subject:(Auctions)

Montana Tech

1. Clark, Robert Edward. ON THE BLOCK: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF AUCTIONS.

Degree: PhD, 1973, Montana Tech

URL: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/9815

Subjects/Keywords: Auctions.

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APA (6^th Edition):

Clark, R. E. (1973). ON THE BLOCK: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF AUCTIONS. (Doctoral Dissertation). Montana Tech. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/9815

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Clark, Robert Edward. “ON THE BLOCK: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF AUCTIONS.” 1973. Doctoral Dissertation, Montana Tech. Accessed April 10, 2021. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/9815.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Clark, Robert Edward. “ON THE BLOCK: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF AUCTIONS.” 1973. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Clark RE. ON THE BLOCK: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF AUCTIONS. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Montana Tech; 1973. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/9815.

Council of Science Editors:

Clark RE. ON THE BLOCK: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF AUCTIONS. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Montana Tech; 1973. Available from: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/9815

Simon Fraser University

2. Busche, Kelly, 1949-. Toward a theory of repeating Dutch auctions.

Degree: 1984, Simon Fraser University

URL: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/6258

Subjects/Keywords: Auctions.; Auctions – Netherlands.

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APA (6^th Edition):

Busche, Kelly, 1. (1984). Toward a theory of repeating Dutch auctions. (Thesis). Simon Fraser University. Retrieved from http://summit.sfu.ca/item/6258

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Busche, Kelly, 1949-. “Toward a theory of repeating Dutch auctions.” 1984. Thesis, Simon Fraser University. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://summit.sfu.ca/item/6258.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Busche, Kelly, 1949-. “Toward a theory of repeating Dutch auctions.” 1984. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Busche, Kelly 1. Toward a theory of repeating Dutch auctions. [Internet] [Thesis]. Simon Fraser University; 1984. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/6258.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Busche, Kelly 1. Toward a theory of repeating Dutch auctions. [Thesis]. Simon Fraser University; 1984. Available from: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/6258

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Guelph

3. Elskamp, Rebecca Catherine. Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions: Three Essays.

Degree: PhD, Department of Food, Agricultural and Resource Economics, 2017, University of Guelph

URL: https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/10165

► This thesis contains three essays on the topic of bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions. The first essay develops and experimentally tests multi-unit auction theory to… (more)

▼ This thesis contains three essays on the topic of bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions. The first essay develops and experimentally tests multi-unit auction theory to identify the effects of "scaling up" multi-unit auction environments on individual bidding behaviour. A uniquely tractable environment is developed that leads to the construction of uniform auctions of different scales, where the prediction is that risk neutral bidders' bids on the last unit they demand are independent of scale. Two main effects were observed in the experimental data. Regardless of scale, bidders were found to bid more aggressively than predicted by the theory. Secondly, small scale effects were observed, as bids were more aggressive in the small scale relative to the larger scale treatment. The theoretical consequences of risk aversion, joy of winning, and anticipated regret are analyzed to explain these deviations from predictions. The second essay provides empirical evidence on how economic agents converge to optimality. Learning direction theory is applied to bidding behaviour from the Ontario dairy quota auction, following a change in pricing rule from uniform to discriminatory. Two dimensions of bidding behaviour are examined at the individual bidder level, bid prices and number of price-quantity bid pairs. Adjustments in bidding behaviour are broadly consistent with the ex-post rationality. Experience acquired under the discriminatory pricing rule is found to have diminishing effects on adjustments made to bidding behaviour, consistent with bidders converging towards optimality. The third essay examines the effect of two simultaneous policy changes, implemented in the Ontario dairy quota auction, to determine whether these changes were successful in achieving performance goals. Results of a series of regression models indicate that these two policy changes had no effect on clearing prices. Rather, these two policy changes were found to significantly reduce revenue from quantity purchased, total quantity transferred and total quantity offered. The combination of a significant reduction in bid prices and individual quantity demanded, paralleled by an increase in individual quantity offered appears to have been the underlying mechanisms, in terms of individual bidding/offering behaviour, through which the these two policies failed to meet performance goals. Advisors/Committee Members: Ker, Alan (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: multi-unit auctions

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APA (6^th Edition):

Elskamp, R. C. (2017). Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions: Three Essays. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Guelph. Retrieved from https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/10165

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Elskamp, Rebecca Catherine. “Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions: Three Essays.” 2017. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Guelph. Accessed April 10, 2021. https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/10165.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Elskamp, Rebecca Catherine. “Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions: Three Essays.” 2017. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Elskamp RC. Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions: Three Essays. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Guelph; 2017. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/10165.

Council of Science Editors:

Elskamp RC. Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions: Three Essays. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Guelph; 2017. Available from: https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/handle/10214/10165

University of Alberta

4. Wilson, Scott Alexander. Incorporating Variable Costs of Adoption into Conservation Auctions.

Degree: MS, Department of Resource Economics and Environmental Sociology, 2013, University of Alberta

URL: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/z890rv525

► Conservation auctions are a policy tool designed to provide incentives for the implementation of beneficial management practices (BMPs) more efficiently than traditional policies. Few practical… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: conservation auctions; risk aversion; experimental auctions; wetland restoration; beneficial management practices; reverse auctions

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APA (6^th Edition):

Wilson, S. A. (2013). Incorporating Variable Costs of Adoption into Conservation Auctions. (Masters Thesis). University of Alberta. Retrieved from https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/z890rv525

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Wilson, Scott Alexander. “Incorporating Variable Costs of Adoption into Conservation Auctions.” 2013. Masters Thesis, University of Alberta. Accessed April 10, 2021. https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/z890rv525.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Wilson, Scott Alexander. “Incorporating Variable Costs of Adoption into Conservation Auctions.” 2013. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Wilson SA. Incorporating Variable Costs of Adoption into Conservation Auctions. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Alberta; 2013. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/z890rv525.

Council of Science Editors:

Wilson SA. Incorporating Variable Costs of Adoption into Conservation Auctions. [Masters Thesis]. University of Alberta; 2013. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/z890rv525

Princeton University

5. Schvartzman Cohenca, Ariel. Circumventing Lower Bounds in Mechanism and Tournament Design .

Degree: PhD, 2020, Princeton University

URL: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp019880vt91m

► How should a seller price multiple items in order to maximize their revenue from a single buyer? This question has been key in connecting research… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: approximately optimal auctions; correlated auctions; mechanism design; multi item auctions; tournament design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Schvartzman Cohenca, A. (2020). Circumventing Lower Bounds in Mechanism and Tournament Design . (Doctoral Dissertation). Princeton University. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp019880vt91m

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Schvartzman Cohenca, Ariel. “Circumventing Lower Bounds in Mechanism and Tournament Design .” 2020. Doctoral Dissertation, Princeton University. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp019880vt91m.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Schvartzman Cohenca, Ariel. “Circumventing Lower Bounds in Mechanism and Tournament Design .” 2020. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Schvartzman Cohenca A. Circumventing Lower Bounds in Mechanism and Tournament Design . [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Princeton University; 2020. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp019880vt91m.

Council of Science Editors:

Schvartzman Cohenca A. Circumventing Lower Bounds in Mechanism and Tournament Design . [Doctoral Dissertation]. Princeton University; 2020. Available from: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp019880vt91m

Vanderbilt University

6. Zheng, Ying. Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auctions.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2018, Vanderbilt University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/13216

► Chapters 1 develops a game-theoretic model to approximate bidders’ behavior in a takeover process, accounting for their valuation discount due to the dissemination of confidential… (more)

▼ Chapters 1 develops a game-theoretic model to approximate bidders’ behavior in a takeover process, accounting for their valuation discount due to the dissemination of confidential information and their uncertainty about the number of actual opponents. We derive a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium with a strictly increasing bidding strategy, and provide a sufficient condition for the monotonicity of the equilibrium bidding strategy. Finally, we construct the information cost resulting from bidders’ information disclosure discounts and show how it affects the seller’s expected revenue. Chapter 2 empirically explains why sellers in takeover auctions limit bidders' entry by considering two types of costs incurred by sellers of target companies: the information cost (developed in Chapter 1) and the operation cost. We establish the identification of the model primitives with unobserved heterogeneity, naturally arising from the confidential information. Using a sample with 287 M&A deals of U.S. public companies, we find that the unobserved heterogeneity explains 75.3% of the variation of the value and bidders lower their values by 11.9% for each rival. We further quantify the information cost and operation cost using counterfactual analysis. Chapter 3 studies the optimal auction design with voluntary entry when entry fees/subsidies are not allowed as a policy instrument, as in most of real-world auctions. In a symmetric IPV paradigm, we find that the optimal mechanism should allocate the asset to the entrant with highest non-negative virtual value with an adjustment for the entry-stage incentivization. The seller can extract additional information rent from the winner as a result of his ability to use a reserve price to induce a desired competition among entrants. Our model embeds Myerson (1981) and Levin and Smith (1994) as special cases. Advisors/Committee Members: Gregory Leo (committee member), Jingfeng Lu (committee member), Eun Jeong Heo (committee member), Tong Li (Committee Chair).

Subjects/Keywords: Auctions; Structural Econometrics; Mechanism Design

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APA (6^th Edition):

Zheng, Y. (2018). Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auctions. (Doctoral Dissertation). Vanderbilt University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1803/13216

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Zheng, Ying. “Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auctions.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, Vanderbilt University. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1803/13216.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Zheng, Ying. “Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auctions.” 2018. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Zheng Y. Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auctions. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Vanderbilt University; 2018. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/13216.

Council of Science Editors:

Zheng Y. Essays on the Structural Analysis of Auctions. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Vanderbilt University; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/13216

7. Gupta, Neha. Analyses of markets and auctions; -.

Degree: Economics, 2013, University of Delhi

URL: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/31778

Available

Appendix p.126-139 and Reference p.140-143

Advisors/Committee Members: Banerji, Abhijit and Meenakshi, J V.

Subjects/Keywords: auctions; markets

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APA (6^th Edition):

Gupta, N. (2013). Analyses of markets and auctions; -. (Thesis). University of Delhi. Retrieved from http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/31778

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Gupta, Neha. “Analyses of markets and auctions; -.” 2013. Thesis, University of Delhi. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/31778.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Gupta, Neha. “Analyses of markets and auctions; -.” 2013. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Gupta N. Analyses of markets and auctions; -. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Delhi; 2013. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/31778.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Gupta N. Analyses of markets and auctions; -. [Thesis]. University of Delhi; 2013. Available from: http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/31778

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Penn State University

8. Schulenberg, Steven P. Essays in Auctions and Collusion.

Degree: 2008, Penn State University

URL: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/6148

► This thesis is composed of four chapters. The first chapter is titled "The Impact of Cost Synergies on Bidding in the Georgia School Milk Market,"… (more)

▼ This thesis is composed of four chapters. The first chapter is titled "The Impact of Cost Synergies on Bidding in the Georgia School Milk Market," co-authored with Robert C. Marshall, Matthew E. Raiff, and Jean-Francois Richard. Each summer milk processors around the country participate in sealed bid procurements for the right to provide public schools with milk throughout the subsequent academic year. School district contracts are an important part of vehicle routing problems that milk processors solve on an ongoing basis. There are allegedly substantial cost savings for a milk processor from servicing a district that is directly adjacent to one they already service. In this paper, following the work of Krishna and Rosenthal (1996), we construct a procurement model allowing for cost synergies. The equilibrium bid function maps directly into an empirical specification. Using data from a time period when bidders were allegedly acting non-cooperatively, our structural parametric estimation results give significant support for the presence of cost synergies in the bidding. This essay demonstrates that a market outcome that is consistent with the division of the market among cartel members is also consistent non-cooperative behavior, indicating that a test for the presence of collusion in this market should consider these synergies or will risk “over-detecting” collusion. The second chapter is titled "Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric Auctions with Optimal Reserve Prices," co-authored with Robert C. Marshall. We numerically calculate equilibrium bids and optimal seller reserve prices for first price auctions within the independent private values framework where two bidders draw their valuations from heterogeneous distributions. In particular, we consider a type of bidder asymmetry that may result from collusion. In contrast to the case of a zero reserve price, once optimal reserve prices are introduced first price auctions no longer dominate second price auctions in terms of expected revenue for the seller. In fact, for the cases examined herein, the opposite is true. There are two main conclusions that we draw from this. First, most of the literature has focused on the case of a zero reserve price. Our paper shows that results that hold with a zero reserve price may not also hold when optimal reserve prices are introduced. Second, there may be situations where auctioneers facing collusive bidders will maximize revenue when using a second price auction. This is contrary to the intuition that first price auctions are less susceptible to cartels than first price auctions, and are therefore preferable. The third chapter is titled "Optimal Reserve Prices at First and Second Price Auctions with Endogenous Coalition Formation." This extends the second essay to consider two coalitions of bidders that form endogenously. In general, the incentive to form a cartel given an auction type will change as the reserve price changes. This essay first shows how the incentives to form a cartel change with the reserve price. … Advisors/Committee Members: Robert Clifford Marshall, Committee Chair/Co-Chair, Herman J Bierens, Committee Member, Ronald Lee Filippelli, Committee Member, J Tomas Sjöström, Committee Member.

Subjects/Keywords: Auctions; Collusion

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APA (6^th Edition):

Schulenberg, S. P. (2008). Essays in Auctions and Collusion. (Thesis). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/6148

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Schulenberg, Steven P. “Essays in Auctions and Collusion.” 2008. Thesis, Penn State University. Accessed April 10, 2021. https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/6148.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Schulenberg, Steven P. “Essays in Auctions and Collusion.” 2008. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Schulenberg SP. Essays in Auctions and Collusion. [Internet] [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2008. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/6148.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Schulenberg SP. Essays in Auctions and Collusion. [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2008. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/6148

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Texas A&M University

9. Wadhwani, Aishwarya. A Reverse Auction Bidding Study of Returns from Guardian Personality Types.

Degree: MS, Construction Management, 2018, Texas A&M University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/174176

► Traditionally in construction, procurement of products and/or services has been conducted via a sealed bidding format, termed in the United States as a hard bid.… (more)

▼ Traditionally in construction, procurement of products and/or services has been conducted via a sealed bidding format, termed in the United States as a hard bid. With changing technology and time, newer methods are being accepted and applied to the process of awarding contracts for the supply of building construction services. One of these systems is the Reverse Auction Bidding system. The purpose of this research is to study the results of an academic game play using a Reverse Auction Bidding (RAB) site conducted with graduate students in a Construction Management program at Texas A&M University. This research continues a long running investigation into how Game Theory and Personality types impact on the returns from the game. Nash developed the basic theory that forms the foundation for any study of a game, one of the issues that Nash briefly discussed is personality impact on game play. This research work investigates the link between personality type and returns. Construction contracts are negotiated often by teams, although often a single person has the final call on the price. Earlier studies into RAB showed that the normalized profit results were approximately fitted by a Beta distribution, which is consistent with other studies of auctions. However, a "secondary underlying" distribution appears to provide a linear addition to the Beta distribution for the normalized profit range greater than 0.75. The objective of this study is twofold, to study the game play returns for Guardian personality types and to investigate the underlying game play cause for the linear addition to the beta distribution, which is thought to be of Gaussian form. Three games were played using the RAB web site. The results showed a trend toward the Beta and Normal distributions and the impact of personality was observed in the game results, although the expected dominance of the Guardian personality was destroyed by the profit destroying play of another personality type, who rushed everyone to the bottom of the distribution. The conclusions are that personality has an impact on results and that the linear addition to the Beta distribution is the result of intelligent playing by some players, who impose a secondary Gaussian distribution on the average returns shown by the Beta distribution. Further work is suggested on the Gaussian distribution and the profit destroying play of another personality type. Advisors/Committee Members: Nichols, John M. (advisor), Bryant, John A. (committee member), Caffey, Stephen (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Guardian; Reverse auctions; distribution type

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APA (6^th Edition):

Wadhwani, A. (2018). A Reverse Auction Bidding Study of Returns from Guardian Personality Types. (Masters Thesis). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/174176

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Wadhwani, Aishwarya. “A Reverse Auction Bidding Study of Returns from Guardian Personality Types.” 2018. Masters Thesis, Texas A&M University. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/174176.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Wadhwani, Aishwarya. “A Reverse Auction Bidding Study of Returns from Guardian Personality Types.” 2018. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Wadhwani A. A Reverse Auction Bidding Study of Returns from Guardian Personality Types. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Texas A&M University; 2018. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/174176.

Council of Science Editors:

Wadhwani A. A Reverse Auction Bidding Study of Returns from Guardian Personality Types. [Masters Thesis]. Texas A&M University; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/174176

Penn State University

10. Jia, Zheng. Essays on Auctions and Remanufacturing Strategies .

Degree: 2011, Penn State University

URL: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/12648

► This dissertation studies online auctions and remanufacturing strategies. First, Chapter 2 investigates information variability impacts in auctions. Online eBay-like auctions often possess rich information resulting… (more)

▼ This dissertation studies online auctions and remanufacturing strategies. First, Chapter 2 investigates information variability impacts in auctions. Online eBay-like auctions often possess rich information resulting in variable bidders' values of auctioned assets. Chapter 2 uses stochastic orders to derive conditions under which greater environmental variability of bidders' information enhances a winning bidder's expected profit and a bid-taker's expected revenue. The study provides insights on the bid-takers' information-disclosure decisions in auction design, as well as bidders' information-improving decisions. Chapter 3 further investigates the role of auctioneers (eBay, e.g.) in online auctions and auctioneers' optimal fee policies. In practice, auctioneers assist sellers in conducting auctions and usually collect two kinds of fees: a reserve fee depending on the reserve price, and a final value fee that is a function of the closing value. The study formulates the problem as a Bayesian game with an auctioneer and a private-type seller, and derives the equilibria. The study finds that multiple optimal fee policies exist, and recommends two sets of policies for implementation. The first is the set of linear policies, with the focus being the percentage final value fee, constant reserve fee policy. This policy is optimal if and only if the seller's value follows a power distribution. The second is the set of optimal policies, with three representative cases: a final value fee only policy, a reserve fee only policy, and a small (large) percentage final value fee with a decreasing (increasing) reserve fee. An auctioneer can achieve optimality with any of these three policies. Motivated by remanufacturing practices in industry, Chapter 4 investigates a remanufacturing inventory system with key characteristics: lost sales, heterogeneous qualities of used product returns, short product lifetimes, and rapidly eroding resale and salvage values of remanufactured products. The study establishes a general remanufacturing framework, and studies two inventory systems under the framework, remanufacture-to-stock (RTS) and remanufacture-to-order (RTO). RTS remanufactures selected returned products with one period leadtime, and stocks remanufactured items to satisfy future demand; whereas, RTO stocks selected returned products, and remanufactures them via an expedited process after observing the demand. The study derives optimal and myopic policies under the general framework, RTS and RTO, and finds that: (1) In RTS, the optimal policy is a multi-dimensional base-stock policy; in RTO, the optimal policy is intractable but the myopic policy delivers satisfiable solution. (2) RTS and RTO perform well only for some parameter settings. (3) A hybrid system that switches between RTS and RTO in the product lifecycle performs significantly better than RTS and RTO, and performs close to the general framework. The study recommends the hybrid system for implementation. Advisors/Committee Members: Susan Xu, Dissertation Advisor/Co-Advisor, Susan H Xu, Committee Chair/Co-Chair, Vijay Krishna, Committee Member, Terry Paul Harrison, Committee Member, Elena Katok, Committee Member, Dennis Kon Jin Lin, Committee Member.

Subjects/Keywords: inventory management; auctions; auctioneers; remanufacturing

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APA (6^th Edition):

Jia, Z. (2011). Essays on Auctions and Remanufacturing Strategies . (Thesis). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/12648

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Jia, Zheng. “Essays on Auctions and Remanufacturing Strategies .” 2011. Thesis, Penn State University. Accessed April 10, 2021. https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/12648.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Jia, Zheng. “Essays on Auctions and Remanufacturing Strategies .” 2011. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Jia Z. Essays on Auctions and Remanufacturing Strategies . [Internet] [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2011. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/12648.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Jia Z. Essays on Auctions and Remanufacturing Strategies . [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2011. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/12648

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Toronto

11. Dee, Jan Victor. Three Essays in Industrial Organization.

Degree: PhD, 2020, University of Toronto

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/101201

► This thesis includes three chapters studying topics related to industrial organization. In the first two chapters, I study auctions with discrete bidding increments and bidding… (more)

▼ This thesis includes three chapters studying topics related to industrial organization. In the first two chapters, I study auctions with discrete bidding increments and bidding costs (henceforth pay-per-bid auctions). In chapter one, I develop a general theoretical framework for pay-per-bid auctions. In this model, bidders have private valuations and arrive exogenously throughout the duration of the auction. Participants are uncertain about the number of other bidders in the auction and I allow the bidders to have non-equilibrium beliefs about this state variable. I then propose a simulated method of moments estimator which I use to recover the underlying structural parameters even when bidders have biased beliefs. Using data from an online auction website called Swoopo, I show that the revenues we observe cannot be generated by a model where bidders have rational expectations but is consistent with a model where bidders have biased beliefs. In chapter two of the thesis, I show that while pay-per-bid auctions generate excess revenues, there is also significant variation in these revenues and markups across different products and categories. Using the theoretical framework and methodology developed in the first chapter, I separately estimate the structural parameters for different products. Finally, given these estimates, I use counterfactual analysis to decompose the sources of markup heterogeneity in these auctions In chapter three of the paper, I study the identification and estimation of dynamic models of market entry when firms can choose to buy or lease fixed inputs. I am particularly interested in the identification of counterfactuals which change the stochastic process of the state variables. I first show that without any additional restrictions, the structural parameters of the model are not point identified. Second, I propose plausible exclusion restrictions that provide point identification of the counterfactuals of interest. Finally, I propose a simple simulation based method to construct confidence regions for counterfactual choice probabilities when they are not point identified. I show the validity of the method using Monte Carlo experiments. Advisors/Committee Members: Aguirregabiria, Victor, Economics.

Subjects/Keywords: Auctions; Dynamic Models; 0501

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APA (6^th Edition):

Dee, J. V. (2020). Three Essays in Industrial Organization. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Toronto. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1807/101201

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Dee, Jan Victor. “Three Essays in Industrial Organization.” 2020. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Toronto. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1807/101201.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Dee, Jan Victor. “Three Essays in Industrial Organization.” 2020. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Dee JV. Three Essays in Industrial Organization. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Toronto; 2020. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/101201.

Council of Science Editors:

Dee JV. Three Essays in Industrial Organization. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Toronto; 2020. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1807/101201

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

12. Ho, Kevin Kai Wing. Impacts of information, product types, culture, and auction formats on electronic auctions.

Degree: 2008, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

URL: http://repository.ust.hk/ir/Record/1783.1-7163 ; https://doi.org/10.14711/thesis-b1029591 ; http://repository.ust.hk/ir/bitstream/1783.1-7163/1/th_redirect.html

► This thesis consists of three studies on Buy-It-Now (BIN) auctions, which is an auction mechanism developed by electronic marketplace operators with an aim to reduce… (more)

▼ This thesis consists of three studies on Buy-It-Now (BIN) auctions, which is an auction mechanism developed by electronic marketplace operators with an aim to reduce the negative effect of information asymmetry. At present, there are two formats of BIN auction, viz. the eBay format, and the Yahoo! format. Both formats provide bidders an opportunity to win the auction instantly at the outset of the auction when any bidder accepts the BIN price (PBIN) posted by the seller. The difference between these formats is, the BIN option will no longer be available and the auction will convert to an ascending auction for the eBay format when any bid above the reserve price is submitted, whereas the BIN option appears throughout the auction for the Yahoo! format. These three studies on BIN auctions are focused on the impact of this new auction mechanism on stakeholders of electronic marketplaces. In the first study, I investigate the impact of PBIN on the closing price of electronic auctions. A model is developed to explain how bidders and sellers use PBIN as a piece of information for better estimation of the number of active bidders in electronic auctions and the expected closing price of electronic auctions. Empirical data were collected from auction websites to support the model. The preliminary finding of this study was reported at the 39th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) in January 2006 (Yoo, Ho and Tam, 2006). In the second study, I examine those factors affecting the decision of sellers on whether they would choose to use BIN auctions to auction their goods. I show that product types and culture are important factors, which affect the level of use of BIN auctions by sellers. I also observe that culture has a significant moderating effect on the effect of product types on the level of use of BIN auctions. The preliminary finding of this study was reported at the Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems 2006 (Ho et al., 2006), and in the Journal of Global Information Management (JGIM) (Ho et al., 2007). The aim for the third study is to investigate factors leading to successful auction of items using BIN auction format in electronic marketplaces. A conception model is proposed to explain how reputation of sellers, product attributes, and BIN auction format affect bidders’ choice in participating in BIN auctions or not.

Subjects/Keywords: Internet auctions

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APA (6^th Edition):

Ho, K. K. W. (2008). Impacts of information, product types, culture, and auction formats on electronic auctions. (Thesis). Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Retrieved from http://repository.ust.hk/ir/Record/1783.1-7163 ; https://doi.org/10.14711/thesis-b1029591 ; http://repository.ust.hk/ir/bitstream/1783.1-7163/1/th_redirect.html

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Ho, Kevin Kai Wing. “Impacts of information, product types, culture, and auction formats on electronic auctions.” 2008. Thesis, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://repository.ust.hk/ir/Record/1783.1-7163 ; https://doi.org/10.14711/thesis-b1029591 ; http://repository.ust.hk/ir/bitstream/1783.1-7163/1/th_redirect.html.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Ho, Kevin Kai Wing. “Impacts of information, product types, culture, and auction formats on electronic auctions.” 2008. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Ho KKW. Impacts of information, product types, culture, and auction formats on electronic auctions. [Internet] [Thesis]. Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; 2008. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://repository.ust.hk/ir/Record/1783.1-7163 ; https://doi.org/10.14711/thesis-b1029591 ; http://repository.ust.hk/ir/bitstream/1783.1-7163/1/th_redirect.html.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Ho KKW. Impacts of information, product types, culture, and auction formats on electronic auctions. [Thesis]. Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; 2008. Available from: http://repository.ust.hk/ir/Record/1783.1-7163 ; https://doi.org/10.14711/thesis-b1029591 ; http://repository.ust.hk/ir/bitstream/1783.1-7163/1/th_redirect.html

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Michigan State University

13. Gibb, Richard Dean. Economies of scale in Michigan livestock auctions.

Degree: PhD, 1959, Michigan State University

URL: http://etd.lib.msu.edu/islandora/object/etd:5455

Subjects/Keywords: Auctions – Michigan

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APA (6^th Edition):

Gibb, R. D. (1959). Economies of scale in Michigan livestock auctions. (Doctoral Dissertation). Michigan State University. Retrieved from http://etd.lib.msu.edu/islandora/object/etd:5455

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Gibb, Richard Dean. “Economies of scale in Michigan livestock auctions.” 1959. Doctoral Dissertation, Michigan State University. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://etd.lib.msu.edu/islandora/object/etd:5455.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Gibb, Richard Dean. “Economies of scale in Michigan livestock auctions.” 1959. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Gibb RD. Economies of scale in Michigan livestock auctions. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Michigan State University; 1959. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://etd.lib.msu.edu/islandora/object/etd:5455.

Council of Science Editors:

Gibb RD. Economies of scale in Michigan livestock auctions. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Michigan State University; 1959. Available from: http://etd.lib.msu.edu/islandora/object/etd:5455

University of Minnesota

14. Li, Xiaolin. The Shadow of the Future" in Procurement Auctions".

Degree: PhD, Business Administration, 2015, University of Minnesota

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/175232

► Buyer behavior for procuring large, complex, customized items consists of initial phases where firms first specify the needed item(s) and pre-qualify vendors, following which an… (more)

▼ Buyer behavior for procuring large, complex, customized items consists of initial phases where firms first specify the needed item(s) and pre-qualify vendors, following which an auction is used to choose the contractor. Despite the rigid rules and detailed specifications accompanying auctions, it is striking that procurement auctions in industries like information technology (IT) display very large differences between the initially agreed-to payment and the actual payments because of revisions negotiated during the execution phase. However, these revisions are ignored in the theoretical and empirical auction literature. After developing a mathematical model to specify how bidders accommodate post-auction modifications, I develop a method to take my model to a comprehensive dataset of IT procurement auctions. I find that the prospects of modifications lower bidders' latent costs, leading to more aggressive bids, especially by bidders without a previous contract with the buyer. To fix the magnitude of this effect, I consider a buyer who credibly commits to a no-modification policy, and find that such a commitment would increase bids by 27%, all else is equal. I also find that the size of this shadow of the future is larger for lump-sum bids. To fix this magnitude, I consider a buyer who switches the auction bid format from a lump-sum bid to a more flexible bid format (e.g., time and materials), and find that bids are lower by 16%, all else being equal. These large effects form the basis of my recommendations for improving procurement auctions. They also contribute to long-standing theory concerns studied in transaction cost economics. My findings support the Williamsonian critique of procurement auctions as a solution for the ex-post monopoly problem; my estimates demonstrate that ex post modifications remain an intrinsic aspect of procurement auctions. However, auctions remain a valuable procurement device for customized goods in complex, fast-moving environments, particularly when used with more flexible payment formats.

Subjects/Keywords: Modifications; Procurement Auctions; Structural Models

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Li, X. (2015). The Shadow of the Future" in Procurement Auctions". (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Minnesota. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11299/175232

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Li, Xiaolin. “The Shadow of the Future" in Procurement Auctions".” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Minnesota. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11299/175232.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Li, Xiaolin. “The Shadow of the Future" in Procurement Auctions".” 2015. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Li X. The Shadow of the Future" in Procurement Auctions". [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Minnesota; 2015. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/175232.

Council of Science Editors:

Li X. The Shadow of the Future" in Procurement Auctions". [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Minnesota; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11299/175232

Clemson University

15. Huff, Nancy. Horizontal Subcontracting in Procurement Auctions.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2012, Clemson University

URL: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/917

► A firm submitting a bid in a procurement auction is sometimes also listed as a subcontractor in one or more competing bids. This paper theoretically… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Auctions; Horizontal Subcontracting; Procurement; Economics

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APA (6^th Edition):

Huff, N. (2012). Horizontal Subcontracting in Procurement Auctions. (Doctoral Dissertation). Clemson University. Retrieved from https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/917

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Huff, Nancy. “Horizontal Subcontracting in Procurement Auctions.” 2012. Doctoral Dissertation, Clemson University. Accessed April 10, 2021. https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/917.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Huff, Nancy. “Horizontal Subcontracting in Procurement Auctions.” 2012. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Huff N. Horizontal Subcontracting in Procurement Auctions. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Clemson University; 2012. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/917.

Council of Science Editors:

Huff N. Horizontal Subcontracting in Procurement Auctions. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Clemson University; 2012. Available from: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/917

University of Maryland

16. Utgoff, Naomi M. Essays on Matching Markets and Their Equilibria.

Degree: Economics, 2016, University of Maryland

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1903/18683

► Matching theory and matching markets are a core component of modern economic theory and market design. This dissertation presents three original contributions to this area.… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Economics; Auctions; Market Design; Matching

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APA (6^th Edition):

Utgoff, N. M. (2016). Essays on Matching Markets and Their Equilibria. (Thesis). University of Maryland. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1903/18683

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Utgoff, Naomi M. “Essays on Matching Markets and Their Equilibria.” 2016. Thesis, University of Maryland. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1903/18683.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Utgoff, Naomi M. “Essays on Matching Markets and Their Equilibria.” 2016. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Utgoff NM. Essays on Matching Markets and Their Equilibria. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Maryland; 2016. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1903/18683.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Utgoff NM. Essays on Matching Markets and Their Equilibria. [Thesis]. University of Maryland; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1903/18683

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Texas – Austin

17. Onur, Ilke. Essays on Internet auctions.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2005, University of Texas – Austin

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/2328

► This dissertation examines the online auction markets and focuses on eBay in particular. EBay provides an environment in which losers can bid again and we… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Internet auctions

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APA (6^th Edition):

Onur, I. (2005). Essays on Internet auctions. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Texas – Austin. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2152/2328

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Onur, Ilke. “Essays on Internet auctions.” 2005. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Texas – Austin. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/2328.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Onur, Ilke. “Essays on Internet auctions.” 2005. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Onur I. Essays on Internet auctions. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Texas – Austin; 2005. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/2328.

Council of Science Editors:

Onur I. Essays on Internet auctions. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Texas – Austin; 2005. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/2328

University of Pennsylvania

18. Konichi Paulo, Cinthia. Empirical Analysis of Procurement Auctions.

Degree: 2016, University of Pennsylvania

URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1820

► This dissertation consists of two self-contained chapters that explore intriguing properties of procurement auctions. The first chapter empirically analyzes procurement auctions in which suppliers must… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: auctions; bidding behavior; Economics

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APA (6^th Edition):

Konichi Paulo, C. (2016). Empirical Analysis of Procurement Auctions. (Thesis). University of Pennsylvania. Retrieved from https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1820

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Konichi Paulo, Cinthia. “Empirical Analysis of Procurement Auctions.” 2016. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania. Accessed April 10, 2021. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1820.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Konichi Paulo, Cinthia. “Empirical Analysis of Procurement Auctions.” 2016. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Konichi Paulo C. Empirical Analysis of Procurement Auctions. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Pennsylvania; 2016. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1820.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Konichi Paulo C. Empirical Analysis of Procurement Auctions. [Thesis]. University of Pennsylvania; 2016. Available from: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1820

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

19. Bregadioli, Gabriela Fernanda [UNESP]. Modelo de leilão de energia multiperíodo com representação linearizada da transmissão e da coordenação com o médio prazo para sistemas hidrotérmicos.

Degree: 2015, Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11449/132546

►

Made available in DSpace on 2016-01-13T13:27:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2015-06-01. Added 1 bitstream(s) on 2016-01-13T13:32:25Z : No. of bitstreams: 1… (more)

▼

Made available in DSpace on 2016-01-13T13:27:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2015-06-01. Added 1 bitstream(s) on 2016-01-13T13:32:25Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 000846853.pdf: 1065532 bytes, checksum: e932fa62c126d6aed37b89616cdb8aca (MD5)

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Os modelos de leilão tradicionalmente utilizados em mercados de energia de sistemas hidrotérmicos consistem em modelos monoperíodo. Estes modelos não consideram em sua formulação a representação detalhada das restrições associadas ao sistema de geração de termoelétrica e à rede de transmissão, bem como a coordenação com o médio prazo para a geração hidroelétrica. A representação destas características é entãof feita através de ajustes posteriores, ex. post, a fim de garantir que os limites técnico-operacionais dos sistemas de geração e transmissão sejam respeitados. Tais ajustes geram ineficiências econômicas e subsídios cruzados. Assim, o objetivo deste trabalho é propor um modelo de leilão multiperíodo com representação da transmissão para sistemas hidrotérmicos. Este modelo, além de incorporar em sua formulação a representação precisa das restrições intertemporais e da transmissão, também considera a coordenação das gerações hidro e termoelétricas com o médio prazo, a fim de assegurar a menor complementação termoelétrica no presente e no futuro. Três abordagens de coordenação entre o curto e o médio prazo são apresentadas: coordenação primal, dual e primal-dual. Para a validadção do modelo de leilão proposto neste trabalho, testes computacionais foram realizados com o sistema 24 barras IEEE RTS-1996 para um caso base, o qual desconsidera a coordenação entre o curto e o médio prazo, e, posteriormente, para os casos que incluem a coordenação com o médio prazo

The auction models traditionally used in energy markets for hydrothermal systems consist in single-period models. he formulation of these models usually does not represent the thermal constraints and network constraints, and it also does not consider the coordination between short and medium-term for hydrothermal generation. The representation of these features is made by ex post adjustments in order to ensure that the technical and operational limits of the generation and transmission systems are guaranteed. Such adjustments generate economic inefficiencies and cross-subsidies. The goal of this work is to propose a multiperiod auction for hydrothermal systems. This model incorporates the accurate representation of inter-temporal constraints and network constraints, and it also considers the coordination between short and medium-term schedulings in order to ensure the lower thermal complementation in the present and in the future. Three coordinating approaches between the short and medium term schedulings are presented: primal, dual and primal-dual coordination. For the validation of the auction model proposed in this work, computational tests are carried out with the IEEE 24 bus RTS-1996 system, for a base case, which does not…

Advisors/Committee Members: Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), Baptista, Edméa Cássia [UNESP], Nepomuceno, Leonardo [UNESP].

Subjects/Keywords: Leilões; Termoeletricidade; Energia elétrica; Auctions

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APA (6^th Edition):

Bregadioli, G. F. [. (2015). Modelo de leilão de energia multiperíodo com representação linearizada da transmissão e da coordenação com o médio prazo para sistemas hidrotérmicos. (Masters Thesis). Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP). Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11449/132546

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Bregadioli, Gabriela Fernanda [UNESP]. “Modelo de leilão de energia multiperíodo com representação linearizada da transmissão e da coordenação com o médio prazo para sistemas hidrotérmicos.” 2015. Masters Thesis, Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP). Accessed April 10, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/132546.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Bregadioli, Gabriela Fernanda [UNESP]. “Modelo de leilão de energia multiperíodo com representação linearizada da transmissão e da coordenação com o médio prazo para sistemas hidrotérmicos.” 2015. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Bregadioli GF[. Modelo de leilão de energia multiperíodo com representação linearizada da transmissão e da coordenação com o médio prazo para sistemas hidrotérmicos. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP); 2015. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11449/132546.

Council of Science Editors:

Bregadioli GF[. Modelo de leilão de energia multiperíodo com representação linearizada da transmissão e da coordenação com o médio prazo para sistemas hidrotérmicos. [Masters Thesis]. Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP); 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11449/132546

McMaster University

20. Mansouri, Bahareh. Models and Algorithms for Procurement Combinatorial Auctions.

Degree: PhD, 2014, McMaster University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/16396

► A key problem in designing marketplaces is how to efficiently allocate a collection of goods among multiple people. Auctions have emerged as a powerful tool… (more)

▼ A key problem in designing marketplaces is how to efficiently allocate a collection of goods among multiple people. Auctions have emerged as a powerful tool with the promise to increase market efficiency by allocating goods to those who value them the most. Nevertheless, traditional auctions are unable to handle real-world market complexities. Over the past decade, there has been a trend towards allowing for package bids and other types of multidimensional bidding techniques that enable suppliers to take advantage of their unique abilities and put forth their best offers. In particular the application of iterative combinatorial auctions in procurement saves negotiation costs and time. Conceptually these auctions show a potential for improving the overall market efficiency. However, in practice they host several new challenges and difficulties. One challenge facing the auctioneer in an iterative combinatorial auction environment is to quickly find an acceptable solution for each round of the auction. Bidders require time to precisely evaluate, price, and communicate different possible combinations based on their current information of item prices. The auctioneer requires time to solve the underlying mathematical problem formulation based on the bids received, report back the feedback information and initiate a new round of the auction. In Chapter 3, we propose a Lagrangian-based heuristic to solve the auctioneer's winner determination problem. After generating the Lagrange multipliers from the solution of a linear relaxation, the heuristic applies several procedures to fix any potentially infeasible optimal Lagrange solutions. In addition to providing an efficient way of solving the winner determination problem, as compared with the leading commercial solver CPLEX, our approach provides Lagrange multipliers. The latter are used as proxies for prices in the auction feedback mechanism. In Chapter 4 we develop a model for the bidders pricing problem, an issue that has received much less attention in the literature. Using the auctioneer feedback, that includes the Lagrange multipliers, the pricing model maximizes the bidders' profit while at the same time keeping their bids competitive. We derive several optimality results for the underlying optimization problem. Interestingly, we analytically show that the auction converges to a point where no bidder is able to submit a bid that yields strictly better profit for him and is not less competitive than his previous bids submitted. We experimentally observe that this approach converges in an early stage. We also find that this iterative auction allows the bidders to improve their profit while providing lower and competitive prices to the auctioneer. In Chapter 5, we introduce a flexible auction model that allows for partial bids. Rather than the regular all-or-nothing indivisible package bids, divisible bids provide flexibility for the auctioneer with the possibility to accept parts of the bids and yet allow the suppliers to capture synergies among the items and… Advisors/Committee Members: Hassini, Elkafi, Computational Engineering and Science.

Subjects/Keywords: Combinatorial Auctions; Procurement Auctions; Winner Determination Problem; Bid Generation Problem

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Mansouri, B. (2014). Models and Algorithms for Procurement Combinatorial Auctions. (Doctoral Dissertation). McMaster University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/11375/16396

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Mansouri, Bahareh. “Models and Algorithms for Procurement Combinatorial Auctions.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, McMaster University. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11375/16396.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Mansouri, Bahareh. “Models and Algorithms for Procurement Combinatorial Auctions.” 2014. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Mansouri B. Models and Algorithms for Procurement Combinatorial Auctions. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. McMaster University; 2014. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/16396.

Council of Science Editors:

Mansouri B. Models and Algorithms for Procurement Combinatorial Auctions. [Doctoral Dissertation]. McMaster University; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/11375/16396

Penn State University

21. Santamaría Tobar, Natalia. An Analysis of Bidding Strategies in Reverse and Combinatorial Auctions.

Degree: 2011, Penn State University

URL: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/12047

► This dissertation deals with the problem bidders have to solve to formulate their bids in two types of auctions: reverse and combinatorial auctions. In reverse… (more)

▼ This dissertation deals with the problem bidders have to solve to formulate their bids in two types of auctions: reverse and combinatorial auctions. In reverse procurement auctions the object for sale is a contract, bidders are suppliers, and the bid taker is a buyer. The suppliers bidding for the contract are usually the current supplier (the incumbent) and a group of potential new suppliers (the entrants). Since the buyer has an ongoing relationship with the incumbent, he needs to adjust the bids of the entrants to include non-price attributes. The buyer can run a scoring auction, in which suppliers compete on the adjusted bids or scores, or, he can run a buyer-determined auction, in which suppliers compete on the price, and the buyer adjusts the bids with the non-price attributes after the auction to determine the winner. In the second chapter I study the bidding strategies in a buyer-determined auction in which an incumbent and a group of suppliers compete for a contract. When different types of suppliers compete (for example domestic and foreign suppliers), practitioners have observed that domestic suppliers stop bidding after observing a low bid from the foreign competitors, even though the domestic suppliers dominate their foreign competitors in non-price dimensions. To mitigate this anticompetitive behavior, the feedback given to suppliers in the auction changed from the bid price to the bid rank. In the third chapter, I study the bidding strategies when two suppliers of different type compete in a reverse auction with rank feedback. Finally, in the fourth chapter, I study the bidding strategies in sealed-bid combinatorial auctions. Combinatorial auctions are auctions of multiple heterogeneous objects that allow bids on subsets of the objects, giving bidders the flexibility to express if the objects in a set are more valuable together than separate. This added flexibility makes it possible for the bidders to express a variety of preferences, but also complicates the problem they need to solve to find their bidding strategies. I present the problem a bidder has to solve in a combinatorial auction of two objects, in which bidders submit mutually exclusive bids once and winners pay their bids. Advisors/Committee Members: Elena Katok, Dissertation Advisor/Co-Advisor, Elena Katok, Committee Chair/Co-Chair, Gary E Bolton, Committee Member, Douglas J Thomas, Committee Member, Anthony Mark Kwasnica, Committee Member.

Subjects/Keywords: Decision Analysis; Bidding Strategies; Procurement Auctions; Combinatorial Auctions

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APA (6^th Edition):

Santamaría Tobar, N. (2011). An Analysis of Bidding Strategies in Reverse and Combinatorial Auctions. (Thesis). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/12047

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Santamaría Tobar, Natalia. “An Analysis of Bidding Strategies in Reverse and Combinatorial Auctions.” 2011. Thesis, Penn State University. Accessed April 10, 2021. https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/12047.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Santamaría Tobar, Natalia. “An Analysis of Bidding Strategies in Reverse and Combinatorial Auctions.” 2011. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Santamaría Tobar N. An Analysis of Bidding Strategies in Reverse and Combinatorial Auctions. [Internet] [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2011. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/12047.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Santamaría Tobar N. An Analysis of Bidding Strategies in Reverse and Combinatorial Auctions. [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2011. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/12047

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Queens University

22. Cardozo, Pamela. Bidders’ Behaviour and Theory of Share Auctions with Applications to the Colombian Primary Bond Market .

Degree: Economics, 2010, Queens University

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1974/5391

► Although most governments sell their bonds through a share auction, little is known about behaviour of bidders in these auctions. This thesis analyzes the literature… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Treasury Auctions ; Share Auctions

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APA (6^th Edition):

Cardozo, P. (2010). Bidders’ Behaviour and Theory of Share Auctions with Applications to the Colombian Primary Bond Market . (Thesis). Queens University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1974/5391

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Cardozo, Pamela. “Bidders’ Behaviour and Theory of Share Auctions with Applications to the Colombian Primary Bond Market .” 2010. Thesis, Queens University. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1974/5391.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Cardozo, Pamela. “Bidders’ Behaviour and Theory of Share Auctions with Applications to the Colombian Primary Bond Market .” 2010. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Cardozo P. Bidders’ Behaviour and Theory of Share Auctions with Applications to the Colombian Primary Bond Market . [Internet] [Thesis]. Queens University; 2010. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1974/5391.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Cardozo P. Bidders’ Behaviour and Theory of Share Auctions with Applications to the Colombian Primary Bond Market . [Thesis]. Queens University; 2010. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1974/5391

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Mississippi State University

23. Rhyne, Jacob Daniel. FACTORS DETERMINING PER ACRE MARKET VALUE OF HUNTING LEASES ON SIXTEENTH SECTION LANDS IN MISSISSIPPI.

Degree: MS, Forestry, 2008, Mississippi State University

URL: http://sun.library.msstate.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-12062007-123838/ ;

► Valuation of leases based on the contingent valuation may be biased because hypothetical data has limitations. This study used the hedonic method to evaluate factors… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: hedonic analysis; Auctions

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APA (6^th Edition):

Rhyne, J. D. (2008). FACTORS DETERMINING PER ACRE MARKET VALUE OF HUNTING LEASES ON SIXTEENTH SECTION LANDS IN MISSISSIPPI. (Masters Thesis). Mississippi State University. Retrieved from http://sun.library.msstate.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-12062007-123838/ ;

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Rhyne, Jacob Daniel. “FACTORS DETERMINING PER ACRE MARKET VALUE OF HUNTING LEASES ON SIXTEENTH SECTION LANDS IN MISSISSIPPI.” 2008. Masters Thesis, Mississippi State University. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://sun.library.msstate.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-12062007-123838/ ;.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Rhyne, Jacob Daniel. “FACTORS DETERMINING PER ACRE MARKET VALUE OF HUNTING LEASES ON SIXTEENTH SECTION LANDS IN MISSISSIPPI.” 2008. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Rhyne JD. FACTORS DETERMINING PER ACRE MARKET VALUE OF HUNTING LEASES ON SIXTEENTH SECTION LANDS IN MISSISSIPPI. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Mississippi State University; 2008. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://sun.library.msstate.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-12062007-123838/ ;.

Council of Science Editors:

Rhyne JD. FACTORS DETERMINING PER ACRE MARKET VALUE OF HUNTING LEASES ON SIXTEENTH SECTION LANDS IN MISSISSIPPI. [Masters Thesis]. Mississippi State University; 2008. Available from: http://sun.library.msstate.edu/ETD-db/theses/available/etd-12062007-123838/ ;

University of Alberta

24. Packman, Katherine. Investigation of reverse auctions for wetland restoration in Manitoba.

Degree: MS, Department of Rural Economy, 2010, University of Alberta

URL: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/gf06g268p

► Reverse auctions for ecological goods and services are an alternative to current agri-environmental government programs to provide incentives for farmers. This thesis reports on a… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: experimental auctions; reverse auction; wetland restoration

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APA (6^th Edition):

Packman, K. (2010). Investigation of reverse auctions for wetland restoration in Manitoba. (Masters Thesis). University of Alberta. Retrieved from https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/gf06g268p

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Packman, Katherine. “Investigation of reverse auctions for wetland restoration in Manitoba.” 2010. Masters Thesis, University of Alberta. Accessed April 10, 2021. https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/gf06g268p.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Packman, Katherine. “Investigation of reverse auctions for wetland restoration in Manitoba.” 2010. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Packman K. Investigation of reverse auctions for wetland restoration in Manitoba. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Alberta; 2010. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/gf06g268p.

Council of Science Editors:

Packman K. Investigation of reverse auctions for wetland restoration in Manitoba. [Masters Thesis]. University of Alberta; 2010. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/gf06g268p

University of Alberta

25. Zhuang, Hejun. Two Essays on Firm's Marketing Strategy: Auction Overlap Decision of Online Auctioneers and Product Positioning of Disadvantaged Firms.

Degree: PhD, Faculty of Business, 2014, University of Alberta

URL: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/cxp68kg40h

► Essay 1: Optimal Seller Strategy in Overlapping Auctions Overlapping auctions for identical products are commonly observed on auction websites. Such an on-line setting for competitive… (more)

▼ Essay 1: Optimal Seller Strategy in Overlapping Auctions Overlapping auctions for identical products are commonly observed on auction websites. Such an on-line setting for competitive auctions changes the consumers’ bidding behaviours. Bidders are able to forward-look, cross-bid and learn during the bidding process. The change in the bidding behaviours has important implications for sellers’ revenue. We adopt a game-theoretical modelling method, aiming to understand—in a single-seller auctions website where the seller is able to decide auction design and bidders are able to forward-look, cross-bid, and learn—the existence of auctions’ overlapping. We also determine its value, pinpoint the factors influencing the degree of overlap, and solve the optimal degree of overlap under different conditions. We find that the degree of overlap depends on the trade-offs among four factors: bidders’ forward-looking, bidders’ learning, time discounting and varied demand. Hence, the combination of the impacts from these factors decides the optimal overlapping strategy of a revenue maximizing seller. Essay 2: Product Positioning Strategy of the Firms without a Competitive Advantage This essay examines the optimal product positioning strategy of asymmetric firms. Much of the theoretical discussion on firm strategies, such as technical investments and advertising, focuses on symmetric firms. Less attention is given to weak firms when they face strong companies such as IBM, Sony, GE, Apply and Wal-Mart. We find that weak firms position their products on areas which they are at advantages relative to their competitors. More importantly, they have an incentive to avoid close competition with strong firms by randomizing their product positions in the market if the advantage gap is still small, and to focus on the extreme edges of the market if the advantage gap is large. However, strong firms act in the opposite way: locating on mass market when the advantage gap is small, and randomizing their market positions and expand to on the edges of the market when the advantage gap is larger. Moreover, the strong firms make less on radical investment than on incremental on product’s features. These findings show the fundamentally different product positioning strategies under asymmetric competition than under symmetric one.

Subjects/Keywords: Overlapping auctions; Bidders' learning; Positioning strategy

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Zhuang, H. (2014). Two Essays on Firm's Marketing Strategy: Auction Overlap Decision of Online Auctioneers and Product Positioning of Disadvantaged Firms. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Alberta. Retrieved from https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/cxp68kg40h

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Zhuang, Hejun. “Two Essays on Firm's Marketing Strategy: Auction Overlap Decision of Online Auctioneers and Product Positioning of Disadvantaged Firms.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Alberta. Accessed April 10, 2021. https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/cxp68kg40h.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Zhuang, Hejun. “Two Essays on Firm's Marketing Strategy: Auction Overlap Decision of Online Auctioneers and Product Positioning of Disadvantaged Firms.” 2014. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Zhuang H. Two Essays on Firm's Marketing Strategy: Auction Overlap Decision of Online Auctioneers and Product Positioning of Disadvantaged Firms. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Alberta; 2014. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/cxp68kg40h.

Council of Science Editors:

Zhuang H. Two Essays on Firm's Marketing Strategy: Auction Overlap Decision of Online Auctioneers and Product Positioning of Disadvantaged Firms. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Alberta; 2014. Available from: https://era.library.ualberta.ca/files/cxp68kg40h

University of Johannesburg

26. Pike, Janine Claire. Adaptive auctioneer agents.

Degree: 2011, University of Johannesburg

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10210/3706

►

M.Sc.

This dissertation investigates how auctioneer agents can maximise the revenue of an auction. Auctions are an effective solution to agent negotiation because of their… (more)

▼

M.Sc.

This dissertation investigates how auctioneer agents can maximise the revenue of an auction. Auctions are an effective solution to agent negotiation because of their simplicity. They are therefore the most widely used approach to agent negotiation. A review of auction theory proves that auction revenue is influenced by factors such as the auction format and the auction parameters. The optimal auction format and parameters are dependent on the bidders and the auction environment. A study of internet auctions confirms the findings of auction theory regarding the importance of the format as well as the parameters in an auction. There has been significant research on the strategies bidding agents can adopt in order to maximise their utility. There is little research, however, on the strategies auctioneer agents can adopt to maximise auction revenue. In this study, a survey is done of the related auctioneer agents in research that maximise auction revenue. The shortcomings of these are identified. The aim of this research is to develop an adaptive auctioneer agent that can maximise the revenue of an auction. The proposed solution is the revenue maximising adaptive auctioneer (RMAA) agent. The RMAA agent consists of three components: the auction manager, the auction format selector (AFS) and the auction parameter selector (APS). The AFS employs a customised zeroth-level classifier system to select the auction format based on the auction environment. The APS employs reinforcement learning combined with a local hill climbing algorithm to learn what the most profitable values are for auction parameters, such as the reserve price and the bid increment. The auction manager automates the auction and coordinates the AFS and APS. It implements the four traditional auction formats, namely the English auction, the Dutch auction, the Vickrey auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction. Experiments conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the RMAA agent prove that this agent can consistently generate more revenue than a non-adaptive auctioneer agent. The contribution of this research is an auctioneer agent that adapts both the auction format and the auction parameters according to the environment in order to maximise the auction revenue.

Subjects/Keywords: Internet auctions; Intelligent agents (Computer software)

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APA (6^th Edition):

Pike, J. C. (2011). Adaptive auctioneer agents. (Thesis). University of Johannesburg. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10210/3706

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Pike, Janine Claire. “Adaptive auctioneer agents.” 2011. Thesis, University of Johannesburg. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10210/3706.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Pike, Janine Claire. “Adaptive auctioneer agents.” 2011. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Pike JC. Adaptive auctioneer agents. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Johannesburg; 2011. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10210/3706.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Pike JC. Adaptive auctioneer agents. [Thesis]. University of Johannesburg; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10210/3706

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

North Carolina State University

27. Hsiao, Ping-Lin. Visualization for Combinatorial Auctions.

Degree: MS, Computer Science, 2006, North Carolina State University

URL: http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/resolver/1840.16/16

► Visualization converts raw data into meaningful graphical images that allow users to rapidly identify and explore values, trends, and patterns in their datasets. Visualization techniques… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: visualization; combinatorial auctions

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APA (6^th Edition):

Hsiao, P. (2006). Visualization for Combinatorial Auctions. (Thesis). North Carolina State University. Retrieved from http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/resolver/1840.16/16

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Hsiao, Ping-Lin. “Visualization for Combinatorial Auctions.” 2006. Thesis, North Carolina State University. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/resolver/1840.16/16.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Hsiao, Ping-Lin. “Visualization for Combinatorial Auctions.” 2006. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Hsiao P. Visualization for Combinatorial Auctions. [Internet] [Thesis]. North Carolina State University; 2006. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/resolver/1840.16/16.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Hsiao P. Visualization for Combinatorial Auctions. [Thesis]. North Carolina State University; 2006. Available from: http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/resolver/1840.16/16

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

UCLA

28. Andreyanov, Pavel. Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design.

Degree: Economics, 2019, UCLA

URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0137s3dw

► My dissertation contributes to the literature on prior-free (robust) mechanism design. Prior-freeness can be interpreted differently, but a common feature is that certain mechanisms can… (more)

▼ My dissertation contributes to the literature on prior-free (robust) mechanism design. Prior-freeness can be interpreted differently, but a common feature is that certain mechanisms can be ranked above the others without the exact knowledge of distributions and/or utilities. According to the Wilson critique, the knowledge of fine details of the setting such as distributions and utilities is an unrealistic assumption and, moreover, optimal mechanisms in the classic (Bayesian) sense are often too complex to be implemented in reality. In the first chapter I study a scoring auction and the welfare implications of switching between the two leading designs of the scoring rule: linear (``weighted bid'') and log-linear (``adjusted bid''), when the designer's preferences for quality and money are unknown. Motivated by the empirical application, I formulate a new model of scoring auctions, with two key elements: exogenous quality and a reserve price, and characterize the equilibrium for a rich set of scoring rules. The data is drawn from the Russian public procurement sector in which the linear scoring rule was applied from 2011 to 2013. I estimate the underlying distribution of firms' types nonparametrically and simulate the equilibria for both scoring rules with different weights. The empirical results show that for any log-linear scoring rule, there exists a linear one, yielding a higher expected quality and rebate. Hence, at least with risk-neutral preferences, the linear design is superior to the log-linear.In the second chapter (Co-authored with Jernej Copic and Byeong-hyeon Jeong, UCLA) I study robust allocation of a divisible public good among n agents with quasi-linear utilities, when the budget is exactly balanced. Under several additional assumptions, we prove that such mechanism is equivalent to a distribution over simple posted prices. A robustly optimal mechanism minimizes expected welfare loss among robust divisible ones. For any prior belief, I show that a simple posted prices is robustly optimal. This justifies a restriction to binary allocations commonly found in the mechanism design literature. Robustness comes at a high cost. For certain beliefs, we show that the expected welfare loss of an optimal posted price is as big as 1/2 of the expected welfare in the corresponding optimal Bayesian mechanism, independently of the size of the economy. This bound is tight for the special case of two agents. In the third chapter (Co-authored with Tomasz Sadzik, UCLA) I provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex-post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus and are ex-post nearly efficient, when there are many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and I make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction, without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. I also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate…

Subjects/Keywords: Economics; auctions; mechanism design; robust; scoring

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APA (6^th Edition):

Andreyanov, P. (2019). Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design. (Thesis). UCLA. Retrieved from http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0137s3dw

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Andreyanov, Pavel. “Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design.” 2019. Thesis, UCLA. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0137s3dw.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Andreyanov, Pavel. “Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design.” 2019. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Andreyanov P. Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design. [Internet] [Thesis]. UCLA; 2019. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0137s3dw.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Andreyanov P. Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design. [Thesis]. UCLA; 2019. Available from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0137s3dw

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

University of Wollongong

29. Zheng, Willa H. The impact of call auctions on China’s stock market liquidity and price quality.

Degree: PhD, 2016, University of Wollongong

URL: 150201 Finance ; https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/4864

► This dissertation contains three essays that examine the impact of call auctions in China. Since they were introduced in the mid-1990s, call auctions have… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: call auctions; liquidity; price discovery; information transparency

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APA (6^th Edition):

Zheng, W. H. (2016). The impact of call auctions on China’s stock market liquidity and price quality. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Wollongong. Retrieved from 150201 Finance ; https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/4864

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Zheng, Willa H. “The impact of call auctions on China’s stock market liquidity and price quality.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Wollongong. Accessed April 10, 2021. 150201 Finance ; https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/4864.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Zheng, Willa H. “The impact of call auctions on China’s stock market liquidity and price quality.” 2016. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Zheng WH. The impact of call auctions on China’s stock market liquidity and price quality. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Wollongong; 2016. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: 150201 Finance ; https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/4864.

Council of Science Editors:

Zheng WH. The impact of call auctions on China’s stock market liquidity and price quality. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Wollongong; 2016. Available from: 150201 Finance ; https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/4864

University of Manitoba

30. Meng, Xin. Essays on designing optimal spectrum license auctions.

Degree: Economics, 2010, University of Manitoba

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1993/3916

► Basically, my dissertation focuses on License Auctions. Four chapters of my dissertation are theoretical analysis of license auctions. Broadly speaking, I analyze the effects of… (more)

▼ Basically, my dissertation focuses on License Auctions. Four chapters of my dissertation are theoretical analysis of license auctions. Broadly speaking, I analyze the effects of different auction rules on revenue, efficiency and social welfare. The first chapter studies the flaw in the design of the 2000 Turkish GSM auction. In this auction, the Turkish government wants to raise as much revenue as possible and to increase competition in the cell-phone market by selling two licenses to new firms via a sequential auction, but it ends up with only one license sold. I identify this auction design failure. And I also show that if the auction were designed as a “simultaneous auction”, the government would sell two licenses and receive more revenue. In the second chapter, I show that if the cost asymmetry between the bidding firms is large enough, then having fewer firms in the market will surprisingly result in higher social welfare. This result is contrast to the common or general case in which “social welfare” will be higher if there are more firms competing in the market. In the third chapter, I characterize the optimal bidding strategies of local and global bidders for two heterogeneous licenses in a multi-unit simultaneous ascending auction with synergies. I determine the optimal bidding strategies in the presence of an exposure problem and show that global bidders may accept a loss even when they win all licenses and moreover, if a “bid-withdrawal” rule is introduced to the auction, the exposure problem disappears, and the simulation results show that revenue will be higher. In the last chapter, I study the Canadian AWS auction in which 40 percent spectrum are set aside for new firms. I characterize the effect of spectrum set-aside auctions on seller's revenue, consumer surplus and social welfare. I show that a spectrum set aside may not only encourage new entry and increase competition in the downstream market, but also under some circumstance, decreases the seller's revenue and consumer surplus. But a spectrum set aside results in inefficient allocation, and this inefficient entry further reduces social welfare. Advisors/Committee Members: Gunay, Hikmet (Economics) (supervisor), Jiang, Janet Hua (Economics).

Subjects/Keywords: License Auctions; Set Aside; Exposure Problem; Synergy

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APA (6^th Edition):

Meng, X. (2010). Essays on designing optimal spectrum license auctions. (Thesis). University of Manitoba. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1993/3916

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Meng, Xin. “Essays on designing optimal spectrum license auctions.” 2010. Thesis, University of Manitoba. Accessed April 10, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1993/3916.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Meng, Xin. “Essays on designing optimal spectrum license auctions.” 2010. Web. 10 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Meng X. Essays on designing optimal spectrum license auctions. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Manitoba; 2010. [cited 2021 Apr 10]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1993/3916.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Meng X. Essays on designing optimal spectrum license auctions. [Thesis]. University of Manitoba; 2010. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1993/3916

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Open Access Theses and Dissertations