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You searched for subject:(Epistemology of Disagreement). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

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McMaster University

1. Lougheed, Kirk. Disagreement and Change of View.

Degree: PhD, 2019, McMaster University

Conciliationists hold that hold that epistemic peer disagreement about whether a proposition is true constitutes a (partial) defeater for that proposition. Non-conciliationists, on the other hand, deny that peer disagreement constitutes a (partial) defeater for a proposition under dispute. A defeater is a reason to doubt the justification one thought one had in believing a certain proposition to be true. While there are dynamic views in the literature, conciliationism and non-conciliationism represent the two most defended positions. This debate has highlighted a number of interesting and underexplored ideas in epistemology, such as the distinction between first-order and second-order reasons, the uniqueness thesis, and independence requirements. I develop and defend an underexplored argument in favour of non-conciliationism. A researcher may be reasonable to remain steadfast in the face of disagreement about a proposition related to her research if doing so will yield epistemic benefits. I draw on two main sources of evidence for this claim: (i) there are numerous real-life examples where this occurs, and (ii) there is empirical evidence to suggest that cognitive diversity helps enhance prediction and problem-solving. The most pressing objection to this argument is that it conflates practical reasons with epistemic reasons. I argue that this objection fails because the reasons in question actually are epistemic. A better distinction is one between synchronic epistemic reasons and diachronic epistemic reasons. I then explore how far, if at all, this argument can be taken beyond research contexts.

Thesis

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Advisors/Committee Members: Griffin, Nicholas, Philosophy.

Subjects/Keywords: Epistemology of Disagreement; Epistemic Peerhood; Conciliationism; Non-Conciliationism

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Lougheed, K. (2019). Disagreement and Change of View. (Doctoral Dissertation). McMaster University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11375/24520

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Lougheed, Kirk. “Disagreement and Change of View.” 2019. Doctoral Dissertation, McMaster University. Accessed October 14, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/24520.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Lougheed, Kirk. “Disagreement and Change of View.” 2019. Web. 14 Oct 2019.

Vancouver:

Lougheed K. Disagreement and Change of View. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. McMaster University; 2019. [cited 2019 Oct 14]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/24520.

Council of Science Editors:

Lougheed K. Disagreement and Change of View. [Doctoral Dissertation]. McMaster University; 2019. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/24520

2. Turner, Martin. Moral Disagreement and Moral Realism.

Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2013, Washington University in St. Louis

This dissertation provides a novel argument from disagreement against moral realism. Moral anti-realists have long suspected that something about the scope and/or nature of moral disagreement threatens moral realism, but existing arguments are either unsound, or rely upon premises which are too question-begging to anyone who does not already share anti-realist metaethical sympathies. This dissertation contends that moral anti-realism provides the best explanation of our view that we ought to hold onto our moral judgments in the face of disagreement about them. It contends that the most plausible view in the epistemology of disagreement tells us that, were our moral judgments the sorts of beliefs that the moral realist says they are, we should drop many of them in the face of disagreement about them which we encounter with people whom we have reason to trust. But we frequently judge that we should not do this. Moral anti-realism is the best explanation of this fact. Advisors/Committee Members: Eric Brown.

Subjects/Keywords: Epistemology of Disagreement; Moral Anti-Realism; Moral Disagreement; Moral Realism; Philosophy

…but not implausibly so. I call my view in the epistemology of disagreement the Relative… …which, as I shall argue, is challenged by the phenomenon of moral disagreement. 2. Competing… …investigate whether moral realism has some kind of nonnegligible problem due to moral disagreement… …will be out to see whether facts about moral disagreement succeed in providing any of what… …all to adjust our moral views in the face of disagreement even with reasonable people. He… 

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Turner, M. (2013). Moral Disagreement and Moral Realism. (Doctoral Dissertation). Washington University in St. Louis. Retrieved from https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1099

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Turner, Martin. “Moral Disagreement and Moral Realism.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis. Accessed October 14, 2019. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1099.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Turner, Martin. “Moral Disagreement and Moral Realism.” 2013. Web. 14 Oct 2019.

Vancouver:

Turner M. Moral Disagreement and Moral Realism. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Washington University in St. Louis; 2013. [cited 2019 Oct 14]. Available from: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1099.

Council of Science Editors:

Turner M. Moral Disagreement and Moral Realism. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Washington University in St. Louis; 2013. Available from: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/1099

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