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You searched for +publisher:"University of Virginia" +contributor:("Ciliberto, Federico"). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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University of Virginia

1. Bruestle, Stephen. Targeted Advertising in the Information Age.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2013, University of Virginia

Chapter 1, “As Webpages Get Narrower, Do Ads Get Nichier? An Online Field Experiment in Google Contextual Ads,” Firms target their advertisements to the consumer segments delivered by webpages. I develop an auction model where firms target segments of heterogeneous consumers. From this, I derive an empirical framework, which I use to test whether more niche or more general ads win the auction for more narrowly-focused webpages. To do this, I create many differentiated webpages in an experimental fashion and observe the Google text ads that are placed on them. Then, I compare general webpages, such as a `Ford’ webpage, with more narrowly-focused webpages, such as a `Ford Truck’ webpage, by using a measures of ad niche-ness. I use a Hierarchical Latent Dirichlet Allocation algorithm from the machine-learning literature to create a robust measure of ad niche-ness. My results show a U-shaped relationship between webpage narrowness and ad niche-ness: Ads for less niche products tend to appear on moderately narrow-focused webpages.

In Chapter 2, “Imperfect Targeting of Advertising and Privacy Regulations,” I investigate how privacy regulations affect consumer welfare through advertising. Tougher privacy regulations reduce the accuracy of information collected on consumers. This discourages targeted advertising. When firms target advertise, privacy regulations ambiguously affect welfare. Less accurate information decreases welfare by inducing a smaller, less-targeted selection of products. Yet less accurate information increases welfare by inducing fewer annoying ads, even without any pricing effects. In extensions, I find that tougher privacy regulations increase the product selection benefit and the ad annoyance cost through reducing the ad price; but greater marketing costs have the opposite effect; and ad avoidance ads has no effect.

In Chapter 3, “Showing Ads To The Wrong Consumers: Strategic Ad Platform Inefficiency In Online Targeted Advertising,” I find that an ad platform has an incentive to induce lower product prices. Consumers pay a search cost when clicking on an ad. To induce consumer clicking, an ad platform adopts a targeting strategy that induces the merchant to lower its price. This involves showing the ad to some consumers who it rationally expects not to buy the product and not showing the same ad to other consumers who it would rationally expect to buy the product.

Advisors/Committee Members: Anderson, Simon (advisor), Ciliberto, Federico (advisor), Larson, Nathan (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: targeted advertising; online advertising platforms; advertisement pricing; online field experiment; hierarchical latent dirichlet allocation; privacy regulations

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Bruestle, S. (2013). Targeted Advertising in the Information Age. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Virginia. Retrieved from http://libra.virginia.edu/catalog/libra-oa:3788

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Bruestle, Stephen. “Targeted Advertising in the Information Age.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Virginia. Accessed February 19, 2019. http://libra.virginia.edu/catalog/libra-oa:3788.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Bruestle, Stephen. “Targeted Advertising in the Information Age.” 2013. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Bruestle S. Targeted Advertising in the Information Age. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Virginia; 2013. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: http://libra.virginia.edu/catalog/libra-oa:3788.

Council of Science Editors:

Bruestle S. Targeted Advertising in the Information Age. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Virginia; 2013. Available from: http://libra.virginia.edu/catalog/libra-oa:3788


University of Virginia

2. Zhang, Zhou. Swiftboating: Misleading Advertising in Presidential Elections.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2016, University of Virginia

The term “swiftboating” arose out of advertisements aired in the 2004 presidential campaign and has now come to refer to any untrue political advertising. I develop an equilibrium model of voting behavior and candidate advertising in a presidential election with misleading and non-misleading advertising. I estimate the model using a unique dataset I created by systematically quantifying misleading statements in political advertisement videos in the 2008 election using FactCheck.org and PolitiFact.com. A candidate chooses misleading and non-misleading advertising in order to maximize his expected electoral votes in exogenously-determined battleground states.

I find that the two candidates spent over $38 million on misleading advertising. At the levels of advertising observed in 2008, I find that the gross effect of misleading advertising is, on average across television markets, more than twice as large as the gross effect of non-misleading advertising in terms of increasing vote share. I calculate that the shadow price of one electoral vote to be $9.7 million for McCain and $15.2 million for Obama. In a counterfactual analysis where candidates cannot air misleading advertising, three states (Missouri, Indiana, and North Carolina) have different electoral outcomes, and the equilibrium level of advertising falls by 21%, with the decrease in non-misleading advertising accounting for 26% of that change. In a second counterfactual, I repeal the laws against misleading advertising in the six battleground states that had them in place in 2008, and I find that misleading advertising in those states increases by 50%, and this change leads to a different electoral winner in the state of North Carolina.

Advisors/Committee Members: Anderson, Simon (advisor), Ciliberto, Federico (advisor), Engers, Maxim (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: elections; political advertising; misleading advertising; campaigns

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Zhang, Z. (2016). Swiftboating: Misleading Advertising in Presidential Elections. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Virginia. Retrieved from http://libra.virginia.edu/catalog/libra-oa:11378

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Zhang, Zhou. “Swiftboating: Misleading Advertising in Presidential Elections.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Virginia. Accessed February 19, 2019. http://libra.virginia.edu/catalog/libra-oa:11378.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Zhang, Zhou. “Swiftboating: Misleading Advertising in Presidential Elections.” 2016. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Zhang Z. Swiftboating: Misleading Advertising in Presidential Elections. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Virginia; 2016. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: http://libra.virginia.edu/catalog/libra-oa:11378.

Council of Science Editors:

Zhang Z. Swiftboating: Misleading Advertising in Presidential Elections. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Virginia; 2016. Available from: http://libra.virginia.edu/catalog/libra-oa:11378


University of Virginia

3. Celik, Levent. Essays on the Economics of Informative Advertising with Applications to the Television Industry.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2014, University of Virginia

This dissertation presents three essays on informative advertising in markets with differentiated products and consumer search. The first essay analyzes a single television station’s choice of airing tune-ins (preview advertisements). I consider two consecutive programs located along a unit line. Potential viewers know the earlier program but are uncertain about the later one. They may learn its location through a tune-in if they watch the earlier program and the television station chose to air a tune-in, or by sampling it for a few minutes. If the sampling cost is sufficiently low, the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) exhibits no tune-ins. If it is sufficiently high, the unique PBE involves a tune-in whenever the two programs are similar enough. For all other values of the sampling cost, either PBE may arise. When the programs are also quality-differentiated, the willingness to air a tune-in, and thus to disclose location information, may be sufficient to signal high quality without any dissipative advertising. The second essay extends the first one by including a second TV station. Now, each station’s tune-in decision may also depend on the rival station’s program, thereby revealing more information than the actual content of the tune-in. This happens only if the sampling cost is low enough. Otherwise, each station makes its tune-in decision independently of its rival’s program. Thus, there may exist signaling via informative advertising. It is welfare improving to ban tune-ins in the latter case while this is not necessarily true in the former one. ii The third essay analyzes informative advertising in a duopoly market with differentiated products when consumer search is costless. If consumers are fully rational, exposure to a single advertisement is sufficient for them to obtain complete market information. In this case, firms undersupply advertising compared to the social optimum because of free-riding. If consumers are not fully rational, they may ignore the existence of another firm when the only advertisement they receive quotes the monopoly price. In this case, both firms advertise the monopoly price, and the market may produce too much or too little advertising compared to the social optimum.

Note: Abstract extracted from PDF text

Advisors/Committee Members: Anderson, Simon (advisor), Engers, Maxim (advisor), Ciliberto, Federico (advisor), Choi, Albert (advisor).

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Celik, L. (2014). Essays on the Economics of Informative Advertising with Applications to the Television Industry. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Virginia. Retrieved from http://libra.virginia.edu/catalog/libra-oa:4252

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Celik, Levent. “Essays on the Economics of Informative Advertising with Applications to the Television Industry.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Virginia. Accessed February 19, 2019. http://libra.virginia.edu/catalog/libra-oa:4252.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Celik, Levent. “Essays on the Economics of Informative Advertising with Applications to the Television Industry.” 2014. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Celik L. Essays on the Economics of Informative Advertising with Applications to the Television Industry. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Virginia; 2014. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: http://libra.virginia.edu/catalog/libra-oa:4252.

Council of Science Editors:

Celik L. Essays on the Economics of Informative Advertising with Applications to the Television Industry. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Virginia; 2014. Available from: http://libra.virginia.edu/catalog/libra-oa:4252

.