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You searched for subject:(Financial Market Design). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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Cornell University

1. Bhattacharya, Ayan. Essays On Financial Market Design .

Degree: 2016, Cornell University

Subjects/Keywords: Financial Market Design; Market Microstructure

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Bhattacharya, A. (2016). Essays On Financial Market Design . (Thesis). Cornell University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1813/45097

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Bhattacharya, Ayan. “Essays On Financial Market Design .” 2016. Thesis, Cornell University. Accessed November 20, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/1813/45097.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Bhattacharya, Ayan. “Essays On Financial Market Design .” 2016. Web. 20 Nov 2019.

Vancouver:

Bhattacharya A. Essays On Financial Market Design . [Internet] [Thesis]. Cornell University; 2016. [cited 2019 Nov 20]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/45097.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Bhattacharya A. Essays On Financial Market Design . [Thesis]. Cornell University; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1813/45097

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation


UCLA

2. Xu, Menghan. Essays on Industrial Organization and Finance.

Degree: Economics, 2016, UCLA

The dissertation consists of three essays on industrial organization with a particular focus on the structures of financial markets. The first chapter theoretically studies how search friction affects competition and resource allocation in crowdfunding loan markets, which are described using a many-to-one matching framework. Namely, competitive fundraisers must accumulate multiple investors to complete a transaction. I develop a dynamic matching model with a fixed sample search, a la Burdett and Judd (1983), in which fundraisers compete in interest rates while investors look for good investment targets. I highlight two important economic forces in the model. First, investors can only observe a limited number of quotes. Second, a surplus cannot be created until a fundraiser attracts contributions from enough investors. I show that in the presence of search friction, fundraisers implement mixed strategies to set interest rates in a unique stationary equilibrium, which results in rate dispersion even if the goods are homogeneous. Regarding resource allocation, I show that in the many-to-one market, rate dispersion creates an endogenous coordination mechanism among anonymous and independent investors, thereby making it easy for them to concentrate their investments. In other words, search friction improves allocation efficiency in a crowdfunding market compared with its perfect competition counterpart.Based on the theoretical framework constructed in the first chapter, the second chapter empirically studies the market structure of the crowdfunding market. I construct a novel data set based on a large panel of fundraisers' behaviors. Using reduced form analysis, I find evidence of persistent rate dispersion and funding mismatches, which are consistent with the theoretical predictions of the search model. I also show that the model is identifiable and can be estimated using a non-parametric approach, which allows me to measure the allocation efficiency. Regarding methodology, I demonstrate that it is sufficient to use projects' ranks to recover search friction primitives, which reduces the computational burden and increases the precision.The third chapter studies how the combination of adverse selection and moral hazard affects the design of financial contracts. Specifically, the chapter studies an optimal mechanism design problem,a la Mussa and Rosen (1978), in the presence of limited enforcement. In the study, the bank (principal) designs loan contracts to screen firms (agents) with unobserved productivities. Meanwhile, the bank cannot prevent the firm from consuming acquired funds without producing anything. The impediment of forming contracts creates an endogenous outside option for all borrowers. I show that in the optimal mechanism, loan sizes for higher types are decreased by ironing, i.e., by pooling on the top. In addition, the lower types produce at the second-best level. Moreover, I show that firms' participation is independent of the enforcement level.

Subjects/Keywords: Economics; Financial Market; Industrial Organization; Mechanism Design; Search Theory

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Xu, M. (2016). Essays on Industrial Organization and Finance. (Thesis). UCLA. Retrieved from http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/17w9n4r2

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Xu, Menghan. “Essays on Industrial Organization and Finance.” 2016. Thesis, UCLA. Accessed November 20, 2019. http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/17w9n4r2.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Xu, Menghan. “Essays on Industrial Organization and Finance.” 2016. Web. 20 Nov 2019.

Vancouver:

Xu M. Essays on Industrial Organization and Finance. [Internet] [Thesis]. UCLA; 2016. [cited 2019 Nov 20]. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/17w9n4r2.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Xu M. Essays on Industrial Organization and Finance. [Thesis]. UCLA; 2016. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/17w9n4r2

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation


University of Melbourne

3. NADJARAN TOOSI, ADEL. On the economics of infrastructure as a service cloud providers: pricing, markets, and profit maximization.

Degree: 2014, University of Melbourne

Cloud computing has introduced a major shift in the IT delivery model by offering computing resources for hosting applications as a utility. This helps businesses and organizations to access advanced IT facilities offered by cloud providers without the expensive up-front investments necessary to establish their own infrastructure. In this context, significant research efforts have already been made that aim to minimize costs for cloud customers; less attention however, has been given to challenges and opportunities that cloud providers face when striving for profit maximization. This thesis presents a set of novel market and economics-inspired policies, mechanisms, algorithms, and software designed to address the profit maximization problem of Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud providers. Our solutions are proposed for two main types of providers: 1) those who rely solely on their own resources to serve customers and 2) those who participate in a cloud federation and benefit from resource sharing. We explore different tools and methods such as resource provisioning mechanisms, financial option markets, revenue management systems, and mechanism design methods to achieve the goal of profit maximization. Our evaluation of the proposed solutions demonstrates that IaaS cloud providers can increase their Return on Investment (ROI) while honoring Quality of Service (QoS) requirements associated with customer applications. In summary, the key contributions of this thesis towards profit maximization for IaaS cloud providers are: 1) resource provisioning policies that assist a provider in a cloud federation in deciding whether to reject, outsource or terminate spot instances to handle incoming requests; 2) a financial option-based market mechanism designed for futures trading of resources in a federated cloud environment; 3) admission control algorithms embedded within a revenue management framework that supports a joint offering of usage-based, reservation-based and demand-oriented pricing models; 4) a multi-unit, online recurrent auction mechanism for selling spare capacity of a data center that is envy-free, truthful with high probability, and generates near optimal profit for the provider; and finally 5) an implementation of the proposed auction mechanism by identifying the Spot instance pricing as a Service (SipaaS) framework and its realization in OpenStack.

Subjects/Keywords: Cloud computing; Pricing; Market; Profit maximization; IaaS; Resource provisioning; financial options; Admission control; Auction; Online; Mechanism Design; Infrastructure-as-a-Service

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

NADJARAN TOOSI, A. (2014). On the economics of infrastructure as a service cloud providers: pricing, markets, and profit maximization. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Melbourne. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11343/45125

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

NADJARAN TOOSI, ADEL. “On the economics of infrastructure as a service cloud providers: pricing, markets, and profit maximization.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Melbourne. Accessed November 20, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/11343/45125.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

NADJARAN TOOSI, ADEL. “On the economics of infrastructure as a service cloud providers: pricing, markets, and profit maximization.” 2014. Web. 20 Nov 2019.

Vancouver:

NADJARAN TOOSI A. On the economics of infrastructure as a service cloud providers: pricing, markets, and profit maximization. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Melbourne; 2014. [cited 2019 Nov 20]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/45125.

Council of Science Editors:

NADJARAN TOOSI A. On the economics of infrastructure as a service cloud providers: pricing, markets, and profit maximization. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Melbourne; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/45125

.