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You searched for subject:(Dynamic House Allocation). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

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Indian Institute of Science

1. Prakash, Gujar Sujit. Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings.

Degree: PhD, Faculty of Engineering, 2012, Indian Institute of Science

Allocation of objects or resources to competing agents is a ubiquitous problem in the real world. For example, a federal government may wish to allocate different types of spectrum licenses to telecom service providers; a search engine has to assign different sponsored slots to the ads of advertisers; etc. The agents involved in such situations have private preferences over the allocations. The agents, being strategic, may manipulate the allocation procedure to get a favourable allocation. If the objects to be allocated are heterogeneous (rather than homogeneous), the problem becomes quite complex. The allocation problem becomes even more formidable in the presence of a dynamic supply and/or demand. This doctoral work is motivated by such problems involving strategic agents, heterogeneous objects, and dynamic supply and/or demand. In this thesis, we model such problems in a standard game theoretic setting and use mechanism design to propose novel solutions to the problems. We extend the current state-of-the-art in a non-trivial way by solving the following problems: Optimal combinatorial auctions with single minded bidders, generalizing the existing methods to take into account multiple units of heterogeneous objects Multi-armed bandit mechanisms for sponsored search auctions with multiple slots, generalizing the current methods that only consider a single slot. Strategyproof redistribution mechanisms for heterogeneous objects, expanding the scope of the current state of practice beyond homogeneous objects Online allocation mechanisms without money for one-sided and two-sided matching markets, extending the existing methods for static settings. Advisors/Committee Members: Narahari, Y (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Investments (Economics)- Allocation; Mechanism Design Theory; Heterogeneous Objects; Dynamic House Allocation; Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions; Optimal Combinatorial Auctions; Dynamic Matching; Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms; Two-Sided Markets; Financial Economics

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Prakash, G. S. (2012). Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings. (Doctoral Dissertation). Indian Institute of Science. Retrieved from http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/1654

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Prakash, Gujar Sujit. “Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings.” 2012. Doctoral Dissertation, Indian Institute of Science. Accessed October 26, 2020. http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/1654.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Prakash, Gujar Sujit. “Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings.” 2012. Web. 26 Oct 2020.

Vancouver:

Prakash GS. Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Indian Institute of Science; 2012. [cited 2020 Oct 26]. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/1654.

Council of Science Editors:

Prakash GS. Novel Mechanisms For Allocation Of Heterogeneous Items In Strategic Settings. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Indian Institute of Science; 2012. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/1654


Delft University of Technology

2. Jalilzadeh, B. (author). Employing Mechanism Design for the Online Allocation of Items.

Degree: Electrical Engineering, Mathematics, Computer Sci, Computer Science, 2009, Delft University of Technology

A fundamental problem in online mechanism design is how to deal with agents that arrive and depart over time. Possible approaches that deal with this problem can roughly be split up into two parts: online mechanism design with and without monetary payments. By far, most research until now has focussed on the former of the two. Our main contribution is to the field of online mechanism design without money, where agents are allowed to trade items with other agents, in an attempt to improve their own allocation. In an off-line context, this problem is known as the House Allocation Problem (HAP). We present a general framework that extends HAP to an online problem, and call it the Time Slot Reservation Problem (TSRP). A key issue in both HAP and TSRP is that we want to reallocate items that are owned by agents, rather than the mechanism. As a consequence, agents are capable of blocking the outcome of a mechanism by not relinquishing their allocation. We present an algorithm, called the Time Slot Shifting Algorithm (TSSA), that takes this intricacy into account. A mechanism that uses TSSA as its allocation rule is shown to be strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto optimal. Moreover, we argue that any mechanism that obtains an outcome in TSRP that cannot be obtained by using TSSA fails to be either strategy-proof or Pareto optimal.

Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science

Advisors/Committee Members: Witteveen, C. (mentor), De Weerdt, M.M. (mentor), Planken, L.R. (mentor), Geers, H.J.A.M. (mentor).

Subjects/Keywords: house allocation; mechanism design; online dynamic; top trading cycle; pareto optimailty

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Jalilzadeh, B. (. (2009). Employing Mechanism Design for the Online Allocation of Items. (Masters Thesis). Delft University of Technology. Retrieved from http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:8ef36410-06c2-4372-a9fe-e0e45b264a73

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Jalilzadeh, B (author). “Employing Mechanism Design for the Online Allocation of Items.” 2009. Masters Thesis, Delft University of Technology. Accessed October 26, 2020. http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:8ef36410-06c2-4372-a9fe-e0e45b264a73.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Jalilzadeh, B (author). “Employing Mechanism Design for the Online Allocation of Items.” 2009. Web. 26 Oct 2020.

Vancouver:

Jalilzadeh B(. Employing Mechanism Design for the Online Allocation of Items. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2009. [cited 2020 Oct 26]. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:8ef36410-06c2-4372-a9fe-e0e45b264a73.

Council of Science Editors:

Jalilzadeh B(. Employing Mechanism Design for the Online Allocation of Items. [Masters Thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2009. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:8ef36410-06c2-4372-a9fe-e0e45b264a73

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