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University of Rochester

1. Matveyev, Egor V. (1981 - ). Essays on corporate governance and the labor market for corporate directors.

Degree: PhD, 2012, University of Rochester

This thesis consists of two essays that examine issues related to the labor market for corporate directors and executive compensation. The first chapter develops and estimates an equilibrium model that identifies the key factors explaining the allocation of directors across firms. The approach is based on a two-sided matching model that allows an identification of director and appointing firm preferences. The findings indicate that directors choices are driven by their desire to expand their social network. Likewise, firms choose directors that increase the connectedness of their boards the most. The model is used to estimate the compensating differentials needed to attract directors with more attractive skill levels and higher quality connections. The evidence also suggests that CEO directors have lower propensity to expand their network, and choose firms with better records of recent performance. The performance of a CEO's firm does not affect his future prospects in the labor market for directorships. Second chapter examines the relation between executive and director compensation at the firm level. After controlling for monitoring proxies and manager-specific heterogeneity, there is no evidence of significant correlation between the excess compensation of directors and executives, contrary to previous research. The observed high levels of correlation between executive and director compensation are driven by underlying positive assortative matching between executive and director talent. Top-quality managers retain exceptional directors, and better directors choose to work for executives with excellent track records. This is consistent with a theory that assumes complementarity in production between director and executive skills.

Subjects/Keywords: Board of directors; Corporate governance; Director-firm match; Director labor markets; Networks; Two-sided matching

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Matveyev, E. V. (. -. ). (2012). Essays on corporate governance and the labor market for corporate directors. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Rochester. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1802/24813

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Matveyev, Egor V (1981 - ). “Essays on corporate governance and the labor market for corporate directors.” 2012. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Rochester. Accessed September 19, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/1802/24813.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Matveyev, Egor V (1981 - ). “Essays on corporate governance and the labor market for corporate directors.” 2012. Web. 19 Sep 2020.

Vancouver:

Matveyev EV(-). Essays on corporate governance and the labor market for corporate directors. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2012. [cited 2020 Sep 19]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/24813.

Council of Science Editors:

Matveyev EV(-). Essays on corporate governance and the labor market for corporate directors. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Rochester; 2012. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/24813

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