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You searched for subject:(Alliance contracts). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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Delft University of Technology

1. Hogendoorn, R.C. Het bonus/malus principe: Onderzoek naar praktische werking en implementatie van het bonus/malus principe binnen de traditionele samenwerkingsvorm.:.

Degree: 2010, Delft University of Technology

The reason for this research is based on the reputation of the current Dutch construction sector. The ‘construction fraud’ and the ‘real estate fraud’ for example are causes of this current image. Generally the different parties mention a lack of trust as the reason why collaboration is not optimal . The lack of trust results in miscommunication, shortage of time, insufficient information and eventually this results in so called costs of failure. These costs of failure within the Dutch construction industry consist of 11% of the total costs of the industry. This inefficiency can be reduced if the involved parties are convinced of the advantage of the added value) which an integrated collaboration achieves (higher quality, reducing failure costs, more efficient process. Previous research showed that the cause of failure costs is found in the design phase, while the failure costs express themselves in the construction phase . This conclusion/insight in comparison with the preference of the Dutch construction firms, explains the preference for the traditional collaboration form (where the design and construction phase are clearly separated). Advisors/Committee Members: Geraedts, R.P., Chao-Duivis, M.A.B..

Subjects/Keywords: bonus/penalty; traditional contracts; project alliance; UAV 1989; DNR 2005; cooperation

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APA (6th Edition):

Hogendoorn, R. C. (2010). Het bonus/malus principe: Onderzoek naar praktische werking en implementatie van het bonus/malus principe binnen de traditionele samenwerkingsvorm.:. (Masters Thesis). Delft University of Technology. Retrieved from http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:9c241260-22a8-4ea2-b835-e666448d9e87

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Hogendoorn, R C. “Het bonus/malus principe: Onderzoek naar praktische werking en implementatie van het bonus/malus principe binnen de traditionele samenwerkingsvorm.:.” 2010. Masters Thesis, Delft University of Technology. Accessed August 18, 2019. http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:9c241260-22a8-4ea2-b835-e666448d9e87.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Hogendoorn, R C. “Het bonus/malus principe: Onderzoek naar praktische werking en implementatie van het bonus/malus principe binnen de traditionele samenwerkingsvorm.:.” 2010. Web. 18 Aug 2019.

Vancouver:

Hogendoorn RC. Het bonus/malus principe: Onderzoek naar praktische werking en implementatie van het bonus/malus principe binnen de traditionele samenwerkingsvorm.:. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2010. [cited 2019 Aug 18]. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:9c241260-22a8-4ea2-b835-e666448d9e87.

Council of Science Editors:

Hogendoorn RC. Het bonus/malus principe: Onderzoek naar praktische werking en implementatie van het bonus/malus principe binnen de traditionele samenwerkingsvorm.:. [Masters Thesis]. Delft University of Technology; 2010. Available from: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:9c241260-22a8-4ea2-b835-e666448d9e87


AUT University

2. Vilasini, Nimesha. Generating Value in Alliance Contracts Through the Lean Concept .

Degree: AUT University

The construction industry has recognised alliancing as a means to increase construction efficiency. Despite the potential benefits attributed to alliancing, the true performance enhancements have not been fully gained in existing alliances. The main focus of the alliance framework is on contractual and organisational domains but less on the operational domain. Even though the operational domain is vital, there has been little research conducted to investigate the integration of operational systems into alliances. Therefore, the current research investigates existing operational practices within projects executed using alliance procurement methodology. It goes on to determine the potential application of lean concepts to improve operations on alliance projects. A number of research questions are posed with a view to increasing the available knowledge about the interferences in alliance projects and ways of applying Lean in an alliance. Due to the contemporary nature of the research problem, a case study research approach was adopted. The selected case study was a viaduct replacement project in Auckland, New Zealand. This study used participant observations, document reviews, interviews and questionnaires as data collection methods. The participant observation covered five processes in an alliance project to identify process waste. Initial process studies were conducted at the southbound construction phase of the viaduct. After completion of each process study, the process study findings were validated through process study reports and presentations at follow-up meetings. The participants of the follow-up meetings were the construction manager, project engineers, site engineers and supervisors. After initial process studies, separate study visits were conducted to study the improvements achieved, the problems faced during implementation and the reasons for precluded improvements. In order to identify behavioural waste in an alliance project, interviews and a questionnaire survey were conducted. Consequently, depending on the data forms, quantitative or qualitative data analysis was performed. The empirical data were analysed by iterating between observed evidence and the literature, also using experts’ comments and suggestions. The study confirms that the construction work in an alliance project can be improved considerably by eliminating waste factors. Moreover, the study showed that the savings are substantial as the processes studied were cyclic and repetitive. This study yields a methodology for process waste detection and improvements at site level. It is evident from the process study observations that the non-integration of site workers and sub-contractors within an alliance can create process waste. The study proposes best practices to eliminate that behavioural waste in alliances by using lean principles. Even though previous researchers stated that there are resistances to lean implementations and process changes in construction, alliance project members were interested in making changes and… Advisors/Committee Members: Neitzert, Thomas (advisor), Tookey, John (advisor), Powell, Alan (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Alliance contracts; Lean concept; Construction industry; New Zealand; Case study

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APA (6th Edition):

Vilasini, N. (n.d.). Generating Value in Alliance Contracts Through the Lean Concept . (Thesis). AUT University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10292/7768

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
No year of publication.
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Vilasini, Nimesha. “Generating Value in Alliance Contracts Through the Lean Concept .” Thesis, AUT University. Accessed August 18, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10292/7768.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
No year of publication.
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Vilasini, Nimesha. “Generating Value in Alliance Contracts Through the Lean Concept .” Web. 18 Aug 2019.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
No year of publication.

Vancouver:

Vilasini N. Generating Value in Alliance Contracts Through the Lean Concept . [Internet] [Thesis]. AUT University; [cited 2019 Aug 18]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10292/7768.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
No year of publication.

Council of Science Editors:

Vilasini N. Generating Value in Alliance Contracts Through the Lean Concept . [Thesis]. AUT University; Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10292/7768

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
No year of publication.

3. Ozdemir, Mahmut. Project-level Governance, Monetary Incentives, and Performance in Strategic R&D Alliances.

Degree: 2011, Erasmus Research Institute of Management

textabstractA growing number of firms rely on strategic R&D alliances to develop new products. In these alliances, firms use various kinds of governance mechanisms for incentive alignment. Project-level governance, i.e., the daily control of alliance activities by firms’ alliance representatives such as steering committee members, alliance managers, and project managers; and, performance-based monetary incentives, i.e., the potential milestone payments tied to the performance of partners, are two governance mechanisms, increasingly used in practice, yet overlooked in the strategic alliances literature. In this dissertation, I examine the antecedents and performance outcomes of these two governance mechanisms in the biopharmaceutical industry setting. The results of this dissertation suggest that project-level governance and monetary incentives offset each others’ effects on alliance innovation performance in the context of startup-incumbent alliances. In other words, offering greater monetary incentives to startups has minimal positive effect on development success, if incumbents opt for intense project-level governance by their controllers at the same time. On the other hand, the results suggest that greater monetary incentives result in higher abnormal stock returns to startup firms following alliance announcements. The results also reveal the positive reciprocal relationship between project-level governance and monetary incentives. The greater the project-level governance, the higher the size of potential milestone-payments, and vice versa. Hence, the incumbents that exercise intense governance on startups in alliances offer also higher potential milestone payments to compensate for the performance risks of startups. The results also show that project-level governance positively influences the contractual detail, which in turn increases the likelihood of development success. Finally, the results reveal several other exogenous and endogenous antecedents of both governance mechanisms.

Subjects/Keywords: agency theory; alliance managers; alliance steering committees; biotechnology; contracts; inter-firm teams; new product development; pharmaceutical industry; potential milestone payments; risk-taking; strategic alliances; technological innovations

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Ozdemir, M. (2011). Project-level Governance, Monetary Incentives, and Performance in Strategic R&D Alliances. (Doctoral Dissertation). Erasmus Research Institute of Management. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/23550

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Ozdemir, Mahmut. “Project-level Governance, Monetary Incentives, and Performance in Strategic R&D Alliances.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, Erasmus Research Institute of Management. Accessed August 18, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/1765/23550.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Ozdemir, Mahmut. “Project-level Governance, Monetary Incentives, and Performance in Strategic R&D Alliances.” 2011. Web. 18 Aug 2019.

Vancouver:

Ozdemir M. Project-level Governance, Monetary Incentives, and Performance in Strategic R&D Alliances. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Erasmus Research Institute of Management; 2011. [cited 2019 Aug 18]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/23550.

Council of Science Editors:

Ozdemir M. Project-level Governance, Monetary Incentives, and Performance in Strategic R&D Alliances. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Erasmus Research Institute of Management; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/23550

.