόηση αυτού του χαρακτήρα είναι κρίσιμη για την περιγραφή της θέσης ισχύος από την οποία το…

Subjects/Keywords: Οργανωμένο έγκλημα; Διαφθορά, Εγκληματολογικές προσεγγίσεις της; Θεωρία παιγνίων; Organised crime; Corruption; Game theoretic approach

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Kalliris, K. (2018). Οργανωμένο έγκλημα και διαφθορά. (Thesis). National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών (ΕΚΠΑ). Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/44353

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Kalliris, Konstantinos. “Οργανωμένο έγκλημα και διαφθορά.” 2018. Thesis, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών (ΕΚΠΑ). Accessed January 23, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/44353.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Kalliris, Konstantinos. “Οργανωμένο έγκλημα και διαφθορά.” 2018. Web. 23 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Kalliris K. Οργανωμένο έγκλημα και διαφθορά. [Internet] [Thesis]. National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών (ΕΚΠΑ); 2018. [cited 2021 Jan 23]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/44353.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Kalliris K. Οργανωμένο έγκλημα και διαφθορά. [Thesis]. National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών (ΕΚΠΑ); 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10442/hedi/44353

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Texas A&M University

5. Suh, Jeong Eui. Two essays on monetary policy under the Taylor rule.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2005, Texas A&M University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/2748

► In this dissertation, two questions concerning monetary policy under the Taylor rule have been addressed. The ﬁrst question is on, under the Taylor rule, whether… (more)

▼ In this dissertation, two questions concerning monetary policy under the Taylor rule have been addressed. The ﬁrst question is on, under the Taylor rule, whether a central bank should be responsible for both bank supervision and monetary policy or whether the two tasks should be exercised by separate institutions. This is the main focus of Chapter I. The second question is on whether the Taylor rule plays an important role in explaining modern business cycles in the United States. The second question has been covered by Chapter II. The implications of the ﬁrst chapter can be summarized as follows: (i) it is inevitable for the central bank to have a systematic error in conducting monetary policy when the central bank does not have a bank supervisory role; (ii) without a bank supervisory role, the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy cannot be guaranteed; (iii) because of the existence of conﬂict of interests, giving a bank supervisory role to the central bank does not guarantee the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy, either; (iv) the way of setting up another government agency, bank regulator, and making the central bank and the regulator cooperate each other does not guarantee the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy because, in this way, the systematic error in conducting monetary policy cannot be eliminated; (v) in the view of social welfare, not in the view of the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy, it is better for the central bank to keep the whole responsibility or at least a partial responsibility on bank supervision. In the second chapter, we examined the eﬀect of a technology shock and a money shock in the context of an RBC model incorporating the Taylor rule as the Fed??s monetary policy. One thing signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from other researches on this topic is the way the Taylor rule is introduced in the model. In this chapter, the Taylor rule is introduced by considering the relationship among the Fisher equation, Euler equation and the Taylor rule explicitly in the dynamic system of the relevant RBC model. With this approach, it has been shown that, even in a ﬂexible-price environment, the two major failures in RBC models with money can be resolved. Under the Taylor rule, the correlation between output and inﬂation appears to be positive and the response of our model economy to a shock is persistent. Furthermore, the possibility of an existing liquidity eﬀect is found. These results imply that the Taylor rule does play a key role in explaining business cycles in the United States. Advisors/Committee Members: Goldberg, Dror (advisor), Li, Qi (advisor), Seo, Byeongseon (committee member), Gawande, Kishore (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Monetary Policy; Bank Supervision; Game-theoretic Approach; Taylor Rule; Business Cycles; Dynamic General Equilibrium Model

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Suh, J. E. (2005). Two essays on monetary policy under the Taylor rule. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/2748

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Suh, Jeong Eui. “Two essays on monetary policy under the Taylor rule.” 2005. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed January 23, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/2748.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Suh, Jeong Eui. “Two essays on monetary policy under the Taylor rule.” 2005. Web. 23 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Suh JE. Two essays on monetary policy under the Taylor rule. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2005. [cited 2021 Jan 23]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/2748.

Council of Science Editors:

Suh JE. Two essays on monetary policy under the Taylor rule. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2005. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/2748

University of Michigan

6. Pak, Dohyun. Real option and game theoretic approach to telecommunication network optimization.

Degree: PhD, Industrial engineering, 2005, University of Michigan

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/124905

► This dissertation introduces a new method for telecommunications network optimization based on real options and game theory. The model is applied to routing optimization, capacity… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Approach; Game Theoretic; Game-theoretic; Network Optimization; Real Option; Telecommunication

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Pak, D. (2005). Real option and game theoretic approach to telecommunication network optimization. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Michigan. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/124905

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Pak, Dohyun. “Real option and game theoretic approach to telecommunication network optimization.” 2005. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan. Accessed January 23, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/124905.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Pak, Dohyun. “Real option and game theoretic approach to telecommunication network optimization.” 2005. Web. 23 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Pak D. Real option and game theoretic approach to telecommunication network optimization. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Michigan; 2005. [cited 2021 Jan 23]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/124905.

Council of Science Editors:

Pak D. Real option and game theoretic approach to telecommunication network optimization. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Michigan; 2005. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/124905

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