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You searched for +publisher:"University of Colorado" +contributor:("Graham J. Oddie"). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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University of Colorado

1. Marks, Tucker Allen. Drones, Intention, and Psychological Harm: An Argument for Restraint.

Degree: MA, Philosophy, 2015, University of Colorado

The use of uninhabited aerial vehicles, or drones, by the United States military has drawn increasing criticism in recent years. Despite this opposition, drones seem to have several advantages. They can reach areas that would not accessible to human soldiers, can survey a location for hours at a time, and are thought to be more precise than other weapons. However, drones have been shown to cause significant fear in civilian populations; here, I argue that this psychological harm makes the use of drones impermissible in many cases. Relevant to this conclusion is the role of intention. I consider several theories of civilian targeting, and argue that we should accept an account based in liability or desert rather than one that depends on intention. If we accept this sort of view, we seem to get more intuitive and more consistent results in a variety of cases, including cases involving drones. Advisors/Committee Members: Alastair Norcross, Chris Heathwood, Graham J. Oddie.

Subjects/Keywords: Double Effect; Drone; Intention; Liability; Military Ethics; War; Ethics and Political Philosophy; Philosophy of Science

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APA (6th Edition):

Marks, T. A. (2015). Drones, Intention, and Psychological Harm: An Argument for Restraint. (Masters Thesis). University of Colorado. Retrieved from http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/46

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Marks, Tucker Allen. “Drones, Intention, and Psychological Harm: An Argument for Restraint.” 2015. Masters Thesis, University of Colorado. Accessed February 18, 2019. http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/46.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Marks, Tucker Allen. “Drones, Intention, and Psychological Harm: An Argument for Restraint.” 2015. Web. 18 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Marks TA. Drones, Intention, and Psychological Harm: An Argument for Restraint. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Colorado; 2015. [cited 2019 Feb 18]. Available from: http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/46.

Council of Science Editors:

Marks TA. Drones, Intention, and Psychological Harm: An Argument for Restraint. [Masters Thesis]. University of Colorado; 2015. Available from: http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/46


University of Colorado

2. Carrick, Michael Robert. Taking Luck Seriously: A Critique of Enoch’s Third-Factor Pre-Established Harmony Explanation.

Degree: MA, Philosophy, 2016, University of Colorado

In this paper I criticize David Enoch’s purported solution to what he terms the epistemic challenge to robust moral realism. The epistemic challenge is a challenge aimed at the robust moral realist to explain how there could be a close enough correlation between normative truths and normative beliefs for humans to have knowledge of the normative truths given that there cannot be a causal relation between the normative truths and the normative beliefs. Enoch suggests a third-factor pre-established harmony between normative beliefs and normative truths as an explanation of the correlation; this explanation will be examined in detail below. Enoch’s solution, I contend, is unsatisfying for two reasons. First, his explanation relies on a miraculous correlation; second, it violates the sensitivity condition for knowledge. Advisors/Committee Members: Chris Heathwood, Michael Huemer, Graham J. Oddie.

Subjects/Keywords: David Enoch; Metaethics; Robust Moral Realism; Safety; Sensitivity; Taking Morality Seriously; Epistemology; Ethics and Political Philosophy

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APA (6th Edition):

Carrick, M. R. (2016). Taking Luck Seriously: A Critique of Enoch’s Third-Factor Pre-Established Harmony Explanation. (Masters Thesis). University of Colorado. Retrieved from http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/51

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Carrick, Michael Robert. “Taking Luck Seriously: A Critique of Enoch’s Third-Factor Pre-Established Harmony Explanation.” 2016. Masters Thesis, University of Colorado. Accessed February 18, 2019. http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/51.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Carrick, Michael Robert. “Taking Luck Seriously: A Critique of Enoch’s Third-Factor Pre-Established Harmony Explanation.” 2016. Web. 18 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Carrick MR. Taking Luck Seriously: A Critique of Enoch’s Third-Factor Pre-Established Harmony Explanation. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. University of Colorado; 2016. [cited 2019 Feb 18]. Available from: http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/51.

Council of Science Editors:

Carrick MR. Taking Luck Seriously: A Critique of Enoch’s Third-Factor Pre-Established Harmony Explanation. [Masters Thesis]. University of Colorado; 2016. Available from: http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/51


University of Colorado

3. Renninger, Rebecca Moore. Action, Agents, and Extended Cognition.

Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2016, University of Colorado

Some authors in philosophy of mind have sought to defend a theory according to which cognitive processing and/or mental states substantively extend beyond the bounds of an individual’s body. The Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) asserts that the vehicles of cognition and mental states exist at least partly outside of the human thinker. This dissertation introduces and defends one new objection to EMT. My focus here will be on what I call the agency problem for the extended mind, which asserts that EMT cannot account for intentional action or human agency. I shall argue that EMT cannot explain genuine intentional actions, the ability to perform which is a central part of our identity as human persons. If we believe EMT, then we give up our last grasp of causal sovereignty when it comes to our actions. I use these arguments to motivate a conservative view of the mind as an embodied, but not substantively extended, entity. Advisors/Committee Members: Robert D. Rupert, Carol Cleland, Graham J. Oddie, Iskra N. Fileva, Clayton H. Lewis.

Subjects/Keywords: Action Theory; Agency; Embodiment; Extended Cognition; Extended Mind; Philosophy; Philosophy of Mind; Theory and Philosophy

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APA (6th Edition):

Renninger, R. M. (2016). Action, Agents, and Extended Cognition. (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Colorado. Retrieved from http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/55

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Renninger, Rebecca Moore. “Action, Agents, and Extended Cognition.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Colorado. Accessed February 18, 2019. http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/55.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Renninger, Rebecca Moore. “Action, Agents, and Extended Cognition.” 2016. Web. 18 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Renninger RM. Action, Agents, and Extended Cognition. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Colorado; 2016. [cited 2019 Feb 18]. Available from: http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/55.

Council of Science Editors:

Renninger RM. Action, Agents, and Extended Cognition. [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Colorado; 2016. Available from: http://scholar.colorado.edu/phil_gradetds/55

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