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You searched for +publisher:"University of Iowa" +contributor:("Yannelis, Nicholas C."). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

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University of Iowa

1. Guo, Huiyi. Essays on mechanism design under non-Bayesian frameworks.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2018, University of Iowa

One important issue in mechanism design theory is to model agents’ behaviors under uncertainty. The classical approach assumes that agents hold commonly known probability assessments towards uncertainty, which has been challenged by economists in many fields. My thesis adopts alternative methods to model agents’ behaviors. The new findings contribute to understanding how the mechanism designer can benefit from agents’ uncertainty aversion and how she should respond to the lack of information on agents’ probability assessments. Chapter 1 of this thesis allows the mechanism designer to introduce ambiguity to the mechanism. Instead of informing agents of the precise payment rule that she commits to, the mechanism designer can tell agents multiple payment rules that she may have committed to. The multiple payment rules are called ambiguous transfers. As agents do not know which rule is chosen by the designer, they are assumed to make decisions based on the worst-case scenario. Under this assumption, this chapter characterizes when the mechanism designer can obtain the first-best outcomes by introducing ambiguous transfers. Compared to the standard approach where the payment rule is unambiguous, first-best mechanism design becomes possible under a broader information structure. Hence, there are cases when the mechanism designer can benefit from introducing ambiguity. Chapter 2 assumes that the mechanism designer does not know agents’ probability assessments about others’ private information. The mechanisms designed to implement the social choice function thus should not depend on the probability assessments, which are called robust mechanisms. Different from the existing robust mechanism design literature where agents are always assumed to act non-cooperatively, this chapter allows them to communicate and form coalitions. This chapter provides necessary and almost sufficient conditions for robustly implementing a social choice function as an equilibrium that is immune to all coalitional deviations. As there are social choice functions that are only implementable with coalitional structures, this chapter provides insights on when agents should be allowed to communicate. As an extension, when the mechanism designer has no information on which coalitions can be formed, this chapter also provides conditions for robust implementation under all coalition patterns. Chapter 3 assumes that agents are not probabilistic about others’ private information. Instead, when they hold ambiguous assessments about others’ … Advisors/Committee Members: Yannelis, Nicholas C. (supervisor).

Subjects/Keywords: ambiguity aversion; coalition; full surplus extraction; implementation; mechanism design; robustness; Economics

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APA (6th Edition):

Guo, H. (2018). Essays on mechanism design under non-Bayesian frameworks. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Iowa. Retrieved from https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/6122

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Guo, Huiyi. “Essays on mechanism design under non-Bayesian frameworks.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Iowa. Accessed September 21, 2020. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/6122.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Guo, Huiyi. “Essays on mechanism design under non-Bayesian frameworks.” 2018. Web. 21 Sep 2020.

Vancouver:

Guo H. Essays on mechanism design under non-Bayesian frameworks. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Iowa; 2018. [cited 2020 Sep 21]. Available from: https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/6122.

Council of Science Editors:

Guo H. Essays on mechanism design under non-Bayesian frameworks. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Iowa; 2018. Available from: https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/6122


University of Iowa

2. He, Wei. Essays in economic theory.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2016, University of Iowa

This thesis is composed of three chapters. Chapter 1 considers the existence of equilibria in games with complete information, where players may have non-ordered and discontinuous preferences. Chapter 2 studies the issues on the existence of pure and behavioral strategy equilibria in games with incomplete information and discontinuous payoffs. We consider the standard setting with Bayesian preferences as well as the case in which players may face ambiguity. Chapter 3 extends the classical results on the Walras-core existence and equivalence to an ambiguous asymmetric information economy, where agents maximize maximin expected utilities (MEU). These results are based on the papers He and Yannelis (2014, 2015a,b,c, 2016a,b). In the first chapter, we propose the condition of "continuous inclusion property" to handle the difficulty of discontinuous payoffs in various general equilibrium and game theory models. Such discontinuities arise naturally in economic situations, including auction, price competition of firms and also patent races. Based on the continuous inclusion property, we establish the equilibrium existence result in a very general framework with discontinuous payoffs. On one hand, this condition is sufficiently general from the methodological point of view, as it unifies almost all special conditions proposed in the literature. On the other hand, our condition is also potentially useful from the realistic point of view, as it could be applied to deal with many economic models which cannot be studied before because of the presence of the discontinuity. In the second chapter, I study the existence problem of pure and behavioral strategy equilibria in discontinuous games with incomplete information. The framework of games with incomplete information is standard as in the literature, except for that we allow players' payoffs to be discontinuous. We illustrate by examples that the Bayesian equilibria may not exist in such games and the previous results are not applicable to handle this problem. We propose some general conditions to retain the existence of both pure strategy and behavioral strategy Bayesian equilibrium, and show that our condition is tight. In addition, we study the equilibrium existence problem in discontinuous games under incomplete information and ambiguity, and show that the maximin framework solves the equilibrium existence issue without introducing any additional condition. In the last chapter, I study a general equilibrium model with incomplete information by adopting the maximin expected utilities. The model is powerful enough to describe the behaviors of risk averse agents that cannot be explained by the standard assumption of subjective expected utilities. I use this new formulation to extend many classical results in general equilibrium theory by incorporating ambiguity into the model. In addition, the desirable incentive compatibility property is shown in our model with maximin expected utilities, while this property will typically fail in… Advisors/Committee Members: Yannelis, Nicholas C. (supervisor).

Subjects/Keywords: publicabstract; Ambiguity; Game Theory; General Equilibrium Theory; Incomplete Information; Economics

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

He, W. (2016). Essays in economic theory. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Iowa. Retrieved from https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3098

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

He, Wei. “Essays in economic theory.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Iowa. Accessed September 21, 2020. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3098.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

He, Wei. “Essays in economic theory.” 2016. Web. 21 Sep 2020.

Vancouver:

He W. Essays in economic theory. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Iowa; 2016. [cited 2020 Sep 21]. Available from: https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3098.

Council of Science Editors:

He W. Essays in economic theory. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Iowa; 2016. Available from: https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3098

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