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You searched for +publisher:"University of Manchester" +contributor:("GLOVER-THOMAS, NICOLA N"). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

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University of Manchester

1. Skowron, Paul. Mental Capacity Law and the Justification of Actions against a Person's Expressed Wishes.

Degree: 2018, University of Manchester

When should it be permissible to act against someone's expressed wishes in their best interests? In both political philosophy and legal practice, answers to this question often appeal to the concept of autonomy. Broadly, the idea is that if a person is sufficiently self-governing, then their wishes must prevail; but if they are not, then their wishes need not be respected when promoting whatever is good for them. This thesis analyses both philosophical models of autonomy and the practice of judges in England and Wales when implementing the Mental Capacity Act 2005. With regard to the philosophical models, it finds that, despite claims to the contrary, they do not offer a plausible way of assessing whether someone else is autonomous without appealing to values that are not the person's own. With regard to legal practice, it finds that, although judges speak about 'autonomy' in contradictory ways, a coherent account of when they will find that they must respect a person's expressed wishes can be constructed. This first stage of analysis makes a gulf between 'autonomy' in philosophy and law obvious. When philosophers talk about 'autonomy', they are largely concerned with the person's relationship to themselves. When judges talk about 'autonomy', they are largely concerned with the person's relationship to the world. 'Autonomy' in the philosophical sense cannot justify current practice because it does not deal with the same subject matter. Analysis of mental capacity cases does, however, allow the development of an alternative justification for actions against a person's expressed wishes. This justification lies in an evaluation of the entire situation, not of the person. It is not reducible to any model of autonomy, not even 'relational' models. Taken seriously, this justification requires a reorientation of the ethics of mental capacity law: away from overreliance on relatively few abstract 'principles' and towards articulating the difficulty and complexity of real situations. The thesis offers two papers towards the development of this latter mode. Advisors/Committee Members: GLOVER-THOMAS, NICOLA N, Keywood, Kirsty, Glover-Thomas, Nicola.

Subjects/Keywords: autonomy; mental capacity; humility; Court of Protection; Meno's Paradox; ethics; law; false belief; UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; legal capacity; best interests

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Skowron, P. (2018). Mental Capacity Law and the Justification of Actions against a Person's Expressed Wishes. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Manchester. Retrieved from http://www.manchester.ac.uk/escholar/uk-ac-man-scw:314854

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Skowron, Paul. “Mental Capacity Law and the Justification of Actions against a Person's Expressed Wishes.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Manchester. Accessed July 19, 2019. http://www.manchester.ac.uk/escholar/uk-ac-man-scw:314854.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Skowron, Paul. “Mental Capacity Law and the Justification of Actions against a Person's Expressed Wishes.” 2018. Web. 19 Jul 2019.

Vancouver:

Skowron P. Mental Capacity Law and the Justification of Actions against a Person's Expressed Wishes. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Manchester; 2018. [cited 2019 Jul 19]. Available from: http://www.manchester.ac.uk/escholar/uk-ac-man-scw:314854.

Council of Science Editors:

Skowron P. Mental Capacity Law and the Justification of Actions against a Person's Expressed Wishes. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Manchester; 2018. Available from: http://www.manchester.ac.uk/escholar/uk-ac-man-scw:314854


University of Manchester

2. Gibson, David. The Bioethical Self Under Review: from Intrapsychic to Intersubjective Capacity.

Degree: 2018, University of Manchester

The Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the practice carried out in its name, sit in a precarious place following a House of Lords Select Committee review. The concern with greater implementation of the Act, as signalled by the House of Lords, risks silencing more significant concerns with the Act. On one level, the House of Lords echoes the Law Commission in accepting mental incapacity as an issue which required and requires a legally sanctioned response. On a more nuanced level, the Act invites healthcare practitioners and others to adopt a particular lens for understanding the self or patient, a lens which bioethical discourse may challenge, endorse or ignore. This thesis seeks to critically engage with these two aspects of the Act from both an ethical and practical dimension. A framing of contemporary practice in the context of prevailing historical mental health and bioethical discourses, facilitates the identification of mental capacity as receptive to a narrative bioethics approach. The papers in this thesis challenge the credibility of the MCA’s current understanding of capacity, itself predicated on an inconsistent understanding of the process of assessment. In doing so, this thesis suggests that an understanding of mental capacity grounded in the activity of narrative identity can inform a more nuanced understanding of the self, the assessor of capacity and the bioethicist, which is attentive to the tensions in practice by acknowledging values, relations of power and epistemic limitations. In opposition to any search for the ‘right’ way which offers certainty in dealing with incapacity, this thesis proposes a disposition of humility which resists closure and promotes ethical enquiry. Advisors/Committee Members: GLOVER-THOMAS, NICOLA N, Giordano, Simona, Glover-Thomas, Nicola.

Record DetailsSimilar RecordsGoogle PlusoneFacebookTwitterCiteULikeMendeleyreddit

APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Gibson, D. (2018). The Bioethical Self Under Review: from Intrapsychic to Intersubjective Capacity. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Manchester. Retrieved from http://www.manchester.ac.uk/escholar/uk-ac-man-scw:314858

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Gibson, David. “The Bioethical Self Under Review: from Intrapsychic to Intersubjective Capacity.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Manchester. Accessed July 19, 2019. http://www.manchester.ac.uk/escholar/uk-ac-man-scw:314858.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Gibson, David. “The Bioethical Self Under Review: from Intrapsychic to Intersubjective Capacity.” 2018. Web. 19 Jul 2019.

Vancouver:

Gibson D. The Bioethical Self Under Review: from Intrapsychic to Intersubjective Capacity. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Manchester; 2018. [cited 2019 Jul 19]. Available from: http://www.manchester.ac.uk/escholar/uk-ac-man-scw:314858.

Council of Science Editors:

Gibson D. The Bioethical Self Under Review: from Intrapsychic to Intersubjective Capacity. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Manchester; 2018. Available from: http://www.manchester.ac.uk/escholar/uk-ac-man-scw:314858

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