Advanced search options

Advanced Search Options 🞨

Browse by author name (“Author name starts with…”).

Find ETDs with:

in
/  
in
/  
in
/  
in

Written in Published in Earliest date Latest date

Sorted by

Results per page:

Sorted by: relevance · author · university · dateNew search

You searched for +publisher:"University of Southern California" +contributor:("Wilburn, Kenneth"). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

Search Limiters

Last 2 Years | English Only

No search limiters apply to these results.

▼ Search Limiters


University of Southern California

1. Roger, Guillaume. Costly quality, moral hazard and two-sided markets.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2008, University of Southern California

The object of this dissertation is to further the study of two-sided markets by departing from the standard setting of price competition alone. Specifically the first two chapters introduce costly differentiation and in doing so contribute to the two-sided market literature by establishing a generic downward distortion in quality. This result is robust to different specifications in the monopoly case (Chapter 1) and arises again in a duopoly (Chapter 2). In the latter, whether a Nash equilibrium exists on one side depends on the size of the profits to be extracted on the other. When competing platforms play in mixed strategies one of them may be inactive ex post. This work also extends a well-established model (Shaked and Sutton (1982)) in the Industrial Organization literature, which speaks to the role of quality as a source of endogenous differentiation. The last chapter allows for moral hazard on a trading platform. It contributes to the two-sided market literature by showing that opportunistic behavior on the part of sellers leads to lower transaction fees on both sides to 1) compensate buyers and 2) provide sellers with incentives to cooperate. Furthermore it breaks an equivalence result between transaction fees and lump-sum payment established by Rochet and Tirole (2005).; Here these two forms of payment plays a different role: lump-sum fees are used to extract the sellers' surplus, while the linear prices are distorted downward to generate the incentives to cooperate. In this case moral hazard can be completely overcome. Unlike in the standard, one-sided moral hazard problem it is not obvious that this result should obtain. In this two-sided market problem, the incentives on the sellers' side depend on the buyers' participation, while the buyers' participation depends on the sellers' incentives. The platform solves these problems simultaneously. Advisors/Committee Members: Tan, Guofu (Committee Chair), Carrillo, Juan D. (Committee Member), Wilkie, Simon J. (Committee Member), Wilburn, Kenneth (Committee Member).

Subjects/Keywords: differentiation,; moral hazard; two-sided markets; media; trading platforms

Record DetailsSimilar RecordsGoogle PlusoneFacebookTwitterCiteULikeMendeleyreddit

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Roger, G. (2008). Costly quality, moral hazard and two-sided markets. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/114871/rec/1676

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Roger, Guillaume. “Costly quality, moral hazard and two-sided markets.” 2008. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. Accessed October 26, 2020. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/114871/rec/1676.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Roger, Guillaume. “Costly quality, moral hazard and two-sided markets.” 2008. Web. 26 Oct 2020.

Vancouver:

Roger G. Costly quality, moral hazard and two-sided markets. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2008. [cited 2020 Oct 26]. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/114871/rec/1676.

Council of Science Editors:

Roger G. Costly quality, moral hazard and two-sided markets. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2008. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/114871/rec/1676


University of Southern California

2. Sobbrio, Francesco. Essays in political economics.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2010, University of Southern California

Three essays compose the dissertation. The first essay entitled "Indirect Lobbying and Media Bias " analyzes amodel where voters have state-contingent preferences over policies and lobbies engage in in fluence activities to affect the information that a media outlet collects on the state of the world. The media outlet acts as a " filter" between lobbies and voters. It has to decide what to communicate to voters given the information it collects and its idiosyncratic bias. We show that, by targeting voters, lobbies are able to indirectly in fluence the political outcome and thus create a distortion in the political process. When the media outlet has a small idiosyncratic bias the (unique) equilibrium is characterized by a large level of lobbies ' in fluence activities and no "news-slanting " by the media outlet. When the media outlet 's idiosyncratic bias is large, the (unique) equilibrium involves a low level of lobbies' in luence activities and a high probability of "news-slanting" by the media outlet. Moreover, we show that a higher idiosyncratic bias of the media outlet may be associated with a lower policy distortion and a higher voters' welfare. On the other hand, public policy measures aimed at increasing the cost of lobbies' influence activities would decrease the distortion in the policy outcome and increase voters welfare. Finally, asymmetries in lobbies' influence activities lead to different probabilities of "news-slanting" by different media outlet 's types.; The second essay entitled " Electoral Participation and Communicative Voting in Europe " (joint with Pietro Navarra) provides an empirical investigation of electoral participation and communicative voting in 14 European countries. We estimate a multi-level voting process where individuals face a participation decision (whether to vote or abstain) and a voting decision (whether to vote strategically for a likely winner party or as communicating for a sure loser party). Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, uninformed individuals and independent ones are less likely to turnout. However, being independent and uninformed does not have any statistically significant effect on electoral participation. Thus our results do not provide empirical support to the swing voter s curse theory. Second, expressive motivations have a positive and significant effect on electoral participation. Third, the probability of voting as communicating is positively related with the level of education and the degree of dissatisfaction with the political system. Fourth, right wing extremists have a significant lower probability of voting as communicating than moderate or left wing extremists. Finally, institutional features characterizing the functioning of the political system and of the media market have a significant effect both on the participation and on the voting decision.; The third essay entitled "Heterogeneous Preferences and Endogenous Acquisition of Costly information" investigates how individuals acquire costly information. We analyze a model of… Advisors/Committee Members: Carrillo, Juan D. (Committee Chair), Mattozzi, Andrea (Committee Member), Wilkie, Simon J. (Committee Member), Tan, Guofu (Committee Member), Wilburn, Kenneth (Committee Member).

Subjects/Keywords: voting; media bias; indirect lobbying; information acquisition

Record DetailsSimilar RecordsGoogle PlusoneFacebookTwitterCiteULikeMendeleyreddit

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Sobbrio, F. (2010). Essays in political economics. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/88107/rec/2434

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Sobbrio, Francesco. “Essays in political economics.” 2010. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. Accessed October 26, 2020. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/88107/rec/2434.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Sobbrio, Francesco. “Essays in political economics.” 2010. Web. 26 Oct 2020.

Vancouver:

Sobbrio F. Essays in political economics. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2010. [cited 2020 Oct 26]. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/88107/rec/2434.

Council of Science Editors:

Sobbrio F. Essays in political economics. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2010. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/88107/rec/2434

.