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University of St. Andrews
1.
Porro, Laura Cecilia.
Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what
.
Degree: 2013, University of St. Andrews
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/4108 
In this thesis I focus on dismissivism in metaphysics. Some philosophers argue that
at least some metaphysical disputes are not substantial, and as a consequence should
be dismissed. In this work I restrict my attention to metaphysics and focus on
debates about existence and grounding. In particular I am interested in finding out
whether there is a difference between the possible options available for dismissing
debates about what there is and the possible options available for dismissing debates
about what grounds what. I will delve into this in two different steps. First of all
I explore the possibility to dismiss debates about what there is, and as a case
study I analyse the debate between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism.
Secondly I delve into whether it is possible to dismiss debates about what grounds
what, thanks to the discussion of another case study, i.e. the debate between
tropes ontologies and universals ontologies. It is worth exploring the nature of
dismissivism, because it bears on the future of philosophy. If philosophy has to
have a future, we have to make sure that at least some disagreements within it are
substantial.
My conclusions will be that metaphysical debates about what there is can be
dismissed for a variety of reasons (semantic, epistemic, ...). I also argue there is no
general formula to find out whether a specific debate should be dismissed. On the
other hand I argue that debates about what grounds what should be dismissed. I
offer two distinct arguments in favour of my claim. Firstly, I argue that disputants
are having a verbal dispute when they talk about what grounds what, and thus
their disagreement is non genuine. Secondly, I argue that the notion of grounding
is underspecified, because it cannot be properly distinguished from causation.
Advisors/Committee Members: Hawley, Katherine (Katherine Jane) (advisor), Brown, Jessica (Jessica Anne) (advisor).Subjects/Keywords: Dismissivism;
Metaphysics;
Metametaphysics;
Tropes;
Universals;
Grounding;
Three-dimensionalism;
Four-dimensionalism;
Parsimony;
Existence
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APA (6th Edition):
Porro, L. C. (2013). Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what
. (Thesis). University of St. Andrews. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10023/4108
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Porro, Laura Cecilia. “Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what
.” 2013. Thesis, University of St. Andrews. Accessed December 08, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/4108.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Porro, Laura Cecilia. “Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what
.” 2013. Web. 08 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Porro LC. Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what
. [Internet] [Thesis]. University of St. Andrews; 2013. [cited 2019 Dec 08].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/4108.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Porro LC. Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what
. [Thesis]. University of St. Andrews; 2013. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/4108
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
University of Lund
2.
Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias.
Objects in Time : Studies of Persistence in
B-time.
Degree: 2009, University of Lund
URL: http://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1503766
;
http://portal.research.lu.se/ws/files/5812281/1586252.pdf
This thesis is about the conceptualization of
persistence of physical, middle-sized objects within the
theoretical framework of the revisionary ‘B-theory’ of time.
According to the B-theory, time does not flow, but is an extended
and inherently directed fourth dimension along which the history of
the universe is ‘laid out’ once and for all. It is a widespread
view among philosophers that if we accept the B-theory, the
commonsensical ‘endurance theory’ of persistence will have to be
rejected. The endurance theory says that objects persist through
time by being wholly present at distinct times as numerically the
same entity. Instead of endurantism, it has been argued, we have to
adopt either ‘perdurantism’ or the ‘stage theory’. Perdurantism is
the theory that objects are four-dimensional ‘space-time worms’
persisting through time by having distinct temporal parts at
distinct times. The stage theory says that objects are
instantaneous temporal parts (stages) of space-time worms,
persisting by having distinct temporal counterparts at distinct
times. In the thesis, it is argued that no good arguments have been
provided for the conclusion that we are obliged to drop the
endurance theory by acceptance of the B-theory. This conclusion
stands even if the endurance theory incorporates the claim that
objects endure through intrinsic change. It is also shown that
perdurantism and the stage theory come with unwelcome consequences.
Paper I demonstrates that the main arguments for the view that
objects cannot endure in B-time intrinsically unchanged fail.
Papers II and III do the same with respect to the traditional
arguments against endurance through intrinsic change in B-time.
Paper III also contains a detailed account of the semantics of the
tenseless copula, which occurs frequently in the debate. The
contention of Paper IV is that four-dimensional space-time worms,
as traditionally understood, are not suited to take dispositional
predicates. In Paper V, it is shown that the stage theory needs to
introduce an overabundance of persistence-concepts, many of which
will have to be simultaneously applicable to a single object (qua
falling under a single sortal), in order for the theory to be
consistent. The final article, Paper VI, investigates the sense in
which persistence can, as is sometimes suggested, be a
‘conventional matter’. It also asks whether alleged cases of
‘conventional persistence’ create trouble for the endurance theory.
It is argued that conventions can only enter at a trivial semantic
level, and that the endurance theory is no more threatened by such
conventions than are its rivals.
Subjects/Keywords: Filosofi; B-time; three-dimensionalism.; stage theory; tenselessness; persistence; perdurance; mereology; four-dimensionalism; dispositions; endurance; B-theory of time; change; temporary intrinsics
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APA ·
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MLA ·
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CSE |
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to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Hansson Wahlberg, T. (2009). Objects in Time : Studies of Persistence in
B-time. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Lund. Retrieved from http://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1503766 ; http://portal.research.lu.se/ws/files/5812281/1586252.pdf
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias. “Objects in Time : Studies of Persistence in
B-time.” 2009. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Lund. Accessed December 08, 2019.
http://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1503766 ; http://portal.research.lu.se/ws/files/5812281/1586252.pdf.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias. “Objects in Time : Studies of Persistence in
B-time.” 2009. Web. 08 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Hansson Wahlberg T. Objects in Time : Studies of Persistence in
B-time. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Lund; 2009. [cited 2019 Dec 08].
Available from: http://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1503766 ; http://portal.research.lu.se/ws/files/5812281/1586252.pdf.
Council of Science Editors:
Hansson Wahlberg T. Objects in Time : Studies of Persistence in
B-time. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Lund; 2009. Available from: http://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1503766 ; http://portal.research.lu.se/ws/files/5812281/1586252.pdf
3.
S. Iaquinto.
ALL THE WORLD'S A FRAGMENT. FRAGMENTALISM, TIME, AND MODALITY.
Degree: 2016, Università degli Studi di Milano
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2434/359599
This thesis is devoted to fragmentalism, a non-standard tense realism introduced by Kit Fine (Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers. Oxford: OUP, pp. 261-320, 2005). In the first three chapters, I will show how to develop a fragmentalist version of presentism – which I will call fragmentalist presentism – in order to face some of the problems usually ascribed to standard presentism. In particular, the goal of the fist chapter is to search for a way to reconcile the correspondence theory of truth (CTT), i.e., the thesis that truth supervenes on facts, with a presentist metaphysics. According to what we might call unrestricted CTT, the truth of past- and future-tensed sentences supervenes – respectively – on past and future facts. Since the standard presentist denies the existence of past and future entities (and facts concerning them that do not obtain in the present), she seems to lack the resources to accept both past- and future-tensed true sentences and unrestricted CTT. I will argue that by endorsing fragmentalist presentism one can uphold past- and future-tensed truths together with unrestricted CTT.
In the second chapter, I argue that the adoption of an unrestricted principle of bivalence is compatible with a metaphysics that (i) denies that the future is real, (ii) adopts nomological indeterminism, and (iii) exploits a branching structure to provide a semantics for future contingent claims. To this end, I will show how to reconcile – within Fine’s non-standard tense realism – a genuinely A-theoretic branching-time model with the idea that there is a branch corresponding to the thin red line, that is, the branch that will turn out to be the actual future history of the world.
Many four-dimensionalists think of continuants as mereological sums of stages from different times. These sums would perdure, that is, they would persist by having different stages. This view is generally taken to be incompatible with presentism: if there is no time except the present, then nothing can be a sum of such stages. The aim of the third chapter is to show that fragmentalist presentism provides us with the tools to embrace both a presentist metaphysics and (a non-standard version of) perdurantism.
In the last chapter, I will extend the fragmentalist approach to modality, by analysing the modal analogue of fragmentalist presentism. The simplest quantified modal logic is generally regarded as incompatible with actualism, the view that everything there is is actual. It is usually held that whoever wants to preserve the former while embracing the latter is somehow bound to enrich the inventory of the world with entities able to play the role traditionally ascribed to possibilia: abstract individualities or contingently non-concrete entities. I will hold that there is another way to reconcile actualism and the simplest quantified modal logic (a way that commits us to accept neither abstract individualities nor contingently non-concrete entities), by exploiting what we might call fragmentalist actualism.
Advisors/Committee Members: tutor: G. Giorello, coordinatore: M. Massimini, MASSIMINI, MARCELLO.Subjects/Keywords: Tense Realism; Fragmentalism; Presentism; Correspondence Theory of Truth; Grounding; Supervenience; Thin Red Line; Branching Time; Principle of Bivalence; Four-dimensionalism; Actualism; Concretism; Quantified Modal Logic; Settore M-FIL/05 - Filosofia e Teoria dei Linguaggi
Record Details
Similar Records
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Share »
Record Details
Similar Records
Cite
« Share
❌
APA ·
Chicago ·
MLA ·
Vancouver ·
CSE |
Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Iaquinto, S. (2016). ALL THE WORLD'S A FRAGMENT. FRAGMENTALISM, TIME, AND MODALITY. (Thesis). Università degli Studi di Milano. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2434/359599
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Iaquinto, S.. “ALL THE WORLD'S A FRAGMENT. FRAGMENTALISM, TIME, AND MODALITY.” 2016. Thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano. Accessed December 08, 2019.
http://hdl.handle.net/2434/359599.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Iaquinto, S.. “ALL THE WORLD'S A FRAGMENT. FRAGMENTALISM, TIME, AND MODALITY.” 2016. Web. 08 Dec 2019.
Vancouver:
Iaquinto S. ALL THE WORLD'S A FRAGMENT. FRAGMENTALISM, TIME, AND MODALITY. [Internet] [Thesis]. Università degli Studi di Milano; 2016. [cited 2019 Dec 08].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2434/359599.
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
Council of Science Editors:
Iaquinto S. ALL THE WORLD'S A FRAGMENT. FRAGMENTALISM, TIME, AND MODALITY. [Thesis]. Università degli Studi di Milano; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2434/359599
Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation
. 
Open Access Theses and Dissertations