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You searched for subject:( Epistemic luck). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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1. Whittington, Lee John. Metaphysics of luck.

Degree: PhD, 2015, University of Edinburgh

Clare, the titular character of The Time Traveller's Wife, reflects that "Everything seems simple until you think about it." (Niffenegger, 2003, 1) This might well be a mantra for the whole of philosophy, but a fair few terms tend to stick out. "Knowledge", "goodness" and "happiness" for example, are all pervasive everyday terms that undergo significant philosophical analysis. "Luck", I think, is another one of these terms. Wishing someone good luck in their projects, and cursing our bad luck when success seems so close to our reach or failure could have so easily been otherwise, happens so often that we rarely stop to reflect on what we really mean. Philosophical reflection on the nature of luck has a rich tradition, that is by no stretch confined to the Western philosophical canon. However, it has only very recently become one of the goals of philosophy to provide a clear account of what luck actually amounts to. This, in part, is the goal of this thesis. The thesis has two primary motivations. The first is to offer and defend a general account of luck that overcomes the problems faced by the current accounts of luck that are available in the current philosophical literature. The second is to apply this general account of luck to the areas of metaethics and epistemology where luck has been a pervasive and problematic concept, and demonstrate how this account of luck may resolve or further illuminate some of the problems that the notion has generated. The thesis is roughly split into two parts. The first half of the thesis focuses on the former objective of offering an account of luck. Chapter 1 offers a selected history of the philosophy of luck that spans from the Ancient Greeks to the present day, so that we might properly situate the current work on luck as part of the broader historical importance of the concept. Chapter 2 will set out the major rival to the theory of luck that I will offer - the lack of control account of luck (LCAL). LCAL has various iterations across the literature, but is most clearly articulated by Wayne Riggs (2009) and E.J. Coffman (2006, 2009). Both Coffman and Riggs add and adapt their own conditions to LCAL specifically so that the account may overcome several problems that have been levied against it. These further conditions are not incompatible so, to provide the strongest lack of control account possible, I have combined them to form a lack of control account I have called Combined LCAL - (c)LCAL. The latter part of the chapter pits (c)LCAL against some of the problems that have been raised against LCAL. However, despite the efforts of both Riggs and Coffman, even (c)LCAL fails to counter some of these objections. For these reasons I have rejected LCAL has a viable candidate for an account of luck. Chapter 3 sets out a modal account of luck (MAL), as argued for by Pritchard (2004, 2005, 2014), where an event is lucky only if it occurs in the actual world, but not in a relevant set of nearby possible worlds. Here I further elaborate on how we should understand the modal distances…

Subjects/Keywords: 123; luck; epistemic luck; metaphysics; moral luck

…Chapter 6, the final chapter, looks at epistemic luck, specifically how the adoption of the… …veritic epistemic luck results in the agent failing to know. The second is that through the… …Theaetetus is often cited as providing the first cases of epistemic luck – where justified true… …resembles it. The term “epistemic luck” is a relatively new one. It’s debatable whether Plato is… …alluding to anything that we would call epistemic luck. Socrates suggests that one might come to… 

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Whittington, L. J. (2015). Metaphysics of luck. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Edinburgh. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1842/20409

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Whittington, Lee John. “Metaphysics of luck.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Edinburgh. Accessed December 08, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/20409.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Whittington, Lee John. “Metaphysics of luck.” 2015. Web. 08 Dec 2019.

Vancouver:

Whittington LJ. Metaphysics of luck. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Edinburgh; 2015. [cited 2019 Dec 08]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/20409.

Council of Science Editors:

Whittington LJ. Metaphysics of luck. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Edinburgh; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1842/20409


University of St. Andrews

2. Church, Ian M. Virtue epistemology and the analysis of knowledge .

Degree: 2012, University of St. Andrews

This thesis centers on two trends in epistemology: (i) the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge, the project of explicating knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, and (ii) the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal of this thesis is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, are lacking. The first part of this thesis involves diagnosing what is wrong with the reductive model and defending that diagnosis against objections. The problem with the reductive project is the Gettier Problem. In Chapter 1, I lend credence to Linda Zagzebski’s grim 1994 diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the abandonment of the reductive model) by examining the nature of luck, the key component of Gettier problems. In Chapter 2, I vindicate this diagnosis against a range of critiques from the contemporary literature. The second part involves applying this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology. In Chapter 3, we consider the virtue epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In Chapter 4, we consider the virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa. Both are seminal and iconic; nevertheless, I argue that, in accord with our diagnosis, neither is able to viably surmount the Gettier Problem. Having diagnosed what is wrong with the reductive project and applied this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology, the final part of this thesis explores the possibility of non-reductive virtue epistemology. In Chapter 5, I argue that there are three strategies that can be used to develop non-reductive virtue epistemologies, strategies that are compatible with seminal non-reductive accounts of knowledge and preserve our favorite virtue-theoretic concepts. Advisors/Committee Members: Greenough, Patrick (advisor), Ebert, Philip A (advisor), Cohen, Stewart (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Virtue epistemology; The Gettier Problem; The analysis of knowledge; Epistemic luck; Alvin Plantinga; Ernest Sosa

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Church, I. M. (2012). Virtue epistemology and the analysis of knowledge . (Thesis). University of St. Andrews. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3118

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Church, Ian M. “Virtue epistemology and the analysis of knowledge .” 2012. Thesis, University of St. Andrews. Accessed December 08, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3118.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Church, Ian M. “Virtue epistemology and the analysis of knowledge .” 2012. Web. 08 Dec 2019.

Vancouver:

Church IM. Virtue epistemology and the analysis of knowledge . [Internet] [Thesis]. University of St. Andrews; 2012. [cited 2019 Dec 08]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3118.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Church IM. Virtue epistemology and the analysis of knowledge . [Thesis]. University of St. Andrews; 2012. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3118

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation


Australian National University

3. Cath, Yuri. A Practical Guide to Intellectualism .

Degree: 2008, Australian National University

In this thesis I examine the view—known as intellectualism—that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that, or propositional knowledge. I examine issues concerning both the status of this view of knowledge-how and the philosophical implications if it is true. The ability hypothesis is an important position in the philosophy of mind that appeals to Gilbert Ryle’s famous idea that there is a fundamental distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. This position appears to be inconsistent with the truth of intellectualism. However, I demonstrate in this thesis that the ability hypothesis can be restated using the intellectualist view of knowledge-how. With regards to the status of intellectualism, I argue that the two main traditional arguments against intellectualism do not succeed. I also provide new and, I claim, successful arguments against intellectualism. These arguments point to a new view of knowledge-how that is distinct from both the standard intellectualist and Rylean views of knowledge-how.

Subjects/Keywords: knowledge-how; knowledge-that; intellectualism; Gilbert Ryle; the ability hypothesis; Gettier; epistemic luck; justification; belief

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Cath, Y. (2008). A Practical Guide to Intellectualism . (Thesis). Australian National University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1885/151968

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Cath, Yuri. “A Practical Guide to Intellectualism .” 2008. Thesis, Australian National University. Accessed December 08, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/151968.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Cath, Yuri. “A Practical Guide to Intellectualism .” 2008. Web. 08 Dec 2019.

Vancouver:

Cath Y. A Practical Guide to Intellectualism . [Internet] [Thesis]. Australian National University; 2008. [cited 2019 Dec 08]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/151968.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Cath Y. A Practical Guide to Intellectualism . [Thesis]. Australian National University; 2008. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/151968

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

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