subject:(Dynamic Mechanism Design)

Penn State University

1. Krasikov, Ilia. ESSAYS ON DYNAMIC CONTRACTING.

Degree: 2019, Penn State University

URL: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/16751izk113

► The thesis focuses on understanding the dynamic nature of contracts used in various economic context, specifically financial economics and industrial organization. The first chapter "A… (more)

▼ The thesis focuses on understanding the dynamic nature of contracts used in various economic context, specifically financial economics and industrial organization. The first chapter "A Theory of Dynamic Contracting with Financial Constraints'' draws on a large empirical literature documenting that small businesses are financially constrained, and operate at an inefficient level. In the paper, we build a theoretical model where financial constraints arise endogenously as a product of interaction between persistent agency frictions and agent's inability to raise external capital. The paper makes two general points. First, efficiency is a certainty in the long run, and it is achieved through monotone slacking of financial constraints. Second, persistence makes the path towards efficiency much more constrained in comparison to the model with the iid technology. In particular, we show that dynamic agency models with persistence predict a larger cross section of firms in the economy to be financially constrained. At a technical level, we invoke the recursive approach of \citet{aps}, using a two-dimensional vector of promised utilities as a state variable. We show that the optimal contract always stays in a strict subset of the recursive domain termed the shell, and the optimal contract is monotone within this set. We also verify that the results continue to hold in continuous time. The second chapter "Dynamic Contracts with Unequal Discounting'' looks at dynamic screening with soft financial constraints. In contrast to the first paper, the agent can raise money but at a different rate than the principal. We solve for the optimal contract and show that efficiency is not attainable with soft financial constraints. Therefore, the predictions of dynamic models of mechanism design are not robust to the assumption of equal discounting. For the large set of parameters, the optimal contract has the restart property- dynamic distortions are a function of the number of consecutive bad shocks, and once the good shock arrives the process repeats again. We also show that restricting attention to contracts which have the restart property is in general approximately optimal. The endogenous resetting aspect of restart contracts shares features of various contracts used in practice. In the third chapter "On Dynamic Pricing'', we explore dynamic price discrimination, extending a canonical model of monopolistic screening to repeated sales, where a seller uses timing of purchases as a screening instrument. The importance of time as an instrument for price discrimination has been understood since Varian [1989]. In the paper, we are aiming to provide a formal analysis of pricing strategies to discriminate amongst consumers based on the timing of information arrival and/or the timing of purchase. A seller repeatedly trades with a buyer. Buyer's valuations for the trade follow a renewal process; that is, they change infrequently at random dates. For the model with two periods, We show that selling the first period good for a spot price… Advisors/Committee Members: Vijay Krishna, Dissertation Advisor/Co-Advisor, Vijay Krishna, Committee Chair/Co-Chair, Rohit Lamba, Committee Member, Syed Nageeb Ali, Committee Member, Chloe Jeanne Tergiman, Outside Member.

Subjects/Keywords: Dynamic contracting; Dynamic mechanism design; Financial constraints; Dynamic pricing

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APA (6^th Edition):

Krasikov, I. (2019). ESSAYS ON DYNAMIC CONTRACTING. (Thesis). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/16751izk113

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Krasikov, Ilia. “ESSAYS ON DYNAMIC CONTRACTING.” 2019. Thesis, Penn State University. Accessed January 21, 2021. https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/16751izk113.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Krasikov, Ilia. “ESSAYS ON DYNAMIC CONTRACTING.” 2019. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Krasikov I. ESSAYS ON DYNAMIC CONTRACTING. [Internet] [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2019. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/16751izk113.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Krasikov I. ESSAYS ON DYNAMIC CONTRACTING. [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2019. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/16751izk113

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Duke University

2. Chen, Mingliu. Stochastic Optimization in Market Design and Incentive Management Problems .

Degree: 2020, Duke University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/20989

► This dissertation considers practical operational settings, in which a decision maker needs to either coordinate preferences or to align incentives among different parties. We… (more)

▼ This dissertation considers practical operational settings, in which a decision maker needs to either coordinate preferences or to align incentives among different parties. We formulate these issues into stochastic optimization problems and use a variety of techniques from the theories of applied probability, queueing and dynamic programming. First, we study a stochastic matching problem. We consider matching over time with short and long-lived players who are very sensitive to mismatch, and propose a novel method to characterize the mismatch. In particular, players' preferences are uniformly distributed on a circle, so the mismatch between two players is characterized by the one-dimensional circular angle between them. This framework allows us to capture matching processes in applications ranging from ride sharing to job hunting. Our analytical framework relies on threshold matching policies, and is focused on a limiting regime where players demonstrate low tolerance towards mismatch. This framework yields closed-form optimal matching thresholds. If the matching process is controlled by a centralized social planner (e.g. an online matching platform), the matching threshold reflects the trade-off between matching rate and matching quality. The corresponding optimal matching threshold is smaller than myopic matching threshold, which helps building market thickness. We further compare the centralized system with decentralized systems, where players decide their matching partners. We find that matching controlled by either side of the market may achieve optimal social welfare. Second, we consider a dynamic incentive management problem in which a principal induces effort from an agent to reduce the arrival rate of a Poisson process of adverse events. The effort is costly to the agent, and unobservable to the principal, unless the principal is monitoring the agent. Monitoring ensures effort but is costly to the principal. The optimal contract involves monetary payments and monitoring sessions that depend on past arrival times. We formulate the problem as a stochastic optimal control model and solve the problem analytically. The optimal schedules of payment and monitoring demonstrate different structures depending on model parameters. Overall, the optimal dynamic contracts are simple to describe, easy to compute and implement, and intuitive to explain. Advisors/Committee Members: Sun, Peng (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Operations research; Dynamic Programming; Market Design; Matching; Mechanism Design; Queueing Theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Chen, M. (2020). Stochastic Optimization in Market Design and Incentive Management Problems . (Thesis). Duke University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10161/20989

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Chen, Mingliu. “Stochastic Optimization in Market Design and Incentive Management Problems .” 2020. Thesis, Duke University. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10161/20989.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Chen, Mingliu. “Stochastic Optimization in Market Design and Incentive Management Problems .” 2020. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Chen M. Stochastic Optimization in Market Design and Incentive Management Problems . [Internet] [Thesis]. Duke University; 2020. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/20989.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Chen M. Stochastic Optimization in Market Design and Incentive Management Problems . [Thesis]. Duke University; 2020. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/20989

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

UCLA

3. Kim, Daehyun. Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design.

Degree: Economics, 2019, UCLA

URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3525w5hh

► This dissertation studies how asymmetric information between economic agents interacts with their incentive in dynamic games and mechanism design. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 study… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Economics; Economic theory; Asymmetric information; Dynamic games; Mechanism design; Repeated games; Robust mechanism; Type space

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APA (6^th Edition):

Kim, D. (2019). Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design. (Thesis). UCLA. Retrieved from http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3525w5hh

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Kim, Daehyun. “Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design.” 2019. Thesis, UCLA. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3525w5hh.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Kim, Daehyun. “Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design.” 2019. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Kim D. Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design. [Internet] [Thesis]. UCLA; 2019. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3525w5hh.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Kim D. Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design. [Thesis]. UCLA; 2019. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3525w5hh

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Delft University of Technology

4. Kuppens, P.R. (author). Automated Robot Design With Artificial Evolution.

Degree: 2016, Delft University of Technology

URL: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:6e4ce276-00c4-47ef-8ec3-2b03120bfd46

►

Robots usually do a single job and would perform better when their mechanical structure is particularly designed for their designated task. However, manually designing robots… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: dynamic; robot; task specific; mechanism design; genetic; evolutionary; algorithm

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APA (6^th Edition):

Kuppens, P. R. (. (2016). Automated Robot Design With Artificial Evolution. (Masters Thesis). Delft University of Technology. Retrieved from http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:6e4ce276-00c4-47ef-8ec3-2b03120bfd46

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Kuppens, P R (author). “Automated Robot Design With Artificial Evolution.” 2016. Masters Thesis, Delft University of Technology. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:6e4ce276-00c4-47ef-8ec3-2b03120bfd46.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Kuppens, P R (author). “Automated Robot Design With Artificial Evolution.” 2016. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Kuppens PR(. Automated Robot Design With Artificial Evolution. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2016. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:6e4ce276-00c4-47ef-8ec3-2b03120bfd46.

Council of Science Editors:

Kuppens PR(. Automated Robot Design With Artificial Evolution. [Masters Thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2016. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:6e4ce276-00c4-47ef-8ec3-2b03120bfd46

University of Sydney

5. Yuan, Chen. Crushing Responses and Design of CF/EP Composite Structures .

Degree: 2018, University of Sydney

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2123/20581

► By virtue of their excellent properties of specific strength-to-mass and stiffness-to-mass ratios, carbon fibre reinforced epoxy (CF/EP) structures are becoming increasingly important in various transportation… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Composite structure; Dynamic response; failure mechanism; Modelling; CFRP; Optimisation design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Yuan, C. (2018). Crushing Responses and Design of CF/EP Composite Structures . (Thesis). University of Sydney. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2123/20581

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Yuan, Chen. “Crushing Responses and Design of CF/EP Composite Structures .” 2018. Thesis, University of Sydney. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/20581.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Yuan, Chen. “Crushing Responses and Design of CF/EP Composite Structures .” 2018. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Yuan C. Crushing Responses and Design of CF/EP Composite Structures . [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Sydney; 2018. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2123/20581.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Yuan C. Crushing Responses and Design of CF/EP Composite Structures . [Thesis]. University of Sydney; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2123/20581

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

6. LI JIANGTAO. ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN.

Degree: 2017, National University of Singapore

URL: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/136058

Subjects/Keywords: Mechanism Design; Robust Mechanism Design; Dynamic Mechanism Design; Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms; Deterministic Mechanisms

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

JIANGTAO, L. (2017). ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN. (Thesis). National University of Singapore. Retrieved from http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/136058

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

JIANGTAO, LI. “ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN.” 2017. Thesis, National University of Singapore. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/136058.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

JIANGTAO, LI. “ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN.” 2017. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

JIANGTAO L. ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN. [Internet] [Thesis]. National University of Singapore; 2017. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/136058.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

JIANGTAO L. ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN. [Thesis]. National University of Singapore; 2017. Available from: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/136058

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Rochester

7. Liu, Heng (1982 - ); Govindan, Srihari. Essays on dynamic mechanism design.

Degree: PhD, 2015, University of Rochester

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/29599

► This dissertation is a collection of two papers studying both the theoretical and the applied aspects of dynamic mechanism design. In Chapter 1, we address… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Contingent transfers; Dynamic mechanism design; Incentive compatibility; Intertemporal correlation; Self-enforcement; Trade agreements

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APA (6^th Edition):

Liu, Heng (1982 - ); Govindan, S. (2015). Essays on dynamic mechanism design. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Rochester. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1802/29599

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Liu, Heng (1982 - ); Govindan, Srihari. “Essays on dynamic mechanism design.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Rochester. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1802/29599.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Liu, Heng (1982 - ); Govindan, Srihari. “Essays on dynamic mechanism design.” 2015. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Liu, Heng (1982 - ); Govindan S. Essays on dynamic mechanism design. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2015. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/29599.

Council of Science Editors:

Liu, Heng (1982 - ); Govindan S. Essays on dynamic mechanism design. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/29599

Duke University

8. Gurkan, Huseyin. Dynamic Mechanism Design without Money .

Degree: 2019, Duke University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/19807

► In this dissertation, we study settings where a principal repeatedly determines the allocation of a single resource to i) a single agent, ii) one… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Business administration; dynamic mechanism design; multi-agent games; resource allocation without money; social efficiency

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Gurkan, H. (2019). Dynamic Mechanism Design without Money . (Thesis). Duke University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10161/19807

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Gurkan, Huseyin. “Dynamic Mechanism Design without Money .” 2019. Thesis, Duke University. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10161/19807.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Gurkan, Huseyin. “Dynamic Mechanism Design without Money .” 2019. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Gurkan H. Dynamic Mechanism Design without Money . [Internet] [Thesis]. Duke University; 2019. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/19807.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Gurkan H. Dynamic Mechanism Design without Money . [Thesis]. Duke University; 2019. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/19807

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Texas – Austin

9. -7424-2596. Essays on experimentation in agency models.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2019, University of Texas – Austin

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/2941

► This dissertation consists of three chapters in microeconomic theory with a focus on dynamic games and learning. It has applications in political economy, contracts, and… (more)

▼ This dissertation consists of three chapters in microeconomic theory with a focus on dynamic games and learning. It has applications in political economy, contracts, and industrial organization. In the first chapter, I study censorship in a dynamic game between an informed agent and an uninformed evaluator. Two types of public news are informative about the agents ability – a conclusive good news process and a bad news process. However, the agent can censor bad news, at some cost, and will censor it if and only if this secures her a significant increase in tenure. Thus, the evaluator faces a bandit problem with an endogenous news process. When bad news is conclusive, the agent always censors when the public belief is sufficiently high, but below a threshold, she either stops censoring or only censors with some probability, depending on the information structure. The possibility of censorship hurts the evaluator and the good agent, and it may also hurt the bad agent. However, when bad news is inconclusive, I show that the good agent censors bad news more aggressively than the bad agent does. This improves the quality of information, and may benefit all players – the evaluator, the bad agent, and the good agent. The second chapter examines the nature of contracts that optimally reward innovations in a risky environment, when the innovator is privately informed about the quality of her innovation and must engage an agent to develop it. I model the innovator as a principal who has private but imperfect information about the quality of her project: the project might be worth exploring or not, but even a project of high quality may fail. I characterize the best equilibrium for the high type principal, which is either a separating equilibrium or a pooling one. Due to the interaction between the signaling incentives of the principal and dynamic moral hazard of the agent, the best equilibrium induces inefficiently early termination of the high quality project. The high type principal is forced to share the surplus – with the agent in the separating equilibrium, or the low type principal in the pooling equilibrium. A mediator, who offers a menu of contracts and keeps the agent uncertain about which contract will be implemented, can increase the payoff of the high type principal to approximate her full information surplus. In the third chapter, I study how competition between platforms affects the process of social learning. Especially, how product differentiation affects that process. Che and Hörner (2018) show that a monopolistic platform may want to over-recommend consumers in the early phase to gather and learn information for the sake of future consumers. I show that when platforms do not differentiate their products, duopoly competition dramatically reduces the early experimentation, and the Full Transparency policy is the unique equilibrium strategy for both platforms. When platforms differentiate their products, I show that the equilibrium strategy is in between the Full Transparency policy and the optimal policy in… Advisors/Committee Members: Bhaskar, V. (Venkataraman) (advisor), Thomas, Caroline, (Caroline Désirée) (advisor), Wiseman, Thomas E. (committee member), Hatfield, John W. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Experimentation; Learning; Dynamic games; Censorship; Information manipulation; Contracts; Innovation; Informed principal; Signaling game; Mechanism design

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APA (6^th Edition):

-7424-2596. (2019). Essays on experimentation in agency models. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Texas – Austin. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/2941

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Author name may be incomplete

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

-7424-2596. “Essays on experimentation in agency models.” 2019. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Texas – Austin. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/2941.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Author name may be incomplete

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

-7424-2596. “Essays on experimentation in agency models.” 2019. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Author name may be incomplete

Vancouver:

-7424-2596. Essays on experimentation in agency models. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Texas – Austin; 2019. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/2941.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Author name may be incomplete

Council of Science Editors:

-7424-2596. Essays on experimentation in agency models. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Texas – Austin; 2019. Available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/2941

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Author name may be incomplete

University of Waterloo

10. Hosseini, Hadi. Incentives in One-Sided Matching Problems With Ordinal Preferences.

Degree: 2016, University of Waterloo

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10012/10594

► One of the core problems in multiagent systems is how to efficiently allocate a set of indivisible resources to a group of self-interested agents that… (more)

▼ One of the core problems in multiagent systems is how to efficiently allocate a set of indivisible resources to a group of self-interested agents that compete over scarce and limited alternatives. In these settings, mechanism design approaches such as matching mechanisms and auctions are often applied to guarantee fairness and efficiency while preventing agents from manipulating the outcomes. In many multiagent resource allocation problems, the use of monetary transfers or explicit markets are forbidden because of ethical or legal issues. One-sided matching mechanisms exploit various randomization and algorithmic techniques to satisfy certain desirable properties, while incentivizing self-interested agents to report their private preferences truthfully. In the first part of this thesis, we focus on deterministic and randomized matching mechanisms in one-shot settings. We investigate the class of deterministic matching mechanisms when there is a quota to be fulfilled. Building on past results in artificial intelligence and economics, we show that when preferences are lexicographic, serial dictatorship mechanisms (and their sequential dictatorship counterparts) characterize the set of all possible matching mechanisms with desirable economic properties, enabling social planners to remedy the inherent unfairness in deterministic allocation mechanisms by assigning quotas according to some fairness criteria (such as seniority or priority). Extending the quota mechanisms to randomized settings, we show that this class of mechanisms are envyfree, strategyproof, and ex post efficient for any number of agents and objects and any quota system, proving that the well-studied Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) is also envyfree in this domain. The next contribution of this thesis is providing a systemic empirical study of the two widely adopted randomized mechanisms, namely Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and the Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS). We investigate various properties of these two mechanisms such as efficiency, strategyproofness, and envyfreeness under various preference assumptions (e.g. general ordinal preferences, lexicographic preferences, and risk attitudes). The empirical findings in this thesis complement the theoretical guarantees of matching mechanisms, shedding light on practical implications of deploying each of the given mechanisms. In the second part of this thesis, we address the issues of designing truthful matching mechanisms in dynamic settings. Many multiagent domains require reasoning over time and are inherently dynamic rather than static. We initiate the study of matching problems where agents' private preferences evolve stochastically over time, and decisions have to be made in each period. To adequately evaluate the quality of outcomes in dynamic settings, we propose a generic stochastic decision process and show that, in contrast to static settings, traditional mechanisms are easily manipulable. We introduce a number of properties that we argue are important for matching mechanisms in…

Subjects/Keywords: Matching Mechanisms; Mechanism Design; Multiagent Systems; Dynamic Matching; Dynamic Preferences; Random Serial Dictatorship; Probabilistic Serial Rule; Strategyproofness

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APA (6^th Edition):

Hosseini, H. (2016). Incentives in One-Sided Matching Problems With Ordinal Preferences. (Thesis). University of Waterloo. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10012/10594

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Hosseini, Hadi. “Incentives in One-Sided Matching Problems With Ordinal Preferences.” 2016. Thesis, University of Waterloo. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10012/10594.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Hosseini, Hadi. “Incentives in One-Sided Matching Problems With Ordinal Preferences.” 2016. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Hosseini H. Incentives in One-Sided Matching Problems With Ordinal Preferences. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Waterloo; 2016. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10012/10594.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Hosseini H. Incentives in One-Sided Matching Problems With Ordinal Preferences. [Thesis]. University of Waterloo; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10012/10594

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Michigan

11. Rasouli, Mohammad. Cyber-Physical Systems Design: Electricity Markets and Network Security.

Degree: PhD, Electrical Engineering: Systems, 2018, University of Michigan

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/144165

► This thesis presents Cyber-Physical Systems Design (CPS Design). Design of CPS is challenging and requires interdisciplinary studies of engineering and economics because of the distinguishing… (more)

▼ This thesis presents Cyber-Physical Systems Design (CPS Design). Design of CPS is challenging and requires interdisciplinary studies of engineering and economics because of the distinguishing features of CPS: strategic (self profit-maximizing) decision makers, complex physical constraints, and large-scale networked systems. We study these features by focusing on designing markets with complex constraints including both policy and physical constraints, and decomposing large-scale CPS within the context of electricity markets and network security. We first study market design for implementation of complex electricity policy targets, i.e. sustainability, reliability, and price efficiency, by efficient design of spot, carbon, and capacity markets that correct the deficiencies of the current electricity markets; this design does not take into account the network constraints due to the Kirchhoff's laws. To address this problem, we develop a framework based on the design of efficient auctions with constraints. Our market design sheds light on major debates in electricity policy including capacity-and-energy vs energy-only markets, carbon market vs carbon tax, and use of price or offer caps. Second, we add network constraints due to Kirchhoff's laws of current and voltage, which are unique to electricity networks, to the design of electricity spot markets with complex physical constraints. To address this problem, we develop a framework for the design of networked markets based on the ideas from local public goods. Finally, we study the design of defense policies for large-scale network security. Our approach is to design approximately optimal defense policies that are computable. We develop a framework based on the notion of influence graph, which captures the connectivity of the security states of the system elements, to decompose the system into subsystems. We then design approximately optimal defense policies for each sub-system. We consider non-Bayesian uncertainty and even though we do not model the attacker as a strategic decision maker, we compensate (in part) for the lack of this feature by adopting a minmax performance criterion. Advisors/Committee Members: Teneketzis, Demosthenis (committee member), Ke, Shaowei (committee member), Akbarpour, Mohammad (committee member), Hiskens, Ian (committee member), Hogan, William (committee member), Milgrom, Paul (committee member), Ozdaglar, Asuman (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Cyber-Physical System, Mechanism Design, Dynamic Control, Netoworked Markets, Auctions with Constraints, Market Design, Decomposition of Large Systems; Electrical Engineering; Engineering

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APA (6^th Edition):

Rasouli, M. (2018). Cyber-Physical Systems Design: Electricity Markets and Network Security. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Michigan. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/144165

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Rasouli, Mohammad. “Cyber-Physical Systems Design: Electricity Markets and Network Security.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/144165.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Rasouli, Mohammad. “Cyber-Physical Systems Design: Electricity Markets and Network Security.” 2018. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Rasouli M. Cyber-Physical Systems Design: Electricity Markets and Network Security. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Michigan; 2018. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/144165.

Council of Science Editors:

Rasouli M. Cyber-Physical Systems Design: Electricity Markets and Network Security. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Michigan; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/144165

Indian Institute of Science

12. Nath, Swaprava. Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing.

Degree: PhD, Faculty of Engineering, 2013, Indian Institute of Science

URL: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2497

► This thesis looks into the economics of crowdsourcing using game theoretic modeling. The art of aggregating information and expertise from a diverse population has been… (more)

▼ This thesis looks into the economics of crowdsourcing using game theoretic modeling. The art of aggregating information and expertise from a diverse population has been in practice since a long time. The Internet and the revolution in communication and computational technologies have made this task easier and given birth to a new era of online resource aggregation, which is now popularly referred to as crowdsourcing. Two important features of this aggregation technique are: (a) crowdsourcing is always human driven, hence the participants are rational and intelligent, and they have a payoff function that they aim to maximize, and (b) the participants are connected over a social network which helps to reach out to a large set of individuals. To understand the behavior and the outcome of such a strategic crowd, we need to understand the economics of a crowdsourcing network. In this thesis, we have considered the following three major facets of the strategic crowdsourcing problem. (i) Elicitation of the true qualities of the crowd workers: As the crowd is often unstructured and unknown to the designer, it is important to ensure if the crowdsourced job is indeed performed at the highest quality, and this requires elicitation of the true qualities which are typically the participants' private information. (ii) Resource critical task execution ensuring the authenticity of both the information and the identity of the participants: Due to the diverse geographical, cultural, socio-economic reasons, crowdsourcing entails certain manipulations that are unusual in the classical theory. The design has to be robust enough to handle fake identities or incorrect information provided by the crowd while performing crowdsourcing contests. (iii) Improving the productive output of the crowdsourcing network: As the designer's goal is to maximize a certain measurable output of the crowdsourcing system, an interesting question is how one can design the incentive scheme and/or the network so that the system performs at an optimal level taking into account the strategic nature of the individuals. In the thesis, we design novel mechanisms to solve the problems above using game theoretic modeling. Our investigation helps in understanding certain limits of achievability, and provides design protocols in order to make crowdsourcing more reliable, effective, and productive. Advisors/Committee Members: Narahari, Y (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Mechanism Design; Game Theory; Crowdsourcing; Game Theory Modelling; Crowdsourcing Network; Crowd Workers; Dynamic Mechanism Design; Strategic Crowd; Game Theoretic Modeling; Computer and Information Science

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APA (6^th Edition):

Nath, S. (2013). Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing. (Doctoral Dissertation). Indian Institute of Science. Retrieved from http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2497

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Nath, Swaprava. “Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, Indian Institute of Science. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2497.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Nath, Swaprava. “Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing.” 2013. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Nath S. Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Indian Institute of Science; 2013. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2497.

Council of Science Editors:

Nath S. Mechanism Design For Strategic Crowdsourcing. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Indian Institute of Science; 2013. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2497

Duke University

13. Boleslavsky, Raphael. Dynamic Screening in a Long Term Relationship .

Degree: 2009, Duke University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1127

► I characterize optimal long term contracts offered by a monopolist to a buyer whose private valuation evolves according to a branching process with privately… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Economics, Theory; Dynamic Mechanism Design; Long Term Contract; Mechanism Design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Boleslavsky, R. (2009). Dynamic Screening in a Long Term Relationship . (Thesis). Duke University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1127

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Boleslavsky, Raphael. “Dynamic Screening in a Long Term Relationship .” 2009. Thesis, Duke University. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1127.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Boleslavsky, Raphael. “Dynamic Screening in a Long Term Relationship .” 2009. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Boleslavsky R. Dynamic Screening in a Long Term Relationship . [Internet] [Thesis]. Duke University; 2009. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1127.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Boleslavsky R. Dynamic Screening in a Long Term Relationship . [Thesis]. Duke University; 2009. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1127

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

14. Barreto Suarez , Carlos Alfredo. Incentives in Demand Response Program .

Degree: 2015, Universidad de los Andes

URL: http://documentodegrado.uniandes.edu.co/documentos/201110307_fecha_2013_06_26_parte_1.pdf

► En este trabajo se prueba la ineficacia (en el sentido de Pareto) del sistema eléctrico, así como su parecido con la tragedia de los comunes.… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Electricity market; dynamic pricing; game theory; mechanism design.

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APA (6^th Edition):

Barreto Suarez , C. A. (2015). Incentives in Demand Response Program . (Thesis). Universidad de los Andes. Retrieved from http://documentodegrado.uniandes.edu.co/documentos/201110307_fecha_2013_06_26_parte_1.pdf

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Barreto Suarez , Carlos Alfredo. “Incentives in Demand Response Program .” 2015. Thesis, Universidad de los Andes. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://documentodegrado.uniandes.edu.co/documentos/201110307_fecha_2013_06_26_parte_1.pdf.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Barreto Suarez , Carlos Alfredo. “Incentives in Demand Response Program .” 2015. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Barreto Suarez CA. Incentives in Demand Response Program . [Internet] [Thesis]. Universidad de los Andes; 2015. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://documentodegrado.uniandes.edu.co/documentos/201110307_fecha_2013_06_26_parte_1.pdf.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Barreto Suarez CA. Incentives in Demand Response Program . [Thesis]. Universidad de los Andes; 2015. Available from: http://documentodegrado.uniandes.edu.co/documentos/201110307_fecha_2013_06_26_parte_1.pdf

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Indian Institute of Science

15. Prakash, Gujar Sujit. Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings.

Degree: PhD, Faculty of Engineering, 2012, Indian Institute of Science

URL: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/1654

► Allocation of objects or resources to competing agents is a ubiquitous problem in the real world. For example, a federal government may wish to allocate… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Investments (Economics)- Allocation; Mechanism Design Theory; Heterogeneous Objects; Dynamic House Allocation; Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions; Optimal Combinatorial Auctions; Dynamic Matching; Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms; Two-Sided Markets; Financial Economics

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Prakash, G. S. (2012). Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings. (Doctoral Dissertation). Indian Institute of Science. Retrieved from http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/1654

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Prakash, Gujar Sujit. “Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings.” 2012. Doctoral Dissertation, Indian Institute of Science. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/1654.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Prakash, Gujar Sujit. “Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings.” 2012. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Prakash GS. Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Indian Institute of Science; 2012. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/1654.

Council of Science Editors:

Prakash GS. Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Indian Institute of Science; 2012. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/1654

Delft University of Technology

16. Jalilzadeh, B. (author). Employing Mechanism Design for the Online Allocation of Items.

Degree: Electrical Engineering, Mathematics, Computer Sci, Computer Science, 2009, Delft University of Technology

URL: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:8ef36410-06c2-4372-a9fe-e0e45b264a73

►

A fundamental problem in online mechanism design is how to deal with agents that arrive and depart over time. Possible approaches that deal with this… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: house allocation; mechanism design; online dynamic; top trading cycle; pareto optimailty

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APA (6^th Edition):

Jalilzadeh, B. (. (2009). Employing Mechanism Design for the Online Allocation of Items. (Masters Thesis). Delft University of Technology. Retrieved from http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:8ef36410-06c2-4372-a9fe-e0e45b264a73

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Jalilzadeh, B (author). “Employing Mechanism Design for the Online Allocation of Items.” 2009. Masters Thesis, Delft University of Technology. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:8ef36410-06c2-4372-a9fe-e0e45b264a73.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Jalilzadeh, B (author). “Employing Mechanism Design for the Online Allocation of Items.” 2009. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Jalilzadeh B(. Employing Mechanism Design for the Online Allocation of Items. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2009. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:8ef36410-06c2-4372-a9fe-e0e45b264a73.

Council of Science Editors:

Jalilzadeh B(. Employing Mechanism Design for the Online Allocation of Items. [Masters Thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2009. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:8ef36410-06c2-4372-a9fe-e0e45b264a73

17. MARIAN MIHAILESCU. Strategy-proof resource pricing in federated systems.

Degree: 2012, National University of Singapore

URL: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/34323

Subjects/Keywords: federated clouds; resource allocation; dynamic resource pricing; strategy-proof; mechanism design; rationality

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APA (6^th Edition):

MIHAILESCU, M. (2012). Strategy-proof resource pricing in federated systems. (Thesis). National University of Singapore. Retrieved from http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/34323

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

MIHAILESCU, MARIAN. “Strategy-proof resource pricing in federated systems.” 2012. Thesis, National University of Singapore. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/34323.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

MIHAILESCU, MARIAN. “Strategy-proof resource pricing in federated systems.” 2012. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

MIHAILESCU M. Strategy-proof resource pricing in federated systems. [Internet] [Thesis]. National University of Singapore; 2012. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/34323.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

MIHAILESCU M. Strategy-proof resource pricing in federated systems. [Thesis]. National University of Singapore; 2012. Available from: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/34323

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

18. WANG ZIJIA. ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN.

Degree: 2020, National University of Singapore

URL: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/168897

Subjects/Keywords: Dynamic mechanism design; price search; information disclosure; public signal; Electoral College; Popular Vote

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APA (6^th Edition):

ZIJIA, W. (2020). ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN. (Thesis). National University of Singapore. Retrieved from https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/168897

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

ZIJIA, WANG. “ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN.” 2020. Thesis, National University of Singapore. Accessed January 21, 2021. https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/168897.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

ZIJIA, WANG. “ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN.” 2020. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

ZIJIA W. ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN. [Internet] [Thesis]. National University of Singapore; 2020. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/168897.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

ZIJIA W. ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN. [Thesis]. National University of Singapore; 2020. Available from: https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/168897

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Delft University of Technology

19. Scharpff, J.C.D. Collective Decision Making through Self-regulation: Mechanisms and Algorithms for Self-regulation in Decision-Theoretic Planning.

Degree: 2020, Delft University of Technology

URL: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; urn:NBN:nl:ui:24-uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; 63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; 10.4233/uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; urn:isbn:978-90-5584-274-2 ; urn:NBN:nl:ui:24-uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d

► This thesis explores the potential of self-regulation in collective decision making to align interests and optimise joint performance. Demonstrated in the domain of road maintenance… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Self-regulation; Decision-theoretic planning under uncertainty; Dynamic mechanism design; Serious gaming

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APA (6^th Edition):

Scharpff, J. C. D. (2020). Collective Decision Making through Self-regulation: Mechanisms and Algorithms for Self-regulation in Decision-Theoretic Planning. (Doctoral Dissertation). Delft University of Technology. Retrieved from http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; urn:NBN:nl:ui:24-uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; 63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; 10.4233/uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; urn:isbn:978-90-5584-274-2 ; urn:NBN:nl:ui:24-uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Scharpff, J C D. “Collective Decision Making through Self-regulation: Mechanisms and Algorithms for Self-regulation in Decision-Theoretic Planning.” 2020. Doctoral Dissertation, Delft University of Technology. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; urn:NBN:nl:ui:24-uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; 63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; 10.4233/uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; urn:isbn:978-90-5584-274-2 ; urn:NBN:nl:ui:24-uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Scharpff, J C D. “Collective Decision Making through Self-regulation: Mechanisms and Algorithms for Self-regulation in Decision-Theoretic Planning.” 2020. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Scharpff JCD. Collective Decision Making through Self-regulation: Mechanisms and Algorithms for Self-regulation in Decision-Theoretic Planning. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Delft University of Technology; 2020. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; urn:NBN:nl:ui:24-uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; 63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; 10.4233/uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; urn:isbn:978-90-5584-274-2 ; urn:NBN:nl:ui:24-uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d.

Council of Science Editors:

Scharpff JCD. Collective Decision Making through Self-regulation: Mechanisms and Algorithms for Self-regulation in Decision-Theoretic Planning. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Delft University of Technology; 2020. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; urn:NBN:nl:ui:24-uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; 63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; 10.4233/uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; urn:isbn:978-90-5584-274-2 ; urn:NBN:nl:ui:24-uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d ; http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:63d60259-e0bf-4852-b38b-c1157c390b0d

20. Ungureanu, Sergiu. Essays on Prospect Theory, Dynamic Contracting and Procurement .

Degree: 2013, Duke University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/7246

► This dissertation collects work concerning the way individuals deal with imperfect information, both related to their knowledge of themselves and of others. The second… (more)

▼ This dissertation collects work concerning the way individuals deal with imperfect information, both related to their knowledge of themselves and of others. The second chapter shows that bounded rationality, in the form of limited knowledge of utility, is an explanation for common stylized facts of prospect theory like loss aversion, status quo bias and non-linear probability weighting. Locally limited utility knowledge is considered within a classical demand model framework, suggesting that costs of inefficient search for optimal consumption will produce a value function that obeys the loss aversion axiom of Tversky and Kahneman (1991). Moreover, since this adjustment happens over time, new predictions are made that explain why the status quo bias is reinforced over time. This search can also describe the behavior of a consumer facing an uncertain future wealth level. The search cost justifies non-linear forms of probability weighting. The effects that have been observed in experiments will follow as a consequence. The third chapter looks to understand how firms create and maintain long term relationships with consumers, or how procurement relations evolve over time, by studying a dynamic variant of the classical two-type-buyer contract in mechanism design. It is less trivial and more interesting if the utility determinant (or utility type) is not fixed or completely random, and fair assumptions are that it is either stochastic, or given by a distribution whose parameters are common knowledge. The first approach is that of Battaglini (2005), while the second is pursued in this paper. With two possible types of buyers, the buyer more likely to have a high utility type will receive the first-best allocations, while the other will receive the first best only if he has the high utility type. The last chapter analyzes a dynamic procurement setting with promise keeping, where two firms (agents) with private information on their costs contract competitively with a principal. To this end, two models are proposed and the optimal allocations are determined. The agents face liquidity constraints, which induce distortions when high marginal costs are reported. We deduce that the principal uses promised utilities to incentivize the agents, which act as state variables in the recursive maximization problem. High cost types are allocated less than efficient quantities and the inefficiency of the allocation is relieved as the promised utilities increase. Advisors/Committee Members: Taylor, Curtis (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Economics; behavioral economics; contracting; dynamic mechanisms; mechanism design; procurement

…reasons for inefficiency. The relationships between buyers and sellers are often dynamic in… …how a principal will design a contract in a situation when there is a permanent partially… …the dynamic contract cannot be reduced to offering a repetition of the same single period… …proposes a general search mechanism in continuous time and proves central results. Section 2.3… …mechanism to make this point. Costly search will generate a reference dependent value function…

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Ungureanu, S. (2013). Essays on Prospect Theory, Dynamic Contracting and Procurement . (Thesis). Duke University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10161/7246

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Ungureanu, Sergiu. “Essays on Prospect Theory, Dynamic Contracting and Procurement .” 2013. Thesis, Duke University. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10161/7246.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Ungureanu, Sergiu. “Essays on Prospect Theory, Dynamic Contracting and Procurement .” 2013. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Ungureanu S. Essays on Prospect Theory, Dynamic Contracting and Procurement . [Internet] [Thesis]. Duke University; 2013. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/7246.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Ungureanu S. Essays on Prospect Theory, Dynamic Contracting and Procurement . [Thesis]. Duke University; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/7246

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

21. Krishnappa, Chinmayi. Unit-demand auctions : bridging theory and practice.

Degree: PhD, Computer Science, 2011, University of Texas – Austin

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-12-4829

► Unit-demand auctions have been well studied with applications in several areas. In this dissertation, we discuss new variants of the unit-demand auction that are motivated… (more)

▼ Unit-demand auctions have been well studied with applications in several areas. In this dissertation, we discuss new variants of the unit-demand auction that are motivated by practical applications. We design mechanisms for these variants that have strong properties related to truthfulness, efficiency, scalability, and privacy. The main contributions of this dissertation can be divided into two parts. In the first part, we introduce a new variant of the classic sealed-bid unit-demand auction in which each item is associated with a put option; the put option of an item gives the seller the right to sell the item at a specified strike price to a specified bidder, regardless of market conditions. We motivate our unit-demand auction setting by discussing applications to the reassignment of leases, and to the design of multi-round auctions. For the classic sealed-bid unit-demand framework, the VCG mechanism provides a truthful auction with strong associated guarantees, including efficiency and envy-freedom. For an item in our auction, the strike price of the associated put imposes a lower bound on the auction price. Due to these lower bound constraints on auction prices, we find that the VCG mechanism is not suitable for our setting. Instead, our work draws on two fundamental techniques, one from the realm of mechanism design for numerical preferences – the dynamic unit-demand approximate auction of Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor – and one from the realm of mechanism design for ordinal preferences – the Top Trading Cycles algorithm – to obtain a natural auction that satisfies the lower bound constraints on auction prices. While we cannot, in general, achieve either efficiency or envy-freedom in our setting, our auction achieves suitably relaxed versions of these properties. For example, this auction is envy-free for all bidders who do not acquire an item via the exercise of a put. We provide a polynomial time implementation of this auction. By breaking ties in an appropriate manner, we are able to prove that this auction is truthful. In the second part, we specify rules for a dynamic unit-demand auction that supports arbitrary bid revision. In each round, the dynamic auction takes a tentative allocation and pricing as part of the input, and allows each bidder – including a tentatively allocated bidder – to submit an arbitrary unit-demand bid. Each round of our dynamic auction is implemented via a single application of the sealed-bid unit-demand auction proposed in the first part. We show that our dynamic auction satisfies strong properties related to truthfulness and efficiency. Using a certain privacy preservation property of each round of the auction, we show that the overall dynamic auction is highly resistant to shilling. We present a fast algorithm for implementing the proposed auction. Using this algorithm, the amortized cost of processing each bidding operation is upper bounded by the complexity of solving a single-source shortest paths problem on a graph with nonnegative edge weights and a node for each item… Advisors/Committee Members: Plaxton, C. Greg (advisor), Gal, Anna (committee member), Klivans, Adam (committee member), Stone, Peter (committee member), Vishwanath, Sriram (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Auction design; Dynamic; unit-demand; Mechanism design; Sniping; Shill bidding; Game theory

…techniques, one from the realm of mechanism design for numerical preferences — the dynamic unit… …one from the realm of mechanism design for numerical preferences — the dynamic unit-demand… …mechanism design for ordinal preferences — the Top Trading Cycles algorithm — to obtain a natural… …sealed-bid unit-demand auction from the first part to design a dynamic unit-demand auction that… …demand auction. A natural third application of our auction is in the design of a dynamic unit…

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APA (6^th Edition):

Krishnappa, C. (2011). Unit-demand auctions : bridging theory and practice. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Texas – Austin. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-12-4829

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Krishnappa, Chinmayi. “Unit-demand auctions : bridging theory and practice.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Texas – Austin. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-12-4829.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Krishnappa, Chinmayi. “Unit-demand auctions : bridging theory and practice.” 2011. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Krishnappa C. Unit-demand auctions : bridging theory and practice. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Texas – Austin; 2011. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-12-4829.

Council of Science Editors:

Krishnappa C. Unit-demand auctions : bridging theory and practice. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Texas – Austin; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-12-4829

22. Chiambretto, Anne-Sarah. Approches volontaires et régulation environnementale : une perspective normative : Voluntary approaches to environmental regulation : a normative perspective.

Degree: Docteur es, Sciences économiques, 2014, Aix Marseille Université

URL: http://www.theses.fr/2014AIXM2012

►

Cette thèse s'articule autour de trois propositions de représentation de la structure incitationnelle qui sous-tend les contextes de régulation environnementale dans lesquels les agents producteurs… (more)

▼

Cette thèse s'articule autour de trois propositions de représentation de la structure incitationnelle qui sous-tend les contextes de régulation environnementale dans lesquels les agents producteurs de l'externalité adoptent des comportements proactifs pour devancer et prévenir la mise en place d'une éventuelle mesure contraignante par l'autorité régulatrice. Ces trois propositions sont faites dans une perspective normative, i.e. en considérant que l'autorité régulatrice peut jouer sur les modalités et résultats de l'autorégulation des agents par le moyen de menaces, d'effets d'annonce, pour d'induire les comportements souhaités, et atteindre l'efficacité environnementale et/ou de coût. Les mécanismes étudiés sont regroupés sous une dénomination commune d' 'approche volontaire collective préventive' (AVCP). La menace, sous la forme d'une taxe unitaire en cas de non-atteinte volontaire d'un objectif environnemental, est au centre de résultats de la thèse. D'abord dans un jeu statique d'émission (premier essai), ensuite dans un jeu différentiel d'extraction (second essai), et enfin, dans un jeu général de participation à l'AVCP (troisième essai). Dans chacun des contextes de régulation environnementale décrits, cette taxe est formalisée comme endogène, ce qui permet de considérer les AVCP comme de réels instruments de régulation, rejoignant la famille des outils dits basés sur les incitations.

This dissertation consists of three essays on the specific incentive structure that underlies regulation contexts in which the agents generating an environmental externality self-regulate in order to preempt the enforcement of a mandatory policy by a regulatory agency. The three essays take a normative perspective, i.e. investigate the way the regulatory agency may induce efficient proactive behavior by the mean of purposely designed threat and announcement effects. Such mechanisms fall under the common denomination of 'collective voluntary-threat policies' (CVTP). The three essays' results focus on the threat, formalized as a unit tax that is said to be implemented by the regulator if the environmental target is not reached voluntarily : first in a two-stage and static emission game (first essay) ; then in a differential extraction game (second essay) ; finally in a general participation game to the CVTP (third essay). In each framework, the tax is considered as endogenous, and thereby, the CVTP being studied as part of the Incentive-Based Regulatory Approaches.

Advisors/Committee Members: Stahn, Hubert (thesis director).

Subjects/Keywords: Approches volontaires; Régulation environnementale; Jeux dynamiques; Contrôle optimal; Économie des ressources naturelles; Pêcheries; Mécanismes d'incitation; Auto-Régulation; Voluntary Approaches; Environmental Regulation; Dynamic games; Optimal Control; Natural Resource Economics; Fisheries; Mechanism design; Self regulation

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APA (6^th Edition):

Chiambretto, A. (2014). Approches volontaires et régulation environnementale : une perspective normative : Voluntary approaches to environmental regulation : a normative perspective. (Doctoral Dissertation). Aix Marseille Université. Retrieved from http://www.theses.fr/2014AIXM2012

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Chiambretto, Anne-Sarah. “Approches volontaires et régulation environnementale : une perspective normative : Voluntary approaches to environmental regulation : a normative perspective.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, Aix Marseille Université. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://www.theses.fr/2014AIXM2012.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Chiambretto, Anne-Sarah. “Approches volontaires et régulation environnementale : une perspective normative : Voluntary approaches to environmental regulation : a normative perspective.” 2014. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Chiambretto A. Approches volontaires et régulation environnementale : une perspective normative : Voluntary approaches to environmental regulation : a normative perspective. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Aix Marseille Université 2014. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://www.theses.fr/2014AIXM2012.

Council of Science Editors:

Chiambretto A. Approches volontaires et régulation environnementale : une perspective normative : Voluntary approaches to environmental regulation : a normative perspective. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Aix Marseille Université 2014. Available from: http://www.theses.fr/2014AIXM2012

23. LIU BIN. ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN.

Degree: 2015, National University of Singapore

URL: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/121977

Subjects/Keywords: (Dynamic) Mechanism Design; Adverse Selection; Moral Hazard; Optimal Contest; Endogenous Entry; Research and Development

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APA (6^th Edition):

BIN, L. (2015). ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN. (Thesis). National University of Singapore. Retrieved from http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/121977

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

BIN, LIU. “ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN.” 2015. Thesis, National University of Singapore. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/121977.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

BIN, LIU. “ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN.” 2015. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

BIN L. ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN. [Internet] [Thesis]. National University of Singapore; 2015. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/121977.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

BIN L. ESSAYS ON MECHANISM DESIGN. [Thesis]. National University of Singapore; 2015. Available from: http://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/121977

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Melbourne

24. Muir, Ellen Victoria. Optimal market thickness and market design.

Degree: 2017, University of Melbourne

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/177358

► In this thesis we primarily focus on developing tractable dynamic market models, together with applications of these models. We also address several open questions concerning… (more)

▼ In this thesis we primarily focus on developing tractable dynamic market models, together with applications of these models. We also address several open questions concerning the statistical properties of static market models. The original research contained in this thesis begins when we define a new distribution, called a general non-central hypergeometric distribution, which models biased sampling without replacement. We then consider a classic mechanism design market model with unit traders in which buyer valuations and seller costs are independent and, on each side of the market, identically distributed. We show that the equilibrium quantity traded has a general non-central hypergeometric distribution under a broad class of mechanisms, where the sampling bias encodes information about the distribution of buyer values relative to seller costs, strategic behaviour of market participants and rent extraction by the market intermediary. We then extend this work by developing a general approach to approximating outcomes in large markets. In particular, we show that the joint distribution of the equilibrium quantity traded and welfare is asymptotically normal, compute the parameters of the approximating normal distribution and bound the approximation rate. We then turn our attention to dynamic market models in which traders with persistent types arrive over time and focus on optimally assessing the tradeoff between the benefits of increasing market thickness and the cost of delay. We start by considering a two-period extension of the classic model of Myerson and Satterthwaite and derive the class of Bayesian optimal mechanisms. Investigating the properties of these mechanisms, we compare them to benchmark static mechanisms and find that dynamics tends to increase the convexity of the region of trade in period one. Motivated by the computational complexity of these optimal mechanisms, we consider approximate implementation in the form of a price-posting mechanism, before turning our attention to models with simpler type spaces. Finally, we consider an infinite-horizon market model in which agents have binary type spaces. Assuming that a buyer-seller pair arrives in each period and agents are privately informed about their types, we introduce notions of dynamic efficiency and optimality and construct the class of Bayesian optimal mechanisms. We demonstrate that, provided the discount factor is sufficiently large, a profit-maximising two-sided platform creates higher welfare compared to a less centralised, welfare-targeting market maker. Further, the main benefits from dynamic mechanisms are reaped by clearing markets at fixed, optimally chosen frequencies. We consider a variety of economic applications including in-house production by the designer, taxation policy and asymptotically optimal prior-free mechanisms. With minor qualifications (including a dynamic generalisation of Myerson regularity), our analysis and main results apply to more general arrival processes and type spaces.

Subjects/Keywords: general non-central hypergeometric distribution; order statistics; two-sided market design; two-sided private information; Bayesian optimal mechanism; large markets; bilateral trade, impossibility theorem; market thickness; dynamic efficiency; two-sided platform; order book

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APA (6^th Edition):

Muir, E. V. (2017). Optimal market thickness and market design. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Melbourne. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11343/177358

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Muir, Ellen Victoria. “Optimal market thickness and market design.” 2017. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Melbourne. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11343/177358.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Muir, Ellen Victoria. “Optimal market thickness and market design.” 2017. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Muir EV. Optimal market thickness and market design. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Melbourne; 2017. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/177358.

Council of Science Editors:

Muir EV. Optimal market thickness and market design. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Melbourne; 2017. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/177358

University of Pennsylvania

25. Penta, Antonio. Incomplete Information and Robustness in Strategic Environments.

Degree: 2010, University of Pennsylvania

URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/134

► Game theoretic modeling involves making assumptions on agents' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. These assumptions are understood to be only approximately satisfied in the actual situation.… (more)

▼ Game theoretic modeling involves making assumptions on agents' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. These assumptions are understood to be only approximately satisfied in the actual situation. Thus, the significance of game theoretic predictions depend on robustness properties of the solution concepts adopted. Chapter 1 discusses recent results in this research area and their relations with the results obtained in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 explores the impact of misspecification of higher order beliefs in static environments, when arbitrary common knowledge assumptions on payoffs are relaxed. (Existing literature focuses on the extreme case in which all such assumptions are relaxed.) Chapter 3 provides a characterization of the strongest predictions, for dynamic games, that are "robust" to possible misspecifications of agents' higher order beliefs, and shows that such characterization depends on modeling assumptions that have hitherto received little attention in the literature (namely, the distinction between knowledge and certainty), raising novel questions of robustness. Chapter 4 develops a methodology to address classical questions of implementation, when agents' beliefs are unknown to the designer and their private information changes over time. The key idea is the identification of a solution concept that allows a tractable analysis of the full implementation problem: Full "robust" implementation requires that, for all models of agents' beliefs, all the perfect Bayesian equilibria of a mechanism induce outcomes consistent with the social choice function (SCF). It is shown that, for a weaker notion of equilibrium and for a general class of games, the set of all such equilibria can be computed by means of a "backwards procedure" that combines the logic of rationalizability and backward induction reasoning. It is further shown that a SCF is (partially) implementable for all models of beliefs if and only if it is ex-post incentive compatible. In environments with single crossing preferences, strict ex-post incentive compatibility and a "contraction property" are sufficient to guarantee full robust implementation in direct mechanisms. This property limits the interdependence in agents' valuations.

Subjects/Keywords: Robustness; Mechanism Design; Robust Implementation; Dynamic Games; Incomplete Information; Rationalizability; Hierarchies of beliefs; Economic Theory

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Penta, A. (2010). Incomplete Information and Robustness in Strategic Environments. (Thesis). University of Pennsylvania. Retrieved from https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/134

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Penta, Antonio. “Incomplete Information and Robustness in Strategic Environments.” 2010. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania. Accessed January 21, 2021. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/134.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Penta, Antonio. “Incomplete Information and Robustness in Strategic Environments.” 2010. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Penta A. Incomplete Information and Robustness in Strategic Environments. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Pennsylvania; 2010. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/134.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Penta A. Incomplete Information and Robustness in Strategic Environments. [Thesis]. University of Pennsylvania; 2010. Available from: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/134

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Florida

26. Wu, Benjamin. Utilizing Mechanism-Based Pharmacokinetic and Pharmacodynamic Models to Understand and Overcome Antibiotic Resistance.

Degree: PhD, Pharmaceutical Sciences - Pharmaceutics, 2010, University of Florida

URL: https://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0042293

► The emergence of antimicrobial resistance poses a critical challenge to public health in the 21st century. The current practice to treat microbes relies on single… (more)

▼ The emergence of antimicrobial resistance poses a critical challenge to public health in the 21st century. The current practice to treat microbes relies on single minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) data to define the optimal clinical dose. This over simplified approach disregards the adaptive nature of microbial response, which leads to emergence of drug resistant microbes over time. In order to overcome antimicrobial resistance, the time course relationships of drug and microbial behavior must first be delineated. In this dissertation, the development of novel mechanism-based pharmacokinetic/ pharmacodynamic (PKPD) models was described using new molecular and genetic findings. The resulting mathematical models provide insight into the complex PKPD relationships necessary to optimize antimicrobial treatments. The two hypotheses tested were dormant and compensatory mutation hypotheses. A thorough model selection process identified the compensatory mutation model to the best model to describe the PKPD relationship. Dynamic kill-curve experiments were conducted for ciprofloxacin against a clinical isolate of Pseudomonas aeruginosa to further test the PKPD models. Aminoglycosides, but not most ?-lactams, appeared to retain the bactericidal activities against the emerged resistant strains following ciprofloxacin treatment. The induction of resistance was not limited to ciprofloxacin as shown with aztreonam. The PD model was applied to a clinical study of ceftobiprole in healthy volunteers. The free fraction of drugs collected in several tissues in this study using microdialysis techniques were used to develop a novel population PBPK model. Target attainments using relevant tissue data were predicted for various dosing schemes. Model also implied one-hour intravenous infusion can produce similar PD effects as two-hour IV infusion. Scenarios of resistance were simulated by combining the PD model with the population PBPK model to explore dosing strategy in case of resistance development. In summary, mechanism-based PKPD model was developed to test hypotheses, design laboratory experiments, and predict clinical drug resistance scenarios. Dynamic kill-curve revealed that aminoglycoside favorably suppress the resistant subpopulations emerged from ciprofloxacin treatment. ( en ) Advisors/Committee Members: Derendorf, Hartmut C. (committee chair), Peloquin, Charles Arthur (committee member), Palmieri, Anthony (committee member), Rand, Kenneth H. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Antimicrobials; Dosage; Drug design; Modeling; Parametric models; Plasmas; Population estimates; Population growth rate; Resistance mechanisms; Statistical models; antimicrobial, ciprofloxacin, dynamic, mechanism, pharmacodynamic, pharmacokinetic, pseudonomas

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APA (6^th Edition):

Wu, B. (2010). Utilizing Mechanism-Based Pharmacokinetic and Pharmacodynamic Models to Understand and Overcome Antibiotic Resistance. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Florida. Retrieved from https://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0042293

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Wu, Benjamin. “Utilizing Mechanism-Based Pharmacokinetic and Pharmacodynamic Models to Understand and Overcome Antibiotic Resistance.” 2010. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Florida. Accessed January 21, 2021. https://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0042293.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Wu, Benjamin. “Utilizing Mechanism-Based Pharmacokinetic and Pharmacodynamic Models to Understand and Overcome Antibiotic Resistance.” 2010. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Wu B. Utilizing Mechanism-Based Pharmacokinetic and Pharmacodynamic Models to Understand and Overcome Antibiotic Resistance. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Florida; 2010. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: https://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0042293.

Council of Science Editors:

Wu B. Utilizing Mechanism-Based Pharmacokinetic and Pharmacodynamic Models to Understand and Overcome Antibiotic Resistance. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Florida; 2010. Available from: https://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0042293

27. She, Yu. Compliant robotic arms for inherently safe physical human-robot interaction.

Degree: PhD, Mechanical Engineering, 2018, The Ohio State University

URL: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1541335591178684

► In recent years, an increasing interest from researchers has been drawn to collaborative robots, which are intentionally designed for physical interaction with human beings and… (more)

▼ In recent years, an increasing interest from researchers has been drawn to collaborative robots, which are intentionally designed for physical interaction with human beings and bring safety concerns to prominent issues. Intentionally introducing compliance to the mechanical structure can increase safety when an impact occurs during a physical Human-Robot Interaction (pHRI). Mechanical compliance of a robot manipulator can be from a compliant joint (CJ) or compliant link (CL), while the former has been widely studied, the latter is much less explored for safe pHRI. This study compares the CJ and CL design in terms of the safety of pHRI, and concludes the CL design could generate a lighter injury than that of the CJ design given the same parameters. In addition, it is found that the CL design has better control and dynamic performance quantified by a larger natural frequency and a larger bandwidth comparing with those of the CJ design. Therefore, this work will focus on the CL design for safe pHRI.A shape optimization framework is developed to design a CL with variable stiffness for safe pHRI. The proposed variable width link takes full advantage of the link rigidity while keeps inherent safety during pHRI. In addition, a shape morphing approach is developed to design a CL with tunable stiffness for safe pHRI. The proposed robotic links are relatively stiffness at slow motions of the robot for maximum performance and highly compliant at rapid motions for maximum safety.Static and dynamic models of the CLs are derived and verified by finite element analysis (FEA). To achieve a high efficiency and accuracy of the dynamic model, a mass-parameter optimization framework is developed for the pseudo-rigid-body (PRB) model. The proposed optimized PRB model can rapidly and precisely predict statics, kinematics, and dynamics for compliant mechanisms.A pHRI platform is then studied from the perspective of both theoretical model and experimental setup. The model provides general guidelines for selecting design parameters for the pHRI platform to achieve desired requirements, and the experimental platform validates the model and demonstrates that the CL design can increase safety for pHRI.This study explores the CL design with variable stiffness for safe pHRI, and expands the research arena with respect to human-safe robot design. The proposed CL designs hold the advantages of larger bandwidth and fewer injury consequences than those of the CJ designs. The developed dynamic model (optimized PRB model) of the CL design has great advantages on economic calculation. The grandly shortened computation of the dynamics model is beneficial for real-time control. The whole pHRI model can be used for evaluations of selected design parameters and provides guidance to customize designs for critical requirements.

Subjects/Keywords: Mechanical Engineering; Robotics; Design; Physical human-robot interaction, Variable stiffness link, Compliant joint, Compliant link, Mechanism design, Pseudo-Rigid body model, Static modeling, Dynamic modeling

…developed the dynamic model of a compliant linear-motion mechanism using the Lagrange equation. In… …Experimental Verification . . . . . . . 2.4.1 Experiment Principle . . . . . . 2.4.2 Hardware Design… …3. Design of Compliant Links with Variable Stiffness . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.1… …Mechanical Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Design a Variable Stiffness Link via… …Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Design a Tunable Stiffness Link via Shape…

10 more images…

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APA (6^th Edition):

She, Y. (2018). Compliant robotic arms for inherently safe physical human-robot interaction. (Doctoral Dissertation). The Ohio State University. Retrieved from http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1541335591178684

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

She, Yu. “Compliant robotic arms for inherently safe physical human-robot interaction.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, The Ohio State University. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1541335591178684.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

She, Yu. “Compliant robotic arms for inherently safe physical human-robot interaction.” 2018. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

She Y. Compliant robotic arms for inherently safe physical human-robot interaction. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. The Ohio State University; 2018. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1541335591178684.

Council of Science Editors:

She Y. Compliant robotic arms for inherently safe physical human-robot interaction. [Doctoral Dissertation]. The Ohio State University; 2018. Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1541335591178684

Université de Montréal

28. Tatoutchoup, Francis Didier. Essais sur la gestion des ressources forestières.

Degree: 2011, Université de Montréal

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/5102

Subjects/Keywords: Règle de Faustmann; Faustmann rule; Rotation optimale; Optimal forest rotation; Asymétrie d’information; Dynamic contracts; Redevance; Mechanism design; Valeur interdépendante; Auction; Enchère; Adverse selection; Contrats de gré à gré; Recycling; Recyclage; Land allocation; Allocation du terrain; Alternative uses; Contrats récursifs; Economics - Theory / Économie - Théorie (UMI : 0511)

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APA (6^th Edition):

Tatoutchoup, F. D. (2011). Essais sur la gestion des ressources forestières. (Thesis). Université de Montréal. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1866/5102

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Tatoutchoup, Francis Didier. “Essais sur la gestion des ressources forestières.” 2011. Thesis, Université de Montréal. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/5102.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Tatoutchoup, Francis Didier. “Essais sur la gestion des ressources forestières.” 2011. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Tatoutchoup FD. Essais sur la gestion des ressources forestières. [Internet] [Thesis]. Université de Montréal; 2011. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/5102.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Tatoutchoup FD. Essais sur la gestion des ressources forestières. [Thesis]. Université de Montréal; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/5102

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Université de Montréal

29. Coinçon, Mathieu. Étude structure-fonction des fructose-1,6-bisphosphate aldolases métallo-dépendantes : mécanisme catalytique et développement d’antimicrobiens.

Degree: 2011, Université de Montréal

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/5110

Subjects/Keywords: aldolase glycolitique; glycolitic aldolase; mécanisme catalytique; catalytic mechanism; clivage du substrat; substrate cleavage; condensation aldolique; aldol condensation; transfert de proton stéréospécifique; stereospecific proton transfer; développement de composés antimicrobiens; drug-design; radiocristallographie; crystallography; diffraction macromoléculaire des rayons X; macromolecular X-ray diffraction; Dynamique moléculaire; molecular dynamic; Biology - Molecular / Biologie - Biologie moléculaire (UMI : 0307)

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APA (6^th Edition):

Coinçon, M. (2011). Étude structure-fonction des fructose-1,6-bisphosphate aldolases métallo-dépendantes : mécanisme catalytique et développement d’antimicrobiens. (Thesis). Université de Montréal. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1866/5110

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Coinçon, Mathieu. “Étude structure-fonction des fructose-1,6-bisphosphate aldolases métallo-dépendantes : mécanisme catalytique et développement d’antimicrobiens.” 2011. Thesis, Université de Montréal. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/5110.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Coinçon, Mathieu. “Étude structure-fonction des fructose-1,6-bisphosphate aldolases métallo-dépendantes : mécanisme catalytique et développement d’antimicrobiens.” 2011. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Coinçon M. Étude structure-fonction des fructose-1,6-bisphosphate aldolases métallo-dépendantes : mécanisme catalytique et développement d’antimicrobiens. [Internet] [Thesis]. Université de Montréal; 2011. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/5110.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Coinçon M. Étude structure-fonction des fructose-1,6-bisphosphate aldolases métallo-dépendantes : mécanisme catalytique et développement d’antimicrobiens. [Thesis]. Université de Montréal; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/5110

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

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