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O presente artigo tem como objeto as dinâmicas geradas pelos modelos de recrutamento empregados nas Supremas Cortes da Argentina e do Chile. Sendo tais modelos antagônicos, visto que na Argentina o recrutamento se dá por indicação presidencial, enquanto no Chile se configura uma cooptação indireta, busca-se compreender qual é o papel que assumem na institucionalização, hierarquização e independência dos poderes judiciais em questão. Parte-se da hipótese que o recrutamento por indicação presidencial estabeleceu na Argentina uma elite judicial integrada ao desenvolvimento sociopolítico do país, apesar de ter facilitado o cerceamento à independência do Judiciário pelo Executivo. Já a cooptação chilena, ainda que tenha assegurado a independência judicial, incentivou a formação de uma elite com traços aristocráticos, autocentrada e que dificulta a renovação da interpretação judicial, deixando o Judiciário anacrônico. A hipótese do presente artigo será sustentada através da apresentação de um panorama histórico-estrutural da institucionalização dos judiciários em questão, observando o efeito dos modelos de recrutamento adotados, e das disputas para defini-los, em sua hierarquização e independência. Também se recorrerá ao método prosopográfico para aprofundar a apreensão da relação entre os padrões de recrutamento das Corte Suprema e a evolução do poder judicial.

El presente artículo tiene por objeto la dinámica generada por los modelos de reclutamiento empleados en las Cortes Supremas de Argentina y Chile. Una vez que estos modelos son antagónicos, ya que en Argentina el reclutamiento es por indicación presidencial, mientras que en Chile es por una cooptación indirecta, se busca comprender el rol que desempeñan en la institucionalización, la jerarquización y la independencia de los poderes judiciales en cuestión. La principal hipótesis es que el reclutamiento por indicación presidencial estableció en Argentina una élite judicial integrada al desarrollo sociopolítico del país, a pesar de haber facilitado la reducción a la independencia del Poder Judicial por parte del Poder Ejecutivo. Por otro lado, la cooptación de Chile, a pesar de que aseguro la independencia judicial, promovió la formación de una élite con rasgos aristocráticos, centrada en sí misma y que dificulta la renovación de la interpretación judicial, dejando el poder judicial anacrónico. La hipótesis de este artículo será sostenida mediante la presentación de un panorama histórico-estructural de la institucionalización del poder judicial de Argentina y Chile, observando el efecto de los modelos de reclutamiento adoptados, y las disputas para definirlos, en su jerarquización e independencia. También se utilizará el método prosopográfico para profundizar la comprensión de la relación entre los patrones de reclutamiento de la Corte Suprema y la evolución del poder judicial.

This article has as object the dynamics generated by the models of recruitment employed by Supreme Courts in Argentina and Chile. Once these models are antagonistic, since in Argentina's…

Advisors/Committee Members: Engelmann, Fabiano.

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O Conselho Superior da Magistratura (CSM), enquanto instituição de governo do poder judicial, desempenha um papel central na democracia portuguesa. Estudado maioritariamente sob a perspectiva jurídica, este Conselho, tal como todo o sistema de justiça, reclama hoje um olhar atento da ciência política. Nesta Dissertação principia-se com um estudo comparativo entra as diferentes soluções de governo da justiça europeias. Procurando isolar variáveis foram analisados os sistemas de Espanha, França, Alemanha e Inglaterra. Seguidamente, e tendo em conta o momento crítico da transição para a democracia, analisa-­se o lugar do CSM na constituição daí resultante, acompanhando a sua evolução até aos dias de hoje. Finalmente, procede-­se à caraterização prosopográfica da elite de juízas e juízes que ocuparam os lugares do CSM ao longo destes 40 anos. Os resultados obtidos no estudo comparado, vêm confirmar que estando garantida a liberdade individual de cada juíza ou juiz no ato de julgar, a forma de governo da justiça parece definitivamente configurar um campo em aberto. Mais do que um modelo ideal, estes órgãos são o resultado de autênticas complementaridades institucionais. A análise histórica demonstra que no poder judicial, a transição decorreu de forma pacífica e consensual, traduzindo-se num ganho progressivo de autonomia externa da magistratura ao longo destes 40 anos. O estudo da elite judicial pertencente ao CSM veio revelar uma uniformidade com poucas variações. Neste momento, os membros do conselho privilegiam o princípio da independência, verificando-­se uma certa desconfiança entre o poder político e o poder judicial.

The Superior Council of Judiciary (CSM) plays a central role in the Portuguese democracy. Mostly studied from the legal perspective, this Council as the whole justice system requests a watchful eye of political science. This Dissertation begins with a comparative study between diferent European solutions for the government justice. Seeking to isolate variables, the systems were investigated are Spain, France, Germany and England. Subsequently, taking into account the critical moment of the democratic transition, this Dissertation investigates the place of the CSM in the resulting constitution, following its evolution to the presente day. Finally, a study of the Portuguese judicial elite throughout these 40 years takes place, by making use of the prosopography characterization. The results of the comparative study, confirms that being guaranteed individual freedom of each judge in the act of judging, the institutional configurations of the government of justice appears to constitute an open field. More than an ideal model, these organs are the result of genuine institutional complementarities. Historical analysis shows that when it comes to the judiciary, the transition took place in a peaceful and consensual manner, resulting in a progressive gain of the judiciary external autonomy over these 40 years. The study of judicial elite belonging to the CSM has revealed uniformity with few variations. At…

Advisors/Committee Members: Almeida, Pedro Tavares de.

▼ Since the early 1990s, the third wave of democratisation has permeated the polity of almost all the African states as authoritarian regimes are replaced with democratic governments through the ballot process. Therefore, in line with the prevailing realities across Africa as well as in other formerly autocratic and closed systems in Asia and Latin America, participatory government was re-introduced in Nigeria in 1999. The use of regular and periodic election as a means of regime change became apparent. However, the conduct of general elections in Nigeria since 1999 has been marred with myriad of controversies thus triggering electoral disputes. This shifts the burden of ensuring free and fair elections and by extension sustaining democracy on the judiciary. This duty, the judiciary performs in the manner it handles and adjudicates over disputes arising from electoral contests. Recent developments in Nigeria have shown that electoral fraud has transcended the casting of votes and has permeated the judicial arm of government. The judiciary is not immune from manipulations by political elite in order to secure electoral victory through the courts when electoral contests shift from the polling booths to the ‘temple of justice’. It is therefore in the light of this development that this study examines the politicisation of election litigation in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic using the 2007 general elections and the ensuing gubernatorial election litigation cases in Ekiti, Ondo and Osun states of Nigeria as case studies. The study fills the gap in litereature which focuses research attention on electoral fraud around issues relating to voting. The theoretical framework for this study was eclectic combining three theories namely elite, state fragility and separation of power theories. For the purpose of this study, qualitative research methodology using case-study design was adopted. The 2007 general election was selected for study using Ekiti, Ondo and Osun states as case studies using the non-probabilistic sampling technique. Purposive sampling method was employed in the selection of research sites and participants. Instrument for data collection was through the use of In-depth Interview (IDI) complemented by data from documented sources. Data from interviews conducted were transcribed and interpreted using thematic content analysis. Data from both primary and secondary sources were systematically, objectively and descriptively analyzed making valid textual inferences from them by identifying specific characteristics as they relate to the manipulation of the judicial process of resolving electoral disputes to secure electoral victory through the courts. Research findings revealed that a combination of financial inducements, executive control through the appointment of judges, power of incumbency, delay tactics, promise of promotion and fear of persecution within and outside the judiciary were strategies political elite used in manipulating the judicial process of resolving electoral disputes to secure and/or retain electoral… Advisors/Committee Members: Mtshali, Khondlo Phillip Thabo. (advisor).

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À partir de l’étude du procès des chefs de l’insurrection algérienne de 1871 jugés en 1873 aux assises de Constantine, la présente thèse reconstitue la fresque judiciaire d’un soulèvement que d’aucuns reconnaissent comme la plus grande séquence insurrectionnelle que l’Algérie ait jamais connue au XIXe siècle. L’analyse de la riche documentation exhumée des archives d’Outre-mer d’Aix-en-Provence, de la Bibliothèque Nationale de France (Paris) et des archives du tribunal de Constantine aurait pu permettre de rétablir la société colonisée dans son droit au chapitre de la parole et de renouveler la compréhension du soulèvement de 1871 mais c’était sans compter sur la complexité des enjeux politiques qui ont transformé le procès d’une insurrection en un théâtre où devait se solder le conflit civils-militaires. Le premier grand procès civil d’Algérie allait transformer une insurrection majeure en délits de droit commun justifiant une étonnante physionomie des peines. En abordant les questions relatives aux causes et aux acteurs de l’insurrection, le présent travail s’est investi dans l’analyse de l’histoire sociale des élites algériennes du XIXe siècle et de leurs caractéristiques, à travers leur implication dans le soulèvement et l’interrogation, aux côtés de diverses sources historiques, de matériaux de nature anthropologique. Tandis que les différentes historiographies attribuaient tour à tour à l’élite nobiliaire des djouads ou à celle confrérique de la rahmaniyya la paternité de la révolte, la présente thèse s’est attachée à mettre en évidence la matrice anti coloniste d’une insurrection populaire.

Starting with the study of the 1871 trial of the Algerian insurgency leaders judged in 1873 at the Constantine criminal court, this thesis reconstitutes the judicial saga of an uprising that some recognize as the greatest insurrectionary sequence Algeria ever knew in the nineteenth century.The analysis of the rich documentation exhumed from the Overseas Archives of Aix-en-Provence, the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (Paris) and the archives of the tribunal of Constantine could have reinstated the colonized society’s right to speak and to renew the understanding of the 1871 uprising, but it was without counting the complexity of the political challenges which transformed an insurrection trial into a theater, where the civil-military conflict had to be resolved. The first great civil trial of Algeria was going to transform a major insurrection into common law offenses justifying astonishing forms of sentences.In addressing issues related to the causes and actors of the insurgency, the present work Involved in the analysis of the social history of the nineteenth century Algerian elites and their characteristics, through their involvement in the uprising and the investigative questioning of various historical sources and anthropological materials. While the various historiographies attributed to the djouads’ noble elite or the rahmaniyya confraternity the authorship of the revolt, the present thesis endeavored to highlight…

Advisors/Committee Members: Alleaume, Ghislaine (thesis director).

▼ In pursuing their goals, newly-created constitutional courts of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics are affected by their institutional setting and capabilities. Yet, previous studies did not explore how constitutional courts develop over time and what noteworthy implications for politics and society result from their institutional growth. To address this gap in the literature, I measured a variety of organizational characteristics and constructed an index of institutional development for the twenty eight constitutional courts in the post-communist countries from the initial year of their transitions through 2005. I argued that high values on this measure (which I labeled the judicial viability score) should enable constitutional court judges to satisfy their policy objectives and improve public and elite perceptions of the judiciary’s role in new democratic systems. To demonstrate this empirically, I tested a series of statistical models of judicial influence to show that the level of court’s institutional viability has profound implications on its legal, political, and social impact. My analyses indicated that the level of the constitutional court’s institutional viability is, indeed, an important determinant of the constitutional court judges’ ability to actively shape public policies and render decisions which are independent of, and in opposition to, the preferences of dominant political actors and government institutions. Additionally, the results demonstrated that the level of constitutional court’s viability significantly affects the perceptions of the ordinary citizens and business elites—ordinary citizens and business owners and managers are more likely to express confidence in the national legal system in countries with relatively institutionalized constitutional courts than citizens living in countries with weakly institutionalized constitutional courts. Thus, my research highlights the importance of studying the evolutionary process by which courts acquire institutional viability and, in doing so, contributes to our understanding of the factors shaping the development of democracy, the rule of law, and constitutionalism in the post-communist societies.