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University of Guelph

1. Slade, Peter. Essays in Economic Behaviour and Interaction.

Degree: PhD, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics, 2015, University of Guelph

This thesis contains three essays. The first essay explores the phenomena of countersignaling in a model with two different audiences: insiders and outsiders. Insiders have private information about the individual (or sender) and provide the individual with a reward if they believe the individual is of high ability. When the individual takes a public action that is associated with having low ability and is still rewarded by insiders, outsiders infer that insiders have favourable private information about the individual. Hence, taking an action commonly associated with low ability may signal to outsiders that the individual is more likely to have high ability by credibly revealing the private information of insiders. The second essay proposes two maximum score estimators for two-sided one-to-one matching models with non-transferable utility: a weighted estimator and an unweighted estimator. The weighted estimator is consistent in the number of markets, based on an identification at infinity argument. Conversely, the unweighted estimator is consistent when preferences are homogeneous. The asymptotics of the unweighted estimator are in either the number of markets or the number of individuals. The third essay examines the impact of gender on the hiring and promotion of academic economists. Past research has shown that females in North America generally experience inferior labour market outcomes, although it remains unclear the extent to which these outcomes are due to employer discrimination or gender differences in preferences. This essay seeks to answer this question through structural models that allow for the separate estimation of employer and employee preferences. The initial hiring of PhD economists is modelled as a two-sided one-to-one matching market with non-transferable utility. Post-hiring outcomes (job exit and promotion) are estimated using a two-sided probit model. In the initial hiring process, departments exhibit no gender bias. However, significant male bias is found in post-hiring job outcomes; males are more likely to be promoted and less likely to be fired. Significant differences are also found in gender preferences, with males being more likely to exit their job voluntarily. Advisors/Committee Members: Cranfield, John (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Countersignaling; two-sided matching; gender

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Slade, P. (2015). Essays in Economic Behaviour and Interaction. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Guelph. Retrieved from https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/9162

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Slade, Peter. “Essays in Economic Behaviour and Interaction.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Guelph. Accessed October 31, 2020. https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/9162.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Slade, Peter. “Essays in Economic Behaviour and Interaction.” 2015. Web. 31 Oct 2020.

Vancouver:

Slade P. Essays in Economic Behaviour and Interaction. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Guelph; 2015. [cited 2020 Oct 31]. Available from: https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/9162.

Council of Science Editors:

Slade P. Essays in Economic Behaviour and Interaction. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Guelph; 2015. Available from: https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/9162

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