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You searched for +publisher:"University of St. Andrews" +contributor:("Ebert, Philip A"). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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University of St. Andrews

1. Neil, Charles Anthony. Reflective luck and meta-epistemological scepticism .

Degree: 2014, University of St. Andrews

In this thesis, I argue that a particular type of epistemic luck, called “reflective luck”, motivates a meta-epistemological challenge to externalism about justification. I argue that the meta-epistemological challenge consists in a substantive philosophical challenge to externalism that entails the rejection of a naturalized epistemology. However, I contend that the philosophical challenge to the externalist analysis of justification should be tempered with an anti-sceptical intuition that we do have knowledge of putatively true propositions. To this end, I argue that an externalist analysis of justification is best able to accommodate our anti-sceptical intuitions; externalism, I argue, is the best way of accommodating commonsense. Although externalism is preserved and survives the meta-epistemological challenge, it is not unscathed. Specifically, I contend that externalism deprives us of adequate internalist epistemic grounds to think that we have externalistically justified beliefs. I identify that in principle this is not a problem for externalism, because externalism can respond in a number of ways (one way is to abandon the concept of justification as essential to knowledge), but that nonetheless an adequate epistemology ought to do justice to the legitimacy of the meta-epistemological challenge. However, accommodating this legitimacy and preserving putative knowledge is not possible within the traditional absolutist framework for doing epistemology. My conclusion is that externalism is correct, but that the kind of externalist knowledge we have is not especially fine-grained or perfect; this should put pressure on the absolutist framework for doing epistemology. Advisors/Committee Members: Ebert, Philip A (advisor), Greenough, Patrick (advisor).

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Neil, C. A. (2014). Reflective luck and meta-epistemological scepticism . (Thesis). University of St. Andrews. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10023/10205

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Neil, Charles Anthony. “Reflective luck and meta-epistemological scepticism .” 2014. Thesis, University of St. Andrews. Accessed April 02, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/10205.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Neil, Charles Anthony. “Reflective luck and meta-epistemological scepticism .” 2014. Web. 02 Apr 2020.

Vancouver:

Neil CA. Reflective luck and meta-epistemological scepticism . [Internet] [Thesis]. University of St. Andrews; 2014. [cited 2020 Apr 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/10205.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Neil CA. Reflective luck and meta-epistemological scepticism . [Thesis]. University of St. Andrews; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/10205

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation


University of St. Andrews

2. Church, Ian M. Virtue epistemology and the analysis of knowledge .

Degree: 2012, University of St. Andrews

This thesis centers on two trends in epistemology: (i) the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge, the project of explicating knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, and (ii) the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal of this thesis is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, are lacking. The first part of this thesis involves diagnosing what is wrong with the reductive model and defending that diagnosis against objections. The problem with the reductive project is the Gettier Problem. In Chapter 1, I lend credence to Linda Zagzebski’s grim 1994 diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the abandonment of the reductive model) by examining the nature of luck, the key component of Gettier problems. In Chapter 2, I vindicate this diagnosis against a range of critiques from the contemporary literature. The second part involves applying this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology. In Chapter 3, we consider the virtue epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In Chapter 4, we consider the virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa. Both are seminal and iconic; nevertheless, I argue that, in accord with our diagnosis, neither is able to viably surmount the Gettier Problem. Having diagnosed what is wrong with the reductive project and applied this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology, the final part of this thesis explores the possibility of non-reductive virtue epistemology. In Chapter 5, I argue that there are three strategies that can be used to develop non-reductive virtue epistemologies, strategies that are compatible with seminal non-reductive accounts of knowledge and preserve our favorite virtue-theoretic concepts. Advisors/Committee Members: Greenough, Patrick (advisor), Ebert, Philip A (advisor), Cohen, Stewart (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Virtue epistemology; The Gettier Problem; The analysis of knowledge; Epistemic luck; Alvin Plantinga; Ernest Sosa

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Church, I. M. (2012). Virtue epistemology and the analysis of knowledge . (Thesis). University of St. Andrews. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3118

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Church, Ian M. “Virtue epistemology and the analysis of knowledge .” 2012. Thesis, University of St. Andrews. Accessed April 02, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3118.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Church, Ian M. “Virtue epistemology and the analysis of knowledge .” 2012. Web. 02 Apr 2020.

Vancouver:

Church IM. Virtue epistemology and the analysis of knowledge . [Internet] [Thesis]. University of St. Andrews; 2012. [cited 2020 Apr 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3118.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Church IM. Virtue epistemology and the analysis of knowledge . [Thesis]. University of St. Andrews; 2012. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3118

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

3. Carrick, Laurence. What do I know? scepticism : reasoning and knowledge .

Degree: 2018, University of St. Andrews

This thesis concerns approaches to solving the problem of paradoxical sceptical arguments from ignorance within contemporary epistemology. In chapter 1, I critically discuss three frameworks for approaching the sceptical problem, and argue that theoretical responses are unsatisfactory. In chapter 2, I critically examine recent accounts of sceptical hypotheses, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 3, I critically examine recent accounts of the epistemic principles underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 4, I critically evaluate the adequacy of resolutions to sceptical paradoxes suggested by three prominent versions of epistemological contextualism. In chapter 5, I examine a central objection to the error theories implied by contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes, which focuses on the notion of semantic blindness. Two assessments of the objection are set out, and contextualist responses to each. I argued that considerations of semantic blindness count against contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes in favour of invariantists. In chapter 6, I assess the potential for an invariantist to provide an adequate error-theory concerning, and resolving, sceptical paradoxes. I critically assess approaches based on aspects of the heuristics and biases paradigm, and of dual-process theories of mindreading. I propose, instead, a novel anti-sceptical error-theory in terms of the default-interventionist model of dual-process theory of judgement and reasoning, together with my conclusions from chapters 2 and 3. Advisors/Committee Members: Ebert, Philip A (advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Knowledge; Scepticism; Sceptical hypotheses; Epistemic closure; Epistemological contextualism; Error theories; Dual-process theories

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Carrick, L. (2018). What do I know? scepticism : reasoning and knowledge . (Thesis). University of St. Andrews. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13770

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Carrick, Laurence. “What do I know? scepticism : reasoning and knowledge .” 2018. Thesis, University of St. Andrews. Accessed April 02, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13770.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Carrick, Laurence. “What do I know? scepticism : reasoning and knowledge .” 2018. Web. 02 Apr 2020.

Vancouver:

Carrick L. What do I know? scepticism : reasoning and knowledge . [Internet] [Thesis]. University of St. Andrews; 2018. [cited 2020 Apr 02]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13770.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Carrick L. What do I know? scepticism : reasoning and knowledge . [Thesis]. University of St. Andrews; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13770

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

.