Advanced search options

Advanced Search Options 🞨

Browse by author name (“Author name starts with…”).

Find ETDs with:

in
/  
in
/  
in
/  
in

Written in Published in Earliest date Latest date

Sorted by

Results per page:

Sorted by: relevance · author · university · dateNew search

You searched for +publisher:"Virginia Tech" +contributor:("Phanse, Kaustubh S."). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

Search Limiters

Last 2 Years | English Only

No search limiters apply to these results.

▼ Search Limiters


Virginia Tech

1. Bhat, Aniket Anant. Stochastic Petri Net Models of Service Availability in a PBNM System for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks.

Degree: MS, Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2004, Virginia Tech

Policy based network management is a promising approach for provisioning and management of quality of service in mobile ad hoc networks. In this thesis, we focus on performance evaluation of this approach in context of the amount of service received by certain nodes called policy execution points (PEPs) or policy clients from certain specialized nodes called the policy decision points (PDPs) or policy servers. We develop analytical models for the study of the system behavior under two scenarios; a simple Markovian scenario where we assume that the random variables associated with system processes follow an exponential distribution and a more complex non-Markovian scenario where we model the system processes according to general distribution functions as observed through simulation. We illustrate that the simplified Markovian model provides a reasonable indication of the trend of the service availability seen by policy clients and highlight the need for an exact analysis of the system without relying on Poisson assumptions for system processes. In the case of the more exact non-Markovian analysis, we show that our model gives a close approximation to the values obtained via empirical methods. Stochastic Petri Nets are used as performance evaluation tools in development and analysis of these system models. Advisors/Committee Members: DaSilva, Luiz A. (committeechair), Varadarajan, Srinidhi (committee member), Phanse, Kaustubh S. (committee member), Midkiff, Scott F. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Service availability; Stochastic Petri Nets; non-Markovian modeling; mobile ad hoc networks; policy-based network management

Record DetailsSimilar RecordsGoogle PlusoneFacebookTwitterCiteULikeMendeleyreddit

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Bhat, A. A. (2004). Stochastic Petri Net Models of Service Availability in a PBNM System for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. (Masters Thesis). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/10000

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Bhat, Aniket Anant. “Stochastic Petri Net Models of Service Availability in a PBNM System for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks.” 2004. Masters Thesis, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/10000.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Bhat, Aniket Anant. “Stochastic Petri Net Models of Service Availability in a PBNM System for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks.” 2004. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Bhat AA. Stochastic Petri Net Models of Service Availability in a PBNM System for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Virginia Tech; 2004. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/10000.

Council of Science Editors:

Bhat AA. Stochastic Petri Net Models of Service Availability in a PBNM System for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. [Masters Thesis]. Virginia Tech; 2004. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/10000


Virginia Tech

2. Srivastava, Vivek. Behavior-based Incentives for Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks.

Degree: PhD, Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2008, Virginia Tech

A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) adopts a decentralized communication architecture which relies on cooperation among nodes at each layer of the protocol stack. Its reliance on cooperation for success and survival makes the ad hoc network particularly sensitive to variations in node behavior. Specifically, for functions such as routing, nodes which are limited in their resources may be unwilling to cooperate in forwarding for other nodes. Such selfish behavior leads to degradation in the performance of the network and possibly, in the extreme case, a complete cessation of operations. Consequently it is important to devise solutions to encourage resource-constrained nodes to cooperate. Incentive schemes have been proposed to induce selfish nodes to cooperate. Though many of the proposed schemes in the literature are payment-based, nodes can be incentivized to cooperate by adopting policies which are non-monetary in nature, but rather are based on the threat of retaliation for non-cooperating nodes. These policies, for which there is little formal analysis in the existing literature on node cooperation, are based on observed node behavior. We refer to them as behavior-based incentives. In this work, we analyze the effectiveness of behavior-based incentives in inducing nodes to cooperate. To determine whether an incentive scheme is effective in fostering cooperation we develop a game-theoretic model. Adopting a repeated game model, we show that nodes may agree to cooperate in sharing their resources and forward packets, even if they perceive a cost in doing so. This happens as the nodes recognize that refusing to cooperate will result in similar behavior by others, which ultimately would compromise the viability of the network as a whole. A major shortcoming in the analysis done in past works is the lack of consideration of practical constraints imposed by an ad hoc environment. One such example is the assumption that a node, when making decisions about whether to cooperate, has perfect knowledge of every other node's actions. In a distributed setting this is impractical. In our work, we analyze behavior-based incentives by incorporating such practical considerations as imperfect monitoring into our game-theoretic models. In modeling the problem as a game of imperfect public monitoring (nodes observe a common public signal that reflects the actions of other nodes in the network) we show that, under the assumption of first order stochastic dominance of the public signal, the grim trigger strategy leads to an equilibrium for nodes to cooperate. Even though a trigger-based strategy like grim-trigger is effective in deterring selfish behavior it is too harsh in its implementation. In addition, the availability of a common public signal in a distributed setting is rather limited. We, therefore, consider nodes that individually monitor the behavior of other nodes in the network and keep this information private. Note that this independent monitoring of behavior is error prone as a result of slow switching between transmit… Advisors/Committee Members: DaSilva, Luiz A. (committeechair), Midkiff, Scott F. (committee member), MacKenzie, Allen B. (committee member), Gilles, Robert P. (committee member), Phanse, Kaustubh S. (committee member), Shukla, Sandeep K. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: topology control simulation; game theoretic modeling

Record DetailsSimilar RecordsGoogle PlusoneFacebookTwitterCiteULikeMendeleyreddit

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Srivastava, V. (2008). Behavior-based Incentives for Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29172

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Srivastava, Vivek. “Behavior-based Incentives for Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks.” 2008. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 21, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29172.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Srivastava, Vivek. “Behavior-based Incentives for Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks.” 2008. Web. 21 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Srivastava V. Behavior-based Incentives for Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2008. [cited 2021 Jan 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29172.

Council of Science Editors:

Srivastava V. Behavior-based Incentives for Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2008. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29172

.