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You searched for subject:( Moral Forgetting). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

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Australian National University

1. Bugeja, Adam Paul. Fiduciary Non-cognitivism .

Degree: 2017, Australian National University

I present and defend a novel non-cognitivist theory of our moral thought and practices. It holds that moral judgements depend on the existence of broadly ‘social’ relationships among those who make them (among ‘moralists’, as I shall say). I am led to this position by observations about non-cognitive disagreement. Theorists can satisfactorily explain the phenomenon of moral disagreement as a kind of non-cognitive disagreement only if they predict that it will have a property which I call ‘robustness’. Roughly, a candidate disagreement is robust if its status as a disagreement is difficult to dispute. I argue that parties to a robust non-cognitive disagreement necessarily share a type of trust relationship. One party entrusts to the other a concern to accommodate a certain subset of her desires in his decisions. The ‘entrusted party’ can resist the relevant desires of the ‘entrusting party’ without violating her trust only if satisfying them would frustrate a certain subset of his desires. I call this an entrusted concern relationship. Robust non-cognitive disagreement exists when the parties to such a relationship have opposing preferences, based on their relevant desires, concerning how the entrusted party is to act. I call such preferences ‘voiceable preferences’. To explain moral disagreement and predict its robustness, non-cognitivists must posit the existence of entrusted concern relationships linking all moralists. I call the species of non-cognitivism which holds that the non-cognitive components of moral judgements are the voiceable preferences of parties to a network of entrusted concern relationships linking all moralists (a ‘moral trust network’) fiduciary non-cognitivism. This dissertation develops a non-cognitivist theory of this sort. I describe a form the moral trust network might take that would explain various elementary features of moral thought and talk, and defend the postulation of the described network. I argue that this postulation is not too extravagant by explaining how and why such a network might exist, and by giving plausible examples of smaller trust networks with similar properties. I also contend, following Philippa Foot, that approval and disapproval presuppose the existence of a social context entitling approving parties to voices in approved parties’ decisions, and argue that, in light of this, we need to posit something like a moral trust network to provide a wholly satisfactory explanation of moral approval and disapproval. Beyond moral disagreement and approval, my non-cognitivist theory offers at least partial explanations for the following phenomena: the use of moral judgements to justify and criticize actions; the rule-like character of moral requirements and the desirability of simplicity in moral theorizing; the changes of moral…

Subjects/Keywords: Metaethics; Moral Psychology; Moral Judgement; Moral Judgment; Non-cognitivism; Expressivism; Disagreement; Approval; Trust; Moral Forgetting; Non-cognitive Disagreement; Disagreement in Attitude; Normative Uncertainty; Moral Motivation; Moral Reasoning

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Bugeja, A. P. (2017). Fiduciary Non-cognitivism . (Thesis). Australian National University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1885/146121

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Bugeja, Adam Paul. “Fiduciary Non-cognitivism .” 2017. Thesis, Australian National University. Accessed October 22, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/146121.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Bugeja, Adam Paul. “Fiduciary Non-cognitivism .” 2017. Web. 22 Oct 2019.

Vancouver:

Bugeja AP. Fiduciary Non-cognitivism . [Internet] [Thesis]. Australian National University; 2017. [cited 2019 Oct 22]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/146121.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Bugeja AP. Fiduciary Non-cognitivism . [Thesis]. Australian National University; 2017. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/146121

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation


University of Florida

2. Moore, Kellia. Memory and Forgetting in Austen.

Degree: 2014, University of Florida

Subjects/Keywords: Concept of mind; Enlightenment; Forgetting; Grief; Love; Memory; Moral character; Morality; Persuasion; Poetry; Austen, Jane, 1775-1817; Memory; Novels (Austen, Jane)

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Moore, K. (2014). Memory and Forgetting in Austen. (Thesis). University of Florida. Retrieved from http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00060296

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Moore, Kellia. “Memory and Forgetting in Austen.” 2014. Thesis, University of Florida. Accessed October 22, 2019. http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00060296.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Moore, Kellia. “Memory and Forgetting in Austen.” 2014. Web. 22 Oct 2019.

Vancouver:

Moore K. Memory and Forgetting in Austen. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of Florida; 2014. [cited 2019 Oct 22]. Available from: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00060296.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Moore K. Memory and Forgetting in Austen. [Thesis]. University of Florida; 2014. Available from: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00060296

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

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