+publisher:"Virginia Tech" +contributor:("Gilles, Robert P.")

Virginia Tech

1. Ginde, Samir. A Game-theoretic Analysis of Link Adaptation in Cellular Radio Networks.

Degree: MS, Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2004, Virginia Tech

► In recent years, game theory has emerged as a promising approach to solving the power control problem in wireless networks. This thesis extends the reach… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Radio resource management; Nash equilibrium; Link adaptation; Game theory; Power control

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APA (6^th Edition):

Ginde, S. (2004). A Game-theoretic Analysis of Link Adaptation in Cellular Radio Networks. (Masters Thesis). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/9932

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Ginde, Samir. “A Game-theoretic Analysis of Link Adaptation in Cellular Radio Networks.” 2004. Masters Thesis, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/9932.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Ginde, Samir. “A Game-theoretic Analysis of Link Adaptation in Cellular Radio Networks.” 2004. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Ginde S. A Game-theoretic Analysis of Link Adaptation in Cellular Radio Networks. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Virginia Tech; 2004. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/9932.

Council of Science Editors:

Ginde S. A Game-theoretic Analysis of Link Adaptation in Cellular Radio Networks. [Masters Thesis]. Virginia Tech; 2004. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/9932

Virginia Tech

2. Outkin, Alexander V. Local Interactions, Learning and Automata Networks in Games.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 1998, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29465

► This dissertation is an attempt of expanding the domain of game theory into the sphere of evolving, potentially non-equilibrium systems. We especially focus our attention… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: automata networks; learning; evolution; cooperation

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APA (6^th Edition):

Outkin, A. V. (1998). Local Interactions, Learning and Automata Networks in Games. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29465

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Outkin, Alexander V. “Local Interactions, Learning and Automata Networks in Games.” 1998. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29465.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Outkin, Alexander V. “Local Interactions, Learning and Automata Networks in Games.” 1998. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Outkin AV. Local Interactions, Learning and Automata Networks in Games. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 1998. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29465.

Council of Science Editors:

Outkin AV. Local Interactions, Learning and Automata Networks in Games. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 1998. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29465

Virginia Tech

3. Komali, Ramakant S. Game-Theoretic Analysis of Topology Control.

Degree: PhD, Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2008, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28358

► Ad hoc networks are emerging as a cost-effective, yet, powerful tool for communication. These systems, where networks can emerge and converge on-the-fly, are guided by… (more)

▼ Ad hoc networks are emerging as a cost-effective, yet, powerful tool for communication. These systems, where networks can emerge and converge on-the-fly, are guided by the forward-looking goals of providing ubiquitous connectivity and constant access to information. Due to power and bandwidth constraints, the vulnerability of the wireless medium, and the multi-hop nature of ad hoc networks, these networks are becoming increasingly complex dynamic systems. Besides, modern radios are empowered to be reconfigurable, which harbors the temptation to exploit the system. To understand the implications of these issues, some of which pose significant challenges to efficient network design, we study topology control using game theory. We develop a game-theoretic framework of topology control that broadly captures the radio parameters, one or more of which can be tuned under the purview of topology control. In this dissertation, we consider two parameters, viz. transmit power and channel, and study the impact of controlling these on the emergent topologies. We first examine the impact of node selfishness on the network connectivity and energy efficiency under two levels of selfishness: (a) nodes cooperate and forward packets for one another, but selfishly minimize transmit power levels and; (b) nodes selectively forward packets and selfishly control transmit powers. In the former case, we characterize all the Nash Equilibria of the game and evaluate the energy efficiency of the induced topologies. We develop a better-response-based dynamic that guarantees convergence to the minimal maximum power topology. We extend our analysis to dynamic networks where nodes have limited knowledge about network connectivity, and examine the tradeoff between network performance and the cost of obtaining knowledge. Due to the high cost of maintaining knowledge in networks that are dynamic, mobility actually helps in information-constrained networks. In the latter case, nodes selfishly adapt their transmit powers to minimize their energy consumption, taking into account partial packet forwarding in the network. This work quantifies the energy efficiency gains obtained by cooperation and corroborates the need for incentivizing nodes to forward packets in decentralized, energy-limited networks. We then examine the impact of selfish behavior on spectral efficiency and interference minimization in multi-channel systems. We develop a distributed channel assignment algorithm to minimize the spectral footprint of a network while establishing an interference-free connected network. In spite of selfish channel selections, the network spectrum utilization is shown to be within 12% of the minimum on average. We then extend the analysis to dynamic networks where nodes have incomplete network state knowledge, and quantify the price of ignorance. Under the limitations on the number of available channels and radio interfaces, we analyze the channel assignment game with respect to interference minimization and network connectivity goals. By quantifying the… Advisors/Committee Members: MacKenzie, Allen B. (committeechair), Reed, Jeffrey Hugh (committee member), DaSilva, Luiz A. (committee member), Shukla, Sandeep K. (committee member), Gilles, Robert P. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: node cooperation; cognitive network; distributed algorithm; cross-layer optimization; game theory; network design; topology control; ad hoc network

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APA (6^th Edition):

Komali, R. S. (2008). Game-Theoretic Analysis of Topology Control. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28358

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Komali, Ramakant S. “Game-Theoretic Analysis of Topology Control.” 2008. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28358.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Komali, Ramakant S. “Game-Theoretic Analysis of Topology Control.” 2008. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Komali RS. Game-Theoretic Analysis of Topology Control. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2008. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28358.

Council of Science Editors:

Komali RS. Game-Theoretic Analysis of Topology Control. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2008. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28358

Virginia Tech

4. Hahn, Kyungdong. Economies with public projects: theory and experimental evidence.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 1995, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/38192

► This dissertation concerns economies with public projects. Public projects are a special case of public goods which size is not necessarily measured by units and… (more)

▼ This dissertation concerns economies with public projects. Public projects are a special case of public goods which size is not necessarily measured by units and which are either built at some fixed cost or not built at all. Our theoretical studies of public projects are based on personalized prices for access to the public project rather than personalized prices for the units consumed of public goods as in the literature on Lindahl equilibrium. Furthermore, the private provision of public projects is experimentally investigated with a double oral auction market for assets that are required in order to produce public projects. The first paper (Chapter 2), "Economies with Multiple Public Projects" (joint work with Robert P. Gilles), discusses an economy with multiple public projects each separately produced by a distinct provider operating under a different cost function. In an economy with the non-Euclidean representation of multiple public projects space we show that the two welfare theorems hold for valuation equilibria in which a public project is financed through a (non-linear) system of taxes or subsidies, called a valuation system, and that the core allocations are equivalent to the set of valuation equilibria with a nonnegative valuation system. Furthermore, if a Euclidean space is used to describe the public projects specified to the standard case of public goods, every Pareto efficient allocation is supported as an affine valuation equilibrium which is characterized with a price per unit of public good and a lump sum tax or subsidy. The second paper (Chapter 3), "Market Provision of Public Projects: Some Experimental Results" (joint work with Sheryl B. Ball), presents experimental evidence on the provision of a public project which is produced by a coalition of economic agents in the population. A double oral auction asset market is employed as the trading institution for assets that are required in order to produce the public project. The experimental environments differ by rules about who can produce the project, information about the benefits to the other agents of the project, and parameters which include the symmetry and size of individual valuations of the assets and the magnitude of social benefits from the project. We find that individually rational client outcomes which are identified by a theoretical analysis based on Chapter 2, are more likely in some environments than others, and suggest that these findings may have implications for the usefulness of this mechanism for public project provision. The third paper (Chapter 4), "Economies with Costly Trade Links," is an application of the model of economies with public projects to the case of an economy with endogenous formation of costly trade links between industries in different sectors of the economy. The trade links reduce transaction costs, but inevitably incur set-up costs. We prove that the two welfare theorems hold for trade equilibria in which each trade link is separately financed with budget neutrality as well as profit maximization.… Advisors/Committee Members: Gilles, Robert P. (committeechair), Ball, Sheryl B. (committee member), Eckel, Catherine C. (committee member), Haller, Hans H. (committee member), Kats, Amoz (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: multiple public projects; LD5655.V856 1995.H346

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APA (6^th Edition):

Hahn, K. (1995). Economies with public projects: theory and experimental evidence. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/38192

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Hahn, Kyungdong. “Economies with public projects: theory and experimental evidence.” 1995. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/38192.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Hahn, Kyungdong. “Economies with public projects: theory and experimental evidence.” 1995. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Hahn K. Economies with public projects: theory and experimental evidence. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 1995. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/38192.

Council of Science Editors:

Hahn K. Economies with public projects: theory and experimental evidence. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 1995. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/38192

Virginia Tech

5. Sarangi, Sudipta. Exploring Payoffs and Beliefs in Game Theory.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2000, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28556

► This dissertation explores the importance of the payoff structure and beliefs for noncooperative games. Chapter 2 considers instances where the payoffs and the objectives may… (more)

▼ This dissertation explores the importance of the payoff structure and beliefs for noncooperative games. Chapter 2 considers instances where the payoffs and the objectives may not be very clear to the players or the analyst. We develop a model for analyzing such games using a vector of reference utilities which are included in the definition of the game and assumed to be shared by all players. These are used to obtain the true utilities in the game. Conditions for the existence of equilibrium are identified by allowing players to have beliefs about the others. The solution concept is applied to the Traveler's Dilemma and a duopoly. In Chapter 3 a non-cooperative model of network formation is developed. Agents form links based on the cost of the link and its assessed benefit. Link formation is one-sided, i.e., agents can initiate links with other agents without their consent, provided the agent forming the link makes the appropriate investment. The model builds on the work of Bala and Goyal, but allows for agent heterogeneity by allowing for different failure probabilities. We investigate Nash networks that exhibit connectedness and redundancy and provide an explicit characterization of star networks. Efficiency and Pareto-optimality issues are discussed through examples. We also explore the consequences of three alternative specifications which address criticisms of such communication networks. Chapter 4 examines noncooperative fuzzy games. Both in fuzzy noncooperative games and in abstract economies, players impose mutual restrictions on their available strategic choices. Here we combine these two theories: A player tries to minimize the restrictions he imposes on others, while respecting the restrictions imposed by others on him, but does not explicitly pursue any other objectives of his own. We establish existence of an equilibrium in this framework. In Chapter 5 normal form game is modeled using tools from fuzzy set theory. We extend the decision theory framework of Bellman and Zadeh (1970) to a game-theoretic setting. The formulation is preliminary Advisors/Committee Members: Stegeman, Mark (committee member), Feltenstein, Andrew (committee member), Ball, Sheryl B. (committee member), Gilles, Robert P. (committeecochair), Haller, Hans H. (committeecochair).

Subjects/Keywords: Fuzzy Games; Nash Networks; Traveler's Dilemma; Reference Payoffs

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APA (6^th Edition):

Sarangi, S. (2000). Exploring Payoffs and Beliefs in Game Theory. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28556

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Sarangi, Sudipta. “Exploring Payoffs and Beliefs in Game Theory.” 2000. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28556.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Sarangi, Sudipta. “Exploring Payoffs and Beliefs in Game Theory.” 2000. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Sarangi S. Exploring Payoffs and Beliefs in Game Theory. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2000. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28556.

Council of Science Editors:

Sarangi S. Exploring Payoffs and Beliefs in Game Theory. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2000. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28556

Virginia Tech

6. Liu, Chung-shu. Objectives and incentives in financial markets.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 1994, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/40155

► This dissertation is a collection of papers investigating objectives and incentives in financial markets. The first essay (Chapter 2) deals with the endogenous determination of… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: Finance Mathematical models.; LD5655.V856 1994.L59

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APA (6^th Edition):

Liu, C. (1994). Objectives and incentives in financial markets. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/40155

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Liu, Chung-shu. “Objectives and incentives in financial markets.” 1994. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/40155.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Liu, Chung-shu. “Objectives and incentives in financial markets.” 1994. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Liu C. Objectives and incentives in financial markets. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 1994. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/40155.

Council of Science Editors:

Liu C. Objectives and incentives in financial markets. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 1994. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/40155

Virginia Tech

7. Mikami, Kazuhiko. Market failure and forms of enterprise.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2002, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/26274

► This dissertation attempts to construct a theory which states that forms of enterprise are determined to a large extent by potential market failure. In the… (more)

Subjects/Keywords: market failure; forms of enterprise

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APA (6^th Edition):

Mikami, K. (2002). Market failure and forms of enterprise. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/26274

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Mikami, Kazuhiko. “Market failure and forms of enterprise.” 2002. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/26274.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Mikami, Kazuhiko. “Market failure and forms of enterprise.” 2002. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Mikami K. Market failure and forms of enterprise. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2002. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/26274.

Council of Science Editors:

Mikami K. Market failure and forms of enterprise. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2002. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/26274

Virginia Tech

8. Badasyan, Narine. Game Theoretic Models of Connectivity Among Internet Access Providers.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2004, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/11193

► The Internet has a loosely hierarchical structure. At the top of the hierarchy are the backbones, also called Internet Access Providers (hereafter IAPs). The second… (more)

▼ The Internet has a loosely hierarchical structure. At the top of the hierarchy are the backbones, also called Internet Access Providers (hereafter IAPs). The second layer of the hierarchy is comprised of Internet Service Providers (hereafter ISPs). At the bottom of the hierarchy are the end users, consumers, who browse the web, and websites. To provide access to the whole Internet, the providers must interconnect with each other and share their network infrastructure. Two main forms of interconnection have emerged â peering under which the providers carry each otherâ s traffic without any payments and transit under which the downstream provider pays the upstream provider a certain settlement payment for carrying its traffic. This dissertation develops three game theoretical models to describe the interconnection agreements among the providers, and analysis of those models from two alternative modeling perspectives: a purely non-cooperative game and a network perspective. There are two original contributions of the dissertation. First, we model the formation of peering/transit contracts explicitly as a decision variable in a non-cooperative game, while the current literature does not employ such modeling techniques. Second, we apply network analysis to examine interconnection decisions of the providers, which yields much realistic results. Chapter 1 provides a brief description of the Internet history, architecture and infrastructure as well as the economic literature. In Chapter 2 we develop a model, in which IAPs decide on private peering agreements, comparing the benefits of private peering relative to being connected only through National Access Points (hereafter NAPs). The model is formulated as a multistage game. Private peering agreements reduce congestion in the Internet, and so improve the quality of IAPs. The results show that even though the profits are lower with private peerings, due to large investments, the network where all the providers privately peer is the stable network. Chapter 3 discusses the interconnection arrangements among ISPs. Intra-backbone peering refers to peering between ISPs connected to the same backbone, whereas inter-backbone peering refers to peering between ISPs connected to different backbones. We formulate the model as a two-stage game. Peering affects profits through two channels - reduction of backbone congestion and ability to send traffic circumventing congested backbones. The relative magnitude of these factors helps or hinders peering. In Chapter 4 we develop a game theoretic model to examine how providers decide who they want to peer with and who has to pay transit. There is no regulation with regard to interconnection policies of providers, though there is a general convention that the providers peer if they perceive equal benefits from peering, and have transit arrangements otherwise. The model discusses a set of conditions, which determine the formation of peering and transit agreements. We argue that market forces determine the terms of interconnection, and there… Advisors/Committee Members: Gilles, Robert P. (committeechair), Haller, Hans H. (committee member), Eckel, Catherine C. (committee member), Barkhi, Reza (committee member), Spanos, Aris (committee member), Lutz, Nancy A. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Pairwise Stability; Nash Equilibrium; Peering; Transit; Internet

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APA (6^th Edition):

Badasyan, N. (2004). Game Theoretic Models of Connectivity Among Internet Access Providers. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/11193

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Badasyan, Narine. “Game Theoretic Models of Connectivity Among Internet Access Providers.” 2004. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/11193.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Badasyan, Narine. “Game Theoretic Models of Connectivity Among Internet Access Providers.” 2004. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Badasyan N. Game Theoretic Models of Connectivity Among Internet Access Providers. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2004. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/11193.

Council of Science Editors:

Badasyan N. Game Theoretic Models of Connectivity Among Internet Access Providers. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2004. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/11193

Virginia Tech

9. Suris, Juan Emilio. Cooperative Game Theory and Non-convex Optimization Analysis of Spectrum Sharing.

Degree: PhD, Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2007, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/30063

► Opportunistic spectrum access has become a high priority research area in the past few years. The motivation behind this actively researched area is the fact… (more)

▼ Opportunistic spectrum access has become a high priority research area in the past few years. The motivation behind this actively researched area is the fact that the limited spectrum available is currently being utilized in an inefficient way. The complete wireless spectrum is assigned and reserved, but not necessarily being used. At the same time, the demand for innovation in wireless technology is growing. Since there is no room in the wireless spectrum to allocate significant frequency bands for future wireless technologies, the only recourse is to increase utilization of the spectrum. To achieve this, we must find a way to share the spectrum. Spectrum sharing techniques will require coordination between all the layers of the protocol stack. The network and the wireless medium are inextricably linked and, thus, both must be considered when optimizing wireless network performance. Unfortunately, interactions in the wireless medium can lead to non-convex problems which have been shown to be NP-hard. Techniques must be developed to tackle the optimization problems that arise from wireless network analysis. In this document we focus on analyzing the spectrum sharing problem from two perspectives: cooperative game theory and non-convex optimization. We develop a cooperative game theory model to analyze a scenario where nodes in a multi-hop wireless network need to agree on a fair allocation of spectrum. We show that in high interference environments, the utility space of the game is non-convex, which may make some optimal allocations unachievable with pure strategies. However, we show that as the number of channels available increases, the utility space becomes close to convex and thus optimal allocations become achievable with pure strategies. We propose the use of the NBS and show that it achieves a good compromise between fairness and efficiency, using a small number of channels. We also propose a distributed algorithm for spectrum sharing and show that it achieves allocations reasonably close to the NBS. In our game theory analysis, we studied the possible outcomes of the spectrum sharing problem and propose the NBS as a desirable outcome and propose an algorithm to achieve the NBS spectrum allocation. However, the expression used to compute the NBS is a non-convex optimization problem. We propose an optimization model to solve a class of problems that incorporate the non-convex dynamics of the wireless medium that occur when the objective is a function of SINR. We present two case studies to show the application of the model to discrete and continuous optimization problems. We propose a branch and bound heuristic, based on the RLT, for approximating the solution of continuous optimization problems. Finally, we present results for the continuous case study. We show simulation results for the heuristic compared to a time constrained mixed integer linear program (MILP) as well as a nonlinear optimization using random starting points. We show that for small networks the MILP achieves the optimal in reasonable… Advisors/Committee Members: DaSilva, Luiz A. (committeechair), Gilles, Robert P. (committee member), Reed, Jeffrey Hugh (committee member), Midkiff, Scott F. (committee member), MacKenzie, Allen B. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Spectrum management; Distributed algorithms; Power control; Cochannel interference; Game theory

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APA (6^th Edition):

Suris, J. E. (2007). Cooperative Game Theory and Non-convex Optimization Analysis of Spectrum Sharing. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/30063

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Suris, Juan Emilio. “Cooperative Game Theory and Non-convex Optimization Analysis of Spectrum Sharing.” 2007. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/30063.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Suris, Juan Emilio. “Cooperative Game Theory and Non-convex Optimization Analysis of Spectrum Sharing.” 2007. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Suris JE. Cooperative Game Theory and Non-convex Optimization Analysis of Spectrum Sharing. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2007. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/30063.

Council of Science Editors:

Suris JE. Cooperative Game Theory and Non-convex Optimization Analysis of Spectrum Sharing. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2007. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/30063

Virginia Tech

10. Chakrabarti, Subhadip. Network Formation and Economic Applications.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2004, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/11256

► Networks, generically, refer to any application of graph theory in economics. Consider an undirected graph where nodes represent players and links represent relationships between them.… (more)

▼ Networks, generically, refer to any application of graph theory in economics. Consider an undirected graph where nodes represent players and links represent relationships between them. Players can both form and delete links by which we mean that they can both form new relationships and terminate existing ones. A stable network is one in which no incentives exist to change the network structure. There can be various forms of stability depending on how many links players are allowed to form or delete at a time. Under strong pairwise stability, each player is allowed to delete any number of links at a time while any pair of players can form one link at a time. We introduce a network-value function, which assigns to each possible network a certain value. The value is allocated according to the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule, which divides the value generated by a component equally among members of the component (where a component refers to a maximally connected subgraph). An efficient network is one that maximizes the network value function. We show that there is an underlying conflict between strong pairwise stability and efficiency. Efficient networks are not necessarily strongly pairwise stable. This conflict can be resolved only if value functions satisfy a certain property called "middlemen-security". We further find that there is a broad class of networks called "middlemen-free networks" for which the above condition is automatically satisfied under all possible value functions. We also look at three network applications. A peering contract is an arrangement between Internet Service Providers under which they exchange traffic with one another free of cost. We analyze incentives for peering contracts among Internet service providers using the notion of pairwise stability. A hierarchy is a directed graph with an explicit top-down structure where each pair of linked agents have a superior-subordinate relationship with each other. We apply the notion of conjunctive permission value to demonstrate the formation of hierarchical firms in a competitive labor market. Comparative or targeted advertising is defined as any form of advertising where a firm directly or indirectly names a competitor. We also examine a model of targeted advertising between oligopolistic firms using non-cooperative game theoretic tools. Advisors/Committee Members: Lutz, Nancy A. (committee member), Sarangi, Sudipta (committee member), Stegeman, Mark (committee member), Eckel, Catherine C. (committee member), Gilles, Robert P. (committeecochair), Haller, Hans H. (committeecochair).

Subjects/Keywords: Comparative Advertising; Nash Equilibrium; Strong Pairwise Stability; Private Peering; Permission Value

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APA (6^th Edition):

Chakrabarti, S. (2004). Network Formation and Economic Applications. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/11256

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Chakrabarti, Subhadip. “Network Formation and Economic Applications.” 2004. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/11256.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Chakrabarti, Subhadip. “Network Formation and Economic Applications.” 2004. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Chakrabarti S. Network Formation and Economic Applications. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2004. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/11256.

Council of Science Editors:

Chakrabarti S. Network Formation and Economic Applications. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2004. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/11256

Virginia Tech

11. Johnson, Cathleen A. Social Capital and Conventions: A Social Networks Perspective.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2000, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/27230

► We introduce a spatial cost topology in the network formation model analyzed by Jackson and Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory 71 (1996), 44 – 74.… (more)

▼ We introduce a spatial cost topology in the network formation model analyzed by Jackson and Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory 71 (1996), 44 – 74. This cost topology might represent geographical, social, or individual differences. It describes variable costs of establishing social network connections. Participants form links based on a cost-benefit analysis. We examine the pairwise stable networks within this spatial environment. Incentives vary enough to show a rich pattern of emerging behavior. We also investigate the subgame perfect implementation of pairwise stable and efficient networks. We construct a multistage extensive form game that describes the formation of links in our spatial environment. Finally, we identify the conditions under which the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of these network formation games are stable. We analyze the dynamic implications of learning in a large population coordination game where both the actions of the players and the communication network evolve over time. Cost considerations of social interaction are incorporated by considering a circular model with endogenous neighborhoods, meaning that the locations of the players are fixed but players can create their own communication network.The dynamic process describing medium-run behavior is shown to converge to an absorbing state, which may be characterized by coexistence of conventions. In the long run, when mistake probabilities are small but nonvanishing, coexistence of conventions is no longer sustainable as the risk-dominant convention becomes the unique stochastically stable state. We create and investigate a system that is capable of observing the accumulation of social capital and the effect of social capital accumulation on behavior of individually rational players. In the first model, we develop a restricted system to show that social capital forms and is maintained at a steady state level. The resulting network is the chain. The second model uses a congestion function in conjunction with social capital to show a network emerge that contains links that costlier than those in the chain network. Advisors/Committee Members: Gilles, Robert P. (committeechair), Snyder, Susan K. (committee member), Spanos, Aris (committee member), Burns, John A. (committee member), Eckel, Catherine C. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Conventions; Stability; Social Capital; Social Networks; Local Interaction

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APA (6^th Edition):

Johnson, C. A. (2000). Social Capital and Conventions: A Social Networks Perspective. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/27230

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Johnson, Cathleen A. “Social Capital and Conventions: A Social Networks Perspective.” 2000. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/27230.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Johnson, Cathleen A. “Social Capital and Conventions: A Social Networks Perspective.” 2000. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Johnson CA. Social Capital and Conventions: A Social Networks Perspective. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2000. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/27230.

Council of Science Editors:

Johnson CA. Social Capital and Conventions: A Social Networks Perspective. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2000. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/27230

Virginia Tech

12. Kyureghian, Hrachya Henrik. Theory and Simulations in Spatial Economics.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2000, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/26077

► Chapter 2 deals with a linear city model Ã la Hotelling where the two firms share linear transport costs with their customers. Mill pricing and… (more)

▼ Chapter 2 deals with a linear city model Ã la Hotelling where the two firms share linear transport costs with their customers. Mill pricing and uniform delivery pricing are special limiting cases. We characterize the conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in the two-stage location-price game. These enable us to identify the causes for non-existence in the two limiting cases. We solve for the equilibrium of a location game between the duopolists with an exogenously given price. When the two firms are constrained to locate at the same central spot, we show the nonexistence of pure strategy equilibria, conjecture the existence of mixed strategy equilibria, and show that any such possible equilibria will always yield positive expected profits. Chapter 3 provides simulations as well as theoretical analysis of potential spatial separation of heterogeneous agents operating on a two-dimensional grid space that represents a city. Heterogeneity refers to a characteristic which is also a determinant of individual valuation of land. We study spatial separation with respect to the distinguishing characteristic and investigate the details of emerging spatial patterns. Simulations suggest that the process of interaction with little trade friction goes through stages which resemble its end-state with high trade friction. Several theoretical examples exhibit a distinguishing characteristic upon which the simulations are based. They reflect some of the causes for spatial separation. Examples for the absence of spatial separation are also given. In Chapter 4 simulations, in addition to some theory, are used to investigate certain aspects of a city formation process. The model assumes two types of economic agents, workers and employers, operating on a two-dimensional grid. The agents have simple preferences, positive for the opposite type and negative for the own type in the own location. In addition, they have positive or negative preference for agglomeration in the own location. The model helps build intuition about a potentially important factor for agglomeration formation, namely, the disparity between entrepreneurial and technical skills in localities. We also determine the minimum level of positive preference for agglomeration that leads to agglomeration formation. Advisors/Committee Members: Stegeman, Mark (committee member), Kats, Amoz (committee member), Lutz, Nancy A. (committee member), Gilles, Robert P. (committeecochair), Haller, Hans H. (committeecochair).

Subjects/Keywords: Self-Reinforcement; Linear City; Automata; Hotelling; Agglomeration; City Formation; Simulations

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Kyureghian, H. H. (2000). Theory and Simulations in Spatial Economics. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/26077

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Kyureghian, Hrachya Henrik. “Theory and Simulations in Spatial Economics.” 2000. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/26077.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Kyureghian, Hrachya Henrik. “Theory and Simulations in Spatial Economics.” 2000. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Kyureghian HH. Theory and Simulations in Spatial Economics. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2000. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/26077.

Council of Science Editors:

Kyureghian HH. Theory and Simulations in Spatial Economics. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2000. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/26077

Virginia Tech

13. Mohemkar-Kheirandish, Reza. Intra-Household Decision Making.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2008, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29215

► This dissertation consists of three essays. In the first one (Chapter three), "Gains and Losses from Household Formation," I introduce a general equilibrium model, wherein… (more)

▼ This dissertation consists of three essays. In the first one (Chapter three), "Gains and Losses from Household Formation," I introduce a general equilibrium model, wherein a household may consist of more than one member, each with their own preferences and endowments. In these models at first, individuals form households. Then, collective decisions (or bargaining) within the household specifies the consumption plans of household members. Finally, competition across households determines a feasible allocation of resources. I consider a model with two types of individuals and pure group externalities. I investigate the competitive equilibrium allocation and stability of the equilibrium in that setting. Specifically, I show that under a certain set of assumptions a competitive equilibrium with free exit is also a competitive equilibrium with free household formation. Similar results are obtained for a special case of consumption externality. Illustrative examples, where prices may change as household structures change, are used to show how general equilibrium model with variable household structure works and some interesting results are discussed at the end of the first essay. In the second essay (Chapter four), “Effects of the Price System on Household Labor Supply,” I introduce leisure and labor into the two-type economy framework that was constructed in the first essay. The main objective of this essay is to investigate the effects of exogenous prices on the labor supply decisions, and completely analyze the partial equilibrium model outcomes in a two-type economy setting. I assume a wage gap and explore the effect of that gap on labor supply. The main content of the second essay is the analysis of the effect of change in wages, price of the private good, power of each individual in the household, relative importance of private consumption compared to leisure, and the level of altruism on individual's decisions about how much private good or leisure he/she wants to consume. The effect of a relative price change on labor supply, private consumption and utility level is also investigated. Moreover, one of the variations of Spence's signaling model is borrowed to explain why higher education of women in Iran does not necessarily translate into higher female labor force participation. Finally, fixed point theorem is used to calculate the power (or alternatively labor supply) of individuals in the household endogenously for the two-type economy with labor at the end of this essay. In the third essay (Chapter five), “Dynamics of Poverty in Iran: What Are the Determinants of the Probability of Being Poor?,” I explore the characteristics of the households who fall below the poverty line and stay there as well as those who climb up later. I decompose poverty in Iran into chronic and transient poverty, and investigate the relation of each component of poverty with certain characteristics of households. I also study mobility and the main characteristics of growth in expenditure of households. One of the main issues in… Advisors/Committee Members: Haller, Hans H. (committeechair), Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad (committee member), Kats, Amoz (committee member), Tideman, Thorwald Nicolaus (committee member), Gilles, Robert P. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Mobility; Transition Matrix; Externality; Household; Decision Making; Labor Supply; Equilibrium; Stability; Poverty; Private Consumption; Labor Force Participation rate; Chronically Poor; Transitory Poor; Dynamics; Two-type economy

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Mohemkar-Kheirandish, R. (2008). Intra-Household Decision Making. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29215

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Mohemkar-Kheirandish, Reza. “Intra-Household Decision Making.” 2008. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29215.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Mohemkar-Kheirandish, Reza. “Intra-Household Decision Making.” 2008. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Mohemkar-Kheirandish R. Intra-Household Decision Making. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2008. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29215.

Council of Science Editors:

Mohemkar-Kheirandish R. Intra-Household Decision Making. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2008. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29215

Virginia Tech

14. McEntarfer, Erika L. Three Essays on Social Networks in Labor Markets.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2002, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29531

► This dissertation consists of three essays examining the important role of job connections, references, and word of mouth information in labor markets. The first essay… (more)

▼ This dissertation consists of three essays examining the important role of job connections, references, and word of mouth information in labor markets. The first essay examines the importance of job connections for internal migrants. In this chapter, I develop a theoretical model where labor market networks provide labor market information with less noise than information obtained in the formal market. This model predicts lower initial wages and greater wage growth after migration for migrants without contacts. I then use data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY) to examine whether migrants who used social connections when finding their first job assimilate faster in the new region. Consistent with the theoretical model, I find that migrants who did not use social connections take longer to assimilate in the new region. The second essay models how screening workers through social networks impacts labor mobility in markets with adverse selection. When there is asymmetric information in labor markets, worker mobility is constrained by adverse selection in the market for experienced workers. However, if workers can acquire references through their social networks then they can move more easily between jobs. In this chapter I develop a simple labor market model in which workers can learn the productivity of other workers through social interaction. I show that networks increase wages and mobility of high-productivity experienced workers; however, networks discourage workers from accepting jobs outside their job-contact network, because of adverse selection. The third essay in this dissertation examines the importance of social networks in labor markets when work is produced jointly. Most employers cite poor attitude and poor fit with firm culture as their greatest problems in recruiting employees, rating these factors more important than skill. This is easily explained when the output of the firm requires that workers engage in work together. In this essay, I explain why it might be rational for firms to hire through social networks even when worker skill is observed perfectly, if these workers are better able to do joint work with the firm s existing employees. Advisors/Committee Members: Tideman, Thorwald Nicolaus (committeechair), Ashley, Richard A. (committee member), Murphy, Russell D. (committee member), Lutz, Nancy A. (committee member), Gilles, Robert P. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Migration; Social Networks; Labor Mobility

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

McEntarfer, E. L. (2002). Three Essays on Social Networks in Labor Markets. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29531

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

McEntarfer, Erika L. “Three Essays on Social Networks in Labor Markets.” 2002. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29531.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

McEntarfer, Erika L. “Three Essays on Social Networks in Labor Markets.” 2002. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

McEntarfer EL. Three Essays on Social Networks in Labor Markets. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2002. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29531.

Council of Science Editors:

McEntarfer EL. Three Essays on Social Networks in Labor Markets. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2002. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29531

Virginia Tech

15. Raychaudhuri, Subhashis. Essays on game theory and its application to social discrimination and segregation.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 1994, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/37258

► This dissertation consists of three chapters on game theory and its application to social segregation and discrimination. In the first chapter, we discuss two interpretations… (more)

▼ This dissertation consists of three chapters on game theory and its application to social segregation and discrimination. In the first chapter, we discuss two interpretations of the Nash equilibrium and connect the remaining two chapters based on such interpretations. The first chapter also provides the motivations and the summary of Chapters 2 and 3. In the second chapter, we consider an extension of an almost strictly competitive game in n-person extensive games by incorporating Seiten's subgame perfection. We call this extension a subgame perfect weakly-almost (SPWA) strictly competitive game, in particular, a SPW A strictly competitive game in strategic form is simply called a WA strictly competitive game. We give some general results on the structure of these classes of games. One result gives an easy way to verify almost strict competitiveness of a given extensive game. We show that a two-person weakly unilaterally competitive extensive game and a finitely repeated WA strictly competitive game are SPW A strictly competitive. In the third chapter, we consider segregations, discriminatory behaviors, and prejudices in a recurrent situation of a game called the festival game with merrymakers. We show that segregation and discriminatory behaviors may occur in Nash equilibria in the sense that players of one ethnic group go to one festival, and, if any member of one ethnic group tries to go to a different festival, he will be treated differently only for the reason of nominal differences in ethnicities between them. One of our results states that if a player tries to enter a larger festival from a smaller one, he would be discriminated against by some people in the larger festival, but not necessarily if one goes from a larger one to a smaller one. We use the theory of stable conventions for the considerations of the entire recurrent situation and of the epistemic assumptions for each individual player. We show that the central parts of the stable conventions are captured by the Nash equilibria. Associating our results with the theory of stable conventions and the cognitive and moral views called subjectivism and retributionism, we discuss the emergence of fallacious views of each player about the utility functions of all the players. One such view explains prejudicial attitudes as a rationalization of discriminatory behaviors. Advisors/Committee Members: Kaneko, Mamoru (committeechair), Gilles, Robert P. (committee member), Haller, Hans H. (committee member), Kats, Amos (committee member), Lebrun, Bernard (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Equilibrium (Economics); Game theory.; Discrimination Econometric models.; LD5655.V856 1994.R393

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Raychaudhuri, S. (1994). Essays on game theory and its application to social discrimination and segregation. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/37258

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Raychaudhuri, Subhashis. “Essays on game theory and its application to social discrimination and segregation.” 1994. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/37258.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Raychaudhuri, Subhashis. “Essays on game theory and its application to social discrimination and segregation.” 1994. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Raychaudhuri S. Essays on game theory and its application to social discrimination and segregation. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 1994. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/37258.

Council of Science Editors:

Raychaudhuri S. Essays on game theory and its application to social discrimination and segregation. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 1994. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/37258

Virginia Tech

16. Srivastava, Vivek. Behavior-based Incentives for Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks.

Degree: PhD, Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2008, Virginia Tech

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29172

► A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) adopts a decentralized communication architecture which relies on cooperation among nodes at each layer of the protocol stack. Its… (more)

▼ A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) adopts a decentralized communication architecture which relies on cooperation among nodes at each layer of the protocol stack. Its reliance on cooperation for success and survival makes the ad hoc network particularly sensitive to variations in node behavior. Specifically, for functions such as routing, nodes which are limited in their resources may be unwilling to cooperate in forwarding for other nodes. Such selfish behavior leads to degradation in the performance of the network and possibly, in the extreme case, a complete cessation of operations. Consequently it is important to devise solutions to encourage resource-constrained nodes to cooperate. Incentive schemes have been proposed to induce selfish nodes to cooperate. Though many of the proposed schemes in the literature are payment-based, nodes can be incentivized to cooperate by adopting policies which are non-monetary in nature, but rather are based on the threat of retaliation for non-cooperating nodes. These policies, for which there is little formal analysis in the existing literature on node cooperation, are based on observed node behavior. We refer to them as behavior-based incentives. In this work, we analyze the effectiveness of behavior-based incentives in inducing nodes to cooperate. To determine whether an incentive scheme is effective in fostering cooperation we develop a game-theoretic model. Adopting a repeated game model, we show that nodes may agree to cooperate in sharing their resources and forward packets, even if they perceive a cost in doing so. This happens as the nodes recognize that refusing to cooperate will result in similar behavior by others, which ultimately would compromise the viability of the network as a whole. A major shortcoming in the analysis done in past works is the lack of consideration of practical constraints imposed by an ad hoc environment. One such example is the assumption that a node, when making decisions about whether to cooperate, has perfect knowledge of every other node's actions. In a distributed setting this is impractical. In our work, we analyze behavior-based incentives by incorporating such practical considerations as imperfect monitoring into our game-theoretic models. In modeling the problem as a game of imperfect public monitoring (nodes observe a common public signal that reflects the actions of other nodes in the network) we show that, under the assumption of first order stochastic dominance of the public signal, the grim trigger strategy leads to an equilibrium for nodes to cooperate. Even though a trigger-based strategy like grim-trigger is effective in deterring selfish behavior it is too harsh in its implementation. In addition, the availability of a common public signal in a distributed setting is rather limited. We, therefore, consider nodes that individually monitor the behavior of other nodes in the network and keep this information private. Note that this independent monitoring of behavior is error prone as a result of slow switching between transmit… Advisors/Committee Members: DaSilva, Luiz A. (committeechair), Midkiff, Scott F. (committee member), MacKenzie, Allen B. (committee member), Gilles, Robert P. (committee member), Phanse, Kaustubh S. (committee member), Shukla, Sandeep K. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: topology control simulation; game theoretic modeling

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Srivastava, V. (2008). Behavior-based Incentives for Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. (Doctoral Dissertation). Virginia Tech. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29172

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Srivastava, Vivek. “Behavior-based Incentives for Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks.” 2008. Doctoral Dissertation, Virginia Tech. Accessed January 24, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29172.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Srivastava, Vivek. “Behavior-based Incentives for Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks.” 2008. Web. 24 Jan 2021.

Vancouver:

Srivastava V. Behavior-based Incentives for Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2008. [cited 2021 Jan 24]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29172.

Council of Science Editors:

Srivastava V. Behavior-based Incentives for Node Cooperation in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Virginia Tech; 2008. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29172

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