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You searched for +publisher:"University of Texas – Austin" +contributor:("Sosa, David"). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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University of Texas – Austin

1. Drake, Jonathan Paul. The (ir)relevance of truth to rationality.

Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2018, University of Texas – Austin

It is possible to act for a reason. We do it all the time. You might have brought her medicine for the reason that she is ill. He might go to the store to get milk. Edmund might skate in the middle of the pond because the ice in the middle of the pond is thin. What must be true of us, and of the world, such that we can act for reasons? In normal cases, when someone acts for the reason that (for example) the ice in the middle of the pond is thin, it really is the case that the ice in the middle is thin. This is mostly due to the fact that we are not often wrong about such mundane ways the world is. But what if one takes it that the ice is thin, and in fact it is not thin? Can one still act for the reason that the ice is thin? In my efforts to give a sufficient answer to this question, I have been led to a package of views, the core tenets of which are at least the following five. First, it is possible to act in the light of a falsehood: a consideration that is not the case can be an agent’s reason for acting. Second, it is not possible to act in unbelief: in order for an agent to act for a reason, the agent must at least believe that reason to be the case. Third, the reasons for which agents act can play a role in explaining the actions done for those reasons –– even when agents act in the light of falsehoods. Fourth, there are very few (if any) formal rules or principles constraining the explanatory role of reasons. Any action explanation that specifies the content of the reason for acting has reserved a legitimate explanatory role for the reason. Fifth, all of these claims apply equally to motivating and normative reasons, so-called practical and epistemic reasons, and reasons for action and reasons for belief. Advisors/Committee Members: Dancy, Jonathan (advisor), Sosa, David, 1966- (advisor), Bonevac, Daniel (committee member), Buchanan, Ray (committee member), Alvarez, Maria (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Ethics; Epistemology; Reasons; Rationality; Justification; Normativity; Action; Belief; Explanation

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APA (6th Edition):

Drake, J. P. (2018). The (ir)relevance of truth to rationality. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Texas – Austin. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2152/63733

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Drake, Jonathan Paul. “The (ir)relevance of truth to rationality.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Texas – Austin. Accessed December 06, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/63733.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Drake, Jonathan Paul. “The (ir)relevance of truth to rationality.” 2018. Web. 06 Dec 2019.

Vancouver:

Drake JP. The (ir)relevance of truth to rationality. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Texas – Austin; 2018. [cited 2019 Dec 06]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/63733.

Council of Science Editors:

Drake JP. The (ir)relevance of truth to rationality. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Texas – Austin; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/63733


University of Texas – Austin

2. Tsoi, Siwing. The ethics of political participation : are citizens obligated to participate, and what exactly are they obligated to do?.

Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2015, University of Texas – Austin

The aim of the dissertation is to show that, with few exceptions, citizens have a defeasible moral obligation to participate in politics. Moreover, the arguments presented in support of the thesis have an implication on how exactly one should participate: participation can take many different forms, but they all need to constitute democratic deliberation of one’s polity – the policy-making process guided by the exchange of reasons among citizens. In Chapter One, I clarify the thesis and frame the issue in terms of a challenge raised by a classical liberal consideration against the obligation to participate in politics. In Chapter Two, I argue that one should not defend the obligation to participate in democratic deliberation by thinking of democracy as a sort of shared value in democratic society. In Chapters Three and Four, I present two independent arguments for the thesis that citizens have a defeasible moral obligation to participate in democratic deliberation. Advisors/Committee Members: Martinich, Aloysius (advisor), Dancy, Jonathan (committee member), Gregg, Benjamin (committee member), Higgins, Kathleen (committee member), Sosa, David (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Democratic deliberation; Political participation; Collective agency; Moral obligation

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Tsoi, S. (2015). The ethics of political participation : are citizens obligated to participate, and what exactly are they obligated to do?. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Texas – Austin. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2152/31631

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Tsoi, Siwing. “The ethics of political participation : are citizens obligated to participate, and what exactly are they obligated to do?.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Texas – Austin. Accessed December 06, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/31631.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Tsoi, Siwing. “The ethics of political participation : are citizens obligated to participate, and what exactly are they obligated to do?.” 2015. Web. 06 Dec 2019.

Vancouver:

Tsoi S. The ethics of political participation : are citizens obligated to participate, and what exactly are they obligated to do?. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Texas – Austin; 2015. [cited 2019 Dec 06]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/31631.

Council of Science Editors:

Tsoi S. The ethics of political participation : are citizens obligated to participate, and what exactly are they obligated to do?. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Texas – Austin; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/31631


University of Texas – Austin

3. -9868-8696. Pragmatic Encroachment : entailments and evaluation.

Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2018, University of Texas – Austin

Pragmatic Encroachment, the view that knowledge is sensitive to one’s practical situation, is a marked departure from traditional epistemology. A popular way of endorsing it requires that one’s evidence be practically adequate. I derive the following entailments from this view: one can gain knowledge that p by getting evidence against p, there is a significantly stronger evidential requirement for knowing atheism than there is for Christianity, and some tiny bets can bring about very strong evidential requirements. I argue that these entailments count as evidence against Pragmatic Encroachment. Advisors/Committee Members: Sosa, David, 1966- (advisor), Dever, Josh (committee member), Dogramaci, Sinan (committee member), Schoenfield, Miriam (committee member), McGrath, Matthew (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Epistemology; Pragmatic Encroachment; Pascal's Wager; Evidence; Practical adequacy

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

-9868-8696. (2018). Pragmatic Encroachment : entailments and evaluation. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Texas – Austin. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/2152/65890

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Author name may be incomplete

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

-9868-8696. “Pragmatic Encroachment : entailments and evaluation.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Texas – Austin. Accessed December 06, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/65890.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Author name may be incomplete

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

-9868-8696. “Pragmatic Encroachment : entailments and evaluation.” 2018. Web. 06 Dec 2019.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Author name may be incomplete

Vancouver:

-9868-8696. Pragmatic Encroachment : entailments and evaluation. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Texas – Austin; 2018. [cited 2019 Dec 06]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/65890.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Author name may be incomplete

Council of Science Editors:

-9868-8696. Pragmatic Encroachment : entailments and evaluation. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Texas – Austin; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/2152/65890

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Author name may be incomplete

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