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You searched for +publisher:"University of Southern California" +contributor:("Alonso, Ricardo"). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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University of Southern California

1. Pinto, Brijesh Preston. Cyclical matching in higher dimensions.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2013, University of Southern California

In this dissertation, we study stable and strongly stable matching for the Cyclic Matching Problem when the number of dimensions (sides) is greater than or equal to three. The following is a summary of the analysis and results.; 1. We offer preliminary results on Pareto optimality in higher dimensions; we also comment on changes in the relationships among stability, strong stability, and Pareto optimality, when we move from the two-sided to the higher-sided case.; 2. We construct a function whose fixed points are exactly the set of strongly stable matchings.; 3. We show how to compute all strongly stable matchings for a given instance of the Cyclic Matching Problem using the methodology of Echenique and Yenmez (2007).; 4. We construct a non-monotonic function whose fixed points are exactly the set of stable matchings.; 5. We investigate an extension of the Adachi program to higher dimensions; in particular, we look at the properties of the fixed points of certain functions constructed so that they are increasing with respect to "natural" partial orders in higher dimensions.; 6. We consider extensions of the Gale-Shapley algorithm to higher dimensions; we design the Hierarchical Gale-Shapley Algorithm and comment on its properties with regard to (1) convergence and (2) stability of the output matching. Advisors/Committee Members: Wilkie, Simon J.Magill, Michael J.P. (Committee Chair), Alonso, Ricardo (Committee Member).

Subjects/Keywords: matching; cyclical preferences; stability; strong stability; Pareto optimality; fixed points; Gale-Shapley algorithm

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APA (6th Edition):

Pinto, B. P. (2013). Cyclical matching in higher dimensions. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/612841/rec/1750

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Pinto, Brijesh Preston. “Cyclical matching in higher dimensions.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. Accessed December 05, 2020. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/612841/rec/1750.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Pinto, Brijesh Preston. “Cyclical matching in higher dimensions.” 2013. Web. 05 Dec 2020.

Vancouver:

Pinto BP. Cyclical matching in higher dimensions. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2013. [cited 2020 Dec 05]. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/612841/rec/1750.

Council of Science Editors:

Pinto BP. Cyclical matching in higher dimensions. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2013. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/612841/rec/1750


University of Southern California

2. Castro, Manuel. Laboratory studies in the economics of information.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2011, University of Southern California

This dissertation consists of three laboratory studies in the economics of information. The first chapter entitled “Delegation in Teams” analyzes, both in theory and in the laboratory, the effects of delegation of authority to set contracts on team production. Two specifications are considered: in one the organizer sets the contracts of the team members (no delegation), and in the other the organizer selects one of the team members to set the contracts (delegation). Afterward, team members engage in a standard joint production activity. The chapter shows that when the team is productive- i.e. the combined cost of effort of both team members is small- the organizer should delegate authority to the member with the highest cost of effort, and both players exert effort; when the team is unproductive the organizer should delegate authority to the member with the lowest cost of effort, and only this player exerts effort. With no delegation, when the team is productive, the organizer splits the revenue between the team members in a way that both players have incentives to exert effort; when the team is unproductive, the organizer gives the whole revenue to the player with the lowest cost of effort, and this player solely exerts effort. In the laboratory, subjects cooperate more under no delegation than under delegation. Also subjects are more likely to exert effort when they set the contracts and less likely when the other team member sets the contracts. Estimation of the Inequality Aversion, Quantal Response Equilibrium and Cognitive Hierarchy models reveals that each model captures different aspects of the behavior of subjects. ❧ ❧ In the second chapter, entitled “The Nature of Information in a First-Price Common Value Auction” (joint with Isabelle Brocas and Juan Carrillo), we study in the lab- oratory a series of first-price sealed bid auctions of a common value good. Bidders face three types of information: private information, public information and common uncertainty. Auctions are characterized by the relative size of these three information elements. According to Nash Equilibrium theory, bids can be decomposed into two additive parts. For the private information, bidders should shade their bid. For the common uncertainty and public information, bidders should compete a` la Bertrand and bid the expected and realized values respectively. We find that only half of the subjects takes into account the different types of information; for these subjects, the departures from equilibrium predictions occur not only with respect to private information but with respect to public information and common uncertainty as well. A cluster analysis shows that there is heterogeneous behavior regarding the bidding strategies. Estimation of the Cognitive Hierarchy and Cursed Equilibrium models reveals that each model captures some important aspects of the behavior of subjects. However, the disparity of the estimated parameters as we vary the relative size of the three types of information suggests that their predictive power is limited. ❧… Advisors/Committee Members: Carrillo, Juan D. (Committee Chair), Brocas, Isabelle (Committee Member), Alonso, Ricardo (Committee Member).

Subjects/Keywords: experimental economics; economics of information; behavioral models

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Castro, M. (2011). Laboratory studies in the economics of information. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/616794/rec/3727

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Castro, Manuel. “Laboratory studies in the economics of information.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. Accessed December 05, 2020. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/616794/rec/3727.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Castro, Manuel. “Laboratory studies in the economics of information.” 2011. Web. 05 Dec 2020.

Vancouver:

Castro M. Laboratory studies in the economics of information. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2011. [cited 2020 Dec 05]. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/616794/rec/3727.

Council of Science Editors:

Castro M. Laboratory studies in the economics of information. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2011. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/616794/rec/3727


University of Southern California

3. Nilakantan, Rahul. Essays on the economics of non-profit institutions.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2010, University of Southern California

This dissertation examines the economics of non-profit institutions in the television industry and agriculture. We analyze two kinds of non-profit institutions: (1) state owned welfare maximizing television broadcasters, and (2) agricultural cooperatives. With regard to the television industry, our main results are as follows. Broadcasters’ decisions on advertising levels and viewer subscription fees are not always more optimal under mixed economy. Social welfare is always higher under mixed economy except in situations where the state broadcaster carries 0% advertising level (e.g. BBC, France TV etc.), or 100% advertising level. Private broadcaster profits are mostly lower under mixed economy, thereby lending credence to their complaints of suffering due to "anti-competitive" actions of state broadcasters. However, no regulatory action is required unless the state broadcaster carries 0% or 100% advertising level, since lower private broadcaster profits are consistent with higher welfare under mixed economy. The state broadcaster usually makes lower profits than its private counterpart, and sometimes even makes losses while fulfilling its public service broadcasting mandate. However, a welfare argument can be made for the continued existence and operation of loss making state broadcasters.; With regard to agricultural cooperatives, it is the case that in India, most agricultural cooperatives have local area monopoly status in their area of operation (typically a number of villages). One purpose of according local monopoly status to agricultural cooperatives was to rectify the market power imbalance caused by a large number of small farmers facing a few large traders. In light of the findings of the literature on the quantity and quality distorting effects of monopolies, this dissertation investigates the welfare implications of permitting the unregulated operation of monopoly cooperatives in agricultural settings where quality is unobservable and grading capacity is insufficient to grade all available output. We find that for a given cost of quality and a given quality gap between low and high quality output, if the grading capacity is low enough, the co-op member farmer may provide a greater amount of high quality output at a lower price than the equivalent perfectly competitive farmer, leading to higher welfare under monopoly. Advisors/Committee Members: Wilkie, Simon J. (Committee Chair), Nugent, Jeffrey B. (Committee Member), Alonso, Ricardo (Committee Member).

Subjects/Keywords: economics; non-profit institutions

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Nilakantan, R. (2010). Essays on the economics of non-profit institutions. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Southern California. Retrieved from http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/335059/rec/2484

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Nilakantan, Rahul. “Essays on the economics of non-profit institutions.” 2010. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Southern California. Accessed December 05, 2020. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/335059/rec/2484.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Nilakantan, Rahul. “Essays on the economics of non-profit institutions.” 2010. Web. 05 Dec 2020.

Vancouver:

Nilakantan R. Essays on the economics of non-profit institutions. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2010. [cited 2020 Dec 05]. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/335059/rec/2484.

Council of Science Editors:

Nilakantan R. Essays on the economics of non-profit institutions. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Southern California; 2010. Available from: http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15799coll127/id/335059/rec/2484

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