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You searched for +publisher:"University of Arizona" +contributor:("Noussair, Charles"). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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University of Arizona

1. Bose, Devdeepta. Essays on Fairness, Cooperation, and Coordination .

Degree: 2018, University of Arizona

The primary aim of this dissertation is to identify channels through which economic agents use social preferences such as proclivities towards fairness and inequality to make choices in one-shot and repeated game environments. I am particularly interested in economic situations of strategic interaction that support multiple equilibria. When faced with such situations, economic agents often coordinate on a set of salient outcomes that are smaller than the set of all possible equilibrium outcomes. There is a lack of broad consensus on what makes certain payoff outcomes salient in the minds of agents, while others are ignored. The human decision making involved in this equilibrium selection process interests me, because a better understanding of this mechanism can help us make sharper predictions about the plausible outcomes we should expect to see. I believe models that incorporate social preferences, learning, and bounded rationality are likely to make better predictions in these scenarios than models that assume economic agents are infinitely rational. To examine the questions of how economic agents go about the equilibrium selection process, I use a combination of theory, computation, and laboratory experiments. Each of these three approaches has unique benefits, and complements each other. 1) Economic theory allows us to focus on a specific problem and prove general theorems that hold in all situations that the assumptions allow. Specifically, I am interested in theoretical models that allow for a combination of personal and social preferences for economic agents that weight notions of efficiency, selfishness, and fairness in personal and joint payoff outcomes when undertaking the equilibrium selection process. 2) Computation allows us to run simulations of models that may not have closed-form solutions, or ones that are difficult to grasp analytically. 3) Experiments allow us to test whether outcomes that agents arrive at after undergoing the equilibrium selection process are context dependent, and change based on the nature of the information available to them. They help examine human behavior in a controlled environment, allowing us to focus on the specific aspect of the decision making process in which we are interested. The combination of theory, computation, and experiments helps us look into the black box of the decision making of economic agents undertaking the equilibrium selection process. Advisors/Committee Members: Romero, Julian N (advisor), Noussair, Charles (committeemember), Blume, Andreas (committeemember), Dufwenberg, Martin (committeemember).

Subjects/Keywords: Antecedents; Equilibrium Selection; Repeated Games; Social Preferences

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APA (6th Edition):

Bose, D. (2018). Essays on Fairness, Cooperation, and Coordination . (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Arizona. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10150/628424

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Bose, Devdeepta. “Essays on Fairness, Cooperation, and Coordination .” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Arizona. Accessed February 21, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/628424.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Bose, Devdeepta. “Essays on Fairness, Cooperation, and Coordination .” 2018. Web. 21 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Bose D. Essays on Fairness, Cooperation, and Coordination . [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Arizona; 2018. [cited 2019 Feb 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10150/628424.

Council of Science Editors:

Bose D. Essays on Fairness, Cooperation, and Coordination . [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Arizona; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10150/628424


University of Arizona

2. Weigel, Collin. Essays in Experimental Economics .

Degree: 2016, University of Arizona

Human behavior is incredibly complex, but it drives how our society functions. Economists have recently taken greater interest in understanding the decisions that people make, rather than prescribing optimal actions to take. The first two chapters of this dissertation contribute to the field of behavioral economics by using incentivized and unambiguous settings to determine if people base their decisions, in part, on sunk costs. Though standard economic theory would insist that sunk costs do not matter, I find that, at least in small stakes, sunk costs have about 10% the effect on decisions as profit does. Further, I find that sunk effort, even small amounts, can affect decisions, making one more likely to continue along the course of action for which they committed the effort. My third chapter surveys people's perceptions of contributions to judicial campaigns. I find that the distinction between signed and unsigned solicitations from a judge does not produce significantly different expected outcomes. Also, I find no evidence of a difference in the expected fines based on the race and gender of the judge. Advisors/Committee Members: Reynolds, Stanley (advisor), Reynolds, Stanley (committeemember), Dufwenberg, Martin (committeemember), Noussair, Charles (committeemember), Stegeman, Mark (committeemember).

Subjects/Keywords: Experimental; Economics; Behavioral

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Weigel, C. (2016). Essays in Experimental Economics . (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Arizona. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10150/620853

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Weigel, Collin. “Essays in Experimental Economics .” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Arizona. Accessed February 21, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/620853.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Weigel, Collin. “Essays in Experimental Economics .” 2016. Web. 21 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Weigel C. Essays in Experimental Economics . [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Arizona; 2016. [cited 2019 Feb 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10150/620853.

Council of Science Editors:

Weigel C. Essays in Experimental Economics . [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Arizona; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10150/620853


University of Arizona

3. Nguyen, Quyen. Strategic Communication Games: Theory and Experiments .

Degree: 2016, University of Arizona

This dissertation focuses on the topic of information design and information exchange between economic agents theoretically and experimentally. In the first section of my dissertation, I revisit the classic problem of product information revelation using a new theoretical framework developed by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). In the second section of my dissertation, I design an experimental test of the predictions of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), an influential paper that has provided the theoretical foundations for many models in the information design literature. In the last section, I look at the problem of disclosing bias when communicating to a heterogeneous audience. A firm's incentive to provide product information is a topic of central importance in industrial organization theory. In the first section of my dissertation titled "Controlling Information to Influence Consumer Beliefs," I take a fresh look at the question of how much information firms are willing to provide consumers using the information design framework developed in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). In my model, I show that even without the ability to price discriminate, a firm can influence a rational consumer to change her beliefs and extract full expected consumer surplus. In contrast to the results of earlier papers such as Lewis and Sappington (1996) and Johnson and Myatt (2006), the firm chooses to provide partial information in equilibrium. In addition, I show that competition is beneficial in the sense that it forces firms to reveal information in order to differentiate themselves from one another and avoid fierce competition. Persuasion commands a huge share of economic resources and is a topic of great importance to economists. In the model of persuasion by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), the sender can influence the receiver's belief and therefore the receiver's action given the power to manipulate the information environment. The question of whether in reality people can learn to influence other people's prior beliefs optimally by changing the information environment as predicted by Kamenica and Gentzkow's model remains unanswered. The second section of my dissertation, titled "Bayesian Persuasion: Evidence from the Laboratory" attempts to answer this question using data generated from a series of laboratory experiments. I find that whether subjects can learn to implement the optimal persuasion strategy depends on the number of feasible strategies available to them as well as feedback about the effectiveness of each strategy. In this section, I provide data to test the theory as well as a novel experimental design that can be implemented in testing other information design theories. The final chapter of my thesis looks at the problem of communicating to a heterogeneous audience. I find that when a sender communicates with a heterogeneous audience consisting of proponents and opponents, it is beneficial for him to not disclose his bias. For example, if a conservative politician wishes to win the support of both conservatives and liberals,… Advisors/Committee Members: Blume, Andreas (advisor), Blume, Andreas (committeemember), Noussair, Charles (committeemember), Walker, Mark A. (committeemember), Plan, Asaf (committeemember).

Subjects/Keywords: Economics

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Nguyen, Q. (2016). Strategic Communication Games: Theory and Experiments . (Doctoral Dissertation). University of Arizona. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10150/621306

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Nguyen, Quyen. “Strategic Communication Games: Theory and Experiments .” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Arizona. Accessed February 21, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/621306.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Nguyen, Quyen. “Strategic Communication Games: Theory and Experiments .” 2016. Web. 21 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Nguyen Q. Strategic Communication Games: Theory and Experiments . [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Arizona; 2016. [cited 2019 Feb 21]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10150/621306.

Council of Science Editors:

Nguyen Q. Strategic Communication Games: Theory and Experiments . [Doctoral Dissertation]. University of Arizona; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10150/621306

.