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You searched for +publisher:"Washington University in St. Louis" +contributor:("Larry May"). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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Washington University in St. Louis

1. Hoskins, Zachary. The Moral Permissibility of Punishment.

Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2011, Washington University in St. Louis

This dissertation offers an account of the moral permissibility of criminal punishment. Punishment presents a distinctive moral challenge in that it involves a community’s inflicting harm on individuals, treating them in ways that would typically be morally wrong. We can distinguish a number of different questions of punishment’s permissibility. This dissertation focuses on four central questions:: 1) Why may we punish? Why is it in principle permissible to inflict harm on criminal offenders?: 2) Why should we punish? Is there a compelling reason to do so?: 3) How may we punish? What principles should constrain impositions of punishment? And finally,: 4) who is properly subject to punishment? Rather than expect to answer all of these questions by appeal to the same moral principle, this dissertation contends that the questions should be seen as distinct, and thus as appropriately answered by appeal to distinct moral considerations. Ultimately, the dissertation concludes that an institution of punishment that aims at deterrence, constrained by considerations of retribution and reform, is permissible insofar as the institution is among the mutually beneficial practices with which community members have reciprocal, fairness-based obligations to comply. Advisors/Committee Members: Larry May.

Subjects/Keywords: Philosophy; Law; criminal law, deterrence, punishment, reform, retribution

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Hoskins, Z. (2011). The Moral Permissibility of Punishment. (Doctoral Dissertation). Washington University in St. Louis. Retrieved from https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/156

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Hoskins, Zachary. “The Moral Permissibility of Punishment.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis. Accessed October 19, 2019. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/156.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Hoskins, Zachary. “The Moral Permissibility of Punishment.” 2011. Web. 19 Oct 2019.

Vancouver:

Hoskins Z. The Moral Permissibility of Punishment. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Washington University in St. Louis; 2011. [cited 2019 Oct 19]. Available from: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/156.

Council of Science Editors:

Hoskins Z. The Moral Permissibility of Punishment. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Washington University in St. Louis; 2011. Available from: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/156


Washington University in St. Louis

2. Delston, Jill. A Hybrid Theory of Global Justice.

Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2011, Washington University in St. Louis

Although we have obligations to address global problems at a political level, we disagree on the source, justification, and content of these norms. For example, what kinds of obligations exist across national borders and why? What international actions are right and wrong? Who is required to perform these actions? When it is it permissible to use coercion at the global level? In my dissertation, I develop an original theory of global justice that can answer these questions and I show how my theory applies to current problems. I start by articulating why we need a theory of international justice and introducing the theories that have already been proposed. I divide these theories into two general kinds. One theory says global political norms are rooted in objective facts about what is good for human beings. In this view, human beings have certain needs and desires, and so some ways of treating humans are forbidden: for example, harming others) and others are obligatory: such as helping others). The other theory says that international norms are the product of some contract or agreement. I call the former non-constructivism and the latter social contract theory. I then explain why neither of these two kinds of theories adequately describes or justifies international norms. Due to what I call the choice and specification problems, I argue that there are many ways to attain the goods we pursue in international relations, none of which is privileged, and that there are too many ways to specify norms, none of which is privileged. Next, due to what I call the constraint problem, I also argue that social contract theory is insufficient to ground a theory of global justice. Parties to contracts may agree to seemingly incorrect agreements or fail to agree to seemingly required contracts. Despite being insufficient by themselves to ground global justice, I argue that these theories are also necessary. I affirm the existence of objective facts and endorse their contribution to global justice. I also appeal to respect for rational agents, success in consensus, and practical considerations in showing social contract theory is necessary for global justice. In addition to the independent reasons necessitating these theories, we also have reason to include them in a theory of global justice insofar as they complete each other. I argue that social contract theory best solves the choice and specification problems and that non-constructivism best solves the constraint problem. Having found that both theories are individually necessary and jointly sufficient, I argue that a combination of the two succeeds. I defend such a combination – a hybrid theory – in two stages. In the first stage, I argue hybrid theory is possible and that it avoids the defects of each component without incurring any fresh difficulties. After defending hybrid theory generally, I proceed to a second stage of this defense, in which I develop a particular version of hybrid theory. I first seek a particular version of hybrid theory in history, considering Epicurus,… Advisors/Committee Members: Larry May.

Subjects/Keywords: Philosophy; Consent; Ethics; International justice; Justice; Political philosophy; Social contract theory

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Delston, J. (2011). A Hybrid Theory of Global Justice. (Doctoral Dissertation). Washington University in St. Louis. Retrieved from https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/568

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Delston, Jill. “A Hybrid Theory of Global Justice.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis. Accessed October 19, 2019. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/568.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Delston, Jill. “A Hybrid Theory of Global Justice.” 2011. Web. 19 Oct 2019.

Vancouver:

Delston J. A Hybrid Theory of Global Justice. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Washington University in St. Louis; 2011. [cited 2019 Oct 19]. Available from: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/568.

Council of Science Editors:

Delston J. A Hybrid Theory of Global Justice. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Washington University in St. Louis; 2011. Available from: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/568


Washington University in St. Louis

3. Crookston, Emily. John Locke on Obligation: Sensation, Reflection, and the Natural Duty to Consent.

Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2009, Washington University in St. Louis

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT: John Locke on Obligation: Sensation, Reflection, and the Natural Duty to Consent By Emily Marie Crookston Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Washington University in St. Louis, 2009 Professor Larry May, Chairperson Locke's theories of moral and political obligation are instructive both in their successes and in their failures. Writing during a time in which previous assumptions were being widely challenged, Locke judiciously accepts the wisdom of his predecessors as a firm foundation upon which to build his own arguments. Of course, Locke also was not immune to criticism. On the moral obligation side, Locke faces the charge of internal inconsistency: his theory of natural law cannot meet the standards set by his naturalist empiricism. On the political obligation side, critics complain that consent theory is descriptively inadequate: if citizens could consent to their governments, then they would be morally bound. The problem is that most citizens have never consented. So two of Locke's crucial arguments seem to be in trouble. In my dissertation, I take another look at these criticisms. First, I argue that though Locke's natural law theory is too vague to count as a decisive theory of moral obligation, he could enrich his account using features of a Kantian approach in order to develop a coherent and internally consistent theory of moral obligation. In the second half of the dissertation, I build upon this comprehensive theory of moral obligation in order to argue for a more charitable interpretation of Locke's theory of political obligation. According to my view, although consent is necessary and sufficient for political obligation, there are nonetheless universal moral constraints upon the individual choice to consent. Thus, though it is true that individuals are bound to obey only those political institutions to which they have consented, there is a natural moral duty to consent when certain conditions are met. If I am correct, Locke comes closer to having a unified theory of obligation than most scholars give him credit for. By developing a credible theory of moral obligation, which Locke can then use to defend himself against critics of his consent theory of political obligation, I provide Locke with the tools to save both projects. Advisors/Committee Members: Larry May.

Subjects/Keywords: Philosophy; Consent Theory, Locke, Natural Law, Obligation

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Crookston, E. (2009). John Locke on Obligation: Sensation, Reflection, and the Natural Duty to Consent. (Doctoral Dissertation). Washington University in St. Louis. Retrieved from https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/77

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Crookston, Emily. “John Locke on Obligation: Sensation, Reflection, and the Natural Duty to Consent.” 2009. Doctoral Dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis. Accessed October 19, 2019. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/77.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Crookston, Emily. “John Locke on Obligation: Sensation, Reflection, and the Natural Duty to Consent.” 2009. Web. 19 Oct 2019.

Vancouver:

Crookston E. John Locke on Obligation: Sensation, Reflection, and the Natural Duty to Consent. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Washington University in St. Louis; 2009. [cited 2019 Oct 19]. Available from: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/77.

Council of Science Editors:

Crookston E. John Locke on Obligation: Sensation, Reflection, and the Natural Duty to Consent. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Washington University in St. Louis; 2009. Available from: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/77

.