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You searched for +publisher:"University of Southern California" +contributor:("Young, S. Mark"). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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University of Southern California

1. Olsen, Kari Joseph. For the love of the game? ownership and control in the NBA.

Degree: PhD, Business Administration, 2015, University of Southern California

The National Basketball Association (NBA) presents a setting wherein agency frictions and other causes of managerial myopia, which are common in many organizational settings, are limited for NBA team owners. Much like managers of any business, NBA team owners make decisions about how to pursue their objectives, which in this setting include clearly defined strategic objectives of winning games and maximizing profits. I examine NBA team owners’ resource‐allocation decisions related to these objectives by analyzing the effect of team‐level player compensation on on‐the‐court (winning) and off‐the‐court (financial performance) outcomes. Results show that spending more on team‐level player compensation has a positive effect on team’s winning, yet is also associated with lower current operational profits. However, results also show that spending more on team‐level player compensation leads to higher team values due to an increase in revenue generation ability and brand value from winning more games. Rather than winning and profits being alternative objectives to satisfy, the realization of the one objective (long‐term profits) is contingent upon investments leading to the satisfaction of the other objective (winning). Hence, results suggest that NBA team owners who pursue short‐term operational profits by spending less on team‐level player compensation likely do so at the expense of real‐economic future value. That is, despite not facing typical causes of managerial myopia, team owners may pursue myopic behavior. Advisors/Committee Members: Young, S. Mark (Committee Chair), Fiss, Peer C. (Committee Member), Allen, Eric (Committee Member).

Subjects/Keywords: ownership objectives; performance measurement; myopia; brand value; firm value; NBA

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Olsen, K. J. (2015). For the love of the game? ownership and control in the NBA. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/537110/rec/2861

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Olsen, Kari Joseph. “For the love of the game? ownership and control in the NBA.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. Accessed October 18, 2019. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/537110/rec/2861.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Olsen, Kari Joseph. “For the love of the game? ownership and control in the NBA.” 2015. Web. 18 Oct 2019.

Vancouver:

Olsen KJ. For the love of the game? ownership and control in the NBA. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2015. [cited 2019 Oct 18]. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/537110/rec/2861.

Council of Science Editors:

Olsen KJ. For the love of the game? ownership and control in the NBA. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2015. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/537110/rec/2861


University of Southern California

2. O'Brien, Nina, F. Effects of economic incentives on creative project-based networks: communication, collaboration and change in the American film industry, 1998-2010.

Degree: PhD, Communication, 2015, University of Southern California

Traditional theories of economic development suggest that industry-specific tax rebates, credits and other incentives will promote sector-specific industrial activity, employment, and establishments in the jurisdictions where they are applied. However, project-based industries, which assemble for the completion of a specific task, are both temporary and highly mobile, presenting a challenge for jurisdictions seeking to draw these kinds of industries through incentive programs. This dissertation employs insights from the theories of organizational ecology and interorganizational networks to explain the uneven success of tax incentive programs targeting the film industry in the United States. ❧ Film production is a project-based industry that is characterized by the interaction of specialized firms in a dynamic interorganizational network. This study examines the relationships among organizations which collaborate in the production of feature films to determine whether incentives targeting this industry produce development outcomes like increased in-state filming, film-sector employment and an increase in film-sector establishments in the states that offer them. The dissertation explores ecological and social network predictors of economic development, and tests the hypotheses that states which have more diverse organizational networks, and a larger number of dominant firms enjoy higher rates of filming, employment and establishment. States whose networks demonstrate specific structures associated with successful collaboration, including the balance of ties the state's firms have with others within and beyond the state, the networks' small-worldness and the degree of network coreness relative to other states, are also predicted to result in more significant and stable development outcomes. ❧ This study uses mixed-effects models to examine the effects of incentive programs, organizational diversity, the presence of dominant firms, and networks of communication and collaboration on economic development outcomes in the contemporary American film industry between 1998 and 2010. The results of the study show that states offering an incentive program increase the amount of filming in their state significantly. States offering an incentive program also increase film-industry employment and establishment, but the size of the effect is more modest for employment and establishment than it is for filming. The amount of money a state offers does not appear in these analyses to make a statistically significant difference, suggesting that states do not need to outspend one another to achieve positive development outcomes. However, post-hoc analysis reveals collinearity among the variables which measure incentives, and suggests that the claim that the presence of incentives is more important for outcomes than the dollar value of those incentives cannot be fully supported until the question of collinearity is resolved. ❧ An even more significant predictor of positive outcomes for incentivizing states is their organizational diversity:… Advisors/Committee Members: Monge, Peter R. (Committee Chair), Fulk, Janet (Committee Member), Young, S. Mark (Committee Member).

Subjects/Keywords: economic development; film industry; organizational ecology; organizational networks; project-based industries

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

O'Brien, Nina, F. (2015). Effects of economic incentives on creative project-based networks: communication, collaboration and change in the American film industry, 1998-2010. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/301775/rec/2212

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

O'Brien, Nina, F. “Effects of economic incentives on creative project-based networks: communication, collaboration and change in the American film industry, 1998-2010.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. Accessed October 18, 2019. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/301775/rec/2212.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

O'Brien, Nina, F. “Effects of economic incentives on creative project-based networks: communication, collaboration and change in the American film industry, 1998-2010.” 2015. Web. 18 Oct 2019.

Vancouver:

O'Brien, Nina F. Effects of economic incentives on creative project-based networks: communication, collaboration and change in the American film industry, 1998-2010. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2015. [cited 2019 Oct 18]. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/301775/rec/2212.

Council of Science Editors:

O'Brien, Nina F. Effects of economic incentives on creative project-based networks: communication, collaboration and change in the American film industry, 1998-2010. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2015. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll3/id/301775/rec/2212


University of Southern California

3. Lee, Sung-Han. CEO reputation: who benefits  – the firm and the CEO?.

Degree: PhD, Accounting, 2007, University of Southern California

In this dissertation, I examine the potential economic value of CEO reputation: performance improvement at the firm level and personal benefits to the CEO such as compensation and job retention. Two perspectives on CEO reputation offer different predictions regarding the benefits of CEO reputation. The ability perspective in the agency literature advocates the economic benefits of CEO reputation. The symbolic image perspective from recent CEO reputation studies, however, argues that CEO reputation does not necessarily improve firm performance or CEO job retention. I investigate which perspective is more consistent with empirical evidence. The results of firm performance tests show that CEOs with well-established reputations are able to sustain good firm performance but do not turn around poor performance. These results imply that stakeholders might have to consider replacing the CEO  – no matter how highly regarded  – with a turnaround specialist when a firm suffers financially. Another finding from job security tests shows that CEOs with high reputation are more likely to be dismissed than CEOs with low reputation when they perform poorly. These results suggest that the reputations of CEOs through promoting their own images in the media do not necessarily secure their job titles. Finally, the results of compensation tests show that CEO reputation increases pay-for-performance sensitivity. Advisors/Committee Members: Young, S. Mark (Committee Chair), Van der Stede, Wim A. (Committee Member), Sandino, Tatiana (Committee Member), Ridder, Geert (Committee Member).

Subjects/Keywords: CEO reputation; firm performance; job retention; compensation

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Lee, S. (2007). CEO reputation: who benefits  – the firm and the CEO?. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/535037/rec/1270

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Lee, Sung-Han. “CEO reputation: who benefits  – the firm and the CEO?.” 2007. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. Accessed October 18, 2019. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/535037/rec/1270.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Lee, Sung-Han. “CEO reputation: who benefits  – the firm and the CEO?.” 2007. Web. 18 Oct 2019.

Vancouver:

Lee S. CEO reputation: who benefits  – the firm and the CEO?. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2007. [cited 2019 Oct 18]. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/535037/rec/1270.

Council of Science Editors:

Lee S. CEO reputation: who benefits  – the firm and the CEO?. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2007. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/535037/rec/1270

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