▼ Esta dissertação de mestrado pretende analisar o pensamento de Foucault e Deleuze, e as suas práticas genealógicas na análise das relações de poder, dos micro-poderes e dos pontos ou froças de resistência. Através destes dois filósofos são analisados as sociedades discipinares e as sociedades de controlo e os processos de subjectivação do sujeito através das diversas práticas dos poderes e dos saberes, e das múltiplas tecnologias e estratégias de dominação. Nas modernas sociedaddes de controlo os processos de subjectivação emergem dos dispositivosdisciplinares e de controlo, e do pbiopoder. As práticas genealógicas, a crítica e a resistência têm por funçãodesenredar as linhas dos dispositivos para inventar ou criar modos deexistência e linhas de subjectivação. Analisar-se-á a possibilidade de linhas de fuga nas actuais sociedadesde controlo partindo do princcípio que tal processo de individuação terá de ter na base - sendo este o fio condutor- a genealogia, a crítica e a resitência para superar a linha de forças dos dispositivos.

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A tese procura estabelecer um ponto de apoio para o estudo da subjetividade na obra de Martin Heidegger. Para alcançar este objetivo traça seu argumento a partir das obras do período entre 1925 e 1930. Os principais textos sobre o assunto são abordados individualmente e indicam uma reapropriação da transcendência e liberdade como centro do que poderia ser o sujeito bem entendido de que Heidegger fala. A caracterização enfrenta, entre outras, a dificuldade de uma proximidade com o projeto fenomenológico de Husserl. Essa dificuldade será articulada em duas versões de um mesmo argumento continuísta. A versão francesa e a versão escandinava. A apresentação das versões e suas principais características e argumentos serão dispostos em busca de um eixo de decidibilidade encontrado na influência kantiana. Para superar a dificuldade do continuísmo o trabalho propõe uma análise da influência da interpretação kantiana no projeto fenomenológico de Heidegger em comparação com o de Husserl. As análises indicam uma incompatibilidade entre a abordagem heideggeriana da subjetividade e a fenomenologia em termos estritamente husserlianos desautorizando assim o argumento continuísta.

The thesis seeks to establish a foothold for the study of subjectivity in the work of Martin Heidegger. To achieve this goal it locates his argument in the works of the period between 1925 and 1930. The individual approach of the main texts on the subject indicates a representation of transcendence and freedom as the center of what could be the well understood subject of which Heidegger speaks. This characterization will deal with the problem of Heideggers supposed debt to Husserl s phenomenological project. This difficulty will be exposed in two versions of the same argument: the French version and the Scandinavian version. The presentation of both versions in their key features and arguments will be directed to an axis of decidability found in Kant s influence. To overcome the continuism problem, this work proposes an analysis of Heideggers interpretation of Kant as major influence on his phenomenological project in comparison with that of Husserl. The analysis indicates a mismatch between the approach of Heidegger s particular view on subjectivity and phenomenology in strictly Husserlian terms. This mismatch allows the conclusion for the continuistic arguments invalidity.

Advisors/Committee Members: Jesus Vázquez Torres.

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A meta desta dissertação foi verificar o porquê da recorrência da pintura na filosofia de Merleau-Ponty. Para tanto, analisamos os textos A dúvida de Cézanne , A linguagem indireta e as vozes do silêncio e O olho e o espírito que tratam diretamente da pintura, demonstrando a sua função em cada um deles, levando em consideração as noções de corpo e expressão. Inicialmente, analisamos a concepção de corpo que teve como objetivo resgatar o aspecto primordial do sensível, em seguida, tratamos da teoria da expressão merleau-pontiana que toma a expressão pictórica como privilegiada, por fim apresentamos a pintura relacionada com os temas da história e da visibilidade. Concluímos que Merleau-Ponty não concebe a pintura como cópia ou representação da Natureza. Na sua filosofia, ela não é mera ilustração. É o meio de demonstrar a pertinente aproximação entre a filosofia e a arte no debate acerca da experiência estética. A expressão pictórica nos dá a emergência constitutiva da visibilidade, nos revelando uma abertura ao ser que configura a ontologia selvagem pretendida por Merleau-Ponty.

Le but de cette dissertation a consisté a vérifier le pourquoi de la récurrence de la peinture dans la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty. Nous avons pour cela analysé les textes Le doute de Cézanne, Le langage indirect et Loeil et lesprit, qui traitent directement de la peinture, en démontrant sa fonction en chacun dentre eux, en prenant en considération les notions de corps et dexpression. Nous avons tout dabord analysé la conception de corps qui a eu pour objet de retrouver laspect primordial du sensible, ensuite nous avons traité de la théorie de lexpression merleau-pontienne qui privilégie lexpression picturale, enfin nous avons présenté la peinture dans son rapport avec les thèmes de lhistoire et de la visibilité. Nous en avons conclu que Merleau-Ponty ne conçoit pas la peinture comme copie ou représentation de la Nature. Dans sa philosophie elle nest pas une simple illustration. Elle est le moyen de démontrer le rapprochement pertinent entre la philosophie et lart dans le débat au sujet de lexpérience esthétique. Lexpression picturale nous présente lémergence constitutive de la visibilité, en nous révélant une ouverture à lêtre qui configure lontologie sauvage défendue par Merleau-Ponty.

Advisors/Committee Members: Iraquitan de Oliveira Caminha.

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O pensamento de Santo Agostinho é a evolução espiritual de um homem em busca da verdade de sua vida. Como poderemos observar, trata-se de uma inteligência que abre precedência para a fé e uma vontade que se abre para a ação da graça. Com isso, Agostinho travará batalhas intelectuais gigantescas com outros pensadores, a exemplo de Mani e Pelágio, bem como usará dos ideais e terminologia de outras correntes de pensamentos, como o platonismo, neoplatonismo e autores cristãos, principalmente São Paulo. Somente depois de freqüentar várias dessas correntes é que Agostinho chega ao cristianismo e tenta fundar sua própria concepção filosófica, denominada por ele mesmo de filosofia cristã. Com ela, ele busca a noção de verdade, encontrar o que por tanto tempo buscou de forma infrutífera e sem nenhum progresso. De acordo com o próprio Agostinho, foi no cristianismo e na revelação bíblica que ele se deparou com a verdade de modo incontestável, manifestada e garantida através da autoridade da Igreja e fundada sobre o Cristo, filho de Deus. A partir dessa descoberta, Agostinho fará de sua vida e sua doutrina um caminho para ajudar outras pessoas a viver de modo reto, ensinando-lhes a humildade, a continência, a caridade e o amor mútuo. Em suma, trata-se de um exemplo capaz de remeter as almas a si mesmas e de conduzi-las em direção a Deus.

Saint Augustines thought traces the path of his spiritual evolution; a man in search for the truth of his own life. As we shall see, it concerns an intelligence open to his faith and a will open to Grace. In this, Augustine will struggle against other thinkers like Mani and Pelagius, using the language and the ideals of other traditions, like Platonism, neo-platonism and Christian authors, like Saint Paul. Only after dealing with these different currents of thought, he becomes Christian and tries to base his own philosophical work, termed by himself as Christian philosophy. There, he searches for the notion of truth, which he had tried to find for so long in many unfruitful ways. In his own perception, it was in Christianity and the biblical revelation that he has found the truth in an uncontested way, manifested and granted through the authority of the Church and founded in Christ, the Son of God. Experiencing this discovery, Augustine will make of his life and teachings a path to help other people to live the right life, teaching them humility, continence, and love to one another. In Augustine we find a model capable of return the souls to themselves and to lead them to God.

Advisors/Committee Members: Marcos Roberto Nunes Costa.

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In contemporary debates, the concept of Europe is most often discussed and defined in terms of a geographical, cultural, political, or even as an economic entity. This dissertation aims at reinstituting the philosophical relevance of this concept by articulating a novel understanding of one of its guiding intellectual motives: the idea of universalism. Against the typically modern understanding of this idea - most evident in the violent and unilateral history of European expansionism - this work provides a new formulation of this idea as a necessarily pluralistic and self-critical category of historical and intercultural reflection. This work has its methodological and conceptual background in the philosophical work of Edmund Husserl (1859 - 1938). Late in his career, Husserl - the founder of modern phenomenology - composed a series of essays and lectures discussing the topic of Europe, its philosophical idea and teleological history. These texts, which had their imminent background in the devastating experience of the First World War (1914 - 1918) and the consequent political turmoil of the Weimar Republic, took their point of departure from the overall cultural crisis of European humanity, which seemed to lose its confidence in the founding ideas of modernity, most importantly, in the ideas of universal reason and progress that structure the domains of scientific and political activity. The argument of this work is based on an interpretation according to which Husserl s late reflections on Europe should not be treated as mere analyses of contemporary criticism, but as serious phenomenological reflections on the particular topics of generativity and historicity, that is, those forms of meaning-creation that take place in interpersonal, intergenerational and geo-historical processes of co-operation. Through his reflections on Europe, it is argued, Husserl reformulated his phenomenological project in order to account for its intersubjective, historical and normative dimensions. In the light of the phenomenological analysis, the idea of Europe appears as a specific task of renewal and critique. This task, which has its origin in the birth of Greek philosophy, is corresponded by specific forms of intersubjectivity and historicity. As a result, the dissertation provides a new constructive interpretation on some of the key concepts of modern philosophy of history. Against the postmodern critique on the impossibility of the teleological view of history - the end of grand narratives - the work defends the ideas of crisis, teleology and universal history as inalienable tools of philosophical reflection and critique.

Eurooppa on ymmärretty perinteisesti maantieteelliseksi tai kulttuuriseksi käsitteeksi, vaikka nykyisin siitä puhutaan myös poliittisena ja taloudellisena yksikkönä. Kysymys Euroopan merkityksestä on kuitenkin moniselitteinen ja sillä on myös filosofinen ulottuvuus. Eurooppa on toiminut alustana useille ideoille, arvoille ja käytännöille - esimerkiksi roomalaiselle oikeudelle, kristinuskolle ja…

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After Gödel's incompleteness theorems and the collapse of Hilbert's programme Gerhard Gentzen continued the quest for consistency proofs of Peano arithmetic. He considered a finitistic or constructive proof still possible and necessary for the foundations of mathematics. For a proof to be meaningful, the principles relied on should be considered more reliable than the doubtful elements of the theory concerned. He worked out a total of four proofs between 1934 and 1939. This thesis examines the consistency proofs for arithmetic by Gentzen from different angles. The consistency of Heyting arithmetic is shown both in a sequent calculus notation and in natural deduction. The former proof includes a cut elimination theorem for the calculus and a syntactical study of the purely arithmetical part of the system. The latter consistency proof in standard natural deduction has been an open problem since the publication of Gentzen's proofs. The solution to this problem for an intuitionistic calculus is based on a normalization proof by Howard. The proof is performed in the manner of Gentzen, by giving a reduction procedure for derivations of falsity. In contrast to Gentzen's proof, the procedure contains a vector assignment. The reduction reduces the first component of the vector and this component can be interpreted as an ordinal less than epsilon_0, thus ordering the derivations by complexity and proving termination of the process.

De begränsningar av formella system som uppdagades av Gödels ofullständighetsteorem år 1931 innebär att Peanoaritmetikens konsistens endast kan bevisas med hjälp av fundamentala principer som inte kan formaliseras inom systemet. Trots att Hilberts finitistiska metoder inte kunde producera ett konsistensbevis, så fortsatte sökandet efter ett bevis med konstruktiva metoder. För att ett bevis skall vara meningsfullt borde principerna som används vara mera pålitliga än de element som betvivlas inom teorin. Avhandlingens titel hänvisar till ett citat av Gentzen då han motiverar behovet av konsistensbevis för första ordningens aritmetik. Gentzen själv producerade fyra konsistensbevis och analyserade hur väl dessa stämde överens med Hilberts program. Gentzen använde konstruktiva metoder i sina bevis, men det debatteras huruvida dessa metoder kan anses vara finitistiska. Det tredje och mest kända beviset presenterar en reduktion av härledningar av kontradiktioner. Med hjälp av transfinit induktion visas att reduktionsprocessen terminerar i en enkel härledning som konstateras vara omöjlig. Därför kan det inte finnas någon härledning av en kontradiktion. Avhandlingen undersöker och jämför Gentzens bevis från olika aspekter. Konsistensen av intuitionistisk Heytingaritmetik bevisas både i sekvenskalkyl och i naturlig deduktion. Det tidigare beviset är i Gentzens anda och innehåller ett snittelimineringsbevis för kalkylen och en syntaktisk studie av den aritmetiska delen av systemet. Det senare beviset påminner om ett normaliseringsbevis och visar terminering med hjälp av en…

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The doctoral dissertation Collective Responsibility: Against Collectivism offers an indirect defence of the individualist position in the debate concerning collective moral responsibility. As such it swims against the general tide as it were. However, the individualism defended in the dissertation is of a rather weak kind, allowing a range of collective entities. The main claim of the thesis is that only human agents qualify as moral agents, and thus moral responsibility, either individual or collective, is to be ascribed to individual agents either individually or collectively. The thesis consists of four articles. A major part of my thesis consists of critical evaluations of some available versions of the collectivist position with respect to collective moral responsibility, the position according to which collectives in their own right are, at least in some cases, capable of bearing moral responsibility independently of the individual members of the collective. My approach in the articles is to argue that collectives in their own right are not capable of bearing moral responsibility and thus the collectivist rendering of collective moral responsibility is not a viable option. I argue herein that collectives, even if acceptable as agents, cannot satisfy conditions of moral responsibility in the way that would make it fair to hold collective agents morally responsible in their own right.

Tutkielmassa puolustetataan individualistista kantaa kollektiivista vastuuta koskevassa keskustelussa. Sellaisena se kulkee valtavirtaa vastaan. Tutkielmassa puolustettu individualismi on kuitenkin melko maltillista sikäli, että se on yhteensopivaa useiden erilaisten kollektiivisten entiteettien hyväksymisen kanssa. Tutkielman keskeinen väite on, että vain ihmisagentit ovat moraalisia agentteja ja siten moraalinen vastuu, yksilöllinen tai kollektiivinen, tulee attribuoida yksilöille joko yksin tai yhdessä. Tutkielma koostuu neljästä artikkelista. Tutkielmassa arvioidaan kriittisesti kollektivistista kantaa edustavia kollektiivisen moraalisen vastuun näkemyksiä. Kollektivistisen kannan mukaan jotkut kollektiivit ovat kykeneviä kantamaan vastuuta itsenäisinä toimijoina riippumatta niiden yksilöjäsenistä. Tutkielmassa argumentoidaan, että kollektiivit eivät ole kykeneviä kantamaan moraalista vastuuta ja siten kollektivistinen näkemys kollektiivisesta moraalisesta vastuusta ei ole kestävä. Tutkielman argumentin mukaan vaikka hyväksyisimmekin jotkut kollektiivit agenteiksi eli toimijoiksi, ne eivät kuitenkaan täyttäisi moraalisen vastuun kantamisen ehtoja ja siten niiden pitäminen itsenäisesti moraalisesti vastuullisina ei olisi reilua niitä kohtaan.

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The articles comprising this dissertation concern classification and concept formation in the social and behavioral sciences. In particular, the emphasis in the study is on the philosophical analysis of interdisciplinary settings created by the recent intellectual developments on the interfaces between the social sciences, psychology, and neuroscience. The need for a systematic examination of the problems of conceptual coordination and integration across disciplinary boundaries is illustrated by focusing on phenomena whose satisfactory explanation requires drawing together the theoretical resources from a variety of disciplines. In philosophy, questions regarding the nature of scientific concepts have often been framed in terms of theories of natural kinds. For this reason, analysis of the notion of natural kind as well as examination of how theories of natural kinds should be connected to recent philosophical accounts of scientific explanation and mechanisms form the core of the study. Building on contemporary discussions on these topics in the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of cognitive science, and the philosophy of the social sciences, the articles develop a mechanistic theory of natural kinds in the social and behavioral sciences, and scrutinize its applicability and usefulness as a theory of conceptual change in interdisciplinary settings. The study suggests that, although the mechanistic theory cannot account for the functioning of the whole range of scientific concepts, interweaving biological, cognitive, and social mechanisms in the manner suggested by the mechanistic theory offers a naturalistic and non-reductionist basis for conceptualizing epistemic coordination across disciplinary boundaries.

Kuudesta artikkelista ja johdantoesseestä koostuva väitöskirja on tieteenfilosofinen tutkimus käsitteenmuodostuksesta ihmistieteissä. Tutkimusta motivoi kognitio- ja neurotieteiden sekä genetiikan kasvava rooli inhimillisen käyttäytymisen selittämisessä, mikä on luonut tarpeen ajatella uudelleen eri ihmistieteiden välistä työnjakoa ja myös niiden suhdetta luonnontieteisiin. Väitöskirjan yleisenä päämääränä onkin luoda filosofisia välineitä moni- ja poikkitieteellisissä konteksteissa tapahtuvan käsitteenmuodostuksen ja tutkimusalojen välisen tiedollisen yhteistyön jäsentämiseen. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan ilmiöitä ja käsitteitä, jotka sijoittuvat toisaalta kognitiotieteiden ja yhteiskuntatieteiden välimaastoon, ja toisaalta tieteellisen tutkimuksen ja yhteiskunnallisen todellisuuden kohtaamispinnalle. Useiden psykiatristen sairauksien, kognitiivisen kykyjen, ja sosiaalisten ilmiöiden kattava ymmärtäminen edellyttää monista eri perspektiiveistä peräisin olevien käsitteellistysten suhteiden selvittämistä ja niiden yhteensovittamista. Väitöskirja-artikkeleissa tarkastelun kohteeksi valitut ilmiöt (mm. syömishäiriöt, autismikirjon häiriöt, (sosiaalinen) muisti, itsensä toteuttavat ennusteet) toimivat tapausesimerkkeinä, joiden valossa tässä tutkimuksessa esitettyä tieteellisten käsitteiden teoriaa…

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My doctoral dissertation explores gender and sexuality in Ancient Stoic philosophy. It investigates the different areas of Stoicism, cosmology, metaphysics, ethics, philosophical therapy, and social philosophy, from a novel viewpoint of gender. It is the first extensive systematic study of the topic in Stoicism. I also scrutinize questions that have been rather marginal in scholarship, such as beautification, embryology, and female exemplifications. I place the Stoic views into a wider philosophical and historical context, and discuss Stoicism against the backdrop of and in comparison to Plato s and Aristotle s philosophies, as well as the medical approach of the Hellenistic medical doctor Galen. This methodology is important for my argument in enabling me to make sense in a new way of the scattered remarks on gender and sexuality in early Stoic sources and to highlight the originality of the Stoic position in rejecting their predecessors views. My study divides into three parts: Body, Character, and Community. In part I, I argue that in Stoic metaphysics, men and women are to be understood as equally rational and equally capable of becoming sages and achieving happiness. In addition, I explore the status of gender in the Stoic category, a topic that has not been previously studied, and claim that to have gender should be understood in the Stoic category of koinos poion, common qualities, whereas to be of a specific gender is an individual quality, idios poion. The reproductive capacity is understood as a function of the rational soul. In part II, I argue that Musonius Rufus suggestion that girls and boys should both be educated equally follows naturally from Stoic premises even though other sources do not explicitly say so. I show that the Stoics discussed gendered characteristics both as inborn and culturally acquired and as ethically neutral. The Stoic philosophical therapy would also change certain cultural gendered features such as the traditional view of masculinity. In part III, I show that the Stoic cosmopolitanism provides further arguments in favor of gender equality even though the Stoics did not promote real-life political programs aiming at changing existing inequalities. Yet I stress their view of close human relations and family as the primary places where virtue is learned and practiced.

Väitöskirjani tarkastelee sukupuolen ja seksuaalisuuden merkitystä antiikin stoalaisessa filosofiassa. Stoalaisuus oli vaikutusvaltainen filosofinen koulukunta hellenistisellä ja roomalaisella kaudella, koulukunnan perustajasta Zenon Kitionlaisesta (n. 333 261 eaa.) Rooman keisari Markus Aureliukseen (121 180 jaa.). Tutkielmani on ensimmäinen systemaattinen tutkimus sukupuolesta stoalaisuudessa ja kattaa stoalaisen filosofian eri osa-alueet kosmologiasta kosmopolitanismiin, kasvatusnäkemyksistä käsityksiin kauneudesta ja onnellisuudesta. Osoitan, että kaikilla osa-alueille stoalaiset käsittivät sukupuolen ihmisen tärkeimpien ominaisuuksien ja päämäärien kannalta merkityksettömäksi ominaisuudeksi. Osoitan…

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The notion of causal explanation is an essential element of the naturalistic world view. This view is typically interpreted to claim that we are only licensed to postulate entities that make a causal difference , or have causal power . The rest are epiphenomena and hence eliminable from the correct view of reality. The worry that some entities and phenomena that we take for granted mental properties in particular turn out to be epiphenomenal, can be seen as stemming from this sort of naturalistic attitude. This thesis reviews the issue of causal explanation within the context of the naturalistic philosophy of mind. It is argued that there is no single monolithic, unanimously accepted notion of causation that the naturalist should be committed to. Views vary on what this notion amounts to exactly, and fields of science vary with respect to their causal commitments. However, the naturalist can still presume that a scientifically informed philosophical account of causation exists, an account that is fundamentally philosophical, but also sensitive to actual scientific practice and its view of reality. The central issue of the current naturalistic philosophy of mind is the so-called problem of causal exclusion. According to this, the assumption that mental states could have genuine and autonomous effects on the physical world is inconsistent with physical commitments, namely the idea that mental states are necessarily neurally based and the idea that the physical world is causally complete. The causal exclusion argument claims that mental causes must be reduced to physical causes, as there remains no role for independent mental causes. The thesis reviews some central responses to the causal exclusion argument. It is shown that within the context of the interventionist notion of causation, inter-level causation can be ruled out. The causal exclusion argument would thus find support, contrary to what the proponents of the interventionist view typically claim. However, the result is also shown to have the corollary that purely higher-level, mental-to-mental causation is possible. The thesis suggests that this offers a consistent view of mental causation for a naturalist to hold.

Kausaalinen selittäminen on oleellista kokeellisille tieteille nojaavalle naturalistiselle maailmankuvalle. Tälle näkemykselle voidaan pitää luonteenomaisena, että oletetaan vain sellaisia olioita ja tapahtumia, joilla on kausaalista voimaa . Kaikki muu on epifenomenaalista vailla fyysistä vaikuttavuutta ja täten eliminoitavissa tieteellisesti perustellusta todellisuuskäsityksestä. Huolen siitä, että jotkut meille tutut oliot tai tapahtumat kuten mentaaliset ilmiöt jäävät epifenomeeneiksi, voidaan nähdä juontuvan tällaisesta naturalistisesta asenteesta. Tämä väitöskirja on tutkimus kausaalisen selittämisen kysymyksestä naturalistisen mielenfilosofian kontekstissa. Tutkimuksessa esitetään, että ei ole olemassa yhtä monoliittista, yleisesti hyväksyttyä kausaalikäsitystä, johon naturalistin tulisi sitoutua. Yhtäältä filosofiset…

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In this study the author discusses the historical and philosophical connections between David Hume (1711-1776) and Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Kierkegaard mainly encountered Humean ideas through the writings of Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788) and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819). Hamann's and Jacobi's interpretations of Hume were at least among the influences when Kierkegaard developed his idea of paradoxical Christianity and his criticism of "Speculation". Because Hume's discussion of miracles is a classic in the philosophy of religion and Kierkegaard is known for his idea of the absolute paradox as the object of faith and because of Kierkegaard's knowledge of the conclusion of Hume's "Of Miracles", I have found it worthwhile to compare these two terms. The idea of a miracle expressed explicitly in terms of violation of the laws or order of nature is not important to Kierkegaard. I claim that the unavoidable doubtfulness of all historical knowledge and the non-immediate meaning of personal experience are the most important philosophical reasons for Kierkegaard's tangential interest in the concept of a miracle as a philosophical problem. The author argues that Kierkegaard's notion of ordinary belief as the opposite of doubt is at least partly analogous to Hume's notion of belief as a lively conception. Kierkegaard's belief is a terminator of doubt. Hume's custom-based belief acts in the same role when it disregards the uncertainty inherent in the conclusions drawn from our immediate experience. The author further argues that just like the ancient fiction of substance for Hume, the notions of pure being and an absolute beginning in a logical system for Climacus refer to fictional conceptual structures. Kierkegaard argues that there can be no system of life and Hume argues that the philosophical system solving the important problem of perception yields a fictitious solution. Humean notions of true and false philosophy are discussed in this connection. The thesis concludes with the suggestion that there is an affinity between the revocation of the Postscript and the conclusion of the first book of the Treatise. Finally, the author concludes that Kierkegaard was perhaps even profoundly inspired by the ideas present in Hume s thought. He, unlike Hume, embraced the idea of nearly miraculous personal transformation and believing in the most improbable thing. However, they shared the idea that at some basic level we are all nevertheless natural believers. They also understood the lure of abstract thought and saw the dangers of thinking in a sense too highly of philosophical enterprise itself, and agreed on the idea that it is not in fact that tautological or redundant to say that philosophers, too, are human beings.

Väitöskirjatutkimuksessa analysoidaan Humen ja Kierkegaardin näkemyksiä koskien ihmeen käsitettä, uskomuksen käsitettä ja heidän tietynlaisen filosofian kritiikkejään. Näkökulma on ennen kaikkea filosofinen, vaikka teenkin huomioita Humen ajattelun osittaisen tuntemuksen tosiasiallisesta…

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This work investigates the role of narrative literature in late-20th century and contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy. It aims to show the trend of reading narrative literature for purposes of moral philosophy from the 1970 s and early 80 s to the present day as a part of a larger movement in Anglo-American moral philosophy, and to present a view of its significance for moral philosophy overall. Chapter 1 provides some preliminaries concerning the view of narrative literature which my discussion builds on. In chapter 2 I give an outline of how narrative literature is considered in contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy, and connect this use to the broad trend of neo-Aristotelian ethics in this context. In chapter 3 I connect the use of literature to the idea of the non-generalizability of moral perception and judgment, which is central to the neo-Aristotelian trend, as well as to a range of moral particularisms and anti-theoretical positions of late 20th century and contemporary ethics. The joint task of chapters 2 and 3 is to situate the trend of reading narrative literature for the purposes of moral philosophy in the present context of moral philosophy. In the following two chapters, 4 and 5, I move on from the particularizing power of narrative literature, which is emphasized by neo-Aristotelians and particularists alike, to a broader under-standing of the intellectual potential of narrative literature. In chapter 4 I argue that narrative literature has its own forms of generalization which are enriching for our understanding of the workings of ethical generalizations in philosophy. In chapter 5 I discuss Iris Murdoch s and Martha Nussbaum s respective ways of combining ethical generality and particularity in a philosophical framework where both systematic moral theory and narrative literature are taken seriously. In chapter 6 I analyse the controversy between contemporary anti-theoretical conceptions of ethics and Nussbaum s refutation of these. I present my suggestion for how the significance of the ethics/literature discussion for moral philosophy can be understood if one wants to overcome the limitations of both Nussbaum s theory-centred, equilibrium-seeking perspective, and the anti-theorists repudiation of theory. I call my position the inclusive approach .

Denna avhandling är en undersökning av den berättande litteraturens roll i angloamerikansk moralfilosofi från sent 1900-tal till idag. Den syftar till att belysa det nyfunna intresset för att läsa skönlitteratur för moralfilosofiska syften från sent 70-tal till idag som en del av en större rörelse inom den angloamerikanska moralfilosofin, samt att presentera en syn på litteraturens betydelse för moralfilosofin överlag. Kapitel 1 utgör en inledning till den syn på berättande litteratur som min efterföljande diskussion bygger på. I kapitel 2 ger jag en översikt av hur berättande litteratur används inom den angloamerikanska moralfilosofin, och kopplar detta bruk till den samtida nyaristoteliska etiken. I kapitel 3 länkar…

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This work offers a systematic phenomenological investigation of the constitutive significance of embodiment. It provides detailed analyses of subjectivity in relation to itself, to others, and to objective reality, and it argues that these basic structures cannot be made intelligible unless one takes into account how they are correlated with an embodied subject. The methodological and conceptual starting point of the treatise is the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. The investigation employs the phenomenological method and uses the descriptions and analyses provided by Husserl and his successors. The treatise is motivated and outlined systematically, and textual exegesis serves as a means for the systematic phenomenological investigation. The structure of the work conforms to the basic relations of subjectivity. The first part of the thesis explores the intimate relation between lived-body and selfhood, analyzes the phenomena of localization, and argues that self-awareness is necessarily and fundamentally embodied self-awareness. The second part examines the intersubjective dimensions of embodiment, investigates the corporal foundations of empathy, and unravels the bodily aspects of transcendental intersubjectivity. The third part scrutinizes the role of embodiment in the constitution of the surrounding objective reality: it focuses on the complex relationship between transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity, carefully examines the normative aspects of genetic and generative self-constitution, and argues eventually that what Husserl calls the paradox of subjectivity originates in a tension between primordial and intersubjective normativity. The work thus reinterprets the paradox of subjectivity in terms of a normative tension, and claims that the paradox is ultimately rooted in the structures of embodiment. In this manner, as a whole, the work discloses the constitutive significance of embodiment, and argues that transcendental subjectivity must be fundamentally embodied.

Väitöskirjani tarjoaa systemaattisen fenomenologisen tutkimuksen ruumiillisuuden merkityksestä subjektiviteetin konstituutiossa. Teos analysoi subjektiviteettia suhteessa itseensä, suhteessa toisiin tietoisiin olentoihin, ja suhteessa ympäröivään todellisuuteen, ja argumentoi, että näiden kokemuksen perusrakenteiden ymmärtäminen edellyttää kokevan subjektiviteetin ruumiillisuuden tutkimista. Teoksen metodologinen ja käsitteellinen lähtökohta on Edmund Husserlin filosofiassa. Tutkimus käyttää fenomenologista menetelmää sekä hyödyntää Husserlin ja hänen seuraajiensa kuvauksia ja analyyseja. Tutkimus on motivoitu ja rajattu systemaattisesti, ja tekstuaalinen eksegeesi palvelee systemaattista fenomenologista tutkimusta. Työn kolmiosainen rakenne mukailee subjektiviteetin yllämainittuja perussuhteita. Ensimmäinen osa keskittyy itsetietoisuuteen: se analysoi aistimellisuutta, kokemusten paikantumista, eletyn ruumiin konstituutiota, ja argumentoi, että itseyden kokemuksella on aina välttämättä ruumiillinen ulottuvuus.…

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The Uppsala school of Axel Hägerström can be said to have been the last genuinely Swedish philosophical movement. On the other hand, the Swedish analytic tradition is often said to have its roots in Hägerström s thought. This work examines the transformation from Uppsala philosophy to analytic philosophy from an actor-based historical perspective. The aim is to describe how a group of younger scholars (Ingemar Hedenius, Konrad Marc-Wogau, Anders Wedberg, Alf Ross, Herbert Tingsten, Gunnar Myrdal) colonised the legacy of Hägerström and Uppsala philosophy, and faced the challenges they met in trying to reconcile this legacy with the changing philosophical and political currents of the 1930s and 40s. Following Quentin Skinner, the texts are analysed as moves or speech acts in a particular historical context. The thesis consists of five previously published case studies and an introduction. The first study describes how the image of Hägerström as the father of the Swedish analytic tradition was created by a particular faction of younger Uppsala philosophers who (re-) presented the Hägerströmian philosophy as a parallel movement to logical empiricism. The second study examines the confrontations between Uppsala philosophy and logical empiricism in both the editorial board and in the pages of Sweden s leading philosophical journal Theoria. The third study focuses on how the younger generation redescribed Hägerströmian legal philosophical ideas (Scandinavian Legal Realism), while the fourth study discusses how they responded to the accusations of a connection between Hägerström s value nihilistic theory and totalitarianism. Finally, the fifth study examines how the Swedish social scientist and Social Democratic intellectual Gunnar Myrdal tried to reconcile value nihilism with a strong political programme for social reform. The contribution of this thesis to the field consists mainly in a re-evaluation of the role of Uppsala philosophy in the history of Swedish philosophy. From this perspective the Uppsala School was less a collection of certain definite philosophical ideas than an intellectual legacy that was the subject of fierce struggles. Its theories and ideas were redescribed in various ways by individual actors with different philosophical and political intentions.

Uppsalafilosofin, som var den dominerande filosofiska riktningen i Sverige under mellankrigstiden, tillskrivs som regel en mycket stor roll i den svenska filosofins historia. Å ena sidan kan den sägas vara den sista originellt svenska filosofiska riktningen, men samtidigt brukar man också påstå att den moderna analytiska traditionen i Sverige har sitt ursprung i denna filosofi. Det är heller inte sällan som man hör att uppsalafilosofin, och speciellt Axel Hägerströms så kallade värdenihilistiska teori, har haft ett mycket stort inflytande på det moderna svenska samhället, antingen som en kall och kärlekslös filosofi, eller som ett slags teoretiskt fundament till folkhemmet eller den svenska välfärdsstaten. I denna avhandling undersöks hur…

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This study is an inquiry into three related topics in Aristotle’s psychology: the perception of seeing, the perception of past perception, and the perception of sleeping. Over the past decades, Aristotle’s account of the perception of perception has been studied in numerous articles and chapters of books. However, there is no monograph that attempts to give a comprehensive analysis of this account and to assess its relation and significance to Aristotle’s psychological theory in general as well as to other theories pertaining to the topics (e.g. theories of consciousness), be they ancient, medieval, modern, or contemporary. This study intends to fill this gap and to further the research into Aristotle’s philosophy and into the philosophy of mind. The present study is based on an accurate analysis of the sources, on their Platonic background, and on later interpretations within the commentary tradition up to the present. From a methodological point of view, this study represents systematically orientated research into the history of philosophy, in which special attention is paid to the philosophical problems inherent in the sources, to the distinctions drawn, and to the arguments put forward as well as to their philosophical assessment. In addition to contributing many new findings concerning the topics under discussion, this study shows that Aristotle’s account of the perception of perception substantially differs from many later theories of consciousness. This study also suggests that Aristotle be regarded as a consistent direct realist, not only in respect of sense perception, but also in respect of memory.

Tutkimukseni käsittelee kolmea Aristoteleen psykologiassa esiin nousevaa aihetta: näkemisen havaitsemista, menneiden aistihavaintojen havaitsemista sekä nukkumisen havaitsemista. Näiden havaintojen suhteita ei ole aiemmassa tutkimuksessa systemaattisesti selvitetty. Tässä työssä esitetään, että havainnot näkemisestä, menneistä aistihavainnoista ja nukkumisesta ovat kaikki erilaisia havaintoja, joita kuitenkin yhdistää se, että ne ovat havaintoja havaitsijan itsensä suhteesta havainnon objekteihin: väreihin, aiemmin havaittuihin objekteihin tai unissa ilmeneviin asioihin. Työni on ensimmäinen aihetta käsittelevä monografiatutkimus, joka perustuu tarkkaan analyysiin alkuteksteistä, niiden taustasta Platonin filosofiassa ja myöhemmistä tulkinnoista kommentaaritraditiossa aina viimeisimpiä tutkimuksia myöten. Metodiselta kannalta työ on filosofista perustutkimusta, jossa huomio kiinnitetään teksteissä esiintyviin ongelmiin, käsitteellisiin erotteluihin ja argumentteihin, joita analysoidaan ja arvioidaan kriittisesti. Työn päälähteinä ovat Aristoteleen teokset Sielusta, Muistista ja mieleen palauttamisesta, Nukkumisesta ja valveillaolosta sekä Unista, jotka asetetaan yksityiskohtaisen tekstianalyysin kohteeksi. Analysoitavat tekstit liitetään tulkinnallisesti mielekkäisiin yhteyksiinsä ja tulkinnassa hyödynnetään Aristoteleen omia tai myöhempiä käsitteellisiä apuvälineitä. Työni uusia tutkimustuloksia…

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In the last thirty years, primarily feminist scholars have drawn attention to and re-evaluated the philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir (1908 1986). Her philosophical practice has been described as non-systematic, and her literary writing has been viewed as part of her non-systematic mode of philosophising. This dissertation radically deepens the question concerning Beauvoir s philosophical motivations for turning to literature as a mode to express subjectivity. It explicates the central concepts of Beauvoir s philosophy of existence, which are subjectivity, ambiguity, paradox and temporality, and their background in the modern traditions of existential philosophy and phenomenology. It also clarifies Beauvoir s main reason to turn to literature in order to express subjectivity as both singular and universal: as a specific mode of communication, literature is able to make the universality of existence manifest in the concrete, singular and temporal texture of life. In addition, the thesis gives examples of how Beauvoir s literary works contribute to an understanding of the complexity of subjectivity. I use the expression poetics of subjectivity to refer to the systematic relation between Beauvoir s existential and phenomenological notion of subjectivity and her literary works, and to her articulations of a creative mode of using language, especially in the novel. The thesis is divided into five chapters, of which the first three investigate Beauvoir s philosophy of existence at the intersection of the modern traditions of thought that began with René Descartes and Søren Kierkegaard s intuitions about subjectivity. Chapter 1 interprets Beauvoir s notion of ambiguity, as compared to paradox, and argues that both determine her notion of existence. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the phenomenological side of Beauvoir s philosophy through a study of her response to early French interpretations of transcendental subjectivity, especially in the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. My analysis shows that Edmund Husserl s distinction between different levels of subjective experience is central to Beauvoir s understanding of subjectivity and to the different ego concepts she uses. Chapter 4 is a study of Beauvoir s reflections on the expression of subjective thought, and, more specifically, her philosophical conceptions of the metaphysical novel and the autobiography as two modes of indirect communication. Chapter 5, finally, compares two modes of investigating concrete subjectivity; Beauvoir s conceptual study of femininity in Le deuxième sexe and her literary expression of subjectivity in the novel L Invitée. My analysis reveals and explicates Beauvoir s original contribution to a comprehensive understanding of the becoming and paradox of human existence: the fundamental insight that these phenomena are sexed, historically as well as imaginatively.

Under de senaste trettio åren har framförallt feministiska filosofer visat ett förnyat intresse för Simone de Beauvoirs (1908-1986) tänkande. Hennes filosofiska…

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The object of this work is Hegel's Logic, which comprises the first third of his philosophical System that also includes the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. The work is divided into two parts, where the first part investigates Hegel s Logic in itself or without an explicit reference to rest of Hegel's System. It is argued in the first part that Hegel's Logic contains a methodology for constructing examples of basic ontological categories. The starting point on which this construction is based is a structure Hegel calls Nothing, which I argue to be identical with an empty situation, that is, a situation with no objects in it. Examples of further categories are constructed, firstly, by making previous structures objects of new situations. This rule makes it possible for Hegel to introduce examples of ontological structures that contain objects as constituents. Secondly, Hegel takes also the very constructions he uses as constituents of further structures: thus, he is able to exemplify ontological categories involving causal relations. The final result of Hegel's Logic should then be a model of Hegel s Logic itself, or at least of its basic methods. The second part of the work focuses on the relation of Hegel's Logic to the other parts of Hegel's System. My interpretation tries to avoid, firstly, the extreme of taking Hegel's System as a grand metaphysical attempt to deduce what exists through abstract thinking, and secondly, the extreme of seeing Hegel's System as mere diluted Kantianism or a second-order investigation of theories concerning objects instead of actual objects. I suggest a third manner of reading Hegel's System, based on extending the constructivism of Hegel's Logic to the whole of his philosophical System. According to this interpretation, transitions between parts of Hegel's System should not be understood as proofs of any sort, but as constructions of one structure or its model from another structure. Hence, these transitions involve at least, and especially within the Philosophy of Nature, modelling of one type of object or phenomenon through characteristics of an object or phenomenon of another type, and in the best case, and especially within the Philosophy of Spirit, transformations of an object or phenomenon of one type into an object or phenomenon of another type. Thus, the transitions and descriptions within Hegel's System concern actual objects and not mere theories, but they still involve no fallacious deductions.

Väitöskirjani tutkii Hegelin logiikkaa, joka on ensimmäinen osa hänen filosofista järjestelmäänsä, johon kuuluvat myös luonnon- ja hengenfilosofia. Väitöskirjani ensimmäisessä osassa tutkin logiikkaa ottamatta huomioon sen suhteita Hegelin filosofian muihin osa-alueisiin. Pyrin osoittamaan, että Hegelin logiikka pyrkii antamaan ohjeet, joiden avulla on mahdollista konstruoida malleja perustavista ontologisista kategorioista. Lähtökohtana on Hegelin Ei-miksikään kutsuma rakenne, jonka esitän tarkoittavan mahdollista tilannetta, ettei mitään ole olemassa. Hegel…

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This monograph describes the emergence of independent research on logic in Finland. The emphasis is placed on three well-known students of Eino Kaila: Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003), Erik Stenius (1911-1990), and Oiva Ketonen (1913-2000), and their research between the early 1930s and the early 1950s. The early academic work of these scholars laid the foundations for today's strong tradition in logic in Finland and also became internationally recognized. However, due attention has not been given to these works later, nor have they been comprehensively presented together. Each chapter of the book focuses on the life and work of one of Kaila's aforementioned students, with a fourth chapter discussing works on logic by authors who would later become known within other disciplines. Through an extensive use of correspondence and other archived material, some insight has been gained into the persons behind the academic personae. Unique and unpublished biographical material has been available for this task. The chapter on Oiva Ketonen focuses primarily on his work on what is today known as proof theory, especially on his proof theoretical system with invertible rules that permits a terminating root-first proof search. The independency of the parallel postulate is proved as an example of the strength of root-first proof search. Ketonen was to our knowledge Gerhard Gentzen's (the 'father' of proof theory) only student. Correspondence and a hitherto unavailable autobiographic manuscript, in addition to an unpublished article on the relationship between logic and epistemology, is presented. The chapter on Erik Stenius discusses his work on paradoxes and set theory, more specifically on how a rigid theory of definitions is employed to avoid these paradoxes. A presentation by Paul Bernays on Stenius' attempt at a proof of the consistency of arithmetic is reconstructed based on Bernays' lecture notes. Stenius correspondence with Paul Bernays, Evert Beth, and Georg Kreisel is discussed. The chapter on Georg Henrik von Wright presents his early work on probability and epistemology, along with his later work on modal logic that made him internationally famous. Correspondence from various archives (especially with Kaila and Charlie Dunbar Broad) further discusses his academic achievements and his experiences during the challenging circumstances of the 1940s.

I slutet av 1800-talet skedde en avgörande förändring inom vetenskapen, i form av upptäckten av motsägelser i matematikens grundvalar. En vetenskap som hittills betraktats som absolut tillförlitlig visade sig innehålla fundamentala brister redan i sina mest grundläggande byggstenar. Ett berömt exempel på dessa motsägelser är Russells paradox. Denna grundvalskris kom att bli en katalysator för utvecklandet av vad i matematiken och filosofin idag kallas för logik. Grundtanken med logiken är att matematiska teorier och slutledningar uttrycks i ett symbolspråk på ett sådant sätt, att systemet självt kan undersökas inom detta språk. De grundläggande byggstenarna i detta…

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O presente ensaio tem por objeto a explicação neoclássica de justificação fundacional. Conforme o fundacionalismo internalista, em epistemologia, as crenças sobre o mundo à nossa volta só podem ser racionalmente justificadas se a cadeia constituída pelas relações inferenciais de justificação terminar em crenças que são justificadas de modo não inferencial, e se o sujeito estiver consciente das características justificadoras presentes nas experiências sensoriais, que são as candidatas mais plausíveis para dar término ao regresso da justificação. Não há consenso entre os fundacionalistas quanto ao tipo de justificação que as crenças básicas devem ostentar, para o fundacionalista neoclássico apenas uma fundação que seja certa pode fornecer base adequada para o conhecimento empírico. A defesa dessa concepção requer uma explicação de justificação internalista que possa enfrentar tanto o dilema de Sellars quanto o dilema de Bergmann, mostrando que crenças fundacionais podem ser não inferencial e infalivelmente justificadas e satisfazer as condições do internalismo. Neste ensaio consideramos detalhadamente as teorias da justificação fundacional mais representativas do internalismo infalibilista, a fim de apresentar nossa tese de que elas compartilham uma base comum e podem enfrentar de maneira conjunta os desafios colocados às suas concepções

This essay is about the neoclassical account of foundational justification. According to Internalist Foundationalism, in epistemology, if our ordinary beliefs about the world around us are to be rationally justified, the chain of inferential justification must terminate in beliefs that are justified noninferentially, and the subject must be aware of the justifying features of the experiential states, that are the most plausible candidates for ending the regress of justification. There is no agreement among Foundationalists at to the right sort of justification the foundational beliefs have to possess. The Neoclassical Foundationalist claims that only a foundation that is certain can provide the basis for empirical knowledge. A defense of this view requires an account of justification that can face both Sellars and Bergmanns dilemmas, showing how foundational beliefs can be noninferentially and infallibly justified, satisfying the internalist conditions. In this essay we consider in detail the most representative internalist infallibilist theories of foundational justification in order to introduce our thesis that they share a common basis and can respond in a common way to the challenges against their views

Advisors/Committee Members: Cláudio Gonçalves de Almeida.

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Neste trabalho, oferecemos uma apresentação geral do debate, em filosofia da linguagem, entre contextualismo e minimalismo. Oferecemos também uma defesa do contextualismo acerca do significado de adjetivos comparativos, a partir de uma refutação das objeções presentes no livro de H. Cappelen e E. Lepore, Insensitive Semantics.

In this work, we offer a general presentation of the debate in philosophy of language between Contextualism andMinimalism. We also offer a defense of a contextualist account of the meaning of comparative adjectives, through a refutation of the objections present in H. Cappelen and E. Lepores book, Insensitive Semantics.

Advisors/Committee Members: André Leclerc.

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A presente dissertação tem por escopo fazer uma investigação acerca do sentido de verdade no pensamento de Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), mais precisamente na obra Ser e Tempo (1927), que nos permita delimitar os contornos da questão da verdade em relação a outras questões conexas a ela: a questão do conhecimento, a questão da verdade enquanto concordância e, enfim, a sua relação com a questão primordial do pensamento heideggeriano, que é a questão do sentido do ser. Pretende, também, mostrar de que modo Heidegger estabelece uma concepção da verdade que resgata etmologicamente o sentido original da palavra grega a)lh/qeia. É esta mesma concepção que, além desse resgate, abre a perspectiva hermenêutica através da assunção da estrutura do como hermenêutico enquanto fundamento do logos aponfântico, do qual o enunciado, em seu aspecto lógico formal, apresenta-se como uma derivação.

This dissertation aims at making an investigation about the meaning of the truth in Martin Heideggers thought (1889-1976), more precisely in the work Being and Time (1927) that allows us to define the contours of this question of the truth concerned to other issues which are related to it: the question of the knowledge, the question of the truth as concordance and finally its relation with the primordial question of his thinking, whichs the question about the meaning of being. If also intends to show how Heidegger sets a conception to etymologically recover the original meaning of the greek word a)lh/qeia. This is the same concept that, beyond this redemption, opens the hermeneutic perspective through the assumption of the structure of the hermeneutic how as the basis of apophantic logos, which the statement, in his formal-logical aspect, presents itself as a derivation.

Advisors/Committee Members: Robson Costa Cordeiro.

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As pessoas discordam o tempo todo. Os objetos de discordância variam dos mais banais, como a localização correta de um restaurante, até questões mais sofisticadas entendidas somente por experts, como no caso das ciências. A pergunta proposta é: qual a relevância do desacordo para a justificação epistêmica? Ao entrar em franco desacordo, devemos revisar nossa atitude doxástica? Inicialmente procurei uma resposta na forma de uma norma epistêmica única para casos como esse. Apresentarei as correntes que inicialmente propuseram tais normas e como variáveis epistêmicas transformaram essa visão durante o denso debate sobre essa questão

People disagree all the time. The objects of discordance vary from the most banal, such as the correct location of a restaurant, to more sophisticated issues understood by some experts, as in the case of the Sciences. The question proposed here is the following: what is the relevancy of the disagreement to the epistemic justification? When one is in total disagreement, should we rethink our doxastic attitude? Initially, I sought for an answer in the form of a single epistemic norm for cases such as these. I will present the currents that have initially proposed such norms and how epistemic variables transform this vision during the deep debate over this issue

Advisors/Committee Members: Cláudio Gonçalves de Almeida.

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Nesta dissertação, orientados pela busca da relação entre a lógica matemática e a lógica tradicional, nos dirigimos às caracterizações de lógica oferecidas por Kant e Frege. Num primeiro momento consideramos e precisamos diversos modos de entender a tese de que a lógica pode ser distinguida das outras ciências por abstrair da matéria ou conteúdo do conhecimento e tratar apenas da forma. Duas destas noções mostraram-se indispensáveis para explicitar as relações entre as concepções de lógica dos dois autores; a saber, generalidade i.é. vigência normativa sobre todos os domínios do pensamento e formalidade i.é. completa abstração do conteúdo semântico. Em um segundo momento, evidenciamos o papel fundamental destas duas noções, na caracterização kantiana de lógica. Kant, em consonância com seus contemporâneos, começa caracterizando a lógica pela generalidade, mas, quando chega às teses fundamentais do seu idealismo transcendental, inova completamente ao argumentar também pela sua formalidade. Em um terceiro momento, evidenciamos a marcante influência kantiana na obra de Frege, que se faz presente de modo especial na concepção de lógica. Nos primeiros escritos, Frege parece adotar a mesma caracterização que Kant, mas, com o amadurecimento de sua obra, acaba por dar-se conta que suas inovações técnicas rejeitam a formalidade da lógica. A caracterização pela generalidade, ao contrário, é uma constante ao longo de todo o corpus fregeano, embora seja também reformulada com o acirramento de seu antipsicologismo. O principal resultado desta dissertação é a explicitação do núcleo comum entre as concepções de lógica dos dois autores, e com ele, do fundamento da divergência acerca do status da aritmética. Somente porque lógica significa o mesmo para ambos, o malogrado projeto logicista poderia ter provado que Kant estava errado acerca da aritmética.

In this master thesis, guided by the search of the relationship between mathematical logic and traditional logic, we address the characterizations of logic offered by Kant and Frege. First, we considered and specified several ways to understand the thesis according to which logic can be distinguished from other sciences through its abstraction of matter or knowledge content, and its attention to form. Two of these notions turned out to be indispensable to make explicit the relationships between the two conceptions of logic; namely, generality i.e. normative validity on all domains of the thought and formality i.e. complete abstraction of semantic content. Second, we pointed out the fundamental role of these notions in the Kantian characterization of logic. Kant, in consonance with his contemporaries, begins characterizing logic by its generality, but when he arrives at the fundamental thesis of his transcendental idealism, he innovates arguing also for its formality. Third, it becomes clear, at least with regard to the conception of logic, that Frege was under Kantian influence. In his first writings, Frege adopts the Kantian characterization, only later does he become aware that…

Advisors/Committee Members: Frank Thomas Sautter, Hans Christian Klotz.

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Na Crítica da Razão Pura, Kant propõe-se resolver como é possível o conhecimento mediante juízos sintéticos a priori. Isto evidencia a grande importância que tem a noção de síntese e a possibilidade do conhecimento determinado a priori mediante condições subjetivas. Este trabalho aborda esta questão a partir do esclarecimento da Dedução Transcendental dos Conceitos Puros do Entendimento em relação à faculdade de síntese.

In the Critical of the Pure Reason, Kant considers itself to decide as the knowledge by means of synthetic judgments is possible a priori. This evidences the great importance that has the notion of synthesis and the possibility of the a priori definitive knowledge by means of subjective conditions. This work approaches this question from the clarification of the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Agreement in relation to the synthesis faculty.

Advisors/Committee Members: Albertinho Luiz Gallina, Jair Antônio Krassuski.

▼ Este trabalho visa, primeiramente, desenvolver uma interpretaÃÃo sobre a natureza da representaÃÃo dramÃtica, segundo AristÃteles, a partir do elenco de procedimentos composicionais envolvidos na elaboraÃÃo das produÃÃes representativas na PoÃtica. Bem como investigar as diversas significaÃÃes possÃveis de âmimesisâ no pensamento de AristÃteles e estabelecer apontamentos para a identificaÃÃo do itinerÃrio de desenvolvimento dessa noÃÃo a partir da variaÃÃo semÃntica do termo em diversos contextos de seu sistema. Por Ãltimo, tem por objetivo incorporar algumas das principais tendÃncias do debate acerca do problema da imaginaÃÃo em AristÃteles visando o estabelecimento de uma estratÃgia de justificaÃÃo do vinculo hipotÃtico entre a noÃÃo de phantasia, compreendida em um sentido ativo, e um modo determinado de produÃÃo de representaÃÃes. Advisors/Committee Members: Imaculada Kangussu, Maria Luisa Buarque de Holanda, Pedro Sussekind Viveiros de Castro.

▼ Resumo: Nas páginas que se seguem, o leitor encontrará um estudo detalhado sobre aquele que é considerado por Aristóteles o mais difícil entre os impasses formulados em Metafísica III (Beta) e que é respondido no capítulo 2 do livro X (Iota): a Décima Primeira Aporia. Em tal aporia, Aristóteles rivaliza (i) a concepção que os antigos Physiologoi tinham do Um, em que tal princípio é concebido como uma natureza subjacente que extrapola os contornos demarcados pela noção de Um, e (ii) a perspectiva platônico-pitagórica, que prefere conceber o Um em si mesmo, segundo as suas próprias determinações internas e desprovido de qualquer articulação com alguma realidade que lhe seja exterior; Abstract: In the following pages, the reader will find a detailed study of what Aristotle considered the most difficult aporia formulated in Metaphysics III (Beta), which is answered in chapter 2 of Book X (Iota): the Eleventh Aporia. In such aporia, Aristotle rivals: (i) the conception assumed by the ancient Physiologoi, which takes the One to be an underlying nature whose being is not exhausted by being One, and (ii) the Platonic-Pythagorean view, which prefers to conceive the One in itself, according to its own determinations and apart from any connection with some reality outside it Advisors/Committee Members: Angioni, Lucas, 1973- (advisor), Puente, Fernando Eduardo de Barros Rey (committee member), Zillig, Raphael (committee member).

▼ O presente ensaio trata do Contextualismo em Epistemologia. Mais precisamente, ele trata sobre a tese semântica segundo a qual atribuições de conhecimento de instâncias da forma ‗S sabe que P são contextualmente sensíveis. O Contextualismo, ao longo dos últimos trinta anos, tem sido extensivamente debatido, pois versa sobre temas centrais presentes na discussão em Epistemologia contemporânea. Segundo os proponentes dessa teoria, ela é a que melhor responde a importantes questões epistemológicas, tais como: o problema gerado por paradoxos céticos; preserva nossas alegações e atribuições ordinárias de conhecimento; preserva importantes princípios lógicos como, e.g., o princípio de fechamento dedutivo. Apresentaremos três abordagens distintas para o contextualismo propostas por Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose e David Lewis examinando as particularidades e implicações de cada uma dela. Examinaremos também algumas objeções relevantes à tese contextualista, que procuram salientar importantes dificuldades para tal teoria. Contudo, não pretendemos oferecer uma resposta definitiva, nem a favor e nem contrária ao Contextualismo. Por conta disso, a tese proposta será de que, apesar das objeções, o Contextualismo não é refutado mostrando, assim, a possibilidade e necessidade de se continuar a investigação. Por fim, apresentaremos uma versão original do paradoxo do prefácio que acreditamos ser passível de resolução através da aplicação da tese contextualista. Advisors/Committee Members: Cláudio Gonçalves de Almeida.

▼ Neste trabalho procuramos apresentar a tese de que devido à ruptura que fizemos com relação ao nosso passado somos incapazes, hoje em dia, de interpretarmos a nossa história a fim de sustentar uma narrativa de futuro aberta à alteridade, ou seja, à própria subjetividade. Tomamos como ponto de partida a preocupação com a capacidade que ainda temos de interpretar a nossa história, de traduzi-la em uma narrativa que nos autorize a ocupar o lugar de críticos de nossos tempos. Para tanto, nos valemos de quatro autores cujas raízes estão fortemente escavadas em uma espécie de inquietação com o já dado, com o já estabelecido: Sigmund Freud, Ernst Bloch, Emmanuel Levinas e Walter Benjamin. A seu modo, cada um destes pensadores acusou a insuficiência dos conceitos para dar conta da própria vida, ou seja, propôs que o próprio do mundo é justamente ser atravessado por uma temporalidade que arranca à realidade a certeza parda de uma história já contada, restituindo-lhe, assim, a sua originalidade, a sua capacidade de sempre dizer algo diferente. Advisors/Committee Members: Ricardo Timm de Souza.

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Recentemente alguns autores têm defendido uma tendência da epistemologia chamada Inflitração Pragmática. Tais autores se propõem a negar a tese do purismo epistêmico, a saber: dois sujeitos possuem idêntica força de sua posição epistêmica se estão na mesma posição de saber que p - cujo fator determinante para determinar a força da posição epistêmica são as dimensões relevantes para a verdade de p. Para negar tal tese os inflitradores irão assumir: (i) para conhecer p deve-se satisfazer uma condição pragmática ou para satisfazer uma condição pragmática deve-se conhecer p; e, (ii) o conhecimento varia de acordo com fatores pragmáticos. Nessa dissertação pretende-se discutir os argumentos que Jeremy Fantl e Matthew McGrath apresentam em defesa da infiltração, avaliando seus limites e potencialidades.

Recently some authors have defended a tendency in epistemology called Pragmatic Encroachment. Such authors propose to deny the thesis of epistemic purism: two subjects have the same epistemic strength if they are in the same position to know that p - where epistemic strength is determined by the relevant dimensions to truth of p. For that the encroachers will assume: (i) to know p some pragmatic condition must be satisfied or to satisfy a pragmatic condition one should know p; and, (ii) knowledge varies with pragmatic factors. In this dissertation we will discuss the arguments of Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath in defense of the pragmatic encroachment, evaluating their limits and potential.

Advisors/Committee Members: Felipe de Matos Müller.

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O conteúdo do presente trabalho trata de tópicos fundamentais de epistemologia da memória, em particular das noções de crença, justificação e conhecimento memoriais, bem como analisa conceitualmente as principais teorias tradicionais e correntes desta área de pesquisa da epistemologia contemporânea, a saber, o preservacionismo e a teoria epistemológica da memória (TEM), e as supostas críticas que as mesmas sofrem de seus opositores. O preservacionismo, basicamente, é a visão de que crença memorial verdadeira justificada, precisamente a definição canônica do conhecimento implicado pela memória proposicional, se mantém no tempo desde a sua aquisição no passado, em tl, por um sujeito cognoscente S qualquer, até o momento presente, em t2, quando da evocação de tal conhecimento por S. Esta visão, que é endossada estruturalmente pela TEM, cujas bases conceituais vinculam como condições necessárias e suficientes para haver lembrança proposicional que S saiba que P em tl, S sabe que P em t2, e que esse conhecimento entre tl e t2 esteja adequadamente conectado, recebe críticas de determinados autores, particularmente Sven Bernecker e Jennifer Lackey, para os quais a faculdade da memória, respectivamente, não vincularia nem justificação e nem conhecimento, e sim mera representação mental, e esta faculdade não apenas preservaria tais propriedades epistêmicas, mas sim as geraria com o passar do tempo, constituindo-se a retenção de tais propriedades condição insuficiente para haver conhecimento proposicional, embora necessária. Tais críticas são apresentadas por estes autores através de contra-exemplos que instauraram um efervescente e dinâmico debate na comunidade epistemológica atual, em que o objetivo principal será o da análise e da discussão dos mesmos juntamente com o referencial das teorias referidas, haja vista que o escopo conceitua) destas teorias é que estaria em xeque nesta perspectiva, e um veredito acerca da plausibilidade ou não destes contraexemplos se procurará estabelecer argumentativamente ao longo desse trabalho, sendo este precisamente o ponto crucial e essencial que caracteriza a presente pesquisa.

The content of this paper deals with fundamental issues of epistemology of memory, in particular the notions of belief, justification and memoriais knowledge, as well as conceptually analyzes the main traditional theories and current research in this area of contemporary epistemology, namely preservationism and epistemological theory of memory (TEM), and alleged that they suffer criticism from his opponents. The preservationism basically is the view that justified true memorial belief precisely the canonical definition of knowledge implied by propositional memory, remains in the time since its acquisition in the past, tl, for any S a knowing subject, yet this, in t2, when the evocation of such knowledge by S. This view, which is structurally endorsed by TEM, whose conceptual bases bind as necessary and sufficient conditions to be propositional memory that S knows that P tl, S knows that P in t2, and that this…

Advisors/Committee Members: Cláudio Gonçalves de Almeida.