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University of Southern California

1. Wang, Jin. Essays on quality screening in two-sided markets.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2015, University of Southern California

In two-sided markets, consumers care not only about the number of sellers with which they can interact, but also about the quality of products or services these sellers provide. Previous work on two-sided markets has mainly focused on the quantity externality; Little attention has been paid to the quality externality. In this dissertation, I allow both quality and quantity play a role in the end-users' interactions, and analyze how platforms can use quality screening to alleviate the problem of asymmetric information of quality and motivate end-users' participations; and discuss how a platform can implement quality screening and choose optimal quality standard. ❧ The first essay examines the impact of quality screening on end-users' choices in a context of competitive platforms. The analysis proceeds from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. In the theory, I build a model in which two platforms compete but only one of them screens sellers' products. I show that the quality screening influences consumers' expectations of product quality and their choice of sellers and platforms. The resulting screening effect, together with the network and competition effects, further drives sellers to enter different platforms. Comparative static analysis indicates that sellers' incentives to join the platform that screens products follow an inverted U-curve with respect to the observable quality of products. In the empirical study, I transfer the theory to a simultaneous entry game with incomplete information, and carry out the estimation using the Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) estimator with the data from Tmall and Taobao, two online trading platforms operated by Alibaba. The estimation results are consistent with the theory. The counterfactual analysis suggests that quality screening improves the consumers' utility and enlarges Alibaba's market share. ❧ In the second essay, I investigate the optimal thresholds of screening for end-users and the platform. I consider a monopoly platform which utilizes screening to select qualified products onto the market. I find that the platform's profitably optimal screening standard falls below the one that maximizes the consumers' welfare. And the platform prefers to implement quality screening by just informing consumers of the threshold instead of by fully revealing the products' true quality. Advisors/Committee Members: Tan, Guofu (Committee Chair), Ridder, Geert (Committee Member), Dukes, Anthony (Committee Member).

Subjects/Keywords: asymmetric information; quality screening; two-sided markets; duopoly platform competition; discrete choice game; structural estimation; monopoly platform; optimal quality standard

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Wang, J. (2015). Essays on quality screening in two-sided markets. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/610424/rec/2476

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Wang, Jin. “Essays on quality screening in two-sided markets.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. Accessed January 20, 2021. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/610424/rec/2476.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Wang, Jin. “Essays on quality screening in two-sided markets.” 2015. Web. 20 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Wang J. Essays on quality screening in two-sided markets. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2015. [cited 2021 Jan 20]. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/610424/rec/2476.

Council of Science Editors:

Wang J. Essays on quality screening in two-sided markets. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2015. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/610424/rec/2476


Indian Institute of Science

2. Mazumdar, Chandra Sen. Seat Allocation And Pricing in a Duopoly in The Airline Industry.

Degree: PhD, Faculty of Engineering, 2017, Indian Institute of Science

Revenue Management (RM) is the practice of managing perishable assets by control-ling their availability and/or prices with an objective to maximize the total revenue. Seat inventory allocation falls in the purview of quantity-based RM. The liberalization of the aviation sector and the subsequent entrance of the low-cost carriers saw an ever-increasing customer base for the airline industry. Given the large number of buyers, firms were free to decide the price at which they would sell tickets. The low-cost carriers started to follow a third degree price discrimination and segmentation of the market, charging a higher price to the market with a relatively inelastic demand. Although a lot of work has been done in the area of seat inventory allocation under a monopolistic market scenario, we realized that not a lot of work had been done in a competitive market scenario. This thesis considers the problem of seat inventory allocation and pricing in a duopoly where each of the competing airlines have two fare-classes. We consider the possibility that the same fare-class may be priced differently by the two competing airlines and allow for the over flow of passengers between the airlines in the same fare-class. In the first part of our work, we develop a non-linear mathematical model for setting the booking limits for one of the two competing air-lines such that the revenue earned is maximized. We consider over flow of passengers from one airline to another in the same fare-class in response to a price differential and compare the results obtained from our model with the standard Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) model under a monopolistic scenario. The results show that our model gives higher revenues than that obtained from the EMSR model. In the second part of our work, we consider a non-cooperative game between two competing airlines with price cutting as the strategy to increase their demand. Through numerical computations, we identify the pure strategy Nash equilibrium. From the results, we conclude that Nash equilibrium is achieved only when both the airlines follow the same pricing strategy indicating that individual price cutting will not be beneficial. This also indicates that unless the competitors enter into a cooperative coalition with each other, they would not benefit from deep discount offers. In the third and final part, we prove theoretically the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a two airline, two fare-class problem with price sensitive over flow of customers in the same fare-class that was computationally analysed earlier. The strategy / strategies at which Nash equilibrium is achieved are identified. We show that Nash equilibrium is only achieved when both the airlines price identically. Hence, our thesis concludes that differential pricing does not hold any significance for the competing airlines from an operational perspective. Advisors/Committee Members: Ramachandran, Parthasarathy (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Airline Revenue Management; Duopoly Markets; Airport Passenger Overflow Management; Differential Pricing; Nash Equilibrium; Airline Industry; Airlines Rates; Airlines; Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) Model; Game Theoretic Models; Airline Duopoly; Airlines Price; Seat Allocation; Management

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Mazumdar, C. S. (2017). Seat Allocation And Pricing in a Duopoly in The Airline Industry. (Doctoral Dissertation). Indian Institute of Science. Retrieved from http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2721

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Mazumdar, Chandra Sen. “Seat Allocation And Pricing in a Duopoly in The Airline Industry.” 2017. Doctoral Dissertation, Indian Institute of Science. Accessed January 20, 2021. http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2721.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Mazumdar, Chandra Sen. “Seat Allocation And Pricing in a Duopoly in The Airline Industry.” 2017. Web. 20 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Mazumdar CS. Seat Allocation And Pricing in a Duopoly in The Airline Industry. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Indian Institute of Science; 2017. [cited 2021 Jan 20]. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2721.

Council of Science Editors:

Mazumdar CS. Seat Allocation And Pricing in a Duopoly in The Airline Industry. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Indian Institute of Science; 2017. Available from: http://etd.iisc.ac.in/handle/2005/2721

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